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Abstract
Abstract
For more than a decade there has been an economic need to mitigate the negative effects of
the air transport industry's innate sensitivity to cyclical developments as well as the effects of
its inherent lack of substantial profits. The past 20 years were additionally marked by a
change in policy that prompted various countries to liberalise and privatise their civil
passenger air transportation industry. At the same time, airlines' business ambitions became
more global, tapping into markets beyond countries' or continents' main gateways. All three
aspects started to change the pattern of airline competition and required new business models.
Key features of airlines' novel business models are geographic expansion and thus market
development. Global expansion strategies and market development activities in passenger air
transportation are, however, not easily and fluidly executable. The airline industry is, to some
extent, still nationally regulated, thus impeding passenger airlines from fully participating in
the global market-scene and from freely entering promising geographies. Concomitantly, the
competitive landscape in which scheduled passenger airlines operate changed drastically, with
travel value chains occasionally undergoing revolutionary transformations on both the supply
and the demand side. Finally, the air transport service reveals several peculiarities that impact
its production, distribution and consummation. These characteristics have inspired the
execution of novel forms of competitive strategies that are described and critically discussed
in this dissertation.
Within this context, a main root cause for passenger airline partnerships appears to be its
continued regulation and the circumvention thereof through the horizontal joining of forces,
thus emulating concentration tendencies that have long been a fixture in other globalising
industries. Consequently, horizontal interairline partnerships were induced and identified as a
key competitive device with which to weather the challenges of the new air transport rivalry
structures, the increasingly deregulated environment, and the impediments of sustained
market regulation.
All major airlines are now involved in some type of horizontal collaboration. The spectrum of
these linkages is wide and ranges from loose, unattached, operative agreements to long-term,
far-reaching, strategic ones, the most salient forms and instruments of which are thoroughly
scrutinised in this dissertation. This dissertation additionally presents the general core
inducing economic drivers of carrier interrelationship, which are cost reduction, revenue
generation and corporate power considerations. While these aspects offer a multitude of
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possible partnership forms and instruments, the bulk of airline linkages, however, is presently
constituted of joint revenue generation and, consequently, jointly pursued marketing and
market expansion goals. In view of these causes, the present dissertation engages in a
profound discussion of the rationales behind interairline partnerships, their likely evolution
and effects on management practice.
Essentially, the key importance of airline partnerships in meeting basic economic imperatives
on the one hand, while circumventing persistent regulation on the other, questions the
sustainability of incumbent carriers' current business models. There are clear indications that
a structured sequence of events in establishing interairline linkages is a key success factor for
horizontal airline partnerships. However, the empirical examination of contemporary
partnerships' governance structures and managerial practice strongly points to a lack of ample
tools with which to establish airline partnerships, select the appropriate match between
alliance goals and intensity, and govern alliances during their entire life-cycles. This
drawback seems particularly unacceptable in view of the urgent requirement for more
appropriate managerial practice in today's discontinuous air transport business environment,
and speaks loudly of the need for a framework with which to enhance airline partnership
output. Most ideally, a coherent, structured sequence of events should be followed in
partnership formation, organisational set-up and management in order to bring an alliance to
fruition.
On this basis, the establishment of a collaboration governance organisation, adequately
mirroring the specific partnership type and meeting the specific demands of all partners
involved, is equally identified and described as a fundamental success driver in this
dissertation. Further structural, organisational and functional issues thereafter need to be
considered in order to transform the joint business venture of two horizontally allied carriers
into a venture for mutual success. The most essential of these are introduced in this
dissertation.
Synergy plays a central role in this context. Synergy, as the overreaching intention and result
of working together towards a common goal, must be anchored as a prime objective of all
forms of partnership activities. Synergy through interfirm linkages can be derived from
various collaborative areas and is greatly influenced by both internal and external factors. One
gauge for synergy, in particular for the transformation of synergy potentials into synergy
effects, is partnership intensity. The measurement of partnership intensity can be used to
perpetually monitor the benefits of partnership activities. At the same time, inconsistent or
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uneven partnership intensity can indicate the existence of dissynergies or frailties in the
alliance. The underlying theories of collaborative synergy generation, its main drivers and
impediments, with particular reference to horizontal partnerships of scheduled passenger
airlines, are explored in this dissertation.
In recognition of the theoretical and practical background of airline partnerships and the
acknowledged problems associated with their establishment and operation, the present
dissertation proposes a novel model dynamically supporting the quest for synergy in airline
interrelationships. Incorporating the goals of synergy generation and its continual
measurement in interairline partnerships, the synergy audit is designed as a dynamic
managerial tool. The synergy audit functions as a recurring device for unleashing all the
positive partnership benefits of collaborative scope and width. It aids airline alliance
management in transforming the desired benefits of partnership activities - synergy
potentials - into real, tangible synergy effects during the entire partnership life cycle. The tool
A.PIE (Airline Partnership Intensity Evaluator) supports the synergy audit and, which
idiosyncratic to the airline industry, multidimensionally applies the deduced relationship of
partnership intensity and synergy to the most salient partnership areas and functions.
The present dissertation shapes understanding of the true drivers and complexities of today's
airline partnerships. It proposes a circular, multidimensional and dynamic model, thus
attempting to enhance the set-up, performance and output of horizontal airline collaboration.
From this point of view it endeavours to fill the gap identified in contemporary airline
partnership management and practice.
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Vir meer as 'n dekade al is daar 'n ekonomiese behoefte om die negatiewe effekte van die
lugvervoerdiens se inherente sensitiwiteit ten opsigte van sikliese ontwikkelinge asook die
effekte van sy inherente profytgebrek te verminder. Die afgelope 20 jaar is ook gekenmerk
deur 'n beleidsverandering wat verskeie lande beweeg het om hul burgerlike
lugvervoerindustrie van passasiers vry te stel en te privati seer. Samevallend hiermee het
lugrederye se besigheidsambisies meer globaal geraak en markte ver buite lande of kontinente
se hoofpoorte ontgin. Al drie hierdie aspekte het die patroon van lugdienste se kompetisie
begin verander en het nuwe besigheidsmodelle vereis.
Sleuteleienskappe van lugrederye se unieke besigheidsmodelle is geografiese uitbreiding en
dus markontwikkeling. Globale uitbreidingstrategiee and markontwikkelingsaktiwiteite in die
passasierslugdienste is egter nie maklik en soepel uitvoerbaar nie. In 'n sekere mate word die
lugvervoerindustrie steeds op 'n nasionale vlak gereguleer, wat die passasierlugrederye dus
van volle deelname in die globale markomgewing en van die vrye toetreding tot belowende
werelddele weerhou Aanvullend hiertoe het die mededingingsomgewing waarin
geskeduleerde passasierlugdienste funksioneer, drasties verander en het reis-waardekettings
soms revolusionere transformasies op beide die aanbod- en aanvraagkant ondergaan. Laastens
openbaar die lugvervoerdienste verskeie eienaardighede wat 'n invloed het op die produksie,
distribusie en uitvoering daarvan. Hierdie aspekte het die uitvoering van unieke vorms van
kompetisiestrategiee geinspireer wat in hierdie proefskrifbeskryf en krities bespreek word.
Binne hierdie konteks blyk 'n hoof en kern beweegrede vir passasierslugdiensvennootskappe
die volgehoue regulasie en die omseiling daarvan deur die horisontale verbinding van kragte
te wees, in .navolging dus, van die konsentrasietendense wat al lank in ander globaliserende
industriee voorkom. Gevolglik is horisontale onderlinge lugdiensvennootskappe onderneem
en geidentifiseer as 'n sleutelmedingingsmiddel waarmee die uitdagings van die nuwe
lugvervoerwedyweringstrukture, die toenemende dereguleerde omgewing en die hindernisse
van volgehou markregulasie aangepak kon word.
AIle belangrike lugrederye is tans in een of ander tipe horisontale samewerking betrokke. Die
spektrurn van hierdie skakelinge is wyd en strek van los, ongebonde, werksooreenkomste tot
langtermyn, verreikende en strategiese ooreenkomste waarvan die mees kenmerkende vorms
en instrumente deeglik in hierdie proefskrif ondersoek word. Daarbenewens presenteer hierdie
proefskrif die algemeen belangrikste ekonomiese redes vir onderlinge vervoerverhoudings
wat kostevermindering, inkomstegenerering en kooperatiewe magsoorwegings IS. Terwyl
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hierdie aspekte 'n groot hoeveelheid moontlike vennootskapsvorms en -instrumente bied,
bestaan die grootste gedeelte van lugdienskakelings tans egter uit gesamentlike
inkomstegenerering en, gevolglik, die gesamentlike strewe na mark en
markuitbreidingsdoelstellings. In die lig van hierdie redes, ondemeem die huidige proefskrif
'n deeglike bespreking van die beweegredes agter onderlinge lugdiensvennootskappe, hul
waarskynlike verloop en hul uitwerking op bestuurspraktyk.
Wesenlik Ie die sleutelbelang van lugrederyvennootskappe m, aan die een hand, die
voldoening aan basiese ekonomiese verpligtinge terwyl dit, aan die ander kant, blywende
regulasies omseil, die bevraagtekening van die lewensvatbaarheid van bestaande lugdienste se
huidige besigheidsmodelle. Daar is duidelike aanduidings dat 'n gestruktureerde
opeenvolging van gebeure in die vestiging van onderlinge lugdiensskakelings, 'n
sleutelsuksesfaktor vir horisontale lugdiensvennootskappe is. Die empiriese ondersoek van
hedendaagse vennootskapbestuur en -bestuurspraktyk dui sterk op 'n gebrek aan voldoende
instrumente waarmee lugdiensvennootskappe gevestig, die toepaslike koppeling tussen
bondgenootskapdoelstellings en -intensiteit gekies en bondegenootskappe tydens hul
volledige lewensduur bestuur kan word. Hierdie nadeel blyk spesifiek onaanvaarbaar in die
lig van die dringende behoefte aan meer toepaslike bestuurspraktyk in die hedendaagse
onreelmatige vervoerbesigheidsomgewing en spreek duidelik oor die behoefte aan 'n
raamwerk om die lugrederyvennootskap se prestasie te verbeter. In die gunstigste geval sou 'n
samehangende, gestruktureerde opeenvolging van gebeure in vennootskapvorming,
organisatoriese vestiging en bestuur gevolg word om 'n bondgenootskap tot vervulling te
bring.
Op hierdie basis word in hierdie proefskrif die formasie van 'n samewerkingbestuurs-
organisasie wat die spesifieke vennootskapstipe weerspieel en wat aan die spesifieke vereistes
van alle betrokke vennote voldoen, beide as 'n fundamentele dryfveer vir sukses
geidentifiseer en beskryf. Verdere strukturele, organisatoriese en funksionele kwessies moet
daarna ondersoek word om die gesamentlike besigheidsondememing van twee horisontaal
verbonde lugvaartrnaatskappye in 'n ondememing vir wederkerige sukses te transformeer.
Die mees wesenlike van hierdie word in hierdie proefskrif bekendgeste1.
In hierdie konteks speel sinergie 'n belangrike ro1. Sinergie as die uiteindelike bedoeling en
resultaat van samewerking tot 'n gemeenskaplike doeleinde, moet as 'n primere doelstelling
van alle vorme van vennootskaplike aktiwiteite geanker wees. Sinergie deur onderlinge
maatskappyskakelings kan van verskeie samewerkingsareas afgelei word en word beduidend
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deur beide interne en eksterne faktore bemvloed. Een maatstaf vir sinergie, spesifiek vir die
transformasie van sinergiepotensiaal in sinergie-effekte, is venootskapsintensiteit. Die meting
van vennootskapsintensiteit kan gebruik word om die voordele van vennootskapsaktwiteite
voordurend te monitor. Gelyktydig, kan inkonsekwente of ongelyke vennootskapsintensiteit
die bestaan van dissinergiee of swakhede in die bondgenootskap aandui. Die onderliggende
teoriee van die generering van samewerkingsinergie, die belangrikste dryfvere en hindernisse,
met spesifieke verwysing na horisontale vennootskappe van geskeduleerde passasierslug-
dienste word in hierdie proefskrif ondersoek.
In erkenning van die teoretiese en praktiese agtergrond van lugrederyvennootskappe en die
erkende probleme wat met hul vorming en funksionering geassosieer word, stel die huidige
proefskrif 'n unieke model voor wat die soektog na sinergie in onderlinge lugdiensverhou-
dings dinamies ondersteun. Die sinergie-oudit, wat die doelstellings van sinergiegenerering en
die voortdurende meting in onderlinge lugdiensvennootskappe bevat, is as 'n dinamiese
bestuursinstrument ontwerp. Die sinergie-oudit funksioneer as 'n terugkerende middel om al
die positiewe venootskapsvoordele van samewerkingsdraagwydte en -reikwydte vry te stel.
Dit help lugdiensbondgenootskapbestuur om die gewenste voordele van vennootskaps-
aktwiteite - sinergiepotensiaal - in egte, tasbare sinergie-effekte tydens die hele
vennootskapslewensiklus te transformeer. Die instrument A.PIE (Airline Partnership Intensity
Evaluator) ondersteun die sinergie-oudit en, eie aan die lugdiensindustrie, pas dit die afgeleide
verhouding van vennootskapsintensiteit en -sinergie multidimensioneel op die mees
kenmerkende vennootskapsareas en -funksies toe
Hierdie proefskrif gee vorm aan die begrip van die ware dryfvere en kompleksiteite van die
hedendaagse lugrederyvennootskappe. Dit stel 'n sirkelvormige, multidimensionele en
dinamiese model voor en probeer dus die opstelling, uitvoering en resultaat van horisontale
lugdienssamewerking te verbeter. Vanaf hierdie gesigspunt pro beer dit om die gerdentifiseer-
de gaping in die hedendaagse lugdiensvennootskapsbestuur en -praktyk te vul,
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Introduction
1 Introduction
1.1 Background to the Study
Of all the significant business trends that have marked the past zo" century, none seems more
important than the emergence of the globalised economy. The development of many
industries has been marked by a transformation toward bigger arenas and spreading into
regions - formerly unattractive or inaccessible - by way of internal and/or external growth.
Globalisation mandates cross-border business partnerships that, concurrently, become
absolutely essential for strategy. The scholarly community has recognised this fact by
thoroughly examining interfirm linkages, taking cues from different schools of thought and
applying various scientific approaches. While the literature on inter-organisational
relationship formation is fragmented, company linkages can be justified from diverse
theoretical backgrounds, with several disciplines contributing to the field (see Contractor and
Lorange, 1988, Koza and Lewin, 1998, Gomes-Casseres, 1998, Khanna, 1998, Parkhe, 2000,
Dyer et al., 2001). The fragmented nature of the research reflects the multifaceted character of
inter-organisational relationship formation and governance. A wealth of research has,
however, been conducted in the fields of motives, intentions, and objectives of partnership
action (for an overview, see Barringer and Harrison, 2000).
A business partnership is commonly defined as any voluntarily initiated collaborative
agreement between firms that involves exchange, sharing, or co-development, and it can
include contributions by partners offering capital, technology, or firm-specific assets (see
Gulati and Singh, 1998). The purpose of such a combined action is to enhance the competitive
position of each partner (see Bleeke and Ernst, 1991, Spekman et aI., 1998). Currently,
interfirm partnerships have become the conditio sine qua non for the survival of many
companies in the globalised economy. Formal and informal co-operation relating to the
production and the diffusion of scientific and technical knowledge, and the creation of
technology and services has consequently emerged as a widespread phenomenon (see Hamel
et aI., 1989).
The growth of international and domestic interfirm agreements represented a significant and
novel development in the 1980s (see Perlmutter and Heenan, 1986). In the then hyper-
competitive environment, with increasing globalisation and interweaving of national
economies, firms faced difficulties in obtaining all the resources needed to develop and
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sustain their competitive advantage, while simultaneously trying to build new ones (see
Devlin and Bleackley, 1988, Lei and Slocum, 1992, Backhaus and Meyer, 1993, Moss
Kanter, 1994, Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995, Dyer and Singh, 1998, Harrison et al.,
2001). New technologies, products, services and know-how were thereafter less and less the
result of isolated efforts by the lone inventor, or an individual firm. They were increasingly
created, developed, brought to the market and subsequently diffused through complex inter-
organisational relationships and linkages. Simultaneously, collaborative arrangements were
used as an entry mode by firms seeking to invest in economies adapting to the realities of
market-based competition and accommodating the shift towards more consumer power (see
Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2000). Unbound collaborative projects, joint ventures, strategic
alliances and various other forms of network relationships gained pace and expanded in size
as well as in scope.
In the latter years of the 20th century, the term "alliance and merger mania" was created to
describe the trend towards the ever-increasing number and size of cross-border collaborations.
The merger of Daimler Benz and Chrysler, creating DaimlerChrysler, South African
Breweries' take-overs in Europe and North America, the merging of hardware giants Compaq
and Hewlett Packard and media companies AOL and Time Warner, and Vodafone's
aggressive global expansion strategy are just some examples of firms seeking enlarged market
exposure and, eventually, leadership by consequently following integration and collaboration
strategies.
The airline industry has been a dominant contributor to and emblem of globalisation. Its
surging growth, physical and financial availability to an increasing part of the world's
population as well as its technical prowess have shrunk the planet, linking people and markets
more closely (see Oum and Taylor, 1995, Hanlon, 1996, Pompel, 1998, Doganis, 2001). Air
transport lubricates both trade and foreign investment across borders and facilitates the
globalisation of production and distribution systems. By its very nature it is cosmopolitan.
Ironically, however, one of the last industries to fully participate in this onrushing
globalisation has been the airline industry itself (see Button, 1997). Although individual
carriers have built worldwide route systems, and the trend towards expanding international
route structures is an inevitable response to the underlying network economics of the airline
sector, they have not kept up with other industries in forming close cross-border business ties
(see Ombelet, 2001, Baker, The global Groupings, 2001, Doganis, 2001).
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Despite being an increasingly deregulated industry on a national and regional scale,
governmental restrictions and limitations set by international air service agreements deter
airlines from participating in global concentration (see Lyth, 1996, Thierer, 1998, Turnbull,
1999).Nations generally require airlines based within their borders to be majority-owned and
controlled by their own citizens (see Oum et al., 1993, Pompl, 1998). Many countries regard
"their" airlines as sacrosanct extensions of the national flag, this viewpoint being fuelled by
the desire not to cede control of the country's airspace. Furthermore, restrictive air service
agreements between nations often restrain airlines from operating where and how they want
(see Glisson et al., 1996). The airline industry continues to operate according to a national
partisan model that has long since been abandoned elsewhere in business.
However, deregulation has generally opened a window of opportunity for airlines (see, e.g.,
Button, 1996, Niejahr, 1998, Bittlinger, 1998, United States Department of Transportation,
International Aviation Developments, Second Report, 2000). With the air transport
environment moving progressively from strict regulation to more liberalised markets -
although different in each of the major geographies - it is not surprising that collaborations
feature strongly in many airlines' attempts to expand into new markets and to offset country-
based disadvantages, while keeping within the remaining limitations regarding access,
ownership and control (see Bissessur and Alamdari, 1998, Vander Kraats, 2000, Doganis,
2001). Factoring in the potential economies of scale, scope and density, there is a clear
driving force behind interairline co-operation (see Contractor and Lorange, 1988, Gulati,
1988). The likely collaborative benefits to be realised have increased substantially as aviation
markets have been liberalised. Without the tight historic constraints on flight frequency and
fares, market share gains through network expansion have made interairline partnerships
inevitable - if within the confines of continued regulatory impediments.
Currently, every major international airline is tied up in various intercompany co-operations
of various kinds for different purposes, reflecting the flexibility and dynamics of the air
transport sector and suggesting a certain alliance-sophistication (see Parkhe, 2000, Baker,
2001, Ombelet, 2001). Breaking down the basic motivations for creating alliances to a simple
scope, the primary objective is synergy, also in the sense of learning, adding value to an
existing transport service in a competitive context and to circumvent continued limitations
through regulatory constraints (see Contractor and Lorange, 1988, Kogut, 1989,Hamel, 1991,
Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995, Harrison et al., 2001). In value chain partnerships,
airlines with different, but complementary skills link their capabilities and competencies to
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 Introduction
create value for the ultimate users (see Moss Kanter, 1994, p. 98). Within this framework,
forms of interairline collaborations vary between loose joint marketing agreements, franchise
and exchange in equity, or other, closer, configurations of cross-ownership. Further examples
of inter-organisational linkages are alliances between passenger carriers and hotel groups, tour
operators, travel agencies, or car rental companies vertically collaborating within discrete
parts of the travel value chain (see Pompl, 1998). On the other hand, horizontal relationships
describe co-operations within the same industry, between enterprises rendering equivalent
services, producing or offering identical products and are predominately focused on access to
new markets and the extension of route networks, i.e. to gain and distribute more air traffic
(see Bronder, 1992, Lutz, 1993). Furthermore, partners expect to take advantage of each
other's expertise and technology to achieve and exploit possible areas of synergy. With
airlines being highly sensitive to cyclical developments and having immense fixed costs,
interairline partnerships are evidently able to redress these constraints (see Tarry, 1999).
Consequently, horizontal co-operations, spurred by globalisation, deregulation and continued
regulation, are a major and the fastest growing competition tool in the airline industry today.
1.2 Research Problems
The above-mentioned exogenous circumstances underscore the reality of alliances and
stimulate their formation. There are increasing numbers of airlines entering alliances and thus
escalating the levels of involvement in alliances. The most critical issues that surface in
connection with interairline partnerships, both in theory and in practice, are the following (see
Lorange and Roos, 1991, Bleeke and Ernst, 1991, Bronder and Pritzl, 1991, Dyer et al., 20Ql
and below):
• The primary motivation for entering into horizontal partnerships based on necessity or
choice,
• The managerial and organisational implications of partnership building and governance,
• The instability of interfirm linkages, and
• The realisation of benefits associated with horizontal collaboration.
Primary motivations for entering horizontal partnerships can be diverse, which has instigated
academic examination of the paradigms that, in tum, explain why partnerships are formed
(see Bleeke and Ernst, 1991, Contractor and Lorange, 1991, Varadarajan and Cunningham,
1995, Spekman et al., 1998, Barringer and Harrison, 2000). Generally, cost, revenue and the
circumvention of regulative constraints are mentioned as key motivational drivers for airline
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partnerships (see Schmidt, 1993, Piepelow, 1997). Within a set of stimuli for entering
interrelationships, the decision to collaborate may, in many cases, be based on ah hoc
necessity - an effort to ensure the survival of the firm - rather than on choice- as the result of a
well thought-through process (see Ensign, 1998). Equally often, a true alliance strategy,
clearly formulating partnership objectives, is non-existent (see Gomes-Casseres, 1998,
Doganis, 2001). The trend of partnership formation has given rise to a vicious circle - a
defensive fear of being left outside an alliance. With an increasing number of carriers teaming
up to form bi- or multilateral groupings, the mere pressure to join possibly outweighs a
thorough consideration of the partnership implications. The results can leverage the inconstant
effects of alliances as business relationships. Research has taken note of this problem, and has
generally investigated the reasons for forming alliances.
The basic lesson from all industries is that alliances are inherently unstable, and the airline
business is no exception. Issues such as initial partner choice, partnership management and
the degree of collaborative accomplishment likely foster instability and have been
academically scrutinised (see Lorange and Roos, 1991, Spekman et al., 1998, Khanna, 1998).
What is described in the literature on alliances as a careful and time-consuming process of
getting to know and "marrying" a partner, paralleled by simultaneous interpersonal
relationships, might not necessarily lead to success and create value for all participants (see
Moss Kanter, 1994). Partnerships thus need proper conception, set-up and managerial
structures (see Bronder and Pritzl, 1991, Gulati and Singh, 1998). In addition, the
appropriateness of the partner selection has a critical impact on the alliance's success (see
Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993, Dev et al., 1996). Furthermore, the process of selecting alliance
partners and groupings is highly influenced by historic relationships and rivalries, perceptions
of cultural fit and national pride, as well as strategic advantage (see Lorange and Roos, 1992,
Doz, 1996, Dev et al., 1996). However, there are many obstacles in the way before an alliance
becomes a partnership with mutual benefits for all parties.
A potentially synergistic relationship does not automatically unleash synergy effects.
Exogenous and endogenous obstacles and conflicts lessen the benefits to be had from working
together and impact negatively on the value of the co-operation (see Kogut, 1988, Yoshino
and Rangan, 1995, Gulati, 1995, Park and Ungson, 1997). The advantages of collaboration
are frequently offset by fears about relinquishing brand values and independence (see Gomes-
Casseres, 1996, Berardino and Frankel, 1998, Gulati and Singh 1998). Using a set of criteria
such as self-analysis, chemistry and compatibility might only be one approach towards
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structuring crucial internal success factors and identifying possible sources of conflict. The
design of the partnership, its managerial structures, power configurations and the portfolio of
alliances and its network position can have a profound influence on its overall performance
(see Grandori, 1997, Spekman et al., 1998, Dyer et al., 2001).
Partnerships essentially need to produce benefits for the members, and this additional value
should, in some form or another, be tangible (see Hamel et al., 1989). There are as many
benefit dimensions to the formation of an alliance as there are motives to enter into
collaborative ventures (see Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995, Day, 1995). The body of
literature contains substantial research on the different categories of benefits (see Lewis,
1990, Bleeke et al., 1992, Bronder, 1993, Gomes-Casseres, 1996, Dyer, 1997, Osegowitsch,
2001, Dyer et al., 2001). A general claim is that benefits should emerge for all partners and
that they should be durable within a sustaining alliance context (see Moss Kanter, 1994,
Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000).
Despite extant academic examination and the obvious importance of partnership strategies,
the literature on strategic airline alliances suffers from a number of deficiencies, in Particulk
in the mentioned categories. The current status of scientific research scrutinising alliance
formation and management as well as identification and enhancement of synergies can be
described as rather rudimentary and lagging far behind current development (see Goold and
Campbell, 2000). The following research gaps have been specifically identified in the above-
mentioned issues within a passenger airline alliance context:
• Very little comprehensive research has been carried out In the particular field of
motivations for horizontal linkages in the passenger airline industry (see e.g. Schmidt,
1993). 'The existing research makes general economic and qualitative motivations to
I
collaborate applicable to the airline industry without accommodating the specific
characteristics of air transportation (see e.g. Piepelow, 1997). In addition, motivations that
are regularly alluded to are not critically discussed regarding their sustainability during
collaboration. The causality of interairline linkages thus often remains unidentified.
• Existing research largely engages in general examination of the challenges associated with
the establishment and management of collaborations. The main deficiencies in research on
airline partnership management structures emanate from describing discrete efforts by
individual airlines, or applying management expertise from other industries to air
transportation (see Klein, 1996, Flores Jr., 1998). In addition, airline-specific research on
the dynamics of managerial practices and the impediments that partnerships face, is very
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•
scarce and in most cases only provides snapshot insights, singular case studies, or
geographically-confined evidence (see Schmidt, 1993, Oum et al., 1993, Oum, 1995, Park
and Zhang, 2000). Questions thus need to be raised regarding the real prerequisites and
success factors for airline partnerships and the governance mechanisms able to address all
aspects of the relationship as well as those fitting the dynamic nature and evolution of
strategic interairline alliances.
Relatively little has been written in the field of qualitative and quantitative research on the
partnership benefits as well as the dimensions of the additional value that interairline
linkages create (for existing research see Park and Zhang, 1998, Bissessur and Alamdari,
1998, Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000). The reason for this lack of research may be the
complexities associated with quantifying benefits that are influenced by a large number of
variables. Generally missing, however, is a model that captures those drivers of benefit
generation that suggest the potentiality of synergy and delineate ways of partnership
advancement during the partnership's entire life-cycle.
In general scientific literature, the description of airline partnerships, their governance
structures and benefits are often limited to a mere exemplary portrayal of carrier linkages
among other forms of co-operations in different industries (see Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000,
Parkhe, 2000). A review of literature reveals that conclusions are drawn from general
overviews without focusing on one dedicated industry. The consequences are evident.
Neglecting to consider industry specifications, research fails to produce value in respect of the
practical implementation of its findings. While many literature sources specifically emphasise
the airline industry, comprehensive, scientific research dealing with the antecedents,
mechanisms and forms of interairline collaboration is rare. A few research projects investigate
horizontal airline linkages exclusively (see Jackel, 1991, Schmidt, 1993, Netzer, 1998,
Steininger, 1999, Park and Zhang, 2000). However, this research is often merely descriptive
in nature, focused on specific forms of collaborative agreements, or only provides insight into
a specific geography. This dissertation attempts to address the above-mentioned shortcomings
by suggesting that a great potential in terms of a theoretical contribution resides in
conceptually developing collaboration management expertise.
From a more practical perspective, airline partnerships do not produce the benefits they
potentially could, which has been empirically proven and is regularly described in
management and industry publications (see sources such as Airline Business, and Air
Transport World). This is most often due to unstructured configuration and management
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processes, and a lack of skills in detecting and enhancing the value of the collaboration.
Starting right from the preparatory phases of the set-up of management structures, airlines
often do not fully understand the prerequisites for configuration, or the true beneficial
potential thereof. In later stages, carriers have so far failed to implement effective managerial
and controlling tools that would help to identify and enhance the gains from their horizontal
linkages.
These inadequacies clearly evidence an acute need for a framework for interairline
partnership management in order to enhance the conceptual apparatus of airline governance
and performance in a theoretically integrated and empirically grounded way. This dissertation
is thus an examination of the innate propensities or inducements that lead airlines into
alliances, the opportunities and constraints that could influence their behaviour and the
governance and advancement of collaboration. This dissertation conceptualises a
comprehensive and updated framework of partnership building to identify synergy and thus
effectively manage partnerships in the global air transport industry.
1.3 Objectives
Set against the aforementioned background and the research problems, the overall objective of
this dissertation is to contribute, both theoretically and empirically, to the comprehension of
the managerial and organisational challenges associated with effectively establishing and
governing interairline partnerships. More specifically, this dissertation has the following
related objectives:
The primary objective of this dissertation is to:
• Develop a managerial model identifying, evaluating and enhancing the benefits of
interairline co-operation prior to and in the course of partnerships, called the synergy audit
model.
The secondary, supportive, objectives of this dissertation are:
• To describe the airline industry in its current state, which entails a historical overview, a
description of the most important players as well as the developmental drivers, product
characteristics and crucial strategic challenges;
To analyse airline collaboration as a competitive tool in the current air transport
environment, its motivations, types and limitations and to outline emerging types of
competition, and
•
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• To outline prerequisites for successful airline collaboration based on a sequential
evaluation of suitability criteria, partnership managerial skills and configurational
structures.
The essence of the contribution lies in presenting a theoretical framework and a managerial
toolbox idiosyncratic to the airline industry, optimising set-up, governance and advancement
during the entirety of horizontal airline partnerships' life-cycles.
1.4 Scope and Delimitation of the Study
Most research has a delimited scope. This is often due to the manageability of research and its
design as well as timing and funding constraints. In addition, the research methodology can
require a certain scope, or allow a restricted scope in order to achieve valid and reliable results
(see e.g. Weber, 1997, Steininger, 1999 for the airline industry and Martinsuo, 2001). The
scope of the present study can be grouped into three domains:
Geographical:
Due to the nature of the airline business and international airline co-operations, the orientation
of the study is global. International South African and Central European airlines and their
partnership networks form an elementary research platform to facilitate research.
Functional:
Alliances and business partnerships are of particular relevance to a variety of organisational
functions and since this study is focused on strategic planning, and marketing and
organisational issues, the emphasis of the research is on these functional fields. Strategic
planning departments, alliance management and network planning and management, as
company functions, are the focal points of an empirically based evaluation.
Typological:
The range of enterprises to be evaluated is strictly limited by the subject of this research. Only
airlines operating commercially scheduled passenger services in compliance with lATA
(International Air Transport Association) regulations are relevant to the dissertation. Within
this group, any form of horizontal intercompany co-operation and relationship falls within the
Scope of the study. Excluded from the evaluation, however, are wider vertical value chain
partnerships, i.e. alliances with service providers, or within the travel experience value chain
UIIIVER:m::T STElLEIlBOSCH
BJ~LlOTEL:K
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(e.g. hotel groups, car rental companies and financial services). Subsequently, when terms
such as airline alliance, collaborative airline action or carrier partnership are used, they refer
to horizontal airline alliance activities.
1.5 Research Methodology
All research operates within a framework of assumptions and expectations with regard to the
subject matter under investigation, the methods employed and the devices that guarantee the
research quality. These are mainly ontological and epistemological suppositions underpinning
the chosen research methods. Ontology describes the form and character of reality, its
qualities and attributes and how this reality can be comprehended. Ontologically, the present
dissertation endeavours to understand and explicate the realities of airline partnerships in the
context of the wider air transport industry. Epistemology studies the nature of knowledge
itself, its presuppositions and foundations, its extent and validity. Epistemology concerns
itself with the relationship between the knower and what can be known; and how one might
begin to understand the world and communicate this as knowledge (see Burrel and Morgan,
1979, Guba and Lincoln, 1985). Epistemologically, the dissertation builds knowledge by
neutrally examining the passenger airline industry and its horizontal partnerships, and by
applying and further elucidating, probing and advancing current research streams in this field.
The dissertation conveys expertise, thus contributing to the body of knowledge by providing
guidelines for airline partnership formation and advancement and, by means of developing a
model, detecting and enhancing interairline partnership synergies.
The chosen research methods entail the principles and procedures of inquiry in a particular
discipline. This study has been conducted by investigating primary and secondary sources of
information. The research tools utilised in this investigation comprise a set of semi-structured
personal interviews, together with a detailed review of secondary literature and data.
Primary Sources
A survey of a number of airlines was conducted to provide initial knowledge of the business
patterns of passenger carriers in bi- and multilateral horizontal collaborations. In this context,
interviews are generally regarded as the single most important data collecting technique in
social science (see e.g. Yin, 1994). In line with this thought, primary data was collected by the
researcher himself through semi-structured, extensive managerial discussions with senior
management staff (for a sample questionnaire, see the appendix and for questionnaire design,
see Oppenheim, 1992, Webb, 2000). The interview guidelines were designed III a
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questionnaire format to obtain relevant information on sources of motivations for
collaboration, partnership managerial structures, and key success factors of collaboration,
synergy potentials and effects. The questionnaire design followed scholarly principles, and
textually as well as content-wise was compiled with the aid of the dissertation's supervisor
and industry experts from airlines, governmental bodies and suppliers to the air transport
industry. In a subsequent stage, the questionnaires were pre-tested with selected trial
interviewees and further refined regarding content and structure. The empirical research
emphasised areas such as strategic planning, corporate development, local general
management and alliance management, since the most appropriate responses to the research
question were expected to be gathered in these functional areas. The sample included in the
primary research comprised the carriers listed below. The group of interviewees was
judgementally selected in close collaboration with the dissertation's supervisor and based on
recommendations by industry specialists from selected airlines' top management, AASA
(Airlines Association of Southern Africa) and AIRBUS Industries.
The sample size and its functional and organisational composition are regarded as
representative for the dissertation's purpose. A more comprehensive primary empirical study
was neither necessary nor feasible for the dissertation's research intent. The airline industry is
a volatile business sector, which is particularly reflected by the constant emergence,
disappearance and varying types of interairline collaborations. The period 2000-2002
specifically was characterised by changes in alliance compositions and in the business
environment, which were further accentuated by the events of September 11th, 2001 and its
aftermath. The evident lack of a model to detect and enhance airline partnership performance
on the basis of synergy considerations has further rendered more intensive empirical research
obsolete. In addition, the often intangible nature of important airline resources and
information on partnership management, made the approach of geographically limited and
semi-structured empirical research an appropriate means by which to gather relevant
empirical data and expertise for the purpose of developing a managerial tool. This scientific
research concept is widely accepted as a suitable instrument for theory building (see Perry,
2001). A nested field-based study of the present type has furthermore been repeatedly used
for the airline and other industries by various authors (see e.g. Schmidt, 1993, Doz, 1996,
Wilson and Vlosky, 1997,Weber, 1997, Steininger, 1999,Netzer, 1999).
In most cases, both carriers involved in bilateral partnerships were questioned regarding
details of their collaboration to ensure adequate data collection. This approach aims at
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obtaining a comprehensive picture in order to sufficiently evaluate the entire collaboration
dyad (see also Schmidt, 1993). In some cases, follow-up interviews were conducted to
achieve internal consistency (see below for reliability). The size of the sample, i.e. the number
of interviewees, was 19. Interairline partnerships and alliance network microcosms
judgementally selected as primary sources were:
• International/global alliances:
• South African Airways (SAA) - Air Namibia
• SAA - Lufthansa German Airlines
• SAA - Cathay Pacific
• SAA - Thai Airways
• SAA - Emirates
• SAA - Swissair
• Swissair - Sabena
• British Airways - American Airlines
• SAA - American Airlines
• Regional and domestic alliances:
• SAA - SA Express
• Virgin Atlantic Airways - Sunair
• KLM Royal Dutch - Sunair
• Austrian Airlines - Nationwide Air
• British Airways - British Airways Comair
• Swissair/Sabena - Nationwide Air
Due to the relatively small sample size, a statistical - thus quantitative - presentation of the
findings was not feasible. The results drawn from the primary research are mainly
qualitatively embedded into the chapters dealing with airline collaboration, prerequisites and
success factors and the synergy audit model. A supporting tool of the synergy audit model,
the airline partnership intensity evaluator (A.PIE), is additionally founded on a further round
of intensive discussions with scholars and selected airline executives of the above-mentioned
sample. These discussions were mainly held in order to validate salient functions and areas as
well as other partnership components, in which the closeness of the collaboration plays an
important role in the process of interfirm synergy generation.
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Secondary Research
A further element in the research process is desk research, which scrutinises classic business
science and management literature. In this case, secondary research included the extensive
study of relevant international literature - mostly Anglo-American and German - on alliances,
alliance management and marketing, as well as readings on synergy and entrepreneurial
conflict. Within this framework particular emphasis was placed on literature concerning
transport services and airline management. In addition, secondary, cross-sectional case study
research was conducted in order to build an airline partnership management theory (see e.g.
Eisenhardt, 1989, Parkhe, 1993, Yin, 1994, Perry, 1998). The case study research method
therefore involves multiple forms of data collection, such as documentation, archival records,
conversational evidence, direct observation and physical artefacts (see Yin, 1981, Cherty,
1996, Perry, 2001 and discussion by Dyer and Wilkins, 1991).
Due to the rate of alliance formation and dissolution, the sometimes loose and informal ties
between carriers, as well as the flux in the regulatory environment, classic business science
literature might not appropriately reflect all developments. This necessitated further
information, which was gathered by intensively studying airline management literature,
institutional publications, governmental and non-governmental organisations, research
institutions and profit-oriented players in the airline industry, as well as through anecdotal
data. Among others, secondary data originate from:
• AEA (Association of European Airlines)
AIRBUS Industries
AASA (Airlines Association of Southern Africa)
BARIG (Board ofInternational Airline Representatives in Germany)
BARSA (Board of Airline Representatives of South Africa)
BOEING Commercial Aircraft Group
lATA (International Air Transport Association)
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization)
Governmental publications
Newspapers and magazines, in particular Airline Business and Air Transport World
Publications and research by consulting firms
Conference papers
In-house publications, annual reports and statistical data from airline alliances and
networks
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Considering the international orientation of the study, the location of international airlines'
head offices, and the fast moving nature of the business, an elementary means of collecting
data for secondary research was the Internet. The Internet provides a wealth of resources, such
as newsletters, data bases, archival sources as well as online publications covering airline
topics.
Methodological Tools
With the research sources having been described, it remains to introduce the epistemological
framework, or elementary method of conducting research. Very basically, there are two major
approaches to theory development: deductive theory testing or inductive theory building (see
Parkhe, 1993, Perry, 1998).
Deductive research involves the testing of existing knowledge, represented by general
theories, against particular cases. This is done by formulating a hypothesis derived from
existing knowledge, which is then tested against a particular case. The research thus descends
from the general to the particular, from the abstract to the empirical. In this sense, deductive
methods often involve a comparative analysis and always lead either to the modification or
confirmation of existing theory (see Mintzberg, 1979, Parkhe, 1993).
Inductive research works in precisely the opposite direction, moving from the empirical to the
abstract, from the particular to the general - thus not necessarily requiring a pre-formulated
hypothesis. The notion is to assemble an explanation from the empirical material itself. Like
deductive research, inductive research can also be comparative but is usually focused upon
specific cases and is initially interested in their unique qualities. It does not involve the testing
of general theories against cases, but rather examines the material on its own terms. For this
reason, the inductive method is considered appropriate for producing new ways of
understanding and new-fashioned perspectives (see Mintzberg, 1979, Eisenhardt, 1989, Perry,
1998).
Another significant division In research is between quantitative and qualitative
methodological tools. While this demarcation should not be strictly aligned with that between
deductive and inductive research, quantitative research is typically deductive in practice and
qualitative research is characteristically inductive (see Perry, 1998). Quantitative research is
modelled on scientific methods and, hence, seeks to explain the research objective by testing
what are considered scientifically deduced theories against quantitatively measurable
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phenomena. Existing theory thus provides a superior explanation of objective reality.
Conversely, qualitative research concentrates upon the contextual meanings people or
organisations use to make sense of their immediate experiences (see e.g. Carson et al., 2001).
Furthermore, qualitative research is primarily based on a non-numerical examination and
interpretation of observation for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and
relationship patterns (see Babbie, 1983). In this respect, qualitative research gathers its
interpretations from data that are, in turn, based on reasonable expertise, but without the
heavy reliance on existing knowledge. Qualitative research typically focuses upon narratives
that groups and individuals use to express and define their identities as well as focusing on
anecdotal data. The tracking down of consistencies and patterns, in particular from anecdotes,
and the creative leap to describe something new is a key feature of inductive, qualitative
research (see Mintzberg, 1979).
Because of the nature of collaborative strategy and research, objectives cannot easily be
framed within a single fixed paradigm. Hence, partnership management is necessarily a multi-
paradigmatic discipline, requiring varied theoretical perspectives and research methodologies
(see Barringer and Harrison, 2000). As such, the quality of this research and its ability to
provide answers to critical airline collaboration strategy questions take on a new urgency
within the highly dynamic air transport competitive landscape. The research objective and
context thus dictate the choice of appropriate research methods.
This dissertation has an inductive focus, and consequently builds its theory upon the studies
of both primary and secondary data without explicitly hypothesising. However, to a certain
extent theory testing - thus deductive approaches - also forms part of the evaluation, as only
the interplay between the two extremes lead to theory advancement (see Parkhe, 1993). The
dissertation largely bases its fmdings on qualitative data, although quantitative sources too
assist in achieving the research objectives. It is widely accepted that the integration of
quantitative and qualitative methodological tools is likely to be a fruitful course in building
models, performing analysis and developing theories (see Hoskisson et al., 1999). In all
likelihood, results obtained from different methods have the potential to enrich the
understanding of the problems and generate new insights regarding the issues.
Quality Measures for the Research Methodology
Five measures are generally applied to ensure the quality of scientific research and have
therefore been adopted for this dissertation:
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Firstly, construct or concept validity essentially describes the degree to which a study
investigates what it claims to investigate, i.e. it seeks agreement between a theoretical concept
and a specific measuring device or research procedure (see Yin, 1994). Multiple primary and
secondary sources have been extensively used to research airline alliance set-ups and
operations and in order to develop a managerial tool for their sustainability. The dissertation
therefore follows a clear sequence of structural components from first discussing and
introducing the environment and drivers of airline collaboration to finally designing a synergy
audit model. Cross checking of information through multiple sources of evidence can thus
provide various explanations for the same phenomenon, corroborating the chosen methods.
Construct validity is additionally substantiated by triangulation, which refers to the collective
use of qualitative and quantitative research to study the same object (see Yin, 1994, Scandura
and Williams, 2000). In this way, this dissertation endeavours to achieve construct validity by
utilising a range of different multidimensional and multidisciplinary sources that contribute to
the scrutinization of the field of interairline partnerships.
Secondly, internal, or logic validity refers to the decision that a research's procedures are
sufficient to justify rejection or acceptance of a hypothesis or the phenomenon in question
(see Yin, 1994). Internal validity is mainly concerned with causality, in particular in the
analysing phase of research. A cause-and-effect relationship, therefore, can only be asserted if
there is a true co-variation between the variables under investigation and additionally
presupposes that the causes precede the effects, as in laboratory experiments (see Scandura
and Williams, 2000). To a certain extent, the internal validity of this dissertation can be
affirmed by the theoretical basis of the synergy audit model, which states that collaborative
benefits increase with the intensity of the partnership. A cause-effect relationship between a
source (intensity) and an effect (synergy) is thus given. However, in this dissertation it is
mainly the results of the secondary objectives that are insufficiently internally valid. Although
the findings provide very significant aid in structuring and governing interairline partnerships,
they cannot be based on clear causalities.
Thirdly, external validity describes the extent to which the research findings can be
generalised, thus reproduced across other times, settings and by other individuals (see
Scandura and Williams, 2000). Generalizability is therefore highly dependent on the chosen
study approach (see Mintzberg, 1979, Smith et al., 1996).While much research endeavours to
describe economic and managerial phenomena from a supra-industry perspective aimed at
generalised solutions and universally applicable models (see e.g. Porter, 1980, Lorange and
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Roos, 1991), the present study uses an industry-specific approach. The chosen research
approach, moreover, mandates that empirical and secondary studies take place in a certain
time frame, in a geographically limited terrain and by questioning a specific sample of
respondents. The findings of this research are idiosyncratic to the industry researched, and
consequently only apply to the airline industry and horizontally allied scheduled passenger
carriers. Accordingly, and also in view of the fact that empirical research is not easily
reproducible, this research does not claim full external validity across industry boundaries (for
an example of cross-industry validity, see Smith et aI., 1996). However, in as far as the
developed model and the tools it applies are concerned, generalizability can be claimed for the
auditing process of scheduled carriers. The model is highly workable within other horizontal
airline partnerships within the delimitation of this research.
Fourthly, content validity describes the degree to which the test items represent the learning
material. Content validity is measured according to the extent to which a test adequately
samples the domain of the information, knowledge or skill that it purports to measure (see
Sireci, 1998). This is why, classically, content validity is primarily determined by expert
judgement. Content validity of this dissertation is assured by the informed item selection
made by experts (the supervisor and industry experts) in the airline industry domain. More
specifically, domain specifications and questionnaire items in this research were reviewed by
the mentioned panel of experts, during which they judged that the test items possessed content
validity.
Fifthly, reliability describes the degree to which the study is free of random errors and is
therefore a methodological requirement for the process of data collection as well as the
analysis and synthesis of the research's results (see Yin, 1994). In this research, the process of
data collection itself can be claimed as being reliable, since the combination of primary,
empirical and secondary research is a widely accepted practice in social and business
management science (see Barringer and Harrison, 2000, Scandura and Williams, 2000). The
content of the empirical research is based on the most important aspects of alliance formation
and management, direct input by knowledgeable industry specialists and the dissertation's
supervisor. In addition, the interview partners approved the choice of interview categories,
which supported internal consistency as a measure of reliability. Internal consistency
therefore relates to whether tests assess the same characteristics and determine the
homogeneity of items (see Henson, 2001). The results of the interviews were furthermore also
analysed for internal consistencies (see also Steininger, 1999). The analysis concluded that the
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findings of the empirical research all point in the same direction. In some minor points there
were, however, divergences of opinion. In these cases, follow-up interviews were conducted
so that full internal consistency could be achieved. Reliability of both the chosen research
methodology as well as of the results of the finding can thus be attested.
Applying the five mentioned quality measures (construct, internal, external and content
validity as well as reliability) in data collection, analysis and synthesis will advocate that
empirically-based and theoretically-grounded quality results can be produced.
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation follows a traditional, inductive structural set-up. For expository purposes, this
dissertation has been structured in a total of 7 text chapters.
Chapter 2 and 3 aim at giving background information of air transportation, and most
importantly seek to introduce the main drivers of airline development and the underlying
reasons for the formation of interairline partnerships.
Chapter 2 starts with a portrayal of the various forms of air transportation and its current
quantitative status. Its focus, however, lies on the historic development of the global airline
industry and, in particular, on the influences of the industry regulation and deregulation in
Europe and the USA.
Since the airline industry is embedded in a web of stakeholders, interest groups and market
partners and is exposed to a highly competitive environment, chapter 3 provides an overview
of the discrete influences developing from these arenas. Airlines provide their transport
services in. network formats that link markets through different structural configurations,
which greatly affect the carriers' business performances. In order to gain an understanding of
the particular characteristics of air transport products, a part of chapter 3 provides a
description and a discussion of passengers' demand structures and airlines' corresponding
product designs, sales activities and loyalty schemes.
Chapter 4 entails a detailed description of airline collaboration as a competitive tool.
Initially, business partnerships are defined and a taxonomy is delineated. Incentives for
airlines to enter into horizontal alliances are discussed, using the broad motivational
categories of cost, market and revenue-oriented considerations as a guideline. While different
motivational as well as varying corporate backgrounds lead to various forms of interairline
partnerships, the most prevalent are described, mainly distinguishing between operative,
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strategic and hybrid partnership forms and instruments. Although airline partnerships are the
main competitive driver in the airline industry today, they do not occur without criticism from
consumer advocates, national bodies and from within the industry. This critique is analysed in
its leading categories.
Chapter 5 analyses the prerequisites and key factors of successful airline collaboration. The
chapter introduces and observes the sequence of events of carriers assessing their own
suitability to collaborate, followed by partner investigation, also by means of partnership
fitness evaluation, the final choice, legal foundation and the organisational development of the
partnership. The set-up of the collaboration is given detailed attention, specifically regarding
selected aspects of airline operations. Chapter 5 also endeavours to systematically present the
best practices for the interairline alliance's entire life span, and establishes the theoretical basis
as well as the touchstone of the synergy audit model.
Chapter 6 finally develops the synergy audit model. A terminological discussion of synergies
and dissynergies is critical: particularly for the general understanding and for subsequent
standardised usage. Collaborative intensity is brought into direct relation with partnership
benefits, thus enabling for the establishment of an indexed measurement system. The airline
partnership intensity evaluator (A.PIE) is introduced as the core tool of a broader auditing
process to detect and enhance interairline synergies.
Chapter 7 recapitulates the findings, particularly those of chapter 5 and 6, and presents
conclusions and implications of theory and practice. In addition, recommendations for further
studies and practical action are given.
Figure 1.1 gives a comprehensive overview of the structure of the dissertation.
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Figure 1.1: Structure of Presentation
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2 The Airline Industry - Background, Development and
Regulative Characteristics and their Impacts on
Strategic Alliances
2.1 Introduction
For many the airline industry appears to be exciting, innovative, forward-looking and
operating on the frontiers of technological possibilities. Its international orientation, speed,
customary luxurious furnishings and design still lend the industry a glamorous, exclusive
flair. While these attributes certainly apply, the airline industry is, however, very cyclical,
sensitive to changes in the economy and operates with marginal profitability. Years of peak
growth and profits have been regularly succeeded by economic troughs - occasionally drastic
ones. The last down-cycle, starting in 2001, has been marked by a substantial company shake-
out. In addition to this sensitivity, airlines operate in a controlled environment with a host of
stakeholders who, in many parts of the world, impede their development.
All of these seemingly contradictory issues, the forward-orientated, glamorous appeal as well
as the economic frailties, and the controlling environment characterise the airline scene. The
following serves to introduce this industry and discuss some cardinal developments, thereby
focusing, in the second half, on a quantitative description and an examination of the
regulation and deregulation of air transportation.
2.2 Terminology and Patterns of Air Transport Service
The air transport industry is a comprehensive web of technically sophisticated components, as
well as organisations and relationships, used to carry passengers, mail and freight between
locations and to fulfil military and scientific tasks.
The civil airline industry - the research object of this dissertation - is part of the air transport
industry and comprises the following elements:
•
Aircraft and avionics equipment manufacturers and service providers,
Aircraft and avionics distribution intermediates,
Airlines,
Airport authorities,
IIandling and value added service providers,
Air traffic control services (ATC),
•
•
•
•
•
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•
Information technology (IT) providers,
Government regulatory departments or authorities,
Travel agents, tour operators and shipping agents, and, most importantly,
Air transport objectives - passenger and cargo customers, consignors and consignees of air
cargo (see Shearman, 1992, p. 7).
•
•
•
The air transport industry was, and still is, one of the main drivers for globalisation, despite its
history of probably being one of the most regulated global businesses. The world as a global
village became reality through the impetus provided by mass transportation and
communication facilities. New technologies, business models and the changes in the
regulatory environment have given the airline industry a fresh face, which recently opened up
opportunities for all the interest groups involved. This chapter examines a selection of the
above-mentioned air transport industry elements, with special reference to the revolutionising
potential of some of them.
Air transport can be divided according to different criteria, resulting in various patterns. These
criteria and patterns are used to further refine and limit the research objective of this
dissertation.
Table 2.1: Patterns of Air Transportation
Criteria Pattern
Transport Object Passengers, Freight, Mail Air Traffic
Participants Military, Civil Air Traffic
Accessibility Private, Public Air Transport
Commercial Orientation Commercial. General Aviation
Regularity Scheduled, Charter Air Traffic, Unscheduled/Occasional
Distance Cluster Short-. Medium. Long-Haul Air Traffic
Air Space National, Regional, International Air Traffic -
Air Traffic Area I Regional, Interregional, Continental, Intercontinental Air Traffic
Inventory Piston and Jet-propelled Aircraft, Helicopter, Glider, Airship, Balloon, Hang-glider
Source: Pompl, 1998, p. 24
The research focus of this dissertation is functionally limited to passenger, civil, public,
and scheduled traffic in various distance clusters, air spaces and traffic areas, and with
miscellaneous inventory.
While most of the above criteria and patterns are clear cut on their own, the distinction
between chartered and scheduled air traffic is described in more detail.
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2.2.1 Scheduled Air Service
Scheduled air services are defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)i
as "any scheduled service performed by aircraft for the public transport of passenger, mail or
cargo" (see ICAO: Convention, Kap. XXI, Artikel 96 a. seen in Pompl, 1998, p. 25).
Characteristics of scheduled air services are (see Pompl, 1998, p. 25 and Hess, 1994, pp. 51-
53):
• Commercial orientation.
Public availability - air transport must be at the public's disposal.
Schedule orientation - prior to operating a transport service, departure and arrival times
have to be determined. The transport service is required to be established for a specific
duration, usually the timetable period (6 months), and transportation must be upheld
irrespective of the number of passengers.
• Network orientation - the scheduled carrier has to offer at least one origin-destination
•
•
•
(O&D) or point-to-point link that has to be serviced on a regular basis.
Operating obligation, guaranteed provision - the carrier is required to maintain its
operation as long as the local authorities' permission is valid. Permission, however, can be
withdrawn in the case of operational and economic impediments.
Transportation obligation - is an effect of the public availability of the air transport
product and describes the basic binding nature of the contractual relationship between the
operator and the passenger/air service customer. This contract can be dissolved should any
danger to the public evolve as a result of the transportation agreement.
Tariff obligation - tariffs must be published and - usually - be approved by local
authorities. Airlines' commitment to the binding and applicable tariffs for the scheduled
period is to ensure that every air traveller benefits from a transportation contract with
comparable conditions.
•
•
Since the remainder of this study focuses on issues related to scheduled traffic, no further
description of this type of air transport service will be provided at this point.
I ICAO is a United Nations specialised agency comprising 185 nations that are signatories to the 1944 Chicago
Convention under which ICAO was founded. Headquartered in Montreal, Canada its purpose is to foster and
facilitate international civil aviation and development. All 185 nations agree to abide by the same civil aviation
standards. Most nations, however, write their own rules, but they must meet lCAO's standards.
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2.2.2 Charter Air Service - Non-Scheduled Traffic
Charter air service plays a substantial role in, particularly, European air traffic. Two of the
world's largest charter carriers, namely Condor and Britannia Airways, are based in Europe?
However, charter air services have never been satisfactorily defined and no internationally
concluded definition for non-scheduled traffic exists. During ICAO's Chicago Convention of
19443, charter traffic was excluded from the negotiation and definition process, resulting in
total liberalisation of non-scheduled traffic authorisation by the individual nations. Herein lies
the reason why charter traffic has never been the subject of bilateral agreements.
Charter traffic today very much resembles scheduled air traffic. Despite the traditionally
unregulated status of charter traffic in bilateral agreements, European deregulation opened an
extended range of business opportunities for charter air transport operators (for details on
European deregulation, see below). Non-scheduled airlines are now able to carry charter as
well as scheduled service passengers on almost every connection between the members of the
European Union. Charter airlines can declare their offer as charter, or as scheduled traffic (see
Pompl, 1998, p. 31). In addition, charter carriers are allowed to distribute their tickets directly
to passengers, whereas in the past the distribution process had to be handled by an operator,
usually a tour operator, or travel agent (see European Commission, 1997, p. 43).
However, the majority of charter business is still generated through classic, and often
vertically integrated, charter distribution channels, namely as part of package tours, and not as
seat-only charter sales (see Gallacher, 1999, New Challenge to Charter, pp. 68-69). Freight
transport on charter flights offers non-scheduled carriers new business perspectives and helps
to' increase profitability, especially on long-haul flights. Offers by charter carriers can now be
displayed on computer reservation system (CRS) screens along with those of scheduled
carriers. In this context, charter carriers have redefined their relationships with both other
charter and scheduled airlines, while building more integrated business relationships (see
European Commission, 1997, p. 43). With this new set of opportunities, charter traffic will
soon lose its dichotomous character. The continued competition factor, however, will be the
charter industry's focus on holiday travel at competitive fares, with little focus on passenger
2 Condor, a Thomas Cook AG subsidiary, is the largest charter carrier world-wide, with a total number of 50
aircraft and 24 billion revenue passenger kilometres (RPK) (see NIA, Thomas Cook - Unternehmensportrait,
2001).
3 The Chicago Convention was attended by 52 nations to consider some form of multinational agreement on
three critical aspects of international air transport: the exchange of air traffic rights (freedoms of the air), the
control off ares and freight tariffs, and the control of frequencies and capacity (see Doganis, 1986, p. 25).
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service (for further information on charter air traffic in Europe, see European Commission,
1997, pp. 42-46).
2.3 Development Stages of International Air Transport
Air transport is an extensive industry, actively propelled and spurred by globalisation trends
and economic growth in the last decade, as well as by the new regulatory framework. The
following brief historical rundown of the evolution of the airline industry over the last 80
years is presented according to developmental stages. Some of the described issues are of
particular relevance for airline co-operation topics and, consequently, are discussed in further
detail in following chapters.
2.3.1 Competition Pertaining to Administration
The first stage of air transport development can be described as "competition pertaining to
administration" (see Klein, 1996, p. 13). Initially starting in the 1920s, soon after the First
World War, it was not until regional peace was restored after the Second World War that
major expansion really began. This era lasted until the late 1970s (see Hanlon, 1996, p. 1).
During this period, airlines were monogamous co-operations in their home countries. Airlines
participated in the global transportation industry on the basis of regulated markets and
bilateral agreements between nations, established by the Chicago Convention in 1944 (see
Abeyratne, 1996, pp. 800-801). To control fares and rules, as well as to regulate market
mechanisms, individual countries formed the International Air Transport Association (IATA)
in 1945. This led to a complex web of bilateral agreements between pairs of countries, which
had a profound influence on the development of air transport.
During this era, marketing was a comparatively unimportant activity among airline companies
around the world, due to stringent industry regulation. In addition, the industry was operating
in a global seller's market. Protected by government ownership and regulation, airlines were
particularly safe from serious competitive effects in the marketplace. In most cases, the
industry showed an oligopolistic market structure. For instance, price competition was non-
existent, promotional efforts were limited, product/service quality was uneven, and little was
done to develop efficient distribution systems in the travel trade and through hub and spoke
networks. With this approach, neither consumer needs and wants, nor their expectations had
much meaning for airlines (see Kaynak et al. 1994, p. 236).
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2.3.2 Competition Pertaining to Capacity and Fares, and to Alliances
Regulated markets were coming into conflict with the airlines' aspirations and objectives as
well as with passengers' demands regarding fair air travel deals. In 1978, deregulation of the
airline market started in the USA. In 1984, liberalisation commenced in Europe and initiated
the "competition pertaining to capacity and fares" stage (see Klein, 1996, p. 13).
In due course, a framework for the abolishment of artificial air transport markets was created
through air service agreements (ASA) and state protectionism was scaled down. The result
was that individual airlines had to face market economy conditions and adjust to the new
competitive situation. In this phase, the drastic nature of the changes in the global airline
industry had profound effects on the development of this very volatile economic sector in
most countries of the world. Demographic, legal-political, socio-economic and technological
changes lead the way to a transformation of airlines and the way they managed their business
domestically as well as internationally. This rapid re-structuring process forced airlines to
modify their business policies and strategies as well as their marketing (see Kaynak et al.,
1994, p. 236).
Airlines saw the only way to survive in this market environment was by drastic, although
imprudent, capacity expansion both nationally and internationally. Results were massive
overcapacities without the corresponding passenger demand. Negative impacts on the market
were further generated by macro-economical influences such as the Gulf War of 1991. Some
major, especially US, carriers were subsequently forced into bankruptcy." The total loss of the
global airline business during that period (1990-1993) surpassed the total profit generated In
the aviation business from its inception until the beginning of the 1990s. The results of this
market stage were drastic cost reduction and rationalisation programmes as well as a focus on
productivity enhancements.
This same era was marked by a wave of privatisation of flag carriers. The mounting costs of
state-owned carriers and excessively high losses during the airline industry'S recession
compelled many governments to examine and implement privatisation.i This new autonomy
4 Although some US carriers fell under the US Chapter 11 code, which had allowed them to operate at a loss
until that time.
S In the past 20 years, the capacity share of government-owned carriers among the world's top 25 airlines has
declined from 38% to 10%. Currently (2002), of the top 25 airlines in the world, which control approximately
62% of the world's airline capacity, just four remain under full government control. All four, as well as other
smaller airlines, have indicated plans to move towards privatisation in future (see Boeing Commercial Airplane
Group, 2001, p. 39).
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gave rise to a way out of the financial misery, hope for financial recovery and new business
models. It resulted in the third stage of international aviation development, the "competition
pertaining to alliances" (see Klein, 1996, p. 13).
For the first time in airline business history, this new era of competition pertaining to alliances
allowed the establishment of a truly global airline business. Although it was run by national
companies, air transport had always been a global industry through its reach, but with the
formation of partnerships, the prerequisite for a true air transport business globalisation was
provided. The "competition pertaining to alliances" era saw the emergence of a new
competitive environment in which price wars, frequent flyer programmes and a host of
innovative marketing programmes have become industry norms.
2.3.3 Competition Pertaining to Groups and Mergers
Paradoxically, the international airline industry has as yet not seen the trend towards mergers
and acquisitions that occurred in other, also formerly regulated sectors, in the late 1980s and
throughout the 1990s. This trend towards concentration is still active and whole industry
sectors will be re-shaped by huge blocks of competitors.
The airline industry is on the verge of being exposed to a similar trend. Some mergers of
varying sizes have occurred in recent years; others are still locally constrained. Although
European and North-American carriers have merged in their respective regions and countries
true global concentration of the larger industry players has not yet happened (for a detailed
discussion of concentration trends in confined regions, see Doganis, 2001, pp. 57-63).
The air transport industry, despite deregulation efforts, is still not fully liberalised.
Competition authorities and ownership clauses make it difficult, if not impossible, for fully
fledged mergers to take place. Consequently, deregulation must not be confused with full
market liberalisation in the sense of the abolishment of all operational barriers and ownership
restrictions. However, the political, regulatory and economical environment will have to allow
airlines to concentrate on a worldwide scale. Market demand as well as shareholder interests
will be the driving factors in the emergence of a new era of airline competition: the
competition pertaining to mergers.
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2.4 Current Situation and Outlook
The airline industry suffers from cyclical intervals of successes and depression. The following
paragraphs provide a brief overview of the history and future trends of world air passenger
traffic.
The following figures comprise the total world airline traffic of ICAO member nations in the
years from 1989 to 2000.
Table 2.2: Total - International and Domestic - World Scheduled Airline Traffic, Passenger
Numbers and RPK
Year Revenue Pax (000,000) % Change RPK (000,000) % Chanae
1989 1,119 -2,60 1,780,000 4,40
1990 1,165 4,11 1,894,000 6,40
1991 1,135 -2,58 1,844,000 -2,64
1992 1,145 0,88 1,928,000 4,56
1993 1,141 -0,35 1,949,000 1,09
1994 1,231 7,89 2,098,000 7,64
1995 1,304 5,93 2,248,210 7,16
1996 1,391 6,67 2,431,690 8,16
1997 1,457 4,74 2573,010 5,81
1998 1,471 0,96 2,628,120 2,10
1999 1,562 6,20 2,797,800 6,50
2000 1,674 5,40 3,017,790 7,90
Total Increase 1989-1999 555 1,237,790
Average Annual Increase 3,10 4,92
Source: Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Weltluftverkehr 1994, p. 66, Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft,
Weltluftverkehr 2000, p. 72, Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Weltluftverkehr 2001, p. 72
Revenue Passengers (Revenue PAX) are all airline travellers accounting for turnover in
exchange for the travel service. This figure excludes duty travel for airline and airline-related
services staff. Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPK) are calculated by multiplying the number
of revenue passengers by the number of kilometres they have flown. In this context, the
difference in average annual increase of revenue passengers and RPK leads to a simple
conclusion: average travelled distance increased in the above period, or a disproportional
I
growth of long-haul traffic as opposed to short-haul traffic can be observed.
Following the economic slump in 1990/91, partly caused by the Gulf War, international air
traffic enjoyed relatively steady growth over the subsequent years. Subsequent to the
economic crisis in Asia, the period 1998/99 was marked by only marginal growth. This local
recession did not last very long and the upswing in Asia ought to accelerate, accounting for
increasingly high growth in the years to come.
Figures for the entire 2001 have not been published at the time of this writing. It is expected,
however, that the events of September 11th, 2001 have lead to the most drastic decline in air
travel ever experienced. Traffic fell more than 10% in the months after the terrorist attacks
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and the following military strikes. An averaged decrease of revenue passenger figures of
about 4% is to be expected for 2001 (see N/A, 2001 Fall in Traffic First since 1991,2002).
2.4.1 Supply and Demand Structure
The supply of passenger air transport is based on aircraft seat capacity. This supply is
generally measured in terms of available seat kilometres (ASK). ASK describes the number of
seats an airline provides, multiplied by the number of kilometres they are flown. The load
factor describes the ratio of revenue passenger kilometres (RPK) divided by available seat
kilometres (ASK) and is measured in percentages. As an index of the occupancy rate of
airline operations, the load factor is a primary means of measuring overall or route-related
operational success. The following table gives an overview of ASK and RPK as well as load
factors for airlines of ICAO member nations.
Table 2.3: Total- International and Domestic - World Scheduled Airline Traffic, ASK, RPK
and Load Factor
Year ASK (000,000) % Chanae RPK (000,000) % Change Load Factor %
1989 2,618,000 3,70 1,780,000 4,40 66,14
1990 2,801,000 6,99 1,894,000 6,40 65,89
1991 2,777,000 -0,86 1,844,000 -2,64 64,30
1992 2,925,000 5,33 1,928,000 4,56 64,67
1993 3,013,000 3,01 1,949,000 1,09 64,50
1994 3,165,000 5,04 2,098,000 7,64 66,65
1995 3,358,600 6,12 2,248,210 7,16 67,45
1996 3,563,770 6,11 2,431,690 8,16 68,67
1997 3,727,900 4,61 2,573,010 581 69,58
1998 3,837,730 2,90 2,628,120 2,10 68,92
1999 4,050,780 5,60 2,797,800 6,50 69,30
2000 4,259,000 5,10 3,017,790 7,90 70,86
Total Increase 1989-1999 1,641,00 1,237,790
Average Annual Increase 4,47 4,92
Source: Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengeselischaft, Weltluftverkehr 1994, p. 66, Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft,
Weltluftverkehr 2000, p. 72, Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengeselischaft, Weltluftverkehr 2001, p. 72
Very evident from this table is the decrease in demand in 1991 as a result of the Gulf War
crisis and the 1999/98 decline due to the recession in Asian countries. Chronologically, ASK
adjustments did not match RPK decreases between 1991-1993, leading to lower load factors.
However, demand has been increasingly matched by supply of aircraft seats in the last
decade. The correlation coefficient is r=0,916 for the overall period which indicates the high
6 Own calculation on the basis of the given figures. The correlation coefficient r provides an index of the degree
to which the paired measures co-vary in a linear fashion. In general, r will be positive when items with large
values of measure X also tend to have large value ofY, whereas items with small values of X tend to have small
values ofY. Correspondingly, r will be negative when items with large values of X tend to have small values of
Y, whereas items with small values of X tend to have large values ofY. Numerically, r can assume any value
between I and 1 depending upon the degree of the relationship. Plus and minus I indicate perfect positive and
negative relationships, whereas zero indicates that X and Y values do not co-vary in any linear fashion.
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degree to which the paired measures ASK change and RPK change co-vary. The increasing
discipline of matching demand and supply is also reflected by steadily increasing load factors.
Again, figures for 2001 and its dramatic effects on global aviation are not available at this
point. While airlines did react swiftly with capacity decreases, leading to an approximately
10-13% decline in ASK, the averaged yearly ASK development lies in the area of -1%. ASK
adjustments and (temporary) retirements of aircraft have resulted in a comparatively high
estimated load factor of about 71% for 2001 (see N/A, 2001 Fall in Traffic First since 1991,
2002).
Airlines, however, have not always been successful in matching supply and demand. One
reason for the drastic effects of the economic slump in 1990-91 was the inability of airlines in
previous years to equate demand and supply figures. Whilst demand for air transport grew by
22% between 1988 and 1993, global air transport capacity rose by 33% in the same period
(see Nuutinen, 1997, p. 7). This led to low load factors and little or no profitability. After the
huge losses generated during the Gulf War crisis, the market transformed from one
characterised by chronic overcapacity and persistent losses into one where demand and supply
were better matched and where airlines could realistically expect to make a profit. After the
recovery in 1993, airlines returned to a normal and sustainable growth pattern. Furthermore,
the financial recovery of passenger airlines was driven by rationalisation and capacity cuts
within major carriers. The combination of capacity cuts and growth in demand has
additionally produced an improvement in load factors.
Still, air traffic demand is uneven throughout the world. Economic crises like the one in Asia
in the late 1990s and the slowdown of the Japanese economy in 1998/99 had an impact on air
transport behaviour, resulting in locally varying growth figures and development potential.
Similarly uneven were the declines in air traffic after the events of September 11th, 2001. The
key independent driver of cycles of air travel growth is economic growth, yet there is no clear
pattern of decline or boom.
The following chart gives an overview of regional average annual growth rates in RPK, in
relation to the respective average annual growth rates in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for
the period 1986-1999. The chart shows that RPK always grows disproportionately to GDP
and that the figures vary largely between the mentioned regions. The correlation between the
growth figures for the shown regions consequently is only r=0,70.
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Figure 2.1 : Average Annual RPK and GDP Growth Rates 1986-1999
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Source: Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 2000, p. 23
China shows an average annual RPK growth of almost 12% over the described period,
whereas other regions like the Middle East fall well below the 4% rate. Travel growth
outpaces GDP growth in the described period by a factor of about 1,8. The evidence suggests,
however, that travel growth is close to being equal to economic growth plus two percentage
points (see Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 2000, p. 23). These varying patterns in GDP
growth and RPK growth demand some explanation:
• Historically, travel growth has not just been stimulated by the overall wellbeing of the
economy, but also by lower fares, growing international trade and other air transportation-
linked services. The events of late 2001 still need to prove a negative correlation between
recession and decline in air traffic.
• Fares have been declining at a rate of about 1% per year after adjustment for inflation (see
Boeing Commercial Aircraft Group, 2000, p. 27). More private passengers have the
opportunity to travel more often due to fare reductions that also allow for more cost-
effective business travel.
International trade has been an additional travel stimulator. With a growth rate of twice
the growth rate of the world's GPD, economies involved in international trade stimulate
the travel patterns of trade players. This aspect is likely to be contested by proponents of
the travel-decreasing effects of new communication technologies. However, new
•
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communication technologies fuel the will to travel and to personally meet with the
communication counterpart (see Piepelow, 1997, p. 92 and paragraph 3.2.4.2 below).
Higher frequencies and better networks also stimulate travel. In many instances, new air
travel offers have become a viable substitute for other means of land-based transportation.
Bypassing hubs, offering direct instead of connecting flights at higher frequencies has also
lead to a stimulation of air travel. This is often due to the opening up of new market
opportunities through reduced market regulation (see Rolls-Royce, 1999, p. 4). Regional
deregulation and overall increased competition have lead to a polarisation within the
industry between small regional carriers and large global airlines. Regional carriers open
up new markets that have not been serviced before, while larger carriers have retained
control of the key regional hubs. However, with the aid of additional feeder airlines, flight
frequencies can be increased, offering more convenient and marketable connections and
fares.
The distinction between travel growth stimulated by the above-mentioned means and travel
growth due to economic growth is very important in anticipating when travel growth might be
approaching maturity and will begin to slow down. In the last months of 2001, economic
circumstances had an ad hoc influence on travel growth, although, recession did not, per
definition, occur in the majority of the main economic centres of the world. However, the
effects on the above-described relation between GDP and RPK growth still need to be
evaluated and the correlation between the indexes needs re-adjustment.
Physically, the supply of air transport services was provided by about 19,000 aircraft in 2000.
This figure includes all aircraft of ICAO member state airlines with a maximum takeoff
weight of 9,tons or more. Among this total figure are about 16,000 jet-aircraft (see Deutsche
Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 2001, p. 77). The majority of these jet-propelled aircraft are
single aisle (66%), followed by twin aisle (19%), smaller regional jets (8%) and the Boeing
747 cluster (7%) (see Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 2001, p. 13).
2.4.2 Recent Financial Performance and General Expenses Structure
From a financial business performance perspective, the airline industry is traditionally and on
average not very profitable. Despite growth and lower unit costs as the result of restructuring
processes, the airline industry has been marked by a structural and chronic unprofitability. At
the beginning of the 1990s especially, the global airline industry was faced with huge overall
losses, followed by a similar, yet more drastic situation from late 2001 to the beginning of
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2002, which is not as yet quantifiable. IATA estimates from the beginning of 2002 indicate a
total loss of about USD 15 billion in 2001 (see N/A, Global Airline Industry in Trouble?,
2002). The following chart shows the net results of IATA member airlines' entire network
over the given period.
Figure 2.2: Net Results ofIATA Member Airlines 1990-2000
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Source: Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 2000, p. 80, Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengeseilschaft, 2001, p. 80
Financial recovery commenced two years after the Gulf War crisis, with total profits peaking
in 1997. However, the global airline industry is very sensitive towards changes in regional
economic cycles. The years 1998/99 were marked by the Asian recession which had an
immediate effect on airline profits. Decreased load factors, combined with chronically low
profit margins thereafter, accounted for further decreases in the airlines' earnings.
Consequently, shareholders lack confidence in the airline business. The result is that the
airline industry under-performs stock markets - 90% of the time in the period 1970-2000 - and
since 1990 the airline industry has trailed the markets by 10%. Much of this lack of
performance can be blamed on rising fuel prices and currency fluctuations (see N/A, 2000, A
One Way Bet, p. 9). In this context, it is exactly because margins are so fragile that
movements in input prices matter so desperately. Additionally, prominent events have
negative effects on airlines' stock performance. US airline stocks declined by more then 40%
after trading re-started following the incidents of September u", 2001. It is exactly this
inherent sensitivity to disasters and economic fluctuations, and their dependence on high-cost
input factors that make airlines a less preferred option for private and institutional capital
investment.
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Yields are another important index in evaluating an airline's performance and profitability.
Yield is calculated by dividing revenue by RPK. It represents an aggregate of all the airfare
and airline revenue charges and is measured on a per kilometre basis.
Figure 2.3: Yield, Fares and ASK Development 1985-1999
-ASK
--Fares
-Yields
*' ... ·YieldTrendl
0,7 '---------~--,------~
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Year
Source: Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 2000, p. 25 and own calculations
The chart above shows the development in fares, yields and ASK on the basis of 1985 figures.
With an average increase of ASK of 4,2% per year in the described period, fares dropped at
about 1% a year and yields at about 1,9 % a year.' One of the reasons why yield decrease
continuously overstates fare reductions is the tendency towards longer flights, which has been
previously mentioned. The leverage effect of distance in yield calculation becomes apparent
in the following simplified yield calculation.
Table 2.4: Simplified Yield Calculation
Flight 1 A-8 Difference Flight 2 A-C
Flight Revenue 1.500 USD oer PAX +66% 2.500 USD per PAX
Distance/RPK 5.000 +100% 10.000
Yield 0,30 -16% 0,25
Optimum - Equilibrium 1.500 USD +100% 3.000 USD
Distance/RPK 5.000 +100% 10.000
Yield 0,30 = 0,30
Source: own calculation
7 Yield and fare figures have been adjusted for inflation.
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From a marketing perspective it is impossible to increase fares proportionally to distance,
since fares are exposed to a distance-induced degression. In highly competitive markets, fares
are especially under constant pressure from other market players, which drives down yields.
Due to a unit cost degression on long-haul flights, it is not even necessary to proportionally
increase fares from a financial or cost standpoint. However, from a single yield perspective,
yields do decrease with the length of services. This is why in an era of increasing long-haul
flights, paired with increasing input costs, yields generally do decline. In 1999, traffic grew by
slightly more than 5% worldwide, but at the same time yields declined 4% (see NtA, A One
Way Bet, 2000, p. 9).
With the above roughly describing the income of airlines, the following pie chart visualises
areas of airlines' operating expenses. Airline operating expenses include all activities to
attract customers and deliver passengers and cargo to their destinations. Embedded in these
activities is a set of support services necessary to operate airline fleets effectively and dispose
of surplus aeroplanes.
Figure 2.4: Areas and Shares of Airlines' Operating Expenses
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According to the Boeing estimates for 1999, operating expenses for all ICAO member airline
totalled USD 330 billion (see Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 2000, p. 12). With little
profitability and small margins it becomes obvious that an increase in fuel prices, or in other
high volume/value operating expense areas, can have a disastrous effect on an airline's overall
financial performance.
35
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2.4.3 Market Outlook for 2020
Global aviation was immediately hit hard by the events of September n", 2001. In the
subsequent months, the declining world economy, loss of customer confidence in safety and
security as well as the new competitive situation have lead to the most drastic change scenario
international air transportation has ever experienced. With incumbent carriers facing
bankruptcy or going into liquidation, and a huge number of jobs being lost, this development
is unparalleled.
However, economic growth - one of the main drivers of the airline industry - will indicate
positive prospects. Regained markets confidence has already initiated slight recovery starting
as early as the beginning of 2002. All indicators are that as an industry sector, air traffic will
continue to expand in various geographical sub-markets in future, albeit at differential rates.
The upswing in Asia will accelerate in 2002, with Japan's economy in the upswing from its
low points and the "Asian Tiger countries" showing improved domestic market performance.
The United States' growth remains above the predicted level. European economies are slightly
below the trend, but their economic figures are pointing up. South America, however, is at the
bottom of its downturn and economic recovery is not expected before late 2002. Passenger air
travel growth will increase disproportionately to global economic growth (see Boeing
Commercial Airplane Group, 2000, p. 27). Average economic growth, measured in GDP
growth, for 2001-2020 is to be expected at about 3%. RPK is predicted to increase by 4,7%
over the period from 2001-2020 (see Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 2001, p. 9). The
following graph visualises the average annual GDP and RPK growth by region for the period
2001 to 2020. The effects of the economic downturn in 2001/2002 are, however, not reflected
in the figure.
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Figure 2.5: Average Annual GDP and RPK Growth Prediction by Region for 2001 to 2020
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Source: Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 2000, pp. 28-29
China will generate top GDP and RPK growth, also in the following two decades not,
however, equalling the performance of recent years. Southeast Asia will not reach the high
GDP growth rates of the years before the recession, but will be close to the worldwide growth
trend.
Air travel will still grow faster than the economies. The above-discussed set of stimuli will be
partly responsible for this future trend. Communication technologies will have an increasing
impact on business life, but they will have an overall neutral influence on demand for air
travel. Any direct substitution will be counterbalanced by the stimulus they will provide for
growth (see Airbus, 2000, p. 12).
In the projection period, the correlation of GDP and RPK growth will be less significant
(r=0,51) compared to historic figures (r=0,71).8 Enhanced yield and revenue management
systems as well as new distribution methods will allow for higher load factors and utilisation
and will result in improvements in productivity.' This improved capacity utilisation will
absorb part of the demand increase and thus requirements for new seats will be brought to a
8 Own calculations based on figures by Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 2000, p. 23 and p. 28
9 Even after September 11til, 2001, load factors could be maintained at high levels due to carriers swiftly reacting
with capacity reductions.
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relatively lower level. Load factors are projected to reach more than 73% in 2019 (see Airbus,
2000, p. 15).
Yields, however, will decrease further, due to persisting trends towards long-haul travel. Fuel
will have a bigger impact on operating expenses. According to lATA estimates, fuel will be
approximately 18% of an airline's operating expenses, as opposed to 12% (lCAO estimates
10%) in recent years (see lATA, Jeanniot Sees Renewed Optimism in Air Traffic Forecast,
2000).
The USA and Europe will move closer to a groundbreaking agreement, creating a
transatlantic common aviation area. Alliances will continue to proliferate and in the next years
most large airlines will be a member of one grouping or another. In recent years, globalisation
has become a watchword in the international airline industry. Many of the successful airlines
have tried to make their globalisation objectives an integral part of their corporate strategy,
while allowing the global operations to grow and prosper. Within this overall framework,
joint marketing agreements, co-marketing and mergers, cross-border equity investments and
equity swaps have become the primary forms of market entry. In a next step, further financial
linkages between carriers and mergers will occur, creating true consolidation in the industry.
Budget airlines will prosper in their respective niches and will especially stimulate intra-
regional point-to-point traffic further.
The Internet will become a major force in both distribution and competition, cutting costs and
selling seats that previously could not be sold. Travel agents will not succumb to the doubl,e
threat of commission cuts and online competition, but will return to their role as travel
consultants, charging appropriate fees for their services.
Air traffic control (ATC) 'problems and delays will potentially worsen in Europe and the
USA, as extensions of present facilities fail to keep up with traffic growth. In Europe, ATC
privatisation will aim to redress traffic management inadequacies.
Excess capacity will decrease as airlines' fleets become more flexible and a better match of
capacity and demand is achieved. Post-privatisation airlines are increasingly focused on
shareholder-value concepts and the specific demand of capital marekts (see N/A, Blue Skies,
2000, pp. 32-40 and further below). This combination of market trends and institutional
reforms, combined with rising incomes and increased leisure time, will contribute to the
steady growth in demand in aviation markets.
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Some of the issues on the developments in global aviation markets are discussed in greater
detail below.
2.5 Regulation and De-Regulation of the Air Transport Market
The air transport industry has always been regulated. From its phases of predominately
private ownership in the first 40-50 years of the 20th century, through stages of public
ownership until the mid 1980s and the current phase of privatisation, institutional regulation
has been a chronic condition. Regulation as a codified set of rules and other restrictions,
usually statutory, circumscribe the limitations on an air traffic operator's freedom to engage in
economic activities. Regulatory power typically resides with the relevant state department or
government ministry.
Motivation for regulation is diverse and depends on the level of aggregation and the country
of origin. However, there are some principal economic arguments for regulation of air
transportation, such as:
•
Guaranteed provision of air services
Control of the market power of individual players
Effects on externalities
Control and levelling of information deficiencies, especially on the consumer's side
Controlling excessive competition (see Turnbull, 1999, p. 2).
•
•
•
•
Also applicable to the regulation of the air transport industry are military concerns regarding
exclusive national sovereignty over the air space above a nation's territory. This position, in
addition to embodied concerns about security, technology and prestige, make airlines a highly
politicised matter. Furthermore, another motivation for regulation is prevalent. Since
practically all flag carriers outside the USA were publicly owned and heavily subsidised, the
regulatory system was originally based on common interests - minimising competition
between the national carriers saved nations from further expenditure (see Lyth, 1997, p. 156).
The US market also showed a different regulating structure. With the absence of typical flag
carrieres) and focused politicisation, the oligopolistic industry structure was regulated by state
authorities, allowing for a more commercial development.
The transformation of highly regulated air transportation markets into more liberalised ones,
probably was and still is the most important driver for the current developments in global
aviation. Since some of its effects lead the way to the formation of airline partnerships and as
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liberalisation is still to impact globalisation and industry concentration, the complex situation
regarding deregulation is described below, with particular reference to the US and the
European markets.
2.5.1 Deregulation in the USA
In 1978, US President Jimmy Carter signed the "Airline Deregulation Act" which marked the
beginning of a gradual, but radical reform of the domestic US air transportation market (see
Thierer, 1998, p. 5). Liberalisation aimed at enhancing competition, increasing the range of
airline offerings and helping to lower tariffs by way of lowering market entry and exit
barriers. The legislation revolutionised commercial aviation in the USA by placing maximum
reliance on competitive market forces.
Gradually airlines that were willing to and capable of entering the market were granted traffic
rights, unless a competitor could prove that this would be against public interest. In addition,
tariff control was completely abolished, although fares were fixed in a "zone of
reasonableness" (see Lyth, 1996, p. 165 and Thierer, 1998, p. 5). November 31St, 1984 saw
the disbanding of the regulating Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) - its remaining functions
were transferred to the Department of Transportation (DOT) (see Lyth, 1997, p. 165).
The USA's deregulation of its domestic markets for passengers in 1978, combined with its
subsequent commitment to a gradual "Open Skies" approach to international aviation in 1979
(see below), affected the way US policy was conducted, but also, through demonstration and
direct knock-on effects, the ways many other air transport markets are now deregulated.
2.5.1.1 US Market Impact
The deregulation environment caused a multitude of changes within the US airline industry.
I
One unexpected result of deregulation was the emergence of complex systems of tariff
structures. Initially, a simplification of airline tariffs was expected, but the contrary occurred.
Major carriers, especially, developed intricate and regularly-changing fare systems. The
introduction of tariff restrictions (e.g. minimum/maximum stay-away, ticket change
restrictions, and advance booking restrictions) and market-related tariff differentiation,
allowed the major airlines to segment travel demand better.
Another new development in post-deregulation times was the introduction of frequent flyer
programmes (FFP) to enhance passenger loyalty. Closely related to the unclear tariff
structures, was the increasing importance and, consequently, prolific development of more
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sophisticated computer reservation systems (CRSs) to handle and distribute passenger aircraft
capacity.
A further direct consequence of deregulation was the re-configuration of airlines' networks
(see Borenstein, 1992, p. 46). Whereas prior to deregulation networks consisted primarily of
direct city links, deregulation fostered the development of hub and spoke systems, which are
described below.
The market-structural consequences were significant. The beginning of deregulation saw a
high number of new entrants. With entry restrictions removed, the market experienced an
influx of new firms. The number of domestic carriers grew from 36 to 123, filling local
market niches. Accordingly, the market shares of bigger carriers subsequently decreased (see
Borenstein, 1992, p. 46). After 1985, the markets became increasingly price elastic, in
particular in the leisure traveller segment, resulting in a growing number of bankruptcies and
exits from the industry (see Glisson et al., 1996, p. 27). This was motivated in some instances
by the dearth of adequate air transport business skills and cyclical problems such as the
second oil crisis and the effect of the global economic cycle on the US economy. In addition,
incumbent carriers managed, by executing market power, to force their new competitors to
operate with no or little profitability.
Consequently, the consolidation of airlines in the US once again increased as many new
entrants left the market. In the late 1980s, bankruptcies, acquisitions and mergers among
airlines led to an unprecedented level of concentration and the emergence of US American
megacarriers. In this competitive market environment, the network integration by the larger
carriers, focusing on acquisition of new entrants, afforded them forceful market positions. The
importance of CRSs and FFPs increased in such a way that smaller players, without their own
respective systems, were obliged to merge with larger airlines in order to have access to these
marketing tools. In 1984, the control of domestic airline mergers shifted from the CAB to the
DOT (Department of Transport), with the result that the number of mergers increased
dramatically (see Jackel, 1991, p. 162 and Shearman, 1992, pp. 95-99).
New, liberal air transport policies and their lax application in the USA also had an impact on
international air traffic processes. Yielding to pressure by the USA, IATA limited its
influence on tariffs, which marked the end of the price cartel on the North Atlantic air routes.
Simultaneously, the USA was very much involved in signing bilateral agreements with other
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nations with the aim of opening international air traffic to more competition (see Steininger,
1999, p. 30).
2.5.1.2 Contestable Market Theory as a Policy Characteristic of US Deregulation
Despite the rapid emergence and demise of new carriers, the US domestic market was not
necessarily exposed to a laissez-faire approach, but to a theoretical framework that allowed
for maximum freedom of business action. The market was not fully deregulated in the sense
that companies could merge in a totally unregulated way or the industry concentrate
limitlessly. The DOT adopted the "contestable market theory" to control mergers and the
action of market players (see Baumol et al., 1982 and Bailey and Baumol, 1984).
"The key point in this theory is the threat of competition, as distinct from actual competition.
(...) The theory's fundamental assumption is that firms operating in an (...) oligopolistic
industry will still price at the same levels as they would in more competitive industries,
provided a threat of competition exists." (Hanlon, 1996, p. 35).
The contestable market theory is based on the notion that the existence of a large number of
actually present competitors cannot discipline established firms, but that the mere presence of
potential competition does. This presence of potential competition is represented by the lack
of market entry barriers through costless access, or the dearth of market exit barriers (see
Borenstein, 1992, pp. 52-53). According to this assumption, established carriers could not
charge excessive fares in a contestable market, as this would pull in new market entrants, who
would bring fares down again. The DOT also assumed that predatory behaviour would not be
sensible in aviation, as an airline threatened by some other carrier could easily move its assets
(mainly aircraft) to some other market. However, the DOT relied on this "hands-off'
approach for far too long and did not monitor and regulate mergers and market power
accurately (see Williams, 1993, pp. 58-59).
In the meantime, large carriers started building individual market entry barriers for new
entrants by giving special commissions to agents, establishing highly effective CRSs, FFPs
and yield management systems as well as hub and spoke networks. This all lead to a steep
increase in concentration in the local US market. Only in 1989 did the US Department of
Justice (DOJ) take control of the high rate of merges and acquisitions. By that time, many
carriers had lost their traffic rights and equipment to larger operators, or had been forced into
bankruptcy. One of the most prominent victims of the lack of regulation on concentration was
PanAm. The contestable market theory used to liberalise the US domestic market had failed
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and the common belief that deregulation, as a government-controlled process, had abolished
all market barriers and guaranteed free and fair competition proved to be wrong (see
Williams, 1993, pp. 155-158).
2.5.1.3 Critical Issues of US Deregulation
Full deregulation of the domestic US market, underlying the contestable market theory, had
certainly not produced the desired results. The rapid shift from a highly regulated to a fully
deregulated market environment had only proven to be advantageous for a large number of
carriers in the short term. Insufficient control in the years directly after deregulation lead to an
era of domestic concentration, which threatened to jeopardise the positive aspects obtained
from liberalising air transport.
A further initial frailty of US deregulation was the sole focus on the domestic market.
Deregulation aimed particularly at forcing airlines to no longer regard their home market as
protected fortresses, but as open battlefields (see Klein, 1996, p. 12). The US CAB and,
thereafter, the DOT encouraged competition, then, however, initially protected the airlines
and labour unions to the detriment of broader or longer-range air transport interests. Its
reluctance to permit domestic market access to foreign airlines and to allow greater foreign
ownership of airlines are two examples of the deregulation's shortcomings. Shutting out
foreigners as potential investors, or potential air traffic service operators, not only restrains
competition in the domestic American market, it also gives American airlines unjust
advantages on international routes. Being able to feed their international services from the
spoke routes running into their hubs, they are in an advantageous position in contrast to
foreign carriers, who have to rely on local traffic at the gateway city they use (see N/A, Let
Fly, 2001, p. 15).
The deregulation policies are further criticised for allowing incumbent earners to
unrestrictedly hinder the market entrance of smaller carriers. In a predatory manner,
incumbents matched fares and added capacity until a threatening new market entrant
withdrew. In due course, to prevent such behaviour, the DOT considered whether commission
overrides, corporate discounts and frequent flyer awards, all products of deregulation, were
being used in ways that targeted new entrants unfairly (see Flint, Deregulation 1978-1998,
1998,p. 5).
US deregulation has, however, also been repeatedly scrutinised with regards to its positive
effects. The outcome of US deregulation can be summarised in terms of the following factors:
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• Deregulated competition in the US aviation market seems, despite its mentioned frailties,
to drive market mechanisms that guarantee an effective resource allocation regarding air
traffic and an increase in the price/quality option. Quality improvements are indicated by
more aircraft departures, also at smaller and medium-sized airports, fewer delays (even
though, in many instances, the number of delays are still unacceptably high), and the
availability of new service types and marketing options (see United States General
Accounting Office, Airline Deregulation: Changes in Airfares, 1996, pp. 3-4 and p. 33).
• Tariffs did generally decrease, although at large and congested community airports fares
have risen since the beginning of deregulation. Relatively more passengers travelled on
long haul connections, and the number of frequencies grew. From an airline perspective,
lowered tariffs, especially on long-haul services, coincided with decreased yields (see
Thierer, 1998, p. 6 and United States General Accounting Office, Airline Deregulation:
Changes in Airfares, 1996, pp. 22-23).
• Initially, the market power of established carriers seemed to be curtailed, since entry
barriers for new entrants were fairly low (see Pompl, 1998, pp. 335-336). Subsequently,
this notion changed as a result of the admitted failure of the contestability of air transport
markets. In addition, major carriers developed a range of tools to increase entry barriers in
ways that forced many new entrants out of the market. Market entrants at smaller and
medium airports still faced difficulties establishing their operation due to slot controls and
long-term gates leases (see United States General Accounting Office, Domestic Aviation:
Barriers to Entry, 1997, p. 2). The consequence was a high industry concentration. In
1990, the eight largest US carriers held 94% of the domestic passenger market and
controlled almost all the major hubs (see Turnbull, 1999, p. 5).
2.5.2 Deregulation in the European Integration Region
j
Liberalising European air traffic seemed a difficult task as the mostly state-owned, inefficient
carriers were as little interested in changing their status quo as were the national governments
of the European Economic Community member states. In the 1980s, scheduled European air
services showed all the characteristics of classic regulation: capacity division between
designated carriers, route networks based on capital cities, widespread pooling of services,
high fares dictated by lATA, and new entries blocked by restrictive national licensing (see
Lyth, 1997, p. 166). However, with the general goal to harmonise the flow of goods, persons,
services and capital among ..the member states, as well as the unification of economic
structures within the EEC, the air transport industry would be affected by liberalisation efforts
sooner or later.
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The statutory environment in developing a common European market was certainly one
motivation to deregulate air traffic. On the other side, market players in the late 1970s started
to demand changes in the antiquated industry. With non-scheduled carriers taking an
increasing share of the intra-European holiday traffic, and growing customer dissatisfaction
and concerns regarding tariffs, service provision and quality, the regulatory environment was
under threat. 10
2.5.2.1 Historical Succession
The 1957 Treaty of Romell formulated a joint traffic policy, since a common economic
development could only be achieved by harmonising the flow of persons and goods within the
member states of the then European Economic Community (EEC). Articles in the treaty
explicitly specified general conditions for road and rail traffic as well as inland waterway
traffic. Air traffic, however, was not referred to (see Opitz, 1994, pp. 56-57).
Justification for this lack of specifications for air traffic mainly lay in the various nations' fear
of losing national sovereignty, which, especially in the air transport markets, could be
rationalised by a number of military considerations. Consequently, trying to reach an
agreement on joint policies regarding air traffic was a troublesome experience for EEC
members. This situation was worsened by the unanimity consensus rule in the European
Contract, making compromises on policies almost impossible (see Woerz, 1996, p. 100).
Air traffic in Europe consequently remained regulated by individual member states for years
to come. A first step towards a gradual change in Community-wide air transport policy was
reached in 1973. In this year, the European Court of Justice's ruling on the "Seamen Case"l2
stated that the Rome Treaty had to be applied to all industries, generally and without
exception (see Reckewerth, 1993, p. 100). In essence, the basic Community principles of the
free flow of goods, service, capital and labour had to be unconditionally implemented in the
air transport industry as well.
10 In 1983, average fares within Europe were nearly twice as high as equivalent rates in the USA (see Lyth, 1997,
p. 166).
11 The Treaty of Rome was signed on March zs", 1957 and is the founding document of the European Economic
Community (EEC).
12 The seamen case was a lawsuit between the European Commission and the French Republic. Based on the
French "Code du Travail Maritime" of 1926, a 1960 ministerial decree stated that certain senior jobs on French
ships were only available to French citizens. Other seamen were to be appointed following a quota of3 French
citizens to 1 non-French citizen (see Reckewerth, 1993, p. 98). This contravened European Law as laid out in the
Treaty of Rome.
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In 1979, the European Commission published a memorandum which, based on the Seamen
Case, specified certain aspects in order to harmonise air travel in Europe. It stated that an
intra-European air transport network had to be established without national market entry
barriers, in order to offer passengers efficient service and competitive fares. Secondly,
operating costs of carriers had to be generally lowered to enhance productivity, while also
considering the immediate needs and interests of employees. The last aspect of the
memorandum was the assertion that all these changes were to be implemented to enhance the
social welfare and the standard of living ofa wide range of society (see Woerz, 1996, p. 101).
These conceptions - revolutionary for European dimensions at the time - led to various
discussions regarding air transport policy in the integrated European market between the
parties involved. However, these novel air traffic liberalisation conceptions had only been
formulated in a memorandum and thus were not legally binding (also see Opitz, 1994, pp. 60-
61 and Piepelow, 1997, pp. 95-96).
A milestone in liberalisation was the court ruling in the "Nouvelle Frontieres" case.13 The
European Court ordered that the competition rules of the EEC treaty had to be applied to civil
air transportation as well. This treaty was a change and an amendment to the Rome Treaty
and formed the bedrock for liberalisation by generally agreeing on an internal European
market. As of January 1S\ 1987 the ruling became legally effective with the EC Treaty.
Additionally, it was settled that agreements of the Minister's Council did not need a
unanimity consensus, but a qualifying majority, which decreased the decision-blocking power
of protectionist member states (see Steininger, 1999, p. 39).
2~5.2.2Liberalisation Packages
The amendment to the Treaty of Rome had a major impact on the applicability of European
I
law to air transportation, without having any direct liberalising or deregulation effects. The
European Commission therefore had to work specifically on deregulating the European
aviation market. Having observed the radical changes in the US American aviation market
and the consequences for passengers as well as for airlines, member states of the European
Community decided on a more gradual approach, without major upsets, towards liberalising
13 The "Nouvelle Frontieres" lawsuit was a case between the French Republic and air transport operators as well
as travel agencies, one of which was called "Nouvelle Frontieres". The defendant was accused of selling tickets
without prior approval by the French Ministry of Civil Aviation and thus had violated the French "Code de
I' Aviation Civile". The French court of law ruled that tariff approval would lead to price fixing and would
therefore contravene EEC law. The European law agreed to that Iine of argumentation and ruled that the
European Competition Law had to be applied to the air transportation sector as well (see Reckewerth, 1993, pp.
103-105).
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the aviation markets, in order to find the correct balance between competition and control
mechanisms.
2.5.2.2.1 The First Liberalisation Package
The first air transport liberalisation package in Europe came into effect in 1988 for an interim
period of three years and dealt with issues covering the following areas in four acts:
•
Market entry and capacity allocation for scheduled carriers
Tariff regulations
Rules regulating competition between airlines
Exceptions to the rules regulating competition between airlines (see Opitz, 1994, p. 65)
•
•
•
These first deregulation efforts only affected intra-EC member traffic, thus leaving out
domestic as well as international traffic between member states and other countries. Also
untouched was a nation's relationship with its locally registered airlines (see Opitz, 1994, p.
65).
The act referring to the exceptions to rules regulating competition, empowered the European
Commission to exempt certain co-operation and co-ordination actions from laws regulating
competition - the so-called group exemptions. The first provision of the act exempted capacity
co-ordination, profit-sharing, consultation between carriers regarding tariffs and co-ordinated
slot allocation from the rules of competition. The second provision dealt with joint
procurement, operation and sales of CRSs. The third provision was the exemption of joint
aircraft ground handling services from the rules of competition (see Woerz, 1996, pp. 104-
105). Furthermore, the Commission was the only body competent to deal with transactions
falling within the scope of the EC Merger Regulations (see Stragier, 1999, p. 2). The rationale
behind the exemption period was to give airlines the opportunity to adjust to the new market
environment without endangering them financially (see Opitz, 1994, p. 66).
Tariffs in the first liberalisation act still had to be approved by both the origin and the
destination country of the flight - the so-called double approval (for double approval,
disapproval etc., see N/A, Tarifklauseln im international en Luftverkehr, 2000). A new detail
was the introduction of tariff flexibility zones, allowing carriers to introduce multi-tier tariff
systems on the basis of reference fares. As a result, rebated fares with a discount of 10-35%
(discount fare) of the full reference economy fare and an even higher rebate of35-55% (super
discount) could be offered and were automatically approved. The drawback of these fares
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from a customer perspective was that they were linked to certain restrictions like advance-
booking periods or minimum/maximum stay-away periods. The setting of reference fares by
state authorities was not without criticism, since flag carriers were, through their equity
situation, very closely linked to the national traffic and tariff authorities. However, the overall
approach to have fares set through deregulated authorities was seen as the first step to
liberalising pricing in air transportation in Europe.
Capacity restrictions and market entry barriers were also loosened in the first liberalisation
package. Inventory with less than 70 seats was no longer part of any capacity restrictions, as
long as it did not involve traffic between primary hubs (category 1 airports) (see Piepelow
1997, p. 102).
Up until the new ruling, bilateral agreements between nations only allowed a pro rata (50:50)
allocation of capacity for the nations involved. The first liberalisation package allowed for a
successive change of the ratio to 55:45 and, in a following step, to 60:40 in favour of the
designated carriers, in order to ease market access. Market entry was further facilitated since
multiple carriers designations were allowed on routes with a justifying passenger volume.
Prerequisite for multiple designations was a minimum traffic volume on the respective routes.
In 1988, this minimum threshold to allow multiple designations was 250,000 passengers per
year, which was later lowered to 200,000 in 1989 and 180,000 in 1990 (see Opitz, 1994, pp.
66-67).
Traffic carrying passengers and goods to and from the carrier's home country (3rd and 4th
freedom traffic, see excursion on freedoms of the air paragraph 2.5.4) was allowed between
primary hubs and regional airports. In addition, airlines were granted rights to carry traffic to
and from third countries en route (5th freedom rights, see below), provided that a regional
airport (not a category 1 airport) was being used and that the carrier did not utilise more than
30% of its total capacity on the route (see Opitz, 1994, pp. 66-67). The 5th freedom traffic
between primary hubs (category 1 airports) was, however, not allowed (see Piepelow, 1997,
p. 102).
To summarise, the first liberalisation package was less of a revolutionary set of reforms than a
new concept, leading the way to more liberalisation. The US American market experience
certainly had an impact on the intensity of the liberalisation process in Europe, resulting in a
rather prudent approach. On the other hand, nations still wanted to ascertain that their
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individual airline industry was left with sufficient time to prepare for the new, liberalised
markets.
2.5.2.2.2 The Second Liberalisation Package
The first package of reforms was modest and insufficient for the commitments associated
with the agreement to move to a single market (see Button, Liberalising European Aviation,
1996, p. 282). Following the gradual liberalisation approach, the second liberalisation stage
was ratified by the Ministers' Council of the European Community in 1990.
The system of tariff approval remained unchanged, but the flexibility zones were further
widened to 3 sections with a larger range of discounts. For tariffs of more than 105% of the
reference rate, nations used the double disapproval system, by which the tariff of an applying
carrier was approved automatically unless two member nations disagreed. This new approval
system was proposed by the European Commission and had about the same effect as the
single approval concept that was used in bilateral agreements based on the country-of-origin
procedure." Automatic approval was also granted for discount and super discount tariffs,
which could lie between 80% and 94% (discount zone) and 30% and 79% (deep discount
zone) respectively (see Opitz, 1994, p. 69). The new system generally allowed carriers to set
their tariffs more freely without having to face regulatory constraints. In principal, tariffs
could only be approved once they reflected the cost structure of the applying airline, taking
into consideration an adequate return of the invested capital and leaving enough financial
resources to ensure appropriate safety and security standards (see Piepelow, 1997, pp. 105-
106).
Capacity restrictions and market entry were loosened for multiple designations by increasing
capacity - based on the 60:40 capacity allocation - by 7,5% from timetable period to timetable
period (see Opitz, 1996, p. 69 and Woerz, 1996, p. 106). However, the European Commission
maintained the right of restriction if capacity increases threatened member states' carriers
financially. To support route development and to promote regional airports, air transport
between regional airports was excluded from any form of capacity regulations (see Opitz,
1994, p. 69).
14 The single approval or country-of-origin procedure describes an approval concept with tariffs being approved
if the originating state approves them (see Woerz, 1996, p. 12).
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To lower market entry barriers, carrier designation was subject to further liberalisation.
Multiple designations were permitted, provided that in the previous timetable period 140,000
passengers were carried on a certain route, or if 800 return flights were operated. These
figures were further lowered to 100,000 passengers and 600 return flights in 1992.
Traffic to and from the carrier's home country (3rd and 4th freedom traffic, see below) was no
longer limited to categorised airports, but was allowed to all airports in the EC. The
possibility of operating services to and from third countries en route (5th freedom rights, see
below) was not linked to the usage of regional airports, and capacity for the 5th freedom traffic
was increased from 30% to 50% (see Optiz, 1994, p. 69).
Group exemptions as described for the first stage of liberalisation were still in place, but
slightly altered. Freight traffic was added, and the possibility of receiving group exemption
prolonged until 1992. Price fixing was only allowed in connection with interline agreements
and the transparency of airport slot allocation had to be enhanced, whereby new entrants
received priority treatment.
2.5.2.2.3 The Third Liberalisation Package
The third liberalisation stage comprised three provisions and came into effect on January 1S\
1993. The provision regarding traffic licences harmonised technical, financial and formal
approval and continuance of the restricted admission of air transport companies by EC
member nations (see Niejahr, 1998, p. 7). However, a traffic licence did not automatically
result in airline traffic rights or rights to enter a specific market. Discrimination of airline
owners based on nationality was formally abolished as long as an airline owner was an EC
citizen. This meant a shift from national ownership clauses to community ownership clauses
(see Opitz, 1994, pp. 70-7J, Woerz, 1996, p. 108, Steininger, 1999,p. 43).
Designation was completely eliminated as a restrictive factor for all flights in the European
Community and capacity restrictions between member nations were also removed. With the
exception of granting a foreign airline full access to the national market (8th freedom traffic,
see below) and certain airports, all freedom traffic became permissible with the third
liberalisation package (see Piepelow, 1997, p. 108). However, the European Commission was
allowed to freeze a financially endangered airline's capacity temporarily (Woerz, 1996, p.
109). Until March 1997, the 8th freedom rights were restricted to 50% capacity and the 8th
freedom routes had to be an extension of an international route. Full 8th freedom traffic in the
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Europe Union was only allowed from April 1st, 1997 (see Woerz, 1996, p. 109 and Steininger,
1999, p. 43).
Tariffs for scheduled services, non-scheduled services and freight traffic were not subject to
any form of approval. Nevertheless, the Commission and the member nations retained a veto
right to block excessively high or low fares. Consequently, member nations could block
tariffs that were disadvantageous for the travelling public. A veto could also be executed for
low tariffs that were below seasonal fare fluctuations and could possibly impact negatively on
operating carriers on routes or a bundle of routes (see Opitz, 1994, p. 72). The provision
indicating that price leadership was only allowed for carriers of member nations was
protective in character. Any foreign carrier intending to offer lower fares or new services was
not allowed to do so (see Woerz, 1996, p. 110). This left regulating European authorities with
a tutelary power and some authors consequently talked of the "Fortress Europe" in the context
of its obstinate refusal to open markets to international competition (see Woerz, 1996, p. 110).
All airline competition regulation laid out in the third package had to be applied within
nations as well. Group exemptions were still exercised, however, excluding co-operation and
co-ordination in ground handling services (see Woerz, 1996, p. 111).
A further important aspect of the act was the right of airlines to combine services and offer
them under one flight number. Lufthansa, for example, could offer a service from Munich to
Milan and from there with Alitalia onwards to Rome without the need to change the flight
number, thus suggesting a non-stop service. This so-called codesharing (see below for a
detailed discussion) was obviously an important factor for the presentation of connections in
CRSs, as non-stop flights were indicated higher on the screen than connecting flights.
In summary, the third liberalisation package opened the doors for a truly deregulated
European air transportation market. Market entry and tariff agreements were liberalised.
Deriving from the initial negative experience with the US deregulation, European legislators
still endowed individual nations with veto rights and certain protection tools to avoid price
wars. The 8th freedom traffic - at least theoretically - allowed any European carrier to operate
in the entire EU (see Opitz, 1994, p. 73).
The following table summarises key issues of the European liberalisation packages.
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Table 2.5: Progression of European Liberalisation Packages
Liberalisation Initial Status First Liberalisation Second Third Liberalisation
Area Package Liberalisation Package
Package
TARIFFS Bilateral approval Automatic approval of Automatic approval of No more tariff approval
through nations flexibility zones based on a flexibility zones based on required
reference tariff a reference tariff Countries are allowed to
Discount: 65-90% Discount: 80-94% block tariffs in cases of
Super Discount: 45-65% Super Discount: 30-79% predatory pricing or
Regular Economy: 95- excessively high or low
105% prices
Full Flexible: more than
106%
MARKET ENTRY. Bilateral One carrier from Multiple designation for Multiple designation for Free market entry with
Traffic each country routes with a minimum routes with a minimum limited Commission rights
passenger volume of passenger volume of
1988: 250,000 1991: 140,000
1989: 200,000 1992: 100,000
------------------- 1990: 180,000-.-- --51~Freedom - - No regulations, Up -to-30"/0 -of capaciy,- - - - -- Up to -50% capacity - - - - - - - -Free-m-a-rket-eritrY-witti - - --
Traffic not allowed provided a regional airport limited Commission rights
is involved-.--- -Cabota-gef - -- ------------------- No -re-gufiliiciris,- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -Up unifl-Ma-rch- 31St: -f997 --No regulations, No regulations,
not allowed not allowed not allowed 50% capacity of flights as
an extension of an
international flight
As from April 1", 1997 free
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -f988:- up to 55:4-5 - - - - - - - - - - ------------------------- _r_T!'!r:k_~t_~~!ry______________. Capacities Pro rata (50:50) 1991: up to 67,5:32,5 No more restrictions
1989: up to 60:40 1992: up to 75:25
COMPETITION Highly regulated Group exemptions for Group exemptions for Group exemptions for:
REGULATION -Capacity co-ordination -Capacity co-ordination -Schedule co-ordination
-Tariff consultation -Tariff consultation -Tariff consultation
-Slot allocation -Slot allocation -Slot allocation
-Joint CRSs -Joint CRSs -Joint CRSs
-Ground handling -Ground handling -Joint service on low-
-Pool revenue sharing volume routes
LICENSING OF National regulation National regulation National regulation Claim to be licensed if:
AIRLINES -Majority ownership by EU
citizen
-Sound financial basis
-Compliance with security
standards
Cabotage or the eighth freedom describes the permission to carry traffic between two points within a foreign nation.
2 Capacity generally describes the number of an aircraft's seats multiplied by the frequency of operation in a given
period. The capacity ratio outlines the maximum capacity spread between designated carriers in ASA.
Source: Piepelow, 1997, p. 110 and own amendments
2.5.2.3 Critical Issues of European Deregulation
By 1997 deregulation within the Europe Union was complete. Fixed fares were eliminated,
European airlines were given access to all European airports, and received the freedom to
operate within any European country and between any two European countries.
A negative aspect of European air transport market liberalisation is still group exemption
rules that legalise potentially anti-competitive behaviour. The underlying motivation - to
ensure sustainable market performance (particularly for struggling airlines) and to endow
carriers with the possibility of market entry - has never been achieved. Major group
exemptions have been granted for airline alliances involving flag carriers. Despite the
Commission's policy to exempt restrictive alliances if it considers that the economic
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efficiencies and overall benefits of the transaction outweigh the anti-competitive effect, there
is still room for market privileges for the beneficiaries (see Stragier, 1999, p. 2).
The position of national flag carriers has legally also not been touched in any of the
liberalisation packages. Although there is decreasing state involvement in flag carriers, some
of the big European airlines still receive financial, infrastructure and tax benefits. In a
statement, for example, the French Ministry of Industry denied any intentions to relinquish its
53% stake in Air France in early January 2001.
Despite deregulation, the common European air transportation system does not necessarily
allow for the proper functioning of a single market. Different airport slot allocation systems
(see 3.2.5.1.2) and the negotiation of bilateral agreements covering access to non-EU markets
do not guarantee common traffic standards and market conditions in the EU. Each member
still negotiates its air service agreements with non-EU members on an individual basis, while
some of these agreements even violate European competition law. The violation results from
the cumulative effect of a series of bilateral government-to-government agreements,
Particularly those granting US carriers access to the EU market. This is to the detriment of
those carriers whose host governments do not enjoy bilateral agreements with the USA, and
thus contravening the EU rule of free and fair competition for all EU airlines (see Woerz,
1996, p. 115 and The European Commission, 1998, p. 2). A consequence of the bilateral
agreements is that European airlines can, in most instances, not fly to non-member countries
from any point in the EU, but only from their home member state territory. In contrast, e.g.
US airlines can operate services from whatever airport in the US to a wide range of airports in
different EU member states. I 5 This might lead to competitive imbalances between European
and US-based airlines, and also to joint decisions based on factors other than corporate
strategy (see Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000, pp. 46-47). In 1998, the European Commission
thus launched legal proceedings against the eight existing open-skies deals the USA has with
EU countries, on the ground that they are against EU single market rules (see The European
Commission, 1998, p. 2). The findings are expected by late 2002.
Another negative aspect evolving from European deregulation is the fact that air traffic
Control (ATC) in the integration region has not been harmonised. This leads to friction within
the control systems and consequently to delays at main airports that operate far above their
15 Provided that underlying traffic rights exist.
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maximum capacity. The entire complex of ATC, airport operations (including capacities,
processes, finance and fiscal issues, noise emission control, and operation-time restrictions),
ground services and slot allocations needs to be harmonised in order to implement
deregulation (see Bittlinger, 1998, pp. 45-52). These related services pose a crucial limiting
factor on an EU airline's operational possibilities and only EU-wide harmonisation can lead
the way to a true single market.
2.5.3 Air Service Agreements
The existence of many different nationalities among players in the global air traffic industry
has influenced the bilateral bargaining process according to which countries exchange route
traffic rights with each other. The era of bilateralism began when the USA and Britain met in
Bermuda in 1946 to discuss rulings for their air traffic relationship (see Abeyratne, 1996, p.
805). What followed was a web of rules and regulations, pacts and agreements covering the
entire international airline industry.
Prior to European deregulation, the member states of the then EEC and EC did have mutual
agreements to regulate air traffic in the Community. With the third liberalisation package,
agreements of this kind became obsolete. But still, outside the EU, negotiations between
nations for air traffic regulation purposes are a reality of the air transport business. The
resulting air service agreements (ASA) are signed more or less as international treaties on a
bilateral basis and usually determine the following:
•
Routes, i.e. which routes can be served between the countries and to third countries
Designations, i.e. how many airlines from each country can serve these routes
Ownership (of airlines)
Capacities and how frequently flights can be offered
Tariffs, i.e. whether the fares airlines charge need government approval (see United States
General Accounting Office, 1995, p. 11)
•
•
•
•
First, the routes that may be served by the airline(s) of the negotiating nations are specified.
The nation then designates or licenses one or more carriers operating on the appointed routes
(for designation of airlines in ASA, see Scott, 2000, p. 96). Many bilateral agreements
additionally include specifications covering foreign ownership of a national airline. This is to
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avoid an airline still enjoying traffic rights under a bilateral agreements when its national
ownership structure has changed. 16
Bilateral agreements also determine carriers' capacities, and rules to regulate tariffs are being
negotiated. Capacity in most agreements is either of the "Bermuda type" (free determination)
or predetermination'? (see Scott, 2000, p. 96). The Bermuda type describes the absence of
control of frequencies or capacities on routes between the two contracting countries.
However, a protection of capacity allocation has been added to the original Bermuda
Agreement. If a carrier sees its interests adversely affected by the frequencies and capacities
of the other airline, there may be an ex post facto review of capacity and if required, an
alteration (see Doganis, 1986, p. 28).
Tariff regulation by most nations has been delegated to lATA. In the Bermuda Agreement of
1946, which acted as a model agreement for various other bilateral air service agreements,
IATAwas commissioned to regulate tariffs at tariff conferences (see Abeyratne, 1996, p.
806). The process of setting tariffs was regulated by IATA in such a way that direct
competition between carriers could be avoided (in most instances). However, tariffs still have
to be approved as part of ASA. In most instances, this is done by using what is called "limited
disapproval". This term subsumes dual disapproval and tariff acceptance within specified
price zones (see Scott, 2000, p. 96).
The following is an exemplary table of contents of an air transport agreement between the
Federal Republic of Germany and any other nation (seeNIA, Luftverkehrsabkommen, 2000).
16 However, anomalies do apply, e.g. Spanish Iberia's majority shareholding in Aerolinas Argentinas did not
affect the bilateral status of the carrier, since the bilateral partners continued to accept the carrier as the
Argentinean designated airline (for more anomalies see Doganis, 200 I, pp. 46-51).
17 Free determination allows for a totally free handling of capacity, frequency and equipment used by the
contracting states. Predetermination specifies capacities.
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Table 2.6: Air Service Agreement Content
Article 1: Definitions
Article 2: Grant of Traffic Rights
Article 3: Designation and Operating Authorization
Article 4: Revocation or Limitation of Operating Authorization
Article 5: Non-discrimination in respect of Charges
Article 6: Exemption from Customs Duties and other Charges
Article 7: Transfer of Earnings
Article 8: Principles Governing the Operation of Air Services
Article 9: Communication of Operating Information and Statistics
Article 10: Tariffs
Article 11: Commercial Activities
Article 12: Aviation Safety
Article 13: Aviation Security
Article 14: Examination of Travel Documents and of Inadmissible Persons
Article 15: Exchange of Views
Article 16: Consultations
Article 17: Settlement of Disputes
Article 18: Multilateral Conventions
Article 19: Registration with the International Civil Aviation Organization and with the United Nations
Article 20: Previous Agreements
Article 21: Ratification, Entry into Force, Duration
Article 22: Termination
Source: N/A, Luftverkehrsabkommen, 2000
Until recently, bilateral focus was on travel between the countries that were signatory to a
particular bilateral agreement, augmented by limited ability to serve beyond points. However,
individual airlines and airline networks require market access not just between two countries,
but also to catchment markets behind one or both countries. The general notion of ASA is
thus that these agreements are bilateral, although air traffic involves the connection 'of
rriultiple, international points (see United States Department of Transportation, 1999, p. 4).
This calls f.or a further challenge of the legal and infrastructure constraints.
2.5.4 Excursion: Freedoms of the Air
Air service agreements or bilaterals are negotiated by governments within the framework of
freedoms of the air. The following figure depicts the freedoms, which are subsequently
described.
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Figure 2.6: Freedoms of the Air
Homeland Country B First FreedomCountry A
Homeland Country A Country B Second Freedom
Homeland Country A Third Freedom
Homeland Country A Fourth Freedom
Homeland Country A Country B Fifth Freedom
Country A Homeland Country B Sixth Freedom
Homeland Country A Country B Seventh Freedom
,/' _"._"'\ ~
Country A Eighth Freedom I CabotageHomeland
Source: Pompl, 1998, p. 299
The freedoms visualised above are rather self descriptive. The five basic freedoms were
defined in Chapter II of the Chicago Convention of 1944 and came into force on April 4th,
1947 (see Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944, Chapter II). Participating
governments then negotiated the exchange of standard traffic rights. The Chicago Convention
managed to transform the dogma of unrestricted national air sovereignty into a more specific
set of codes guaranteeing access to foreign air space on a scale of increasing commercial
value (see Lyth, 1997, p. 157). These traffic rights are usually exchanged on a reciprocal
basis. The following describes different freedoms ofthe air.
• First freedom: overflying rights
Second freedom: rights to land for technical reasons
Third/fourth freedoms: carry traffic to and from the home country
Fifth freedom: carry traffic to and from third countries en route
•
•
•
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A freedom which has neither been recognised nor designed in the Chicago Convention is the
• Sixth Freedom: carriage of traffic between two foreign nations via the nation in which the
carrier is registered (see Hanlon, 1996, p. 74).
The sixth freedom traffic in this respect can be seen as an altered form of the fifth freedom
traffic as origin and destination are not the country of registration.
The seventh and eighth freedoms were also not specified m the Chicago Convention.
However, they are subject to bilateral air service agreements
• Seventh freedom: a carrier is allowed to operate stand-alone services outside the territory
of its home country and to carry traffic between two nations.
• Eighth freedom: an airline has permission to carry traffic between two points within a
foreign nation. This is more commonly known as cabotage. 18
Cabotage describes air traffic on domestic routes. These rights are generally reserved for
national carriers and are only rarely granted to foreign airlines. Services between the grantor
nation of the traffic right and its overseas territories or former colonies, (e.g. UK-Bermuda,
France-French Guyana) are also included in this definition. Cabotage restrictions were lifted
in 1997 by the third liberalisation package within the EU and cabotage is the ultimate aim of
global air transport liberalisation.
2.5.5 European-US Bilaterals
The US-Netherlands aviation market was one of the fastest growing markets in the world in
the mid to late 1990s. The exceptional growth rates were largely attributed to the Netherlands'
longstanding liberal aviation relationship with the USA, which lead it to become the first
European country to sign an "open skies agreement" with the USA in September 1992. In
brief, the key elements of this liberal bilateral agreement are (see Doganis, 2001, p. 32):
•
Open route access - airlines from either country can fly to any point in the other with full
traffic rights
Unlimited fifth freedom rights
Open access for charter carriers
Multiple designation of airlines
•
•
•
18 The term cabotage is French and means "coastal shipping".
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Airline Industry 59
• No frequency or capacity control
• No tariff controls (except if tariffs 'are too high or too low)
• Airlines are free to codeshare or to make other commercial agreements
Deregulating markets and providing national airlines with the possibilities to form
collaborations with competitors are ways of gaining open skies agreements from foreign
governments. In return for allowing the Dutch carrier KLM to join forces with the USA's
Northwest Airlines, the US DOT won agreement from the Dutch government for US airlines
to serve the Netherlands and to carry Dutch traffic to points beyond the Netherlands (see
Miller, 1997, p. 65).
With the evident benefits of the US-Netherlands ASA and the KLM-Northwest alliance in
focus, nine smaller countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg,
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) all signed open skies agreements with the US in 1995.
The USA and Germany had been liberalising their markets since, in September 1993, signing
a Memorandum of Consultation (MOC) that aimed to achieve open skies by November 1997.
The open skies agreement was initialled in February 1996 when United Airlines and
Lufthansa applied for antitrust immunity in the USA to allow an expanded alliance (which
became the Star Alliance in 1997). Antitrust immunity was granted in the USA in November
1996, which in tum facilitated the official signing of the ASA (see also Sacher, 1997). Surely
the most important aspect of the open skies agreement between Germany and the USA was
the granting of free market access for airlines of both nations to all destinations, either
through individual services or codesharing operations (see N/A, Deutsch-amerikanische
Abkommen im Luftverkehr, 1996, p. 6). Despite the limited annual capacity additions
permitted since the signing of the MOC, growth in the US-Germany market has been rather
lacklustre in recent years (see more in Nuutinen, 1997, pp. 5-6, also see there for more history
and ASA's for other regions in Europe).
The Association of European Airlines (AEA) has a policy statement proposing the
Transatlantic Common Aviation Area (TCAA) and therefore calls for further multilateral
liberal isation in aviation. This would include a full harmonisation of the US and the EU skies,
a relaxation of regulatory barriers, a complete overhaul of airline ownership restrictions and
the establishment of a single, treaty-backed governing body. The USA, however, seems to be
reluctant to embrace the European TCAA proposal, thereby lifting limits on the 8th freedom
traffic and ownership rules. From the governmental side, union opposition is the most
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commonly cited reason for this reluctance (see Walker, Worlds Apart, 2000, p. 29). AEA's
objective is to replace the current fragmented (since it is nationally controlled) regulatory
regime with a unified system that gives airlines full commercial opportunities. There is,
however, a proposal that their activities be governed by a common body of aviation rules,
thereby avoiding unnecessary regulation. This proposal was also backed by the EU Transport
Commissioner and is being discussed at high levels both in the USA and in Europe.
2.5.6 Critical Aspects of Global Deregulation
The above-mentioned deregulation efforts in the US and Europe are limited to geographical
regions. Traffic between those liberalised regions and beyond is, in most cases, still subject to
bilateral agreements. Considering the increasingly global nature of the airline industry, the
current status of liberalisation is not satisfactory and, from a European perspective, most
likely not keeping with common European law (see above and The European Commission,
1998). The ultimate goal of airline liberalisation must be open skies agreements between
individual nations or groups of nations and integration regions, giving airlines full access to
one another's markets. 19
The USA signed their first open skies agreement with the Netherlands in 1992, an action
closely linked to the granting of antitrust immunity to the partnership between KLM and
Northwest (see United States General Accounting Office, 1995, p. 24). The US DOT links
antitrust immunity to an open skies agreement between the home countries of carriers
involved in a partnership. Antitrust immunity exempts airlines from US antitrust laws and
allows them to co-ordinate tariffs, introduce joint FFPs, and to jointly negotiate with travel
agencies and corporate clients. On the whole, antitrust immunity permits collaborating
airlines to act as one entity_2°It is, however, debatable whether the link between granting
I
antitrust immunity and open skies agreements is necessarily economically sensible. Antitrust
immunity, as a prerequisite for open skies, surely represents a final effort to maintain control
of an industry that is otherwise liberalised. The proposed British Airways and American
Airlines collaboration exemplifies the disadvantageous consequences of linking antitrust
immunity and open skies. Since the two carriers have not as yet agreed to the conditions
19 By 2000 almost half of the world's traffic was moving in open markets, such as between North America and
most of Europe, between North America and some countries in Asia, among the countries of Europe, within
Oceania, and among many countries in the Americas (see Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 200 I, p. 38).
20 The latest - January 2002 - partnership to receive antitrust immunity was Delta Air Lines and Air France, thus
paving the way for an open skies accord between the USA and France.
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associated with the granting of antitrust immunity, open skies between the UK and the USA is
still pending - at the expense of other UK and US carriers serving the North Atlantic.t'
However, even open skies only warrants partial deregulation of air traffic, since the USA does
not grant s" freedom/cabotage traffic to foreign carriers, which keeps them from operating
domestically in the US. This means that European carriers cannot build an efficient feeder
network in the US, whereas the US carriers, through the 5th freedom traffic, are able to set-up
feeder services in Asia and Europe. National ownership clauses further inhibit total air traffic
liberalisation. They stipulate that airlines must be substantially owned and effectively
controlled by citizens of the designated nation. As a result of this regulation, an airline would
lose its traffic rights if nationals from other than of the designated nation were to control the
carrier. The same applies to minority share volumes that do allow for the execution of
effective control. The USA has limited the control of a national carrier by foreigners to 25%
and has ruled that the foreign equity stake must not allow foreigners to control the airline (see
Steininger, 1999, pp. 48-49). As a result, international mergers and acquisitions have not yet
taken place. To abolish the ownership clause, further deregulation on a multilateral basis will
have to be accepted.
In the meantime, industry specialists call for a rapid solution to these problems by the.
establishments ofbi-regional agreements or a "phased multilateralism", e.g. between the USA
and Europe. The latter would establish agreements between a limited number of nations to
Commence a truly open market - other countries could follow successively, depending on their
geographic disposition. The proposed TCAA is a step in the right direction and could serve,
once implemented, as an example of open air transport market access between other regions.
Whether air traffic will ever be fully liberalised is an open question. The liberalisation trend in
the telecommunication and energy industries advertises positive aspects in this regard. The
current or next downward cycle could help alter the general attitude towards national
ownership restrictions on mergers and acquisitions. Politicians will have to re-think policies
When bankruptcy becomes the only logical alternative to an international merger. On the
product side, deregulation did reach the intended goals. As a result of increased competition,
air fares fell and the productivity of airlines increased. Frequencies grew and smaller cities
and regions were added to the air transport network. A disadvantage of growth is the resultant
21 British Midland, the UK's second largest carrier wants the EU to take action against the restrictive, anti-
competitive situation on the North Atlantic markets, which impedes the carrier from entering UK-USA services.
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overcrowded airports, since airport development did not adequately follow growth trends in
air transportation.
2.5.7 Implications of Deregulation for Airline Partnerships
In the long regulation phase, airlines did not regard co-operation as a competitive measure.
The regulative systems and state protectionism left enough room for business survival and
modest development. Despite constant losses, airlines found themselves in a secure
environment of state funding and subsidies as well as competition control.
Deregulation became one of the main drivers for airlines to become involved in partnerships.
Liberalisation gave way to a whole new set of competitive actions and operational
performance options. With bans on capacity, frequencies and designation lifted, carriers could
engage in more competitive action. Deregulation and liberalisation did not, however, open the
global aviation industry in ways other formerly regulated industries had. With ASA
constraints against expanding market coverage, airlines have increasingly chosen to co-
operate horizontally in order to overcome regulatory hurdles as well as organisational
development repression. Alliances have provided a way for carriers to mitigate the limitations
of ownership restrictions, licensing and control regulation. This lead to the paradox that
deregulation promoted horizontal airline co-operation to help leverage their position, but at
the same time, partnering was initially used to overcome still existing regulations.
On the other hand, alliance building as a consequence of liberalised markets is often seen as a
threat to free market competition. The disappearance of regulatory constraints increases
competition between market players, but simultaneously the risk of anti-competitive
behaviour grows. European authorities especially, feeling somewhat threatened by US airlines
and policies, are calling for a competition policy which prevents regulatory barriers being
replaced by anti-competitive agreements between airlines and airline networks respectively,
which significantly reduce or eliminate the benefits of liberalisation (see Stragier, 1999, p. 2).
Clearly, airline deregulation has driven collaboration but has not lead to the same set of
corporate co-operation opportunities given to, for example, other global network industries
such as energy and telecommunication. In this respect it is questionable whether international
or at least regional deregulation equals market liberalisation. However, the airline industry is
on the cutting edge of becoming a truly global business.
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2.6 Summary and Implications
The above has elucidated the status, developmental trends and the track from regulated to
more deregulated and liberalised air transport markets. Most of the aspects are highly
significant for the future development of international air transport towards an increasingly
global and liberalised industry sector.
Decreasing yields, geographically fragmented, cyclical market development and further
deregulation therefore precipitate advancement and give rise to new competitive structures
and propagate nations' new policies in dealing with their air transport sector. The last quarter
of 2001 spurred this development - in particular in Europe - with an even more market-
focused approach towards the airline industry emerging. On the other hand, it has also
illustrated actions governments take in order to protect and maintain their national airline
industry. The drastic shifts in the air transport business after September 11th, 2001 have
illustrated two separate ways of dealing with the seemingly liberalised industry to redress
extreme economic problems. While Europe has executed a strict hands-off policy, banning
any direct state subsidies, the USA has provided its airline sector with a relief package of
USD 15 billion. The advantages and disadvantages of both approaches are arguable, although
state subsidies seem an anachronism in a supposedly deregulated and liberalised industry,
which should ideally operate in free market circumstances and move to global consolidation.
The key elements in the airline industry's evolution have been government regulation and,
more recently, deregulation. Governments around the world generally continue to reduce their
regulatory roles in air transportation, a trend predicted to continue in the future. Deregulation
as such allows market forces to control the interaction of all players in an industry and fosters
development of new business models. It is in deregulated markets that interairline
partnerships and low-cost air transport emerge, which offer new product variations, can better
meet passenger demands and induce air travel. In order to become and stay competitive and
provide passengers with efficient, affordable air travel, airlines need to engage freely in
network development - also across national borders. The results of further deregulation will
be vigorous competition triggered by new entrants, exits by unprofitable carriers, and
execution of partnership strategies. Incumbent flag carriers will only be able to weather these
challenges once nations abstain from their financial involvement. Since privatisation of
national carriers often requires capital beyond the capability of local financial markets, many
nations are revising rules governing the level of allowable foreign investment, thus opening
possibilities for further interairline capital linkages.
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There is a world trend towards more liberalised air service agreements between countries.
Historically, bilateral agreements placed restrictions on the number of carriers that could
operate in a market and on the level of service they were allowed to offer. Many air service
agreements negotiated in the past decade are open skies agreements, allowing carriers of each
signing country to (mostly) offer whatever service they desire, fettered only by competition.
Although restrictive bilateral agreements still exist, such as those between the United States
and the United Kingdom, they are increasingly being renegotiated with added services.
Ambitious proposals have been floated for wider liberalisation in future, such as between the
United States and the entire European Union, or between the Asian and American regions.
This supra-national negotiation of air service agreements is urgently required in order to
migrate to maximised market liberalisation. Liberalising air travel between entire regions
therefore best meets the demands of airlines to freely engage in feeder/defeeder services and
to provide passengers with travel convenience.
However, while deregulation and liberalisation have become buzzwords during the past few
years of passenger air transport development, their effects on development are ambivalent.
Reasons that once motivated nations to regulate their domestic air transport and lead to the
restriction of foreign air service providers entering a country, still prevent governments from
taking the final step to full deregulation and liberalisation. Interestingly, gradual deregulation
and liberalisation statutorily and organisationally provided air transport operators with the
possibilities of establishing new business models, such as horizontal partnerships. At the same
time, it made these inter-company actions absolutely necessary to circumvent continued
restriction.
Both issues, deregulation and liberalisation, will continue their forceful impact on the
development of passenger air transport. Globally, the airline industry needs to move away
from unequal competition, resulting from some nations being allowed to protect their
unprofitable carriers, as well as disproportionate competition when airlines cannot operate
where and how they wish. It is clear that airlines operate within the limitations of the specific
characteristics of the products/services they provide. Additionally, they must obey strict
safety and environmental standards that are to be assessed and continuously controlled by
national authorities or other independent bodies. However, the overall obligation of passenger
air carriers is to operate business models that allow them to tackle the challenges emerging
from their pervasive dependency on economic cycles, while safely and securely meeting
passenger as well as public demands.
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3 Passenger Air Transport - Competitive Structures and
Product/Service Characteristics
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 primarily gave a quantitative and classifying description of the air transport
industry, its main regulative impediments and developmental challenges. This information
serves as a point of departure in studying critical issues in the air transport industry. The
purpose of this chapter is to examine air transport competition structures as well as passenger
airlines' particular product and service characteristics.
The shape of passenger air transport rivalry has naturally played an important role in the
industry's development. When subject to regulation, the composition of competition between
carriers and value chain providers was established to their common benefit, but to the
detriment of passengers' needs. Then, deregulation reshuffled rivalry, and the new statutory
circumstances continue to impact on the weight that specific competitive forces exert on
Participants in the air transport industry sector. New technologies and business models
revolutionised air transportation in some parts and gave rise to developmental trends that were
inconceivable some years ago.
However, air transportation operates within the constraints of the products and services it
creates, and these characteristics are unchangeable. All models to increase competitiveness of
air transportation, and to curb its sensitivity to economic cycles, must always work with these
fixtures. In further advancing and modernising the air transport industry, it is certainly the
regulative boundaries, but also these rules that continue to characterise development.
The examinations of this chapter are therefore focused on an endogenous industry perspective
and deduce key bearings that induce the formation of interairline partnerships.
3.2 Air Transport Competitive Structures
Every industry has its individual structures, or is endowed with certain fundamental
Characteristics. Environmental conditions (technology economy, society and the political
framework) as well as the industry structure itself, determine the overall rules of competition
and the strategic alternatives of a firm.
A very effective tool in diagnosing airline competition and the attractiveness of the airline
industry as such is Porter's Industry Analysis, which is used to structure the succeeding
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sections (see Porter, 1980, pp. 3-5 and Porter, 1985, p. 6). There are, of course, a number of
other approaches and models, but for the airline industry, this is still the most accepted and
relevant approach to use (for other sources using this approach, see e.g. Diegruber, 1991,
Steininger, 1999, Netzer, 1999) According to Porter's analysis, the attractiveness of an
industry is determined by the following factors:
•
Intensity of rivalry and competition, i.e. between established companies in an industry
Threat through potential new entrants determined by entry barriers
Threat of substitute products or services
Bargaining power of suppliers
Bargaining power of buyers (i.e. passengers)
•
•
•
•
It becomes evident that competition in an industry is not only determined by the competitors
themselves, but by other forces as well. The collective strength of these factors determines the
profit potential of an industry. In the following sections, factors influencing the intensity of
competition in global aviation are introduced and discussed.
3.2.1 Competition Between Established Airlines
Presently, the intensity of competition between established carriers in the main city pair
markets can be described as very fierce. Certainly, some markets are serviced by monopolies,
while others such as the attractive North Atlantic and Asian intercontinental and continental
connections as well as many domestic connections, are highly competitive. While in the era of
pre-deregulation, airlines operated in a protected environment, market forces are currently
'affecting carriers more seriously and leading to more intense rivalry. Components of airline
competition intensity are determined by the following factors (see Jackel, 1991, p. 253):
• The total number of airlines and their equipment represent an oligopolistic competition
structure.
• The transportation product is generally homogenous and perceived to be a commodity,
thus product differentiation is complex.
•
A high percentage of fixed costs calls for an optimised utilisation of capacities, i.e,
achieving high load factors.
Market exit barriers are higher in practice than theoretically described. This leads to
continued trends in market behaviour and in some instances to state subsidies of flag
carriers.
•
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During the phase of regulation, both domestically and internationally, competition between
established carriers in enclosed markets like Europe and the USA was comparatively low.
State control mechanisms on competition and operation of airlines kept the number of carriers
within reasonable limits. Operating in markets that were characterised by high fare levels on
the one side and a constant state capital influx on the other side, especially in Europe, gave
airlines little incentives to compete intensively with one another. In pre-deregulation years,
European air transport in particular was governed by entry restrictions by means of bilateral
control of traffic rights, capacity control through pools, and price control through multilateral
negotiation within lATA (see Lyth, 1997, p. 159). Even though lATA was commissioned
with the setting of fares on behalf of airlines and individual states respectively, the effective
cartel's members still had to consent unanimously. Accordingly, fare levels were set high in
order to, virtually, cover the costs of the least efficient carrier. This dearth of price
competition resulted in easy profits for the more efficient American carriers and survival for
the remaining market players. Consequently, competition was low, and to some extent,
"managed" by the regulatory framework.
Market liberalisation thus had a strong impact on competition. With state subsidies decreased
or abolished, an increasing number of flag carriers fully or partly privati sed, and with entry
barriers lowered, competition acquired a whole new face. Within the boundaries of ASA,
airlines were forced to rival one another in the global marketplace. The notion of an airline
being a nation's insignia reflecting sovereignty and technical expertise started to fade and
SOonpublic demand increased to tum carriers into profitable companies.
Airlines had to obey the new environment. Marketing, in particular advertising and sales
promotion, became an increasingly important factor in airlines' daily business, which it had,
in fact, previously never been (see Hanlon, 1996, p. 39). The struggle to increasingly satisfy
demanding passengers in order to cover high fixed costs became the norm. Price
differentiation was made possible and widely used by progressive approval processes. The
introduction of new classing structures combined with travel restrictions made pricing
strategies less transparent and leveraged rivalry.
Product differentiation, previously hardly contemplated, became a competitive tool. lnflight
services were increasingly altered to target specific markets. Frequent flyer programmes as
well as waiting lounges and transportation facilities beyond airports were used to attract more
passengers and deliver formerly non-integrated services in a complete package.
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Competition intensity was furthermore increased by the overcapacities of some carriers.
Having a wide range of inventory at their disposal, incumbents could build capacity, which
led to a mismatch of seat demand and supply on some routes. However, overcapacities also
allowed airlines operating 6th freedom traffic (see 2.5.4) to dump seats on the (regional)
catchment market, but still fill beyond-flights from their main hubs. This legally questionable
behaviour, managed to drive fares down and increase competition in many city pairs (see
Steininger, 1999, p. 101).
Airlines will have to be restructured to survive in today's competitive environment where,
besides original industry-inherent competition, new entrants and charter carriers, as well as
low-cost competitors represent a threat to their economic wellbeing. This is why all
international carriers run cost-cutting programmes and productivity enhancement schemes;
why they rationalise their fleet structure, outsource business units that are not directly related
to the core business, and change the organisational and operational structures.
3.2.2 Passenger Air Transport Market Entry Barriers
Legal and economic entry barriers impede airlines from setting foot in new markets and
impose significant constraints on market entry, which is regulated by state authorities in two
different ways. On a national, statutory scale, a carrier's market entry is controlled by
licensing the commercial air transport operation through government air transport agencies.
Historically, the reasons for a national control of airline licences lie in the protection of
incumbent carriers (economic considerations) and in safeguarding technical standards
(technical considerations). In addition to this national operating licence concession, a
concession.to operate scheduled services internationally is usually required (see Pompl, 1998,
pp. 294-296). International market entry regulation is attained by bi- or multilateral
negotiations of landing rights as determined by the ASA (see Schmidt, 1993, p. 33 and see
2.5.3). All of these concessions are mandatory and are associated with sets of technical and
operational prerequisites with which an airline has to comply.
For intra-European traffic, legal market entry barriers are no longer in place, provided that the
respective national aviation authority has approved operational standards. Economic
considerations in licensing air transport services are therefore no longer applicable. For traffic
beyond intra-European routes, ASA can act as a constraint for new entrants as well as
incumbents (see 2.5.3).
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Market entry into the domestic USA market is widely liberalised for US carriers, with the
Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) being in charge of the licensing process. Constraints
regarding international market development for US-based carriers also derive from ASA with
third countries.
3.2.2.1 Structural and Market-inherent Entry Barriers
One can generally categorise economic barriers to entry into structural and market inherent
barriers on the one side and strategic barriers on the other, as developed by existing market
players to fight potential competition (see Piepelow, 1997, p. 88).
Structural and market-inherent barriers consist of the following:
• Product differentiation and branding
Contestable markets
Cost advantages
Economies of size
•
•
•
Product differentiation does not represent a continuous barrier for market entry. Airlines can
potentially differentiate their product in a way that allows them to successfully participate in
markets once they comply with certain operational standards. Airline product features are
usually commodities such as standardised inflight features (seats, food) or passenger handling
facilities, which leave room for individualised feature design. The same applies to branding.
While incumbents rely on their brand status, especially in the high yield business sector,
markets entrants can also successfully establish new brands in the market niche they serve
(see 3.2.3 for new entrants). However, the setting up of FFPs, the possibility of offering
discounts to the travel trade, corporate clients and individuals, as well as interline-agreements
with other carriers, can pose market entry barriers. Especially FFPs have become strong
marketing and CRM (Customer Relationship Management) tools in global aviation. Airlines,
in particular those serving business segments that are not able to offer passenger and
corporate loyalty programmes, will possibly face obstacles to successfully entering markets
Successfully (see Wells, 1993, p. 196). Small carriers, lacking sufficient networks and
operating in highly competitive markets, can be affected by the benefit structure of
incumbents' FFPs, which thereby become a serious threat to successful market entry (see
discussion on market entry implications of FFPs in Hanlon, 1996, pp. 49-51 and the section
On FFP 3.4.3.1).
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The contestable market theory, with specific reference to deregulation, was conceptually
evaluated in chapter 2. With regards to market entry barriers, a contestable market exists if it
is possible to enter a market, and if the provision of a specific offer does not cause any sunk
costs in the case of a market exit (see Beyhoff, 1995, pp. 70-71). The air transportation market
can be generally argued to be a contestable market as sunk costs are relatively low. The
largest investment that an airline has to make is the acquisition of a single or fleet of aircraft.
Purchasing or leasing aircraft results in costs that are by no means inescapably sunk. As there
is a well-developed market for used aircraft, inventory can potentially be disposed of and re-
deployed elsewhere.
Finance does, however, pose an entry barrier. While the equipment itself is not affected by
sunk costs, financing inventory is an entry barrier which also affects the financial structure of
an airline. The huge capital requirements needed to establish an airline with a network of
destinations limits the pool of likely entrants. Despite the sunk costs being low on the
inventory side, which limits the investment risk, volatile capital markets are not in favour of
the low-margin air transport sector, thus making fund raising difficult.
For some of the above-mentioned product differentiation tools, however, sunk costs do exist.
Individually designed FFPs, CRSs and distribution systems or networks, as well as costs for
marketing campaigns can be considered sunk costs. Capital spent on IT solutions and
advertising cannot be recouped if the airline decides to, or is forced to withdraw from the
industry; those costs are then inescapably sunk. This is why at least three compelling reasons
reject the application of the contestable market theory to airline competition as a means of
lowering market entry barriers.
• Slot allocation: Slots can be considered main, but intangible, airline assets. Their financial
value is difficult to judge, although they determine the route-related success of an
operation. Especially in highly condensed markets, slot allocation poses a serious threat to
airlines' operations. Slots in Europe are allocated at co-ordination conferences, but
carriers with a more mature market presence are given priority in slot allotments.
Economically interesting slots have usually already been taken by incumbents (see
Piepelow, 1997, p. 89).
• Size effects: The airline industry has certain elements of economies of scale. There are
particular advantages to size, but the benefits of being large are not derived from
conventional economies of scale, but from opportunities to obtain economies of scope.
The effects of scope apply particularly in marketing, and specifically with regard to the
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•
benefits of widespread image campaigns. The marketing advantages of larger airlines also
surface with regard to CRSs, FFPs, commission overrides and corporate discounts as well
as fare agreements, as these aspects require extensive networks to be most effective.
Agency loyalty programmes, especially, are more beneficial for travel agents when they
promote a carrier that already has a dominant position in the market (see Steininger, 1999,
pp. 213-216 and United States General Accounting Office, International Aviation, 1998,
pp. 16-17).
Route Density: Most important are the opportunities large carriers have to reap the
benefits of route density by configuring their networks in a hub and spoke pattern (see
Hanlon, 1996, pp. 39-40). Hub and spoke configurations not only offer large carriers
financial benefits, but predominantly organisational advantages (some of the mentioned
terms and associations are described in 3.3.2).
3.2.2.2 Strategic Entry Barriers
In describing strategic entry barriers, an understanding of the three basic dimensions of
market entry barriers is helpful (see Piepelow, 1997, p. 89). These are:
• Decrease of market entry incentives
Preventive increase in structural entry barriers
Increase in fear of possible retaliation
•
•
The announcement of predatory pricing behaviour is probably the most common practice in
reducing market entry incentives for new market players (see Porter, 1980, p. 14). In such
cases, an incumbent will announce that, in the event of a new market entry, it would react
aggressively in its pricing strategy (see also Mohr and Rodermann, 1995, p. 58). However,
there are at least two risks associated with this practice. Incumbents could damage their own
financial performance if aggressive pricing were to materialise. Secondly the mere
announcement does not necessarily represent a lasting remedy against new market entrants.
These risks, combined with regulatory aspects condemning this type of competitive practice,
result in such a strategy being burdened with major disadvantages (see Piepelow, 1997 pp.
89-90).
An increase in structural entry barriers usually consists of restricting access to, or increasing
prices for input factors, including marketing channels. By artificially raising a rival's cost to
entering a market, the incumbent could successfully control potential rivalry. Possible ways of
doing so are vertical integration, exclusive contracts, and pre-emptive rights. As far as
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competition at established hubs is concerned, incumbents usually control the most attractive
parts of the airport infrastructure through exclusive user rights and long leases, making it
difficult for a prospective competitor to gain a foothold. Such actions are, however, strictly
monitored by the competition authorities in both the USA and the EU.
Established carriers can incite fear of retaliation by, e.g., deliberately entering markets that are
served by new entrants. Competition is thus spread from direct competition routes to new
markets. A potential entrant's expectation regarding the reaction of existing competitors
might deter entry. Certain conditions, such as a history of vigorous retaliation against entrants,
a well-filled war chest, widely known commitment to the industry and an industry structure
which limits the ability of the industry to absorb a new firm, favour retaliation strategies by
individual players (see Porter, 1980, p. 14).
3.2.3 New Entrants as a Novel Factor in Air Transport Competition
The increasing number of new entrants poses a considerable threat to established carriers.
New entrants increase overall capacity and they can lead, especially in the case of
unconventional low-cost carriers, to substantial changes in the market structure. The
following sections analyse some of the forms of carriers entering the established passenger air
transport market and thus challenging existing market players.
3.2.3.1 Low-Cost Operators in the USA
At the start of deregulation in the USA, the domestic market saw a large number of new
.carriers serving interstate markets. These operators intended to find niches from which to
compete with incumbents - the well-established carriers. In the first six years after domestic
deregulation, the number of carriers operating domestically rose from 36 to 123 (see Andrey,
1992, p. 325). Some new entrants chose the premium market as their terrain, focusing on
business travel and direct connections between main corporate centres. However, the majority
of new carriers established themselves as "light carriers", operating on a low-cost basis and
offering inexpensive fares. The operational cost advantage of the light carriers was up to 50%
of that of the major carriers in the market, as they offered a "low-cost, low-frill" service (see
Steininger, 1999, p. 84 and figure p. 85). This cost advantage was passed on to the passenger
so that in the same period mean domestic fares dropped by 34% (see Dresner et al., 1996, p.
309).
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An often-cited example of a successful new low-cost entrant in the US domestic market is
Southwest Airlines.r' Southwest has developed a new philosophy towards business operation.
The overall aim is to cut unit costs consistently whilst keeping the highest standards of
service, but with a "low-frills" appeal. The following summarises a few aspects of the
carrier's performance as a niche player in the US market. These factors can be considered
symptomatic of other start-up, low-cost carriers:
Operational Aspects
• Use only one type of aircraft, the Boeing 737 series. Advantages lie in reduced training
requirements for pilots and cabin crew. All pilots are able to fly, cabin crew are able to
serve, maintenance employees are able to work on, and provisioning staff are qualified to
stock every aircraft in Southwest's fleet (see Freiberg, 1996, p. 55). Further advantages of
the undiversified choice of equipment are more efficient spare warehousing and the
possibility to negotiate better arrangements with the mainframe and engine manufacturers.
In addition, maintenance costs can be minimised by ensuring that MRO (maintenance,
repair, overhaul) providers are required to fulfil consistent, predictable airline demands.
Use of secondary airports and airports close to business districts of main centres on a
point-to-point basis with frequent service (see Dresner et al. 1996, p. 311).
Ground times for aircraft are cut to a minimum. Turnaround times of about 20 minutes
allow for up to 3 hours extended daily aircraft usage, as opposed to hub and spoke carriers
(see Walker, The King of Low-Cost, 1999, p. 38). Aircraft utilisation lies at
approximately 11 hours per day (see Doganis, 2001, p. 134).
Ground operation staff and aircraft staff have the flexibility to step outside previously
defined job categories to get an aircraft off the ground as quickly as possible (see
Freiberg, 1996, pp. 57-60).
•
•
•
Commercial Aspects
• The short-haul dominance of Southwest Airline is evident from a consistent market share
of at least 60% on almost every non-stop city-pair market it serves (see Freiberg 1996, p.
6). In most cases this is due to the type of connection and Southwest's competitive fare
structure (for a discussion of Southwest's trip strategy also see Economic Strategy
Institute, 2000, pp. 17-21).
22 Southwest Airlines operates out of Dallas/Texas with currently a total fleet of 358 aircraft.
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• Despite a loss during one quarter in 2001, Southwest has always been profitable ever
since its founding in the 1970s; an anomaly on the US air transport scene.
Organisational and Governmental Aspects
• Lean hierarchical structures focusing on fast decision making and informal ways of
communication (see Freiberg, 1996, p. 76).
• Southwest Airlines has a strong tradition of profit-sharing by employees by offering their
staff stock ownership. The airline has thus established a high ratio of employee
commitment that, in turn, has lead to one of the lowest staff fluctuation rates in the
industry.
• Execution of internal marketing strategies by which frontline, contact employees are
treated as internal customers (see Czaplewski et al., 2001).
• Due to the overall business success and fmancial stability of the firm, the company has
never been forced to launch furlough action, which increases perceived job security and
loyalty.
• Competitive wages and high productivity.
Passenger Service/lnjlight Service Aspects
• Initial focus on interstate, short-haul traffic.
• No interlining (see below for types of collaboration).
• Single class service, no pre-assignment in seat selection.
• High seating density through reduced seat pitch.
• No hot meals on board, only peanuts and "fast snacks" on their newly introduced long-
haul flights (more than 1000 miles) and generally no onboard entertainment.
Marketing, Sales Aspects
• No use of established, globally operating CRSs and very high ratio of direct sales through
call centres and their own Internet site. Revenue is thus taken up-front and not via
settlement plans.
• Ticketless travel.
• Offering significantly lower fares and thus stimulating traffic in newly entered markets='
(see Walker, The King of Low-Cost, 1999, p. 42).
23 During a 1991 to 1994 survey period the Southwest's entry in a market resulted in an average fare decline of
48% and a traffic increase 0[200% (see Dresner et aI., 1996, p. 309). •
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Despite initial successes by some low-cost carriers, deregulation promoted a high rate of
concentration in the domestic US market. Since supply drastically exceeded demand,
overcapacities and fierce price competition forced a number of carriers out of the market (for
an overview of market entries and exits resulting from deregulation, see Williams, 1993, pp.
14-16). The market consolidated almost naturally and is currently dominated by some mega-
carriers, including the low-cost giant Southwest, and regionally established smaller airlines.
Start-up firms, however, still operate, but in many cases their task is limited to feeding traffic
into the major's hubs.
To intentionally counteract these start-up carriers and maintain their passenger base,
incumbents traditionally used a variety of strategies. As they could often not lower their cost
base to equal light carriers' expense structures, they had to use a different mix of manoeuvres
to remain competitive and profitable. Amongst these were: mergers and alliances,
codesharing, hub and spoke systems, new fare structures, incentive schemes for travel
agencies, CRSs, FFPs, and making use of restricted infrastructure like airport slots and gates.
In addition, incumbents offered prohibitively low fares to fight new entrants in selected
markets. Supported by the post-deregulation failure of the competition authorities in the US,
the first wave of new entrants could be successfully defeated.
After the Gulf War ignited a global air transportation crisis, low-cost carriers were revitalised,
spurred by Southwest's continuous success. Southwest, however, managed to dominate
markets by cutting average fares and consequently stimulating more traffic. Using the
Oakland-Burbank route, the "California Corridor", as an example, Southwest's entry resulted
in a 55% fare drop and a six-fold increase in passenger traffic (see Dresner et aI., 1996, p.
309). Some incumbents did diversify their operations and incorporated new low-cost
subsidiaries under an umbrella brand. Low-fare divisions established by major carriers in the
USA are, for example, United Shuttle (United Airlines) and Delta Express (Delta Airlines)
(see Walker, The King of Low-Cost, 1999, p. 42). Additionally, individual "Southwest
clones" entered the market niche and offered a similar product mix. The year 2001 with its
drastic decrease in passenger numbers, especially in the USA, again proved the success of the
"model" low-cost carrier Southwest. Southwest posted a profit for the fourth quarter of 2001,
after a slight loss in the third quarter, unlike all other passenger airlines in the USA.
Southwest'S immunity to this extreme situation in aviation somehow underscores the success
of the low-cost business model.
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3.2.3.2 Low-Cost Operators in Europe
There is a justifiable threat to European incumbent carriers by low-cost operators, which is a
much more recent and revolutionary phenomenon. With deregulation widening the
geographical market base for air transport operators, intra-European traffic became attractive
for niche players. In an environment of markets dominated by flag carriers, new entrants can
offer diversified services on previously un- or under-served routes at competitive fares.
Smaller, formerly regional carriers, and start-up airlines now expand their market presence
and, in most instances, offer competitive fare levels on an increasing number of connections
(see Doganis, 2001, p. 135).
European light carriers were once regarded as not receiving sufficient passenger acceptance.
The notion that air travel in Europe is connected to a perception of higher social status
presumably supports a certain resistance regarding the feasibility of light carriers. Southwest
Airlines in the USA faced similar problems in the late 1970s. However, management
identified these doubts and allayed them by educating passengers, offering a very
competitively priced and reliable product and operating safe equipment (see Walker, The
King of Low-Cost, 1999, p. 42).
However, a simple copy of the American, low-cost business model in Europe is not feasible.
European travel habits and thus the composition of passengers are somewhat different to that
of the USA. The very price sensitive "visiting-family-and-friends" traffic (VFR) does not
hold equal passenger potential in Europe as in geographically large countries like the USA or
Canada. VFR travel is usually limited to domestic travel within countries and, consequently,
has not had a strong impact on overall European air travel figures. This limited significance of
VFR air travel is mainly due to relatively small individual country sizes and the well-
developed infrastructure of alternative means of transport. New entrants in Europe need to
consider this travel pattern and, accordingly, must also cater for other types of travel, such as
business travel, traditional tourism air travel and ad-hoc, low lead-time and low involvement
air travel.
Business travel within the EU and its neighbouring countries has mainly been provided by
flag carriers operating between the main business centres. But with the European Union
promoting peripheral areas of the integration zone, services to remote regions are also
required. What has been described above in the context of travel stimulation in the USA, also
applies to Europe. With attractive tourism destinations linked by competitive air transport
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offers, and the provision of easy access to geographically de-centralised business areas, travel
to these market segments could be affected.
Another aspect promoting low-cost operation is the European Airport structure. Low-cost
operators already make use of direct services between secondary airports." Secondary
airports are usually remotely situated, but offer passenger benefits such as shorter distances
within the airport, making late check-ins possible, and offering cheaper parking facilities and
more cost-effective service amenities. From an airline perspective, smaller, secondary airports
are less sensitive to congested air spaces and allow for quicker turn-around times. Airport
landing and handling fees and charges are usually inexpensive, and terminal capacity at
competitive rates is more widely available, thus leveraging cost savings. In addition,
European category 1 airports'" are overcrowded and thus represent little physical and cost-
effective growth potential for start-ups. Since "grandfather rights" exist in slot allocatiorr",
most passenger-winning slots have already been taken by incumbents. Irish-based low fare
airline Ryanair, for example, links London out of Stansted with Hahn Airport about 80 km
West of Frankfurt and made it its second continental-European hub. From a competitive
strategy perspective it is, in any case, not advisable to attack an incumbent at its hub. The
costs of providing competitive service levels at a hub are substantial. Winning business from
an established carrier, provided that the slot allocation allows this, requires considerable
financial outlays (see Wells, 1993, p. 196). Thus, the choice of a secondary airport can
sUccessfullycircumvent strategic and market inherent entry barriers.
Carriers such as Ryanair, Buzz, Easyjet or Germania offer their services either in direct
competition to incumbents via category 1 airports on city pair markets, or by using the above-
described secondary airports. They usually market their products aggressively, also for one-
way services, which has repeatedly preoccupied competition autboritiea" Their ticket
distribution by means of call centres and through the Internet commonly circumvents the
classic travel trade, thus saving on commission payments. It is estimated that a carrier like
24
Some attractive secondary European airports are: London/Stansted, Rorna/Ciampino, FrankfurtlHahn,
gUsseldorf/Monchengladbach, MilanlBergamo.
. Category I airports, are the main gateways into countries and in most instances hubs of flag carriers or other
Important operators. Examples are London Heathrow, Frankfurt Rhein-Main, Paris Charles de Gaulle, and
~msterdam Schiphol.
These historic priorities state that slots are to be given to carriers which possessed them during the previous
~~uivalent timetable period (see below for a more detailed discussion of slot allocation and grandfather rights) .
. Especially the' Lufthansa Ryanair legal struggle in regard to deceptive advertising has been in the public eye
IJ1celate 200 I.
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Easyjet has sales costs that are some 60% lower than those of a conventional carrier (see
Doganis, 2001, p. 146).
European incumbents try to fight market entry of new, low-cost carriers by means of various
measures. To increase market entry barriers, major carriers make use of predatory behaviour.
This includes predatory pricing on routes threatened by new entrants, and by setting prices
well below the cost of operating the service. Another form of predatory behaviour is to make
use of the previously described "increasing rivals' costs concept". Incumbents accordingly
price infrastructure use or services in such a way that it becomes unaffordable for new
entrants. Input factors in this regard would include, for example, the usage of ground services
and CRSs. This anti-competitive behaviour is certainly illegal in the European Union, but
slow reaction processes by authorities and the risk of plaintiffs running up high legal costs,
mean that the practice is still common.
Despite the drastic reactions of incumbent carriers, the low-cost, start-up airline scene in
Europe is growing. Economically less hard hit by the events of September 2001, also through
actively marketing their services in the weeks after September 11t\ 2001, low-cost carriers
are developing into a serious challenge for incumbent European airlines.
3.2.3.3 Non-Scheduled Traffic
Low-cost operators, commuter carriers and other scheduled start-up airlines only seriously
started entering the European airline scene in the late 1980s. Before their appearance,
however, other modes of inexpensive air transportation were provided by non-scheduled or
charter carriers.
In the years prior to full European deregulation, charter operators did cater for at least some of
the market segments which are at present served by low-cost carriers. Their focus was mainly
on the tourism sector, providing air transport to Mediterranean holiday destinations.
Traditionally, charter airline seats were sold by tour operators and travel companies as part of
holiday packages, which also included accommodation. With the arrival of low-cost start-up
carriers, charter airlines, however, came under pressure to defend their market positions both
against other new entrants and against more market-orientated incumbent scheduled airlines.
During the 1990s European charter carriers thus started to sell spare capacity on a seat-only
basis without accommodation, thereby filling their seats whilst moving towards direct
competition with scheduled carriers.
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The reason for charter carriers developing into significant market players, posing a threat to
conventional as well as low-cost carriers, pertains to their regulatory status, their cost
structure and the way their capacity is distributed. Non-scheduled carriers operate far below
the cost levels of their scheduled counterparts. It was estimated that charter operators run at
unit costs 50-65% lower than those of scheduled carriers. Fares for seat-only sales can thus be
offered 30 to 40% below the lowest scheduled fares (see Doganis, 2001, p. 158). The
explanations for their more cost-effective operation are manifold:
• One travelling class configuration allows for more seats in larger aircraft, thus lowering
unit costs per passengers or cost per offered seat kilometre.i"
High daily aircraft utilisation.
Charter passengers are less sensitive to marketing tools like FFPs, hub and spoke
networks, or codeshare operations. In the past, this made the establishment of these tools
less crucial and accounts for the marketing costs of charter operations being significantly
lower than those of scheduled carriers.
Seats are usually sold in contingents to tour operators or agencies, who, in turn, spurred by
prospects of commission, internalise the carriers' marketing expenses. Charter carriers
thus tend to have higher load factors due to vertical integration with tour operators and
travel agency groups. In addition, after the third European Liberalisation Package, charter
operators were allowed to sell their tickets directly to customers.
Inflight service like catering and entertainment is much leaner and therefore cheaper.
Charter airlines' cabin crews tend to be less expensive.
The productivity of the workforce is higher, also due to lower wage levels and reduced
trade union influence.
Charter operations are not part of a bilateral ASA. Being omitted from any regulation in
the Chicago Convention, charter traffic previously operated in a relatively regulation-free
environment. In 1956, all regulations on concessions by the destination country of a
charter flight were abolished by the European Civil Aviation Conference. This is why
charter carriers can decide on their market access, fares and capacity in a fairly flexible
manner. Routes can be served and the service easily discontinued seasonally, leading to
opportunistic servicing of markets.
•
•
•
•
•
•
28 However, in the 1990s charter carriers also started introducing prime travelling cIa ses to ofTer more
convenient travel to less price sensitive holiday travellers and the more price sensitive business traveller.
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The above-mentioned factors lead to a threat potential by charter carriers aimed more at low-
cost operators than scheduled traffic. Given the fact that charter operators run at considerably
lower indirect cost levels than scheduled operators, the notion that they somehow are an
emulation of the US low-cost operators is justifiable. Some charter carriers, attracted by the
inefficiencies of incumbents, have launched scheduled services and have entered mainstream
business markets with the major carriers (for examples of charter carriers' migrations into
scheduled services, see European Commission, 1997, p. 44). Continued success and
significant market share gains are, however, not observable. This is linked to hurdles on the
marketing side - lack of brand status - and in operations - inadequate equipment.
Simultaneously, another hurdle may be that charter frequencies and departure andlor arrival
times might not meet the need of the regular air traveller.
A threat potential - also to scheduled carriers - becomes evident on long-haul routes that non-
scheduled carriers increasingly serve. With travel patterns changing, and an increasing
number of tourists travelling to distant holiday destinations, charter carriers offer seasonally
fluctuating services, which in some cases manage to grab market share from scheduled
competitors (see European Commission, 1997, pp. 45-46).
3.2.4 Threat Through Substitutive Products or Services
The possible growth of an industry can be impeded by substitute products or services. Air
travel providers offer a transportation service that may be substituted by terrestrial
conveyance. Air transportation, as a provision for personal communication, can obviously be
substituted by telecommunication. The following describes these aspects.
3.2.4.1 Substitutive Traffic Carriers - Terrestrial Transportation
The most significant traffic carrier is road transport. Road transport offers, given sufficient
road density and linked infrastructure, flexibility and the physical ability to offer door-to-door
travel service and efficient travel time on distances below 500 krn (see Opitz, 1994, p. 118).
Because of its limited transportation speed and high direct and indirect costs, it can, however,
not fully be considered a substitute to air travel. In the passenger's choice of transportation
modes, attributes like tariffs, speed of travel, safety, on-time performance and flexibility play
an important role. Of these elements, speed seems to be the most crucial decisive factor,
which is certainly a disadvantage of road transport on longer distances (see Piepelow, 1997, p.
91).
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A more realistic threat to air travel is rail transport. The railway is a segregated form of travel,
which gives it a potential for high speeds. High-speed train systems, especially in Europe and
Asia, link large cities that lie relatively close to one another and can be served by trains in line
networks. High-speed train networks in the EU comprised about 2800 km in 1999, while an
extension to 4384 km is expected by the year 2006 (see European Commission, Directorate-
General for Energy and Transport, 2000, p. 27). Usually train stations are situated in, or very
close to the central business districts. Check in and check out are quick and easy, and
convenient access to other urban mass transportation systems is usually provided. Railroads
linked to other transportation means make them a fast and convenient travel service provider.
The following figure comparatively demonstrates the total travel time of rail and air transport
between the city centres of Paris and London.
Figure 3.1: Travel Time London-Paris for Air and Rail Transport
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Source: Opitz, 1994, p. 123
Total travel times are almost equal: air transport totals 240 minutes and rail transport requires
255 minutes for the approximately 500 km trip. For this distance, a choice of either rail or air
transport is thus primarily determined by fares and individual preferences.
The effects of rail transport on air travel can be significant for certain markets. High-speed
train links, e.g. between the cities of Paris and Marseilles in France, are expected to decrease
demand for flights on this route by about 25%. The 800 km distance can be covered in about
3 hours. Air France, however, is facing the competition on this leg and does not intend to
abandon its second biggest domestic route Paris-Marseilles. In 2000, Air France dropped its
Paris-Brussels route due to stiff competition by the French high-speed TGV train systems, but
closed a collaborative agreement with the national railway operator SNCF (see N/A, Air
France Expects Big Competition from TGV Rail Link, 2001).
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Rail transport in highly populated regions such as Europe is being made even more attractive
by linking the high-speed train systems of individual countries. European policies promote a
common network of high-speed train connections. On many inter-city routes in Europe,
competitive air transport's advantages, such as speed and travel time, will thus erode in favour
of trains. However, European integration of high-speed rail linkages in an integration area
requires authorities to reach an agreement on technical and operational standards and general
availability, to make rail travel a truly international mode of transport (for the future of the
European high-speed train system, see Opitz, 1994, pp. 119-121).
Other than the mere travel time, train systems provide high standards of service, often
targeted at the economically more interesting business traveller. Comfort standards onboard
trains are similar to those of business air travel, with a variety of catering facilities,
entertainment and dedicated individual workspaces. Better working conditions and a much
longer effectively useable work time again seem to be in favour of rail trave1.29Rail transport
operators increasingly make use of other marketing and CRM tools - well known from the
airline industry. Internet-based sales, loyalty schemes and discount allocation for repeated
usage attract high yield travel as well as stimulating travel. The combination of factors such as
travel time, service and the initiation of traveller loyalty schemes make existing train systems
a viable competitor to air transport on distances up to 500 - 600 km, or up to 4 hours travel
time. The figure below supports this view by depicting markets shares in relation to journey
time.
29 However, historical figures show that on a European scale, rail transport will be trailing air transport soon.
With an average annual change in performance figures (passenger kilometres, PKM) of 5,5% in the period 1990-
1998 (rail transport 0,7%), air transport will soon pass total rail transport performed passenger kilometres (see
European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, 2000, p. 81).
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Figure 3.2: Market Share Determined by Travel Time of Rail and Air Transport in Europe
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Source: Baker and Field, 2001, p. 108
The 3,5 hour mark seems to be the point at which rail and air have an equal market share.
Below this, rail transport predominates, and beyond this mark, air transport quickly gains
market share.
Airlines need to see the competitive position of rail transport more as an opportunity than a
threat. Inter-modality of air transport and rail services provide a set of synergies to avoid the
more jammed air spaces and offers environmentally friendlier alternatives to air-based travel
(see Diegruber, 1991, p. 2l3). Including rail transport into the regional market strategy should
be an airline business goal, especially in Europe. Prior to this, prerequisites must be fulfilled.
The transfer between the two modes must be as seamless as possible and scheduling,
reservation, pricing, ticketing, baggage handling and check-in procedures must be integrated.
In addition, true infrastructure integration, such as high-speed train stations at airports, must
allow physical closeness of the transport systems (see Baker and Field, 2001, pp. 107-108).
This could ultimately lead to an enhancement of passenger use, less environmental impact,
and would certainly help to decrease air space congestion (see Rondinelli and Berry, 2000,
pp. 401-402). Some airlines have complied with the challenge of inter-modality and included
rail transport into their marketing strategy by using it as feeder and de-feeder services at their
hUbs.3o As railroad infrastructure is increasingly included in airports, seamless travel offers,
paired with other marketing tools, such as FFPs or CRSs make rail transport a viable
30 Air France uses the TGY at Paris Charles de Gaulle, Lufthansa makes use of the ICE in Frankfurt and has
basically outsourced its air service to Stuttgart to the rail provider Deutsche Bahn AG, Delta Air Lines has a
marketing collaboration with the rail operator SNCF to various destinations in France.
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substitute for regional air transport and a complementary travel mode for medium and long
haul service.
3.2.4.2 Telecommunication as Substitutive Competition
Telecommunication can be considered substitutive competition, but does not form part of the
transportation industry. To scrutinise potential non-traffic competition, an examination of
different travel motivations is necessary. Tourists, pleasure travellers and VFR passengers
mainly use air transportation to change geographic location. The motivational aspect of
geographical change for leisure reasons is not likely to be substituted by telecommunication.
Business passengers' main travel purpose is to benefit from effective communication and to
overlook and negotiate business-related issues on site. This need can be increasingly satisfied
by telecommunication. In this context, one emphasis lies on teleconferencing which holds
cost-saving potential with regard to saved out-of-office time and related indirect as well as
direct travel expenses. For the USA, the greatest impact of telecommunication on air travel is
expected to be in intra-company connections with possibly some 30% of air trips substituted
by the year 2010 (see Caves and Gosling, 1999, p. 59). With the deregulation and
privatisation of telecommunication service providers, costs of telecommunication fell
drastically over the last half-decade, while access to sophisticated hardware and infrastructure,
like fibre optics, increased the quality of communication significantly.
Another form of communication is the Internet and its related services, such as e-mail or
chatting. E-mail, especially, offers a fast and reliable means of communicating and conveying
attachments' in various formats. The Internet represents a great source of information and a
I
forum for information exchange, as well as a trading and consultation platform for private and
business use. The Internet benefits from the advanced hardware and infrastructure available,
thus making it an increasingly widely used means of communication.
The overall effects of telecommunication on air transport have been discussed by various
scholars (see Caves and Gosling, 1999, pp. 58-59 and Piepelow, 1997, p. 92). Some argue that
the threat to air transport operators by telecommunication is negligible, because
telecommunication cannot make up for personal contacts, thus still promoting private
meetings. The proliferation of telecommunication and its facilities might even induce the wish
to meet the communication counterpart personally. Another aspect affects private travel: if
telecommunication reduces professional travel time, this saved time can be used to travel
privately more often (see Steininger, 1999, pp. 82-83). More communication might also
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simply stimulate more business and thus more communication and travel are needed (see
Piepelow, 1997, p. 92). This is a typical argument that has been derived from the globalisation
era, since globalisation has been made possible by the provision of communication and
transportation facilities alike.
It is difficult to judge whether (tele- )communication is a substitute for business travel. More
research needs to be conducted, also in the light of the significance of communication in
phases of externally stimulated reluctance to travel, e.g. as in the months after September
2001. It can be stated, however, that communication does influence today's travel patterns.
3.2.5 Bargaining Power of Suppliers
One of the key features of Porter's industry structure model is the bargaining power of
suppliers (see Porter, 1980, p. 4 and Porter, 1985, p. 6). Suppliers in the context of air
transportation include all providers of additional services, products or infrastructure which an
airline requires in order to deliver its air transport service.
Suppliers can establish a specific bargaining power, threatening to increase costs of products
and services or decrease quality (see Porter, 1980 p. 27). The bargaining power depends on
the degree of competitive concentration in the supplier's industry in relation to the degree of
client concentration. Other influencing factors of bargaining power are the competition with
substitutive supply products, the specific importance of supply products, or services for the
client, costs to switch suppliers and the potential of the client to integrate backwards, or for
the supplier to integrate forwards (see Piepelow, 1997, p. 92).
The succeeding sections describe the main categories of air transport industry suppliers and
their discrete bargaining power.
3.2.5.1 Air Transport Infrastructure Provision
The civil air transport system consists of several elements, which were described above. To
provide an overview of how market performance influences infrastructure supply factors, the
following sections focus on airports, slot allocation and ATe.
3.2.5.1.1 Implications of Airport Facilities Provision
A full description of the business implications of airports would be extensive, therefore the
focus merely is on airports' provision of airline and airline partnership-related services, as
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well as on an introduction of business trends III airport operation, which influence the
relationship towards carriers.
Airports generally represent coupling points, chronologically - due to varying departure and
arrival times - and spatially - due to diverse routings and directions - linking transportation
processes. Their main task is thus to handle - arrival, transit and departure - the transportation
object - passengers, freight and mail (see Sterzenbach, 1996, p. 109). Airports therefore
provide the following infrastructure categories:
• Provision of take-off, landing, taxiing and parking facilities for aircraft - an aeronautical
category
• Provision of other installations, buildings, and space directly and indirectly necessary for
air transport services (e.g. air traffic and ground safety and security as well as ground
service and technical service infrastructure) - an aeronautical category
• Provision of other installations, buildings, and space necessary to meet the demands of the
airport's users" (e.g. passenger waiting facilities, entertainment, catering, shopping offers,
parking and transportation facilities, business space, and information) - a non-aviation
category (see also Faulks, 1999, p. 75 and Sulzmaier, 2001, pp. 1-4).
The following table gives an overview of basic airport functions for various interest groups.
Table 3.1: Airport Functions for Different Interest Groups
CUSTOMER Airlines/Airline Local Transfer Local Local Global
GROUPS Partnerships Passengers Passengers Residentsl Business Business
Airport
Employees,
Visitors
FACILITIES Flight Operations " Travel Expedited . Supermarkets, Offices/ Comprehensive
AND Handling Necessities Connection Speciality Conference Service Offers
SERVICES Fuel Duty free
Facilities Shops Facilities . E-commerce
Air Freight Foreign Duty free Bank, Post- Logistics! . Value added
Catering Exchange . Lounges offices, Warehousing, Logistics
Office Space . restaurants . Restaurants Telecom Servicing Headquarter. Seamless Travel Parking Hotels Leisure Franchise Locations
Facilitation Taxi, Railway Facilities, Agreements. Provision of . Bus Transport Canteens
physically close
Operations
Source: Mercer Management, 2000, p. 71 and own supplements
Airports themselves are, consequently, business entities, operating as service providers in
airlines' value chains on the one hand, and also individual players among competitors in their
own airport industrial sphere, on the other.
31 Airport users are commonly categorised into: airlines, passengers, visitors (general visitors as well as drop-off
and pick-up visitors, meeting visitors), residents, concessionaires, and employees.
Passenger Air Transport 87
In classical airport business models, airports generated sustainable business success by
handling more air traffic in high growth markets. Apparently, product superiority and high
relative market share lead the way to success, while costs could easily be passed on to airport
users with little fear of competition. In a more competitive airline and airport environment,
resulting from deregulation and privatisation of traffic infrastructure, airports are exposed to
augmented competitive pressure and have to re-focus their strategies (see Sulzmaier, 2001,
pp. 8-11). Profit distribution patterns have become different and a complex array of new
market opportunities is emerging in conjunction with many types of competitors (see Mercer
Management, 2000, p. 69). Skills and business designs that were once highly rewarded, such
as ground handling, engineering and architecture, are losing their economic relevance,
therefore value generation has to migrate to new profit zones. The latter are seen to lie more
and more in non-aviation areas, such as the above-mentioned installations for airport users,
but also in businesses like facility management, consulting, capital and finance and IT &
communications (see Accenture, 2002).
Structural changes in the aeronautical and aviation category pose challenges to airport
development. An airport, having tailored its business to market circumstances that no longer
exist, might find itself with an oversized and under-served infrastructure: Airlines
Withdrawing their services, such as international links or hub systems, from airports leave
them with an infrastructure that does not apply to operational needs thereafter. Baggage
handling facilities designed for international traffic do not necessarily meet the needs of low-
cost carriers operating domestic or regional services. Similar problems occur when planning
positioned the airport for local and regional passengers, but airlines and airline partnerships
decide to commence international hub operations. In this competitive environment, airports
must proactively design new business opportunities and not merely try to enhance existing
components. The classical set of offers therefore has to be altered (see also Accenture, 2002).
Air space congestion is one of the prime aviation problems in dense markets like Europe and
certain parts of the USA and Asia. The current situation is expected to worsen. According to
lATA's growth statistics, all top 20 airports within Europe will be congested by the year 2010
if traffic growth continues at forecast levels. In this region, just three new airport building
programmes were in process in 2000, namely Athens, Berlin and Lisbon (see Baker Return to
Growth, 2000, p. 57).
One way to redress congestion is via secondary airports. It is already a fact that Europe's
secondary airports' traffic have grown more rapidly than the major hubs in the region. This is
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partly the result of low-cost operators servicing smaller airports (e.g. London Stansted, home
to Ryanair and BA's low-cost operation Go, and Hahn, near Frankfurt, one of the continental
European bases of Ryanair), or secondary airports acting as express substitutes for the bigger
airports in the neighbourhood.
There are further concerns regarding the funding of required airport extensions (see Caves and
Gosling, 1999, pp. 20-21). Market flotation of airport companies seems to be a remedy, which
usually goes hand-in-hand with privatisation (see Bennet, 1999, p. 46). Since airports' quasi-
monopolistic status and high profit margins make them the target of financial investors'
interest, the capital side of airport expansion should be resolved in the coming years. In the
USA, where federal funds are available for expansion, airports, however, tend to rely more on
tax-efficient bond issues and partnerships, including airline funding terminals. Similar
developments can be observed in Europe. In Munich, Lufthansa's secondary hub, the airline
has established a joint venture with the airport company to finance, build and operate a new
terminal (see Baker, Return to Growth, 2000, p. 58).
A new phenomenon has emerged in airport operation - global groupings. Companies like the
British Airport Authority (BAA), the Amsterdam-based Schiphol Group or Frankfurt's
Fraport (the former FAG) are just examples of airport operators expanding their influence
worldwide. The Italian Aerporti di Roma (ADP) emerged with the winning bid in South
Africa's airport privatisation (see Bennet, 1999, p. 47, and see Caves and Gosling, 1999, PP:
32-33). Concentration of airport operators is, however, to be expected within the coming
years, leveraging market power concerns (see Accenture, 2002, p. 11).
Some major international lrub airports are in favourable positions with incumbents being the
dominant user of their infrastructure. Many carriers are associated with one specific airport.
Lufthansa has been based in Frankfurt since starting operation in the 1950s, British Airways
has always predominantly operated out of London Heathrow, South African Airway's base is
Johannesburg International Airport and Delta Air Lines operates out of Atlanta. These bases
are certainly economically motivated, with business centres as the main passenger catchment
areas in the vicinity. However, long-standing commitment to one specific site also gave rise to
investments in infrastructure and relationships with local value providers that represent sunk
costs and thus high exit barriers. Consequently, and despite threatening announcements aimed
at airport operators due to capacity constraints, airlines like Lufthansa will not give up their
facilities in Frankfurt, neither will BA abandon its hub operations at Heathrow (also see
Baker, Return to Growth, 2000, pp. 56-57).
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This gives the airports a certain control in the form of "customer ownership" and justifies
their power as an air transport service and infrastructure provider (see Mercer Management,
2000, pp. 72-73). In a most obvious form, customer ownership is represented by airports' fees
and charges. While airport infrastructure deregulation demands transparent, fair and cost-
related fees and charges, these expenses are significant to airlines and other user groups. They
vary between airports+' and can pose a prohibitive entry barrier. Customer ownership is
represented by airport approaches towards airline alliance. To offer seamless passengers
travel, airline partnerships seek to position airport infrastructures close to each other, in order
to make passenger handling and transfers as easy as possible. In some instances, these plans
materialise e.g. in Frankfurt, where Star Alliance is grouping its partners in Terminal 1 (see
Baker, Slow Shuffle, 2000 and Pinar, 2000). At other airports, in most instances those with a
dominance of a non-member of a multilateral partnership, these plans are sanctioned by
airport authorities (see Hill, Global Challenger, 1999, p. 54). In these instances, airline
alliances struggle to situate their members' operations close to each other. Similar obstacles
are observable at airports that refuse co-operation due to political motives. Preferential
treatment of the home carrier or the home alliance is still the practice at government-
Controlled airports (see Buyck, 2000, p. 52). Other airport authorities tend to be more co-
operative. Given the geographical disposition of London Heathrow it is, however, difficult to
fulfil the accommodation needs of alliances. With the Star Alliance partner, British Midland,
being traditionally based at Terminal 1 and other partners operating out of Terminals 2 or 3,
smooth passenger and baggage transfer is not guaranteed.
Where physical airline partnership co-operation is allowed, airline alliances have managed to
alter the appearance of airports, while airports, in turn, have an impact on the publicity and
the functioning of airline partnerships. The balance of these two forces can thus generally be
described as equal. In addition, airlines try to leverage their position by being more and more
involved in capital investments at airports and to guarantee sufficient occupancy of
equipment, while airports, on the other hand, provide the housing for the infrastructure and
the connection to other services.
32 .
Secondary airports are more cost-effective, thus representing an incentive, especially for low-cost operators to
u e them.
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3.2.5.1.2 Crucial Effects of Slot Allocation on Infrastructure Supply
The most acute predicament of air transport development is restricted airport capacities,
especially in the main business centres around the world. A shortage of infrastructure
facilities at airports as far as runways, terminal and apron space as well as intermodal
connections to other urban mass transportation providers are concerned, hinders air traffic
development and, consequently, represents a significant bargaining chip.
The main bottleneck is shortage of runway slots. As a result of hub and spoke systems, high
occupancy rates of infrastructure and capacity shortages, slots are scarce. Technical
restrictions are escalated by administrative regulations of runway usage, such as maximum
slots per hour or limitations on night operation. It is almost impossible for carriers to obtain
new slots, or to change their existing schedule during peak hour traffic. Airline competition
development is thus clearly influenced by the lack of slots as an input factor.
Slot allocation processes, introduced by IATA in pre-deregulation times, aggravate the
problem. Following these processes, slots in supply shortfall are allocated as follows: Airlines
submit slot applications to the schedule co-ordinator of an individual airport approximately
six months before the start of each travel season. The co-ordinator analyses the application
and allocates slots according to a priority list. The so-called "grandfather rights" enjoy highest
priority. These historic priorities state that slots are to be given to carriers which possessed
them during the previous equivalent timetable period. To avoid warehousing of slots, "use or
lose" provisions state that an airline loses its slots if it does not use them sufficiently, i.e. 80%
of the time. Twice yearly, during lATA's international scheduling conferences, flight
schedule co-ordinators hand out preliminary slot allocations to applicants who then have the
opportunity to exchange slots with other carriers (see Steininger, 1999, pp. 55-56).
This method offers incumbent carriers the opportunity to maintain entry barriers at congested
airports. Being a subsidised flag carrier, incumbents can influence local scheduling
committees and can continue to protect their grandfather rights. In the case of monetarised
slot trading, which is officially allowed at four USA airports, airlines can afford to cross-
subsidise excessively high slot prices at a few pressure points across a large network (see
Hanlon, 1996,p. 140, Gleimer, 1996, p. 878-879 and Caves and Gosling 1999, p. 153,).
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The European Union has adopted the above IATA system, but has additionally introduced
mechanisms to allow new entrants to gain access to attractive slots at congested and co-
ordinated " airports (for an interpretation of the EU rules see Giemulla, 1996, pp. 245-259 and
Crans, 1996, pp. 14-16). To facilitate this, slot pools are established to collect newly created,
unused (80% of the time), returned slots, or slots lost through the "use or lose rule". Fifty
percent of these pooled slots must be given to new entrants if they want them (see Caves and
Gosling, 1999, p. 153). New entrants are considered airlines at specific airports that are in
possession of less than 3% of all daily slots (see Pompl, 1998, p. 374). In addition, the EU has
proposed a maximum limit on frequencies per route and so encourages the use of larger
aircraft. Slot swapping is regarded as anti-competitive within the EU, but it is a common
practice and some airlines have gained access to highly congested London Heathrow Airport
by substitution, and others by black market trading (see Feldman, Calling the Slots, 1998, p.
154). Generally, slot swapping has to be approved by an airport's schedule co-ordinator.
Slots in the economically important peak traffic hours are very scarce, but they are a key
prerequisite for economic survival. This is why slots and slot allocation processes still
represent a major threat to new carriers' successful market entry (see Steininger, 1999, p. 56).
A study of slot allocation at London Heathrow and Gatwick proved that despite the EU
allocation practice, new entrants were not provided the competitive starting position they
required. The majority of allocated slots proved to be unattractive for new entrants, as they
Were located before 7:00 a.m. and after 9:00 p.m., thus outside the inbound and outbound
wave of flight complexes. Some small and medium-sized carriers were excluded from the slot
allocation process anyway, as they did not comply with the 3% rule. The recommendations
Were to pool all, and not just 50%, of returned or withdrawn slots for second and third tier
carriers. In addition, it was recommended that requests for slots should be prioritised to allow
the most promising new carrier on each of the denser routes the opportunity to build up an
effective level of route entry. Furthermore, priority rules should be set at a supranational level
and should thus be unambiguous, blind to nationality and tightly drawn (see UK Civil
Aviation Authority, 1995 and Caves and Gosling, 1999, p. 154).
33 Co-ordinated airports are usually congested airports where, due to a shortage of slots, runway slot allocation
systems are in place and supervised by a slot co-ordinator. The co-ordinator is a legal or natural person,
appointed by the' EU Member States after consultation with airlines, representative organisations and the airport
authorities (see Crans, 1996, p. 15).
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Certain other schemes are being discussed to establish fairer means of slot allocation. An
often-proposed model is to trade slots in secondary markets, or to have them auctioned. Any
attempt to expropriate slots from airlines and re-allocate them would, however, encounter
serious legal problems. Furthermore, market entry for new entrants would not be simplified
by trade in or auctions of slots, since the carrier with the soundest financial background would
be granted the best slots. In turn, monetarising slots would render trading much easier and
some argue that it would even enable new airlines to enter the market without having existing
slots to swap (see Hanlon, 1996, p. 140). Generally, it would be advantageous to trade slots as
fungible goods, but the possibility for new entrants to enter these markets also requires
serious difficulties to be overcome before operating free buy and sell markets in airport slots
is possible. Slots at one airport must be matched by those at another airport. The complexity
involved in bidding for combinations of slots renders trading or auctioning rather difficult to
conduct (see Hanlon, 1996, p. 141).
One needs to argue whether the problem of slot allocation should be solved with regard to
ease of market access for new entrants, or whether it should just be opened to market forces.
Other, newly deregulated industries like telecommunication had to face similar obstacles.
With new licences for mobile phone standards such as UMTS (Universal Mobile
Telecommunications Systems) up for sale in Europe, only those firms with the strongest
financial backing managed to win their bids. In this case, national telecommunication
authorities did not build in mechanisms to either give preferential treatment to national
bidders, or to smaller, new market players. Licence allocation was carried out on a free
market principle with the highest bidders claiming the licence as input factor.
The bargaining power or, better, the industry influence associated with the slot allocation
process is obvious. With slots being one of the most important airline success factors, an
allocation authority or simply an allocation process is given significant power with regard to
an airline's business performance. Airports feel that they are in a justifiable position to control
slot distribution, since runway slots represent their most crucial assets. However, this notion
has not yet been tested by law, and, consequently, the common view that certain airlines have
prior rights to slots, remains an assumption.
3.2.5.1.3 The Bargaining Power of Air Traffic Control
A further source of supplier power and a bottleneck in infrastructure are Air Traffic Control
(ATC). Europe especially suffers from a chronically overstretched and inefficient ATC.
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Reasons for this are to be found in the nationally fragmented ATC systems. According to the
Association of European Airlines (AEA), European airspace is a patchwork of 32 national
traffic control systems, controlled by 68 centres without a common computer system,
communication standards and handling procedures (see Billing, 2000, p. 8). The results are
drastic. lATA estimated cumulative European flight delays of 27 million minutes (circa 51
years) resulting in total costs of at least EUR 4 billion for airlines and another EUR 4 billion
for passengers in 2000 alone (see lATA, Air Traffic Control Delays, 2000). It is estimated
that about 50% of these delays could be attributed to air traffic management (see Billing,
2000, p. 7).
Eurocontrol, a Brussels-based organisation charged with facilitating co-operation between
various air traffic control authorities in Europe, has reached its technical limits in an effort to
emulate a USA-like system - one computer system and a small number of control centrea"
This leads to a dearth of co-ordination between national air space control and high operational
costs. Consequently, the dense European air space is not used efficiently enough and ATC
insufficiencies account for the majority of air transport delays. To achieve a better usage of air
space, common technology and shared procedures need to be implemented. The model of
national ATC, usually national government-owned, is due to change as a result of pressure
from airlines, traffic growth and technology.
In a five-point action plan, lATA has proposed the liberalisation of the provision of air traffic
services through commercialisation, privatisation or corporatisation (see Buyck, Blueprint for
Europe's ATC?, 2000, p. 53). In this wave, the British National Air Traffic Service (NATS)
has been partially sold off to private and public stakeholders and is to be made a private
public enterprise. The bill to change the governance arrangements of NATS was passed in
November 2000 and the process of turning NATS into a public/private partnership took effect
in March 2001.
ATCs generally need an influx of capital for long overdue investments in new technologies to
fight growing air traffic and delays and the resulting pressure from airlines. For NATS, capital
expenditures to deal with growing traffic over the UK are expected to be about GBP 1 billion
OVerthe next 10 years. In the British case, a group of airlines formed a consortium to support
the transformation ofNATS into a private/public partnership, which makes them stakeholders
34 E . 0urocontrol comprised 26 European member states in 20 1.
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and shareholders at the same time. However, on a European scale, the privatisation of a single
national ATC at this stage is seen to be counter-productive towards a unified European ATC.
In a European integration region, it should be an objective to establish one ATC with common
standards and technologies (for more on a single air traffic management system in Europe, see
Billing, 2000).
There is justification for ATC regarding itself as a bargaining power in its role as part of the
air transport supply market. As the main stakeholder guaranteeing safe and orderly air traffic
over any air space region, ATC wields enormous power in influencing the air transport
market development, especially in dense airspace. Strikes by ATC staff in central European
countries repeatedly proved the importance of ATC as an industry player. Although the
European ATC system is very scattered, Eurocontrol, which acts as a clearinghouse on behalf
of its member States, is a monopolist. On the other hand, ATC-owning governments have so
far failed to ensure that traffic management capacity keeps ahead of traffic density. While
privatisation could certainly boost the upgrade of ATC facilities, this should be carried out on
a co-ordinated, supra-national scale. The establishment of public/private ATC enterprises
could lead to monopolisation of air traffic management and thus pose a risk to competition.
Competition-harming consequences for airlines, as the users of ATC services, are probably
controllable through their own financial involvement. Another control mechanism will also
persist - ATC will always have to operate under air traffic laws, thus state or integration
region discipline ought to be assured.
3.2.5.2 Aircraft Airframe Manufacturers
The market for civil aircraft, is split in two, on both the supply and the demand side. Supply is
categorised into producers of aircraft with up to 100 seats and jet -propelled aircraft with more
than 100 seats. The former are usually purchased by regional carriers and the supply structure
is rather diverse, with about 15 producers present on the global market.
Supply of aircraft with more than 100 seats is only provided by two companies, namely
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company of SeattlelUSA and Airbus Industrie of
Toulouse/France. McDonnell Douglas as the former third largest aircraft manufacturer,
merged with Boeing in 1997 and Lockheed ceased production of civil aircraft in the early
1990s. Tupolev and Ilyushin of the former Soviet Union lost market significance after the
break-up of the Eastern Block, and "western" equipment being in higher demand. In 2001,
market share of the combined Boeing and McDonnell Douglas was estimated to be 49%
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versus 51% of Airbus's share of mainline jet aircraft deliveries (see N/A, Airbus Outsells
Boeing in 2001, 2002).
,.....
Competition between Airbus and Boeing is very intense. This is partly due to political
reasons. Airbus Industrie was founded in 1970 as a consortium of European air and space
technology firms, with significant subsidies from national states. The venture's dedicated aim
was to build a European aircraft industry in order to secure the survival of the national
aviation industries, to keep up with technological developments, world standards and, most
important, to fight the dominance of US aeronautical companies (see Pompl, 1998, p. 136).
State subsidies are particularly disliked by the US manufacturers, who, via the US
government, complained about the practice of state-funding and the company's resulting
ability to undercut prices. The European governments in turn argued that start-up grants have
only been awarded to support the development of a new, strategically important company and
that Boeing receives hidden subsidies in form of military development funds. These funds are,
however, also used to develop civil commercial aircraft and thus research and development
processes are not market-related (for more on the manufacturers' battle, see Sherman, 1994,
pp. 185-190).
This concentrated, duopolistic competition structure unquestionably contains scale effects and
other benefits for aircraft manufacturers, but is being discussed as a potential threat to airlines
in case of duopolistic co-ordination. For now, competition between manufacturers is
intensified by exclusive contracts between carriers and aircraft suppliers. These pacts entitle
aircraft manufacturers to secure a certain percentage of the market for the contract period.
Airlines, however, also receive a range of benefits by signing up with manufacturers for a
longer term. These vary from preferential prices and terms to a flexible disposition in
changing types and aircraft configuration, cancellation or extension of orders. As a result of
costs and flexibility advantages from exclusive contracts, airlines tend to be loyal to the
manufacturer with whom they deal exclusively (see Steininger, 1999, pp. 58-59).
Leasing firms represent a buffer between airlines and manufacturers, ensuring economical
survival for some carriers. The industry as a whole would struggle to adapt to market
fluctuations without the cushion of leased aircraft. Approximately 2,800 leased passenger
aircraft account for about a quarter of the world fleet of western-built commercial jets in
service (see NIA, Ranking the World Lessors, 2000, p. 65). Operating lessors are in an
Oversupply position, since an order peak in the late 1990 is not as yet being reflected by
present market performance.
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Authors generally do not see manufacturers as a major bargaining power, due to the
duoplistic, competititive structure (see e.g., Sterzenbach, 1996, pp. 76-77, Pompl, 1998, pp.
134-138, N/A, Snakes and Ladders, 2001, pp. 16-17). Fierce competition between the maifi ~
suppliers Boeing and Airbus, and comparatively high equipment volumes on the used aircraft
market lead to a limited bargaining power. Additionally, cyclical factors are followed by
order cancellations on the airline's side and lead to overcapacities on the manufacturer's side.
Thus airlines can pass the market pressure to which they are exposed on to aircraft and engine
manufacturers, consequently forcing them to market their products more competitively.
3.2.5.3 Other Air Transport Related Services and Products
Historically, flag carriers did have a profound production depth and a wide value chain. Tasks
like ground handling, maintenance, IT, flight training, catering and technical services were
once an integrated part of an airline's value chain, or were supplied by state controlled
airports. Politically motivated sovereignty considerations and the lack of markets for air
transportation-related products and services, forced carriers to vertically integrate and/or
develop industries, or to make use of services offered by a limited group of licensed
providers. This is one reason why functions that were not a main part of an airline's core
business were highly regulated and free market competition was impossible. In many
instances, outsourcing of services was also unrealisable as nations - as major shareholders -
did not allow for statutorily regulated services to be passed on to private businesses.
With the dawn of airline deregulation, however, new entrants were entitled to offer
transportation-related services to airlines and airports. In this context, it was an integral part of
the EU's air transport deregulation to open markets for air transport services to free
competition. Even though the deregulation directive has built-in transitional periods, or has
locally limited the number of service providers to only two, it is expected that increased
competition will be beneficial for all parties involved. By January 2001 ground services had
to be liberalised at all European Union airports that cater for more than 2 million passengers a
year. According to the European Council directive, ground handling comprises the following
(see European Union, Council Directive 96/97IEC, 1996, Annexe):
• Ground administration and supervision
• Passenger handling
• Baggage handling
• Freight and mail handling
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• Ramp handling
Aircraft services•
•
Fuel and oil handling
Aircraft maintenance
Flight operations and crew administration
Surface transport
Catering services
•
•
•
For airlines, the consequences of deregulated ground handling markets were obvious. Firstly,
a loss of sources of income and thus the inability to cross-subsidise other operations through
profits could possibly occur. This obviously only applies to those carriers that are unable to
maintain their in-house ground-handling companies due to intensifying global competition.
For airline-linked incumbents in ground handling;" the new market forces represent business
opportunities. Secondly, increased competition in this newly created market have given
airlines the opportunity to source services from specialised suppliers with global coverage and
to use external economies of scale. This, in turn, embodies the potential of cost savings and
benefits in service quality. Prices for ground handling services are estimated to fall by about
20% in Europe once all airports are open to market forces for ground-handling services (see
Gill, Ramp up, 2000, p. 47). Airlines do, therefore, also vertically dismantle their operations
in favour of efficient third party offers.
Concentration is, however, to be expected in the ground-handling scene. With airlines and
airports divesting from their traditional divisions, possibilities of consolidation for ground
handlers emerge (see Pilling, Getting a Grip, 2001 and Pilling, Empire Building, 2001). The
effect with regards to excessive bargaining power from this development cannot be quantified
at this point. Nevertheless, an evolution towards markets in favour of a few large handling
firms is to be expected.
3.2.6 Bargaining Power of Buyers
The sales market in an industry possesses bargaining power if the market is empowered to
generally influence the prices and/or the quality of products and services (see Porter, 1980,
pp. 24-26). The bargaining power depends on the degree of concentration of buyers
(essentially passengers and trade intermediaries) as opposed to the concentration within the
35 E.g. Lufthansa'~ former GlobeGround or Swissair Group's Swissport. Both airlines, however, sold off their
ground handling divisions in late 200 I.
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airline industry; the significance of the market for the suppliers (airlines) and the cost for the
market to switch to substitutive products (see Piepelow, 1997, p. 93). A comprehensive
description of bargaining power-influencing factors would not be suitable for the purposes of 4-
this dissertation, but certain determining issues, particularly focussing the end-user of air
transportation, are scrutinised.
3.2.6.1 Demand Development and Passenger Segmentation
The buyer's side of the air transport market is characterised by a profound fragmentation.
Every individual client, i.e. passenger, is a buyer and thus, as a single market member, has
little bargaining power in respect of an airline. However, grouped in market segments,
passengers can leverage their bargaining power in relation to carriers. The present situation is
in direct contrast with the long period of strict air transport regulation. In an environment of
little competition and much state funding, passenger bargaining power did not pose a
significant threat to airlines. This changed with the limited and, in some instances, total
abolishment of the regulative framework. Generally, power shifted significantly toward the
customer (see e.g. Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2000).
The heterogeneous group of airline passengers can be segmented, resulting in a portfolio of
meaningful consumer groups and thus market segments. Variations within each segment are
significantly less than those between them. In order to identify these market segments, a set of
relevant characteristics can be used. These include:
• .Trip purpose: business, pleasure, VFR, and other personal reasons
• Travellercharacteristics: age, sex, occupation, income, and flying experience
• Trip characteristics: length of haul, peak vs. non-peak, day of the week, and season
• Length of stay: return same day, overnight, and vacation (see Wells, 1993, pp. 299-301)
A market segmentation is carried out on the basis of these variables, resulting in estimates of
segment size and passenger profiles (for STP - Segmenting, Targeting, Positioning -
Marketing, see Shaw, 1987, p. 23 and Kotler and Bliemel, 1995, p. 421-463). Important in
evaluating the bargaining power of passenger segments is also the division of markets into
geographical market segments. As each O&D (origin-destination) market heralds individual
characteristics of passenger composition, competitive situation and fare levels, these issues
need to be taken into consideration in assessing the power of distinct passenger groups.
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Every segment thus has its specific bargaining power potential towards an airline. With a
carrier's commitment to cater for a particular segment or group of segments, it deliberately
enters a situation of exposure to the bargaining power of these segments. The decision of an
airline to face this bargaining power, is obviously also based on threatlbenefit considerations
arising from the buyer's market strength in respect of the supplier.
Demographic changes in the population structure as well as macroeconomic and social shifts,
result in varying traits, attitudes and expectations regarding the utilisation of an air transport
product. The success of airlines hinges upon the knowledge of the changing business and
market environment. This calls for a dynamic and continuous process of marketing
orientation to suit passengers' preferences in a chosen target market and to deal with the
respective bargaining power of a selected segment (for a study on passenger preferences and
behaviour, see Kaynak et al., 1994, pp. 241-250).
Of high significance, due to their yield-generating potential and lower sensitivity to fares and
seasonal fluctuations, are business travellers. Airlines have long designed their products
around the specific needs of this air travel segment. FFPs were initially created to develop
loyalty among regular travellers, namely business passengers and were designed to mitigate
bargaining (switching) power by binding business passengers to one specific carrier. A further
concession towards the specific need of business travel is the fact that carriers plan their trips
around business hours, in the so-called waves. Considerations pertaining to prestige when
travelling in business or first class are also seen as demands of business travellers and are
therefore incorporated into the product design. The bargaining power of this segment is
substantial, especially in connection with corporate sales agreements between a carrier and a
Company.
Private travel is more sensitive to fares, but less sensitive to product feature variations. Seat
availability, booking flexibility and frequency are less important for this segment than for
business passengers (see Kaynak et aI., 1994, pp. 242-250). Airlines, however, can better
adjust to capacity fluctuations of private travel, since bookings are made well in advance of
the actual flying date (see Diegruber, 1991, p. 115). The bargaining power of the economy
segment in particular, emerges once specific economy travellers' needs and perceptions are
not met. Among these perceptions are certainly the fare levels of air transport. This bargaining
power is particularly experienced by incumbents operating in direct competition with low-
Cost operators. .
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The following figure visualises the product demands of the different traveller segments. From
these demands a very specific profile of bargaining power in respect of an airline's product is
developed. If an airline cannot fulfil the described product expectations, the passenger will
take sanctions and switch carriers.
Figure 3.3: Passenger Product Expectations
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The above-mentioned air transport product expectations only represent headings of a wide
range of passengers' product demands. Each of these headings subsumes fragmented'
individual bargaining powers generating from personal products expectations (see Kohne,
1997, pp. 25-33). A further description of these product features is given below.
3.2.6.2 Distribution Structure - Travel Trade
The most important indirect sales channel for air transportation products are travel agencies
and tour operators. Travel agencies became economically and psychologically important after
deregulation, as the intransparent structure of fares and travel rules rendered decision
processes in purchasing air transport products difficult. Travel agencies thus developed from
being mere ticket sellers to information brokers, who, through sophisticated CRSs, could filter
complex information for the customer. Where airlines merely offered the core air
transportation product, travel agencies covered the whole travel arrangement value chain,
including hotel bookings, rental car reservations, leisure activities and others. This gave travel
agencies a stronger position in carriers' sales processes in post deregulation times.
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However, concentration trends and the emergence of new technologies have re-shaped the
travel trade industry. Whereas in the past, a highly fragmented market of travel agents served
private as well as corporate clients, the market power of clients lead to a competitive threat
towards the agency industry which, consequently, resulted in consolidation. Corporate clients
increasingly use their bargaining power to decrease transaction costs by reducing the number
of travel agencies they deal with. Corporations also more actively monitor their employees'
travel costs and negotiate rebates with agencies. Another reason for business clients to put
competitive pressure on agencies is the threat to bypass the services of the travel trade and to
deal directly with an airline or a group of airlines of their choice.
In tourism, travel agencies face clients' bargaining power due to overcapacities in the supply
market. Yet, the influence of leisure and small business travellers is less strong, since the
incentives for travel agents servicing these customer groups are diverse. From a marketing
and customer loyalty perspective, the agent seeks the lowest prices and the most acceptable
routing. The commission system, however, rewards agents on the basis of the total price
charged to the client, or the revenue made with a specific airline; hence there is disincentive to
seek out the lowest fare (see Wells, 1993, p. 307). With regards to the bargaining power of
airline passengers, travel agencies need to find the right balance between the above-mentioned
sales incentives, which, in most cases, is easier to achieve through consolidation.
Airlines as suppliers try to decrease their distribution costs by reducing the ticket
commissions paid to the larger part of travel agencies. Some preferred agents, however,
receive commission overrides, which, combined with CRSs, have much success in causing
agencies to shift travellers to favoured transport providers. In addition, commission overrides
are tools with which to "buy" loyalty from travel agencies and thus reduce bargaining power
in respect of the carrier (for more on commission overrides, see 3.4.3.2). As travel agencies
classically have an advantageous sales proposition if an airline offers a better network out of
the agency's market, airline partnerships leverage the bargaining position of carriers. Internet-
based distribution is one of the major challenges for the brick-and-mortar travel trade.
Airlines themselves are increasingly involved in the Internet distribution business and so are
other providers (see 3.4.4.2).
Adding the two above-mentioned developments, namely clients' increased bargaining power
and suppliers' cost pressure, the travel agency industry is potentially exposed to reduced
profitability. A solution to these constraining market circumstances is to make use of
economies of scale and other diversification strategies.
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Volume strategies require aggressive growth strategies. These are based on deliberately
reducing the bargaining power of passengers and the power of the supplier airlines. In
addition, utilising other size-driven cost advantages also forms part of volume strategies. The
concentration trend among travel agencies is thus a logical consequence of market
mechanisms. The Thomson Travel Group - owner of Lunn Poly, the largest travel agency
chain in the UK, and Britannia Airways, the UK's biggest charter carrier - has been acquired
by Preussag, a German service conglomerate. The acquisition makes Preussag, which also
bought shares in the French travel firm Nouvelles Frontieres in November 2000 and owns
TUI, a tour operator, the world's leading travel group. The group has generated a turnover of
around EUR 11 billion in its tourism division for the financial year 2001 (see Preussag, 2001,
p. 1). A similar consolidation is occurring in the USA. The following table describes the
historic and estimated numbers of travel agency entities in the USA.
Table 3.2: Number of Travel Agency Entities in the USA
Year 1993 1997 2002 2007
Annual Air Ticket Sales Clusters, USD Millions (est.) (est.)
0-1 14.773 13.048 7.833 5.334
1-2 4.600 5.583 4.267 2.860
1-3 1.402 19.00 1.987 1.933
3-4 638 744 890 907
4-5 316 421 633 663
5-10 599 716 793 813
>10 457 394 627 773
Total 22.785 22.806 17.030 13.283
Source: McCubbrey, 1999, p. 13
According to 'the above, the total number of travel agencies in the USA had decreased by
about 25% in 2002, with turnover-strong agencies taking an increasingly higher share of the
total market. The combination of the contraction in the number of travel agent entities and a
shift away from smaller to larger operators are strong indicators of consolidation.
If the market power of travel agency groups increases in a way that they offer value added
products to a certain group of clients, airlines will be mere capacity providers for the travel
industry. In markets where clients have a high bargaining power, power generally shifts to
those players who are closer to the customer and can generate maximised benefits. This
scenario could imply that passengers' loyalty will shift from airlines to travel agencies (see
Steininger, 1999, pp. 68-70).
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The other scenario would involve a lesser market significance for travel agencies. If airlines
manage to cut out commission-demanding travel agencies by either selling directly to
passengers and/or making use of e-commerce facilities, which mainly only low-cost operators
currently do, the travel agency industry would face serious obstacles. The following section
discusses one of the threats to the classic travel agency business, namely electronic
distribution methods.
3.2.6.3 Electronic Distribution Methods
Generally, three basic methods of electronic distribution can be distinguished: Electronic
ticketing, smart cards and personal computer distribution methods. So far, all methods are
based on information provided by CRSs, Global Distribution Systems (GDSs)36, or airline-
specific distribution systems.
Electronic ticketing replaces the classic paper ticket by storing necessary information in a
database. Passengers are only given a reference number or can use e.g. their credit card details
as a substitute for a physical travel document. This is why electronic ticketing is often referred
to as ticketless travel. American low-cost carriers introduced the system in the 1990s, which
cut down on inefficient accounting and paper stock and, additionally, was an easier and more
cost-effective way of distributing a ticket to a passenger. Electronic ticketing furthermore
offers the possibility of curtailing commissions by circumventing travel agencies through
direct, ticketless distribution, e.g. via call centres or the Internet. These commissions are,
generally, according to an lATA ruling, 9% of the ticket price. This motivates airlines to use
electronic tickets as a tool with which to cut the bargaining power of the distributing travel
trade. Electronic ticketing is primarily used in the USA and increasingly regularly by
European low-cost operators. Internationally, paper tickets are still the predominant travel
document and require physical distribution.
Airlines' smart card systems are similar to electronic ticketing, but allow for a wider use.
Smart cards combine check-in and boarding functions with value-added services like FFP
cards, lounge access cards as well as credit card services. Smart cards in their current stage
are targeted at the premium passenger segment. Loyalty enhancement is one of the main
aspects of smart card use. Another advantage of using electronically integrated systems is
collecting client data for CRM purposes (see Steininger, 1999, p. 73). A standardised
36 CRS have more recently started to call themselves ODS, whereas the term can also describe publicly available
distribution platforms for travel related products.
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application of smart cards has, however, not yet occurred and the market is far from being
penetrated by smart card deployment.
The two latter electronic distribution methods are driven by airline developments and thus
play an insignificant role in the bargaining power considerations of the sales market.
In most cases, personal computer distribution methods are Internet-based sales processes. On
Internet web-sites, passengers can gather transportation-product-related information and book
flight arrangements online. The Internet and aviation are made for each other: flights are high-
value, perishable commodities on which up-to-date information can be made available
electronically. Airlines thus use the Internet as an information dissemination and revenue-
generating channel (see Law and Leung, 2000, p. 203). If operated by an airline or a group of
airlines, this distribution method decreases commission payments to the travel trade as well as
distribution and marketing costs (see Flint, Web of Ambivalence, 1998, p. 31 and N/A,
Webbed Wings, 2001, p. 20). Ticket auctions are a related form of distribution via the World
Wide Web. Clients can bid for selected seats on certain flights. For an airline the advantage
does not just lie in cost cutting by circumventing agents, but also in using auctions as a means
of distributing last minute seats or capacities to unattractive destinations or at unfavourable
times. In addition, Internet ticket sales also help to build client databases with valuable
passenger information. However, Internet ticket sales facilities are not just offered by airlines,
but also by travel agencies. In this case, the classic trade relationships remain unchanged,
although products are offered in a different, virtual environment.
A survey jointly commissioned by SITA (Societe Internationale de Telecommunications
Aeronautiques) and the magazine Airline Business, revealed that airlines are intending to take
a leading role in online ticket sales. Although the Internet is a relatively new distribution
channel, airlines regard it as of great importance in the sale of air transport services. The
majority of the carriers in the survey expect to sell half of all tickets through web-based
services within the next 3 to 5 years. Airlines intend to reduce direct sales costs and maximise
online revenues by using a variety of different web-based services. These are:
•
Own web sites
General distribution system(computer reservation system sites
Online travel agency sites
Joint airline sites
Auctionlbid sites
•
•
•
•
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• New media sites (see SITAJAirline Business, 2000, p. 14 and O'Toole, IT Trends Survey
2001,2001)
Unmentioned in the survey were the possibilities of rn-commerce, i.e. mobile phone-based
transactions via e.g. wireless application protocols (WAP), or other high-speed
telecommunication applications, which will become increasingly important in the wake of
high-speed wireless data transfers (see Gill, Mobile Movers, 2000, p. 85). Airlines and CRS
providers have therefore formed partnerships with mobile phone companies and mobile
telecommunication service providers (see Gill, Changing Channels, 2000, p. 68). Internet and
m-commerce ticket sales, however, are not limited to airlines themselves. As mentioned,
travel agencies and other providers such as software companies and Internet Service Provider
Companies and CRS and GDS operators also take advantage of this form of distribution, and
offer clients a wide range of information and inter-modal travel arrangements.
Generally, the transition of the distribution market has potentially leveraged the airlines'
position regarding combating challenges from the travel trade. Set against the background of
e- and m-commerce-based distribution systems, carriers are now endowed with technical
platforms to distribute their products directly to a wide range of passengers, thus cutting
commissions and increasing load factors.
The travel trade, in turn, uses the same technology, while also able to market a traditionally
wider range of service providers. Capitalising on their experience in distributing air transport
services, the travel trade will not lose too much ground to airlines in sales of air tickets. This
is why the bargaining power of the sales market, despite having shifted to other, namely
electronic battlefields, has not changed dramatically. Furthermore, new Internet and WAP, or
other high-speed data transfer developments, put pressure on CRS providers, therefore
undermining the core client base and technology edge (see Gill, Changing Channels, 2000, p.
66). Taking into account the overall intensification of competition in sales rivalry between
direct and agency-based sales, the bargaining power has not shifted in favour of either of the
two.
3.3 Network Patterns as a Competitive Dimension
Scheduled passenger air transport is heavily dependent on a set of infrastructure provisions to
safely produce the transportation product. The ability of air transport service providers to
bUild a network is based on the choice of specific air routes and airports. Therefore, the
planning of networks providing comprehensive facilities within defined boundaries, has the
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greatest competitive meaning for airlines (see Faulks, 1999, p. 120).Network design is thus a
crucial success factor for individual airlines and airline partnerships. In most cases, air traffic
routes fit into one of three basic network types: line, grid and hub and spoke. The most
common networks are subsequently described.
3.3.1 Line and Grid Networks
Line networks describe an aircraft setting out from its base airport and making intermediate
stops en route to its ultimate destination. Stops are technically and operationally necessary for
refuelling or to pick up traffic.
Figure 3.4: Line Network
Source: Hanlon, 1996, p. 70
The emphasis has shifted away from line networks, as they are not operationally and
economically viable. This particularly applies to incumbent carriers operating hub structures.
Technically, it becomes increasingly easy to serve long-haul destinations due to longer-range
equipment. Economical disadvantages of line networks lie on the cost side since airport,
station expenses are usually spread over a few flights, using each airport in the line very
briefly and infrequently. With limited flight frequencies, average marketing costs are high, as
are cockpit and cabin crew expenses in view of long stopovers at stations. Due to the long
I
journey times, line operations have little appeal for business travellers. Revenue is thus
negatively affected by poor yields, because of the low frequencies at which the services of
line networks tend to be operated. On the other side, low-cost carriers have adopted the
concept of line networks linking secondary airports not otherwise flown to, and offering
inexpensive airport infrastructure, thus permitting higher airline revenues. As passengers can
be, potentially, exchanged on each sector, passenger yields can be increased in line network
structures.
Domestic markets are often served in grid networks. Networks of this kind make it easier to
achieve high rates of utilisation of both aircraft and crews. Schedules allow for operation on
different routes without backtracking, which maximises aircraft utilisation and minimises
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crew stopovers and slippage. One disadvantage is, however, seen in the need for dispersed
sales efforts in the respective markets.
Figure 3.5: Grid Network
Source: Hanlon, 1996, p. 70
High capacity markets such as, e.g., Frankfurt-London, and Johannesburg-Cape Town are
served in shuttling networks by which aircraft constantly shuttle between the destinations. In
peak hours, the shuttle connections are supplemented by additional capacity.
3.3.2 Hub and Spoke Systems
Most commonly, airlines align their routes in hub and spoke networks in which routes radiate
from a central hub to outlying spoke airports. The predominant advantage is the effect hub
and spoke systems have in multiplying by permutation the number of city pairs a carrier can
serve. Hub linkages allow for a much greater number of available city pairs than directly
serving them. This leverage of hubs in generating city pair connections and feeding them with
traffic was a prime motive for the thoroughgoing change from line and grid networks in the
deregulated US domestic market (see Williams, 1993, pp. 18-28). In addition, hub systems
allow for frequent services in city pair markets, whose traffic density would not otherwise
support them. The figure below visualises the increasing number of available city pairs, if
linked via a hub. Five direct services in the example are being replaced by connecting hub
services, resulting in an eleven-fold increase in the number of linked city pairs.
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Figure 3.6: Direct and Hub and Spoke Services
Linear Routes (5 City Pairs) Routes via a Hub (55 City
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Source: Hanlon, 1996, p. 71
Among the basic hub and spoke set-ups, several sub types can be distinguished:
• Hourglass hub: flights from one region operate to points broadly in the opposite direction
(see Hanlon, 1996, p. 72).
• Hinterland hub: short-haul flights feed connecting traffic to the longer trunk routes.
Hinterland hubs thus serve as multi-directional distribution centres for air travel to and
from their surrounding catchment areas. They usually require a change of inventory from
regional aircraft to long range jets (see Hanlon, 1996, p. 72).
• Secondary hub: in addition to a primary or central hub, an airline operates a secondary
hub from where other markets are served (e.g., Lufthansa with its main hub in Frankfurt
(FRA) and secondary hub in Munich (MUC) (see Pompl, 1998, p. 337 and ter Kuile,
1997, p. 71).
• Gateway hub: a main hub that serves as a gateway into a country, region or a continent.
• Mega-hub: hubs being used by several carriers as a central hub, or multi-hubs for a
continent (e.g. London Heathrow (LHR), Frankfurt Rhein-Main (FRA), Paris Charles de
Gaulle (CDG), Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS) (see Pompl, 1998, p. 337).
Primary hub operations are usually structured around the operational and commercial bases of
carriers, which usually explains their dominance in these markets. Examples of the dominance
of carriers at hubs are shown in the following table.
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Table 3.3: Airlines' Hub Dominance
Airport Code Proportion of Flights carried out by lead three Carriers
Carrier 1 Carrier 3
~.------------------ ------- ------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------_
Carrier 2
US Airways 2,3%Atlanta Hartsfield ATL Delta 73,5%International Airport
AirTran Airways 10,9%
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
London Heathrow LHR British Airways 38,2% British Midland 13,4% Lufthansa 3,7%
---------------------- ------- ------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------
Frankfurt Rhein·Main FRA Lufthansa 60,8% British Airways 2,7% Condor Flugdienst 2,5%
Johannesburg
International
JNB South African Airways 56,6% British Airways 13,9% Nationwide Air 7,2%
Source: Baker, Return to Growth 2000, pp. 56.57
The ability to build hubs is an important success factor. Hub building increases cost efficiency
by smaller unit costs of the air transport product. In addition, through the centralisation of
tasks such as maintenance, catering and other operational and commercial services, as well as
pooling of further productive resources, extra benefits can be achieved. Economies of scope
and synergies can additionally be attained by increased passenger volume through feeder
services. Considerable economies of density can be derived through the better utilisation of
aircraft and flight crews (see Williams, 1993,p. 18).
Hub and spoke systems warrant higher market power for the hub carrier in markets which are
served by direct flights from or to the respective hub (see Borenstein, 1989). This quasi-
monopoly, or oligopoly situation usually results from only one, or very few, carriers using a
hub and direct city pairs, which are usually not offered by any other airline. This is why
airlines can charge higher fares on hub-connecting routes which are generally referred to as
"hub premiums" (see Reynolds-Feighan and Berechman, 1995, pp. 273-275 and ter Kuile,
1997,p. 67).
Airlines do, as a result of these market advantages, develop their hubs into competitive
strongholds, so-called "fortress hubs" with high competitive entry barriers (for a thorough
discussion, see Zhang, 1996, pp. 293-307). Carriers precede their operationally superior
position by capitalising on distribution dominance in the travel trade and through strong
passenger loyalty schemes in the markets they serve (see Steininger, 1999, pp. 34-36). New
entrants tend to find that entering the market of the locally dominating carriers at their
respective fortress hubs is a laborious process. Market entry barriers are comparatively high
as a result of a lack of slots, terminal space and the possibility for incumbents to dump fares
and increase frequencies (see Pomp1, 1998, p. 338). Some US airlines even control airport
expansions at their hubs through majority-in-interest clauses. Endowed with veto rights in
110 Passenger Air Transport
respect of terminal. developments, incumbent carriers can actively steer the assignment of
terminal space to prospective new entrants (see Woerz, 1996, p. 43). US American hub
markets are well penetrated with even smaller commuter carriers solely shuttling traffic into
the incumbent's hubs. Thus new entrants often find themselves in a situation of being mere
feeder carriers for a larger airline, or airline network, and are eventually exposed to horizontal
integration (see Woerz, 1996, p. 43 and p. 48).
Some passengers feel hub and spoke services are attractive since they increase the number of
direct connections ex hub. Scheduling the connectivity of flights results in a relatively high
number of destinations being served. Connectivity thus describes the quality of flight
affinities at a given hub and measures the average number of possible connecting flights for
each incoming flight in a given time frame. This time frame's lower threshold is the minimum
connection time," while the upper threshold is between 2-3 hours, with only geographically
viable connections being counted. A perceived passenger disadvantage is the fact that
*
connecting flights increase travel time.38 Transport costs of connecting flights are higher for
airlines, since elevated airport fees and charges as well as fuel costs occur/" The cyclical
wave traffic structure can lead to overcrowded hub airports at peak traffic times, which can
also put a strain on the airport's infrastructure. Delays at hub airports have, as scheduling is
integrated, an effect on the entire traffic system (see Pompl, 1998, pp. 338-339).
Consequently, direct point-to-point connection is the passenger's preferred choice. This trend,
an aspect of fragmentation, is expected to continue into the future, particularly with gateway .
hubs increasingly losing significance.i''
3.4 The Air Transport Products/Services
In comprehending product and production requirements of air transport, it is important to
highlight the unique features of the air transport product/service.
37 Minimum connection time for a passenger to change flights. This time includes baggage claims, transportation
to the next gate and check-in procedures (see Steininger, 1999, p. 260).
38 For travel time, see chapter on customer needs and perceptions (3.4.2.1).
39 See also above for economies of density of hub and spoke operations (3.3.2).
40 For example, in 1977, all of the Europe to Asia non-stop traffic went via only three routes. Today, the top 10
routes carry only 43% of the interregional non-stop service. On the North Atlantic in 1977,36% of the traffic
was carried via the top 10 routes. By 2000, the percentage had dropped to 22% as new city pairs developed.
Transpacific traffic shows a similar pattern, with a decline in traffic on the top 10 routes from 91% in 197-7to
44% in 2000 (see Doganis, 2001, p. 8).
Passenger Air Transport
111
3.4.1 Specific Characteristics of the Air Transport Service
Airlines produce a service that covers the carriage of passengers, mail and freight. The
following aspects identify some of the particular characteristics of air transport (for the
general structure of the following, see Hunziker, 1983, p. 79-87 and Pompl, 1998, pp. 37-44).
Intangibility and immaterial disposition
As with all services, the air transport service is intangible as well as abstract and immaterial
and, being consumptive, can only be enjoyed for a limited time. Passengers are thus not
endowed with the opportunity to fully scrutinise the service prior to consumption - they
merely purchase a servicing promise. The quality of the purchase at the time of acquisition is
difficult to determine (see Jackel, 1991, p. 80). This in turn affects the airline's market
communication and brand building ability to redress probable consumer insecurities.
Simultaneity of production and consumption
Transportation services are, spatially and chronologically, simultaneously produced and
consumed, i.e. the production of a seat or tonne kilometre coincides with its consumption.
Unsold and unused seats, or freight capacity are considered lost and irretrievable 'production
units. This constellation makes air transport a perishable good and requires well-developed
production planning and flexible distribution systems (see Diegruber, 1991, pp. 108-109).
Service Design
The elementary service of air transport is, despite a variety of market players and their
differentiation, a homogenous one. A commodity situation occurs, with customers not
perceiving any major significant product differences and regarding the products of competing
suppliers as virtually identical (see Shaw, 1990, p. 156). This is why direct and related
services, pre-, in- and post-flight, play an important role in diversifying an airline's offer in
the air transport marketplace.
Batch-Production
The total production output of the service cannot be altered on a short-term basis, as it is
always dependent on a given seat or cargo capacity. The production flexibility is furthermore,
lessened by the range and technical specifications of the aircraft, thus any increase in capacity
can only be achieved in discrete steps according to the equipment deployed.
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Joint Production
The production of cargo capacity - so-called belly cargo - is a joint product with the
production of seat capacity in passenger aircraft. Construction constraints prevent the use of
the entire passenger aircraft space for passenger transport, which leaves areas for freight.
However, joint production does not apply to freight aircraft. Marginal costs of the joint
production are not zero, since they are determined by selling - and handling-costs, which are
driven by the freight volume and nature ofthe freight.
Limited Market Entrance
The following aspects limit market entrance for new producers of air transport services (see
also above):
• National regulations and concessions
• Proof of aircraft airworthiness
• Availability of traffic rights
• Intensity of investment
• Technical complexity
• Structural and market inherent barriers
• Strategic entry barriers
High Technological Turnover
No other industry has such highly mobile assets representing a major portion of the total
assets. These assets are exposed to a re-equipment cycle for technological advances and
competition, leading to enormous amounts of capital spending (see Wells, 1994, p. 205).
Subsidised Competitors
Despite the increasing trend of deregulation-driven privatisation, some carriers are still fully
or partly state-owned and therefore receive subsidies for economical and political reasons. For
new market entrants and other, non-subsidised, carriers, these unbalanced competitive
circumstances can lead to even higher entry barriers.l'
41 The US Government granted approximately USD 15 billion to the US airline industry after September 11th,
200 I. These state-subsidies were primarily used to subsidise ticket sales, creating biased competitive situations,
especially on the North Atlantic route.
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Demand Structure
The demand for air transport services is highly susceptible to the economic cycle and the
political environment. Correlation has been proven between national armed conflicts, the
economic situation as well as terrorist attacks and demand fluctuations for air transport (e.g.
the Gulf War in 1991; see Wells, 1994, pp. 206-207 and the results of September 11th, 2001).
Seasonal and Route-specific Demand Fluctuations
Demand for air traffic services is highly dependent on the seasons and differs on different
weekdays and even hours - the so-called waves of flights. Demand fluctuations for routes do
occur in respect of freight services. A high freight load factor to a destination does not imply a
similar load factor on the return route.
Sensitivity to Load Factors
The proportion of fixed costs m aviation is very high. Passenger air transport totals
approximately 85% fixed costs and only 15% variable costs. This means that the financial
SUccessof a route is very sensitive to fluctuations in load factors.
Safety and Security
Air transport is very dependent on traffic safety as even small technical faults or human errors
can cause accidents that frequently lead to high numbers of fatalities and substantial material
damage.
With the aforementioned broadly summansmg air transport service characteristics, the
fOllowing focuses in more detail on the design of air transport services and the differentiation
potential.
3.4.2 The Air Transport Service Value Chain
The range of services in the air transport industry has historically changed from solely
carrying passengers and goods, to a chain of value added offers. Airlines supply services far
beyond the actual transport product. Being focused on various travel-related client needs,
airlines seek to increase their success by adjusting the width of their product and marketing
mix accordingly. The following figure visualises some standard components of the core
product and value-added features of the travel experience.
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Figure 3.7: Air Travel Experience
TRAVEL EXPERIENCE
Basic Services
• Flight Schedule • Waiting FaCilities
• Product Purchase Facilities I POS • Check·ln
• Seat Availability • Technical Quality, Safety, Security
• Seat Reservation • Delay Mal)llgement
• Payment Methods • Tf'II\IelT1me
• Basic In·Fllght Service
• Baggage Claim
II Additional Services II Additional ServicesAdditional Services
• Travel Agencies • Transportation fOactlitles • Transport
• Telephonic Availabil~y I Call Centres • Lounge FaCilities Infrastructure
• Online Reservation • Preterentlal Check-In and Boafdlng • Transport Inter-
• FFP • DEHlentraI Check·ln modality
• Preferential Reservation • Flying Ctasses • Complaints
• Frequencies • In-night entertainment Management
• Network • In-flIght Communication (Telephone I Internet I e-mail) • Connectiv~y
• Transport Infrastructure • Catering • Accommodation
• Accommodation • On-board Shopping • CRMTools
.. • Meet and Greet services ...
• Preferential Baggage ClaIm·.•.
Source: own compilation
Basic services are prerequisites for a functioning travel experience. They have to be provided
in order to ship the passenger and luggage safely and conveniently as well as in compliance
with safety and security standards from origin to destination. Within the competitive group of
airlines, the basic product has become a homogenous commodity. This is why airlines use
their individual value chains as differentiation tools and additionally supplement/enhance
their products by adjoining extra features. A comprehensive list of these additional features is
impossible to compile, as they largely depend on an airline's individual creativity in seeking
distinct air transport service uniqueness. The above thus only gives selected possibilities with
regard to additional product features. The following, however, describes some of these
aspects in greater detail.
3.4.2.1 Customer Needs and Perceptions
Air transportation is undoubtedly a service and passengers do not necessarily perceive a flight
as a rational process and a low-involvement product, but paired with much emotion. These
emotions can be generally positive and related to issues like speed of travel, inflight service
and the luxury appeal of "jet setting". Emotions are, however, also affected by safety and
security concerns and can lead to the perception of being at the technical equipment's mercy.
Hence, airlines strongly focus on the satisfaction of specific customer needs and, as part of
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market segmentation processes, on precisely designing beneficial and satisfactory features of
the air transport product (see Netzer, 1999, p. 121).
The award "Triple Crown" in the USA describes factors leading to passenger contentment. It
is awarded to airlines on the basis of customer satisfaction in the categories: punctuality,
amount of baggage damage and losses, and efficiency in handling complaints. These elements
reflect customer orientation and a service culture as a central success factor (see Klein, 1996,
p. 14). In essence, the factors should ultimately lead to passenger loyalty towards a carrier,
and repeated purchase of the airline's products. Other authors come to the conclusion that
reliability based on demand satisfaction, post satisfactory experience and price are the most
important reasons for selecting an airline (see Kaynak et al., 1994, p. 244). The sensitivity to
price, however, varies with the purpose of the trip and obviously the booking classes
travelled. It is therefore rather puzzling to define overall customer needs and perceptions
without focusing on various passenger market segments (for an overview of different methods
of analysis and research focus see Netzer, 1999, pp. 122-138).
An underlying main aspect of customer needs is travel safety and security. As described
earlier, it is a well-known fact, that air travel is generally safe, with the contingency that when
accidents do occur, the number of fatalities is usually very high. Aircraft crashes are
commonly very prominent events, having a significant impact on passengers' perceptions
towards an airline or particular equipment. After a series of crashes of DC 10 aircraft in the
1980s, air travellers became more sensitive towards the equipment used by carriers. The crash
of a Turkish charter aircraft hired by a German tour operator off the Dominican Republic in
1996 ignited a widespread discussion concerning the technical safety of some low-cost
holiday airlines in Europe. The most prominent aircraft accident in mid 2000 was the crash of
a supersonic Concorde jet of Air France in Paris. The crash and the subsequent investigations
lead to the grounding of the entire Concorde fleet of both operators, Air France and British
Airways. The most drastic impact on global air transport, however, was ignited by the
terrorist attacks in September 2001 in the USA. Besides the dramatic loss of lives caused by
the incident and the political and economical consequences, airlines and airport authorities
Were forced to completely re-evaluate their security strategies.
Lack of air transport safety information is thus still a topic heavily discussed by consumer
advocates, who claim that too little is done to give passengers the opportunity to investigate
airlines' safety standards (see Kohne, 1997, p. 27-28). It is feasible that well-known brand
names convey an image of safety and reliability and, consequently signal quality. In this
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context, brand names could be hostages to the risk-averse buyer, especially. In
communicating to the consumer the identity of the producer, and who to sanction should the
product not perform as expected or promised, the brand name serves as a quality assurance
device. However, if the product does not satisfy the expectations of the passenger, the brand
will be negatively affected.
A company's focus on technical excellence and its attitude towards satisfying customer needs,
resulting in its delivered customer service, is reflected in aspects of the service that a company
chooses to measure. For Lufthansa, these are as indicated by the following table (see N/A,
Lufthansa: the Challenge of Globalisation, 1996, p. 12 and p. 19):
Table 3.4: Service Measure Index (Lufthansa)
Telephone availability in Germany
Telephone availability internationally
Sales service quality
Waiting time at check in
Friendliness and efficiency at check in
Take-off punctuality continental
Take-off punctuality intercontinental
Delay caused by maintenance
Information during delay
Condition of cabin
Friendliness and attention in cabin
Seat comfort
Menus (including snacks and gate buffet)
Waiting time/baggage reclaim Germany
Miles & More (Lufthansa's FFP) mileage re-crediting
Source: N/A, Lufthansa: the Challenge of Globalisation, 1996, p. 12 and p. 19
This list could easily be extended according to an individual airline's specific focus on
differentiation of the basic service. Other factors, based on changing social values and new
scientific aspects, do influence basic demands towards the air transport product. Issues like
the medical implications of flying and environmental concerns have impacted the design of
the basic air transport service in recent years (see Kohne, 1997,pp. 28-29).
One of the travellers' key selection criteria in favouring a flight is travel time. This applies
especially to business travellers (also see in Lufthansa's Customer Service Index). Travel
time, as a feature of the standard airline product, does not just entail the flying time alone, but
the total travel time from the beginning of the journey until its end. Therefore it is important
to distinguish fundamental elements of total travel time (see Steininger, 1999, p. 197):
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• Schedule wait time describes the time from the desired beginning of the journey until the
actual start of the trip. For example, if a traveller desires to depart at 07:00 a.m., but for
scheduling reasons can only leave at 09:00 a.m., the schedule wait time is 2 hours.
Schedule wait time is usually decreased by hub and spoke systems and high frequency
airports.
Airport access time is the time needed from the starting point of the journey to the airport•
•
and from the airport to the end-destination. Airports linked to other means of transport,
especially public transport, enjoy higher passenger preference.
Flight time describes the duration between the scheduled departure time and the actual
arrival time at the destination airport. Flights are influenced by, amongst others, delays of
the scheduled departure time, due to late feeder flights, bad weather, ATC problems,
overcrowded airports as well as technical difficulties. Mere travel time is the actual period
spent airborne. This depends on the distance, the type of aircraft and delays in the course
of the flight caused by weather circumstances, ATC or technical problems. Flight times
can potentially be increased by hub and spoke systems, as those networks are very
susceptible to delays because of the wave structure of flights.
Waiting time for connecting flights is the time a passenger has to spend in a hub waiting
for a connecting flight. Hub and spoke systems increase this waiting time. Direct point-to-
point connections are thus preferred by passengers.
Denied boarding time. If a passenger has to wait for another flight because the flight he or
she is booked on is overbooked, the denied boarding time adds to the total travel time (see
Tretheway, 1992, p. 19).
•
•
Another standard product feature passengers prefer is high frequencies. High frequencies
decrease schedule wait time by offering passengers flights at desired times. The frequency
elasticity for a city pair market is especially significant for business travellers (see Beyhoff,
1995, p. 129 and Steininger, 1999, p. 200). Consequently, frequencies are an important
differentiation feature for an airline in a city pair market. A carrier offering more direct city
pair connections at attractive daytimes than some other operator will particularly enjoy
business passengers' preferences.
Single carrier (online) connections are, after deregulation and the establishment of hub and
SPoke systems, a regular feature in air traffic. Online traffic represents an increase in product
quality for passengers. A co-ordinated schedule leads to a minimised total travel time. Other
adVantages include less walking between gates and the perceived willingness of a carrier to
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wait for its feeder service in a case of a delay. Baggage transfer is easier and more secure and
the passenger has one counterpart to relate to with any kind of problem.
3.4.2.2 Value-added Services
Value-added services are generally features airlines offer in addition to the core transportation
service. These amenities can be derived from core and non-core airline business areas and are
used to differentiate an airline's product, thus to give it a unique touch.
Separable value-adding businesses related to the core passenger activities can include
specialised catering service, or tax free onboard shopping as well as exceptional airport and
inflight infrastructure provisions. These offers, as in respect of check-in, lounge facilities, and
baggage claim, can be associated with designated treatments of premium class passengers, or
an allocation of value-added features for all passengers, deriving from technical feasibility or
creative processes, e.g. individual TV, onboard communication facilities like telephone,
Internet and e-mail, or even onboard massages.
Businesses that exploit the customer franchise and make use of extensive customer contracts
and CRM are another form of diversification and can usually be found as part of the non-core
area of the travel experience. New businesses that leverage an airline's existing skills and
capabilities are considered to be one of the richest areas of future growth. Such businesses
would include linking and vertically integrating the airline service with, for example, the
railway infrastructure or accommodation offers (see Woodley et al., 1998, p. 34).
According to their horizontal position as part of the travel experience, value added services
can be divided in pre-, in- andpost-flight services and can take multiple forms (see also Klein,
1995, p. 266).
Pre- and post-flight services:
• Booking and travel services through 24-hour call centres and Internet-applications
• Intermodal transport services
• Chauffeur services
• Curb-side check in
• Ticketless travel, speed-check 'in
• Lounge services, waiting and pick-up lounges
• Communication services
• Accommodation services
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• CRM applications
Loyalty schemes•
Injlight services:
• Choice of equipment
Leg space and seat design
Cabin design
Cabin crew outfit/appearance
Individual video screens
Interactive inflight entertainment systems, Internet, e-mail facilities
Individual phones and fax facilities, or phone booths
Shopping offers
Individual work spaces
Special catering offers, meal choices
Snooze zones for passengers who want to sleep during night flights
Facilities to get a manicure and a shoulder massage (e.g. Virgin Atlantic see Shifrin,
Atlantic Luxury, 2001, p. 51)
Stand up bars, lounge areas
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The above-mentioned inflight product differentiation features are targeted at premium class
travellers in many instances. However, a trickle-down effect of product design can be
observed. Individual entertainment systems and communication technology were once limited
to premium classes only, but with wider and more cost-effective availability of the necessary
technology, they also proliferate in economy classes.
However, leading product differentiation has not always been targeted at premium class
travellers. Some low-cost airlines modify their product for all passengers and offer light and
"no-frills" services. By deliberately cutting down on inflight service features - e.g. the
infamous peanuts on Southwest Airlines - carriers convey a message of the uniqueness of
their product and thus corroborate their low-fare strategy. In this sense, service design does
not necessarily follow the rule of upward product alteration but can also go the opposite way.
In this context, it is also a common misbelief that airlines gain sustainable market share by
adding frills to their product. Competitors can relatively easily match frills, resulting in cost
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hikes with no or little sustainable compensating increases in traffic42 (see Shaw, 1990, pp.
155-156). To somehow escape the dilemma of easy imitation of product features and being
perceived as the producer of a commodity, airlines continuously have to create awareness of
their brand. Tangible brand values, embodied by the above-mentioned value-added product
features and psychological differences in the perception of a carrier, lead to a leveraged
position for a carrier to capitalise on value-added offers. Provided that a passenger is satisfied
with the products and the services of an airline, it is easier for the passenger to stick with the
current choice. Since the traveller already knows certain procedures and quality features, that
person, as a risk averse buyer, might avoid the costs of searching for substitutive or
competitors' products.
3.4.3 Loyalty Programmes as a Competitive Feature
Building preference for one brand over another is seen as a key requirement of airlines to
survive in the competitive industry. The marketing tool loyalty programmes has been
developed to retain a passenger once this person is convinced of a particular airline's products
and to reap from the distribution chain's loyalty.
Essentially, there are three kinds of schemes airlines use to exert market power by binding the
passenger and by controlling and giving incentives to distribution channels. These are
frequent flyer programmes (FFPs), agency loyalty programmes (ALPs) and corporate loyalty
programmes (CLPs).
3.4.3.1 Frequent Flyer Programmes
Since the introduction of the first frequent flyer programme (FFP) by American Airlines in
1981, passenger loyalty programmes have established themselves as one of the most
important marketing tools for airlines (see Gilbert, 1996, pp. 577-578).
FFPs are bonus systems in which passengers are rewarded for repeated patronage of an airline
or airline-related products. Members of FFPs receive premiums, usually in the form of miles
or points reflecting the distance travelled and the booking class flown on the issuing carrier or
one of its partners. In addition, passengers can accrue premiums when using services and
42 In this context, an often cited example is the offer of free alcoholic drinks to economy class passengers in the
USA in the late 1970s. At the outset, airlines offering alcoholic beverages enjoyed substantial hikes in market
share, which they lost again as other competitors imitated the offer. The result was that market shares fell back to
their previous levels. However, by then airlines were incurring the cost of free drinks whilst earning no •
additional revenue (see Shaw, 1990, p. 155).
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products affiliated with the airline's FFP. Among these are financial services, accommodation
offers, car rental or other transportation arrangements, telecommunication products or
shopping at selected outlets.
The width of related services varies with the airlines' ability to acquire partners for their
programmes and their willingness to distribute their own loyalty schemes through other
services. Airlines sell miles as part of FFP partnerships to the respective industry partners
who, in turn, incorporate them in their own incentive strategies (for different kinds of
relationships between FFP partners, see Petersen, 1997, pp. 38-39). Miles or points
accumulated entitle the passenger to redeem them - once a certain threshold has been passed _
for an award which can be a free or discounted flight, upgrade to higher classes, concessions
on car hire and hotel accommodation, to purchase recompense products and other benefits.
Thus FFPs are a specific form of financial rebates to loyal clients and could be regarded as
discounts for quantity purchases.
Discount considerations as a motivational aspect for passengers m FFP awards are
demonstrated by the following example:
Assuming one return flight ticket from Cape Town International (CPT) to Frankfurt Rhein-
Main (FRA) on SAA costs about ZAR 5,000 and SAA awards 12,000 miles in its "Voyager"
FFP scheme for this flight. The total mileage a passenger would need to redeem an
intercontinental bonus flight in economy class on the same route is 60,000. One fifth of the
bonus flight has therefore already been accumulated by one flight (excluding the enrolment
bonus to the FFP). In monetary terms, flying on the awarding airline would give the passenger
a rebate of ZAR 1,000.43 The discount considerations can obviously be used as a marketing
tool to justify slightly higher fares by the FFP-issuing carrier and thus also reducing passenger
price elasticity (see Hanlon, 1996, p. 48).
One important component of FFPs is their acquisition function. Acquisition of new
passengers is perceived to be easier once an airline can offer a valuable and well-positioned
bonus progranune. Acquisition, however, goes hand in hand with the function of passenger
retention to an airline's product and the FFP itself (see Schmengler and Thieme, 1995, p. 131
and Gilbert, 1996, p. 579). Motivational aspects of passenger attraction to FFPs are the range
43 Assumptions are that mileage accrual on this flight is allowed by booking restrictions and that the passenger
COuntson using awards in the validity period of the award miles.
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of the choice of rewards, e.g. choice of flight destinations or other rewards, the aspirational
value of the reward, e.g. exotic travel as opposed to pure cash-back offers and the perceived
likelihood of achieving the rewards, i.e. the mileage threshold for an award ticket, and the
scheme's ease of use (see Dowling and Uncles, 1997, p. 76).
In addition to the loyalty purpose of FFPs, they also help to gam valuable passenger
information for market research purposes and direct marketing. Linking passenger
information with revenue information is an important IT challenge yet to be met, but promises
more accurate facts on travel behaviour and revenue contribution of FFP members. This is
why FFP is seen as one of the main pillars of a working airline CRM (see Schmengler and
Thieme, 1995, pp. 131-132, Gilbert, 1996, pp. 579-582, Flint, Value beyond Miles, 2000, p.
32).
With high yield and high frequency business passengers, the capturing effect of FFPs works
exceptionally well. The principal-agent conflict works in favour of the airline. This conflict
theory describes the purchasing habit regarding travel products that can still be found among
many corporate travellers. A principal, i.e. the fare-paying employer, pays for travel expenses,
but leaves the choice of the carrier and the travel frequency to the agent, i.e. the business
traveller. The latter, in turn, can privately take full advantage of the benefits accrued by being
a member of a FFP. This motivates a business traveller to choose an airline which appears
most attractive regarding individual benefits and not necessarily the most cost-effective one
(see Hanlon, 1996, p. 51 and Steininger, 1999, pp. 209-210). Companies have realised this
inefficient and, at times, unnecessary pattern of travel services use and, consequently,
increasingly tend to centralise their travel agency services and to collect miles accumulated by
business flights for themselves.
Holiday travellers and less frequent travellers are increasingly attracted by FFPs. The rules
that only full economy or premium fares are eligible for mileage accumulation have changed,
with carriers allowing miles to be earned on all travel, albeit at different rates and depending
on the fare category.
Usually FFPs are designed to only be beneficial for passengers once they use a limited
number of participating carriers; or use the services of selected FFP partners. Awards are only
granted once a certain mileage threshold has been passed and in some FFPs benefits have a
Passenger Air Transport 123
limited validity in a mileage account.44 The award structure is not linear. The marginal value
of the rewards increases as the passenger builds up more and more miles on the account. FFP
participants are furthermore divided into distinct tiers according to their mileage balance, or
their annually accrued miles.45 The membership of a tier level allows the passenger to be
awarded additional entitlements such as, among others, dedicated check-in areas, lounge
access, preferential baggage handling and baggage weight allowances. This increases loyalty
considerations and makes the passenger a hostage to the FFP, as switching costs in terms of
lost rewards and benefits apply if the passenger should transfer his patronage from one airline
to another.
The advantages of network size for an airline's FFP are fairly clear. Large networks give
passengers more opportunities to both earn and use accumulated miles. This creates
economies of scope regarding the award structure for passengers, if an airline offers a wide
spectrum of destinations - preferably at its own hub - originating at the passenger's home
destination. FFPs thus create strategic advantages for carriers and partnerships with an
extensive network (see Gallacher, Power to the Plans, 1997, p. 34). Loyalty schemes even
reinforce the advantages of large networks and thus pose a market entry threat to smaller
carriers. This is because FFPs encourage passengers to fly with the carrier that gives them the
best bonuses and thus a good rebate.
All major airlines have FFPs - usually under distinct brand names. British Airways'
"Executive Club", Lufthansa's "Miles & More" or Swissair's/The Qualiflyer Group's
"Qualiflyer'' have established themselves as strong individual brands. Thus FFPs allow
airlines to add a less likely to be imitated feature to their existing range of products.
3.4.3.2 Agency Loyalty Programmes
Agency loyalty programmes (ALPs) work with mechanisms similar to FFPs. These
programmes enjoy a leveraged preference among their clients, if they are offered by a large
carrier or larger group of airline partners.
As described in previous sections the travel industry altered its objectives as a result of
deregulation. Liberalisation transformed travel agencies from ticket sales outlets to
44
The minimum mileage amount for awards at AA is 20,000. Discrete mileage thre hold for particular
r;wards thereby represent the key loyalty-generating aspect of FFPs.
A colour code system applies at some FFPs that is similar to that of credit cards. BA'5 Executive Club for
example, distinguishes between Blue, Silver and Gold Status.
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information brokers. Infrequent travellers may struggle to understand the complex fare and
schedule structures, and how to extract all information pertinent to a travel decision. On the
one hand, travel agencies using CRSs and offering online booking facilities can distil relevant
information, but influence customer choice by only providing a limited set of air transport
service alternatives. Habitually, travel agencies tend to offer clients products of airlines that
payout the highest relative commission. This is the underlying reason why airlines have
established ALPs to influence booking behaviour in their own favour (for a discussion of
agency relationships, see United States Department of Transportation, 1999, pp. 12-13).
ALPs comprise the same economies of scope for the travel trade that FFPs proclaim for
passengers. The tools with which to influence agencies' booking behaviours are commission
override agreements. Usually, travel agencies receive a fixed percentage of total sales or a
maximum amount as commission.46 Overrides, however, introduce a non-linear gratification
structure whereby once the agency has reached a sales target, provisions are paid out not just
on the additional sales beyond that point, but also on those already made within the year in
question (see Hanlon, 1996, p. 53). Sales quotas can be set for particular routes or overall
sales levels, for sales in different classes and sales in comparison with the trade achievements
of other peer agencies. These sales thresholds lie above those that the agency vended for the
airline in the previous period. This is to give the agent an incentive to sell even more than in
the foregoing term. Above these basic sales targets are other thresholds, which, once
surpassed, guarantee higher commissions. These commission payments usually grow'
discretely and disproportionately with the agency's revenue. Some overrides work on "on the
spot" mechanisms, which are used by carriers to promote selected routes from certain markets
for a limited period of time (see United States Department of Transportation, 1999, p. 7).
Again, similarly to FFPs, ALPs are given brand names to equip them with a higher status and
visibility among agency clients. Lufthansa, for example, calls its ALP "PartnerPlus".
Airlines' sales targets for travel agencies depend on their dominance in the market. The more
dominant an airline's position in the market, the easier it is to sell its products. This is why it
is very important for an agency to qualify for an override programme of an airline or several
airlines that have a high market share among the clients of the particular agency. It can thus
46 In the German travel industry, the average commissions paid out by airlines were 9% of the ticket price
excluding taxes and other fees (see Pompl, 1998, p. 239). In the USA, many carriers pay a maximum standard
commission for domestic flights ofUSD 25 for a one-way and USD 50 for a return fare (see United States
Department of Transportation, 1999, p. 3).
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be beneficial to support the already dominating carrier. This disadvantages smaller carriers, or
carriers with little regional market share and new entrants. Smaller carriers cannot guarantee
agencies substantial income through commission overrides. Even if smaller carriers could
offer agencies a higher commission percentage, the potentially generated revenue would still
be lower than that of larger carriers, due to their wider product range. In the case of "on the
spot" overrides, incumbents try to actively fight carriers' market entrance in selected city-pair
markets.
Airlines give further incentives to travel agencies to influence their booking behaviour. Free
or rebated tickets, lounge access, free holidays and educational trips for agency employees are
only a few tools to encourage the travel trade to sell a specific product. Preferential
overbooking possibilities give agents the chance to book seats for important customers even
though CRSs do not show open seats. CRSs can additionally be furnished with system
enhancements providing operating efficiencies and emphasising override-paying airlines
through restructured screen-displays or through highlighted or pop-up reminders to agents
(see United States Department of Transportation, 1999, p. 5 and p. 10). Abandoning all sense
of impartiality, agents might lead unsuspecting clients to sub-optimal choices merely in order
to meet override targets. This is why overrides are regarded as detrimental to consumer
interests if the passenger is not aware that an agent acts as the preferred distributor for one
airline (see United States Department of Transportation, 1999, p. 3). In this regard, it can be
questioned, whether travel agencies manage to maintain their neutral seller-agent relationship,
or whether they are fulfilling the role of a direct distribution agent for a particular carrier.
However, travel agencies' commission overrides do not have unlimited possibilities. In the
long run, booking behaviour in favour of only one dominant carrier would decrease the
carrier's commission payments. On the other hand, passengers can sanction the booking
patterns and consultation of an agency once they feel that the consultation is not objective and
only favours one specific carrier. More recently, the possibility to use Internet-based facilities
to purchase flights directly from the carrier, or from third party air travel providers reduces
the effectiveness of ALPs even more.
3.4.3.3 Corporate Loyalty Programmes and Corporate Rebates
Corporate Loyalty Programmes (CLPs) are tools through which airlines try to enhance their
corporate clients' loyalty. They are bonus systems granting rebates for high volume patrons.
CLPs are granted in terms of ascending thresholds in relation to the number of journeys made,
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or the amount of money spent, on the services of a particular airline within a specific period
of time. The non-linear gratification structure is similar to that of ALPs, with companies
qualifying for progressively increasing discounts once thresholds are exceeded. Special
incentives for certain periods or routes or in special markets also apply. CLPs are not just
offered by airlines; many companies or organisations enter these rebate schemes voluntarily
and initiate the negotiations themselves.
The term CLP is also used to describe the corporate use of FFP benefits. As pointed out
earlier, the accrual of individual FFP rewards originating from corporate flights is being
discussed as counterproductive to decreasing corporate travel expenses. Some companies
have thus completely banned the use of FFPs on corporate flights in exchange for discount
allocations, or FFP rewards are centrally collected and shared by all employees (see Hanlon,
1996, pp. 51-52 and Bhagwanani, 2000, p. 88).
Airlines that have the best product range locally are in a favourable position to attract many
big corporate customers. The potential of CLPs to influence corporate clients' air travel
patterns is even larger than that of FFPs. As companies with CLP agreements usually issue
strict travel rules to take full advantage of the discount allocation, the individual business
traveller can no longer personally decide which carrier to use, which decreases the principal-
agent conflict described above (see Steininger, 1999, pp. 217-218).
3.4.4 Competitive Distribution Facilities
As part of the basic air transport service, airlines do have to provide, or at least make use of
some sort of device to present their products, check availability, make reservations, quote
fares, sell, issue tickets and book seats on their flights. Thus these systems provide
information transfers regarding logistical functions. The following explains two related
services: computer reservation systems and the more publicly available online reservation
systems and their specific implications for scheduled passengers in the air transport industry.
3.4.4.1 Computer Reservation Systems
Airlines started distributing their products using electronic data processing methods in the
1960s and 1970s. Back then, these individual and often only internally operating airline
reservation systems were simply seen as devices with which to save time and labour in
handling the ever increasing amount of flight reservation data. Starting in 1976, CRSs were
made publicly available to members of the US travel trade with the introduction of American
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Airlines' Sabre and United Airlines' Apollo (for the history of the CRSs see Global Aviation
Associates, 2001, pp. 11-37).
The status of CRSs changed in post-deregulation times with passengers having a wider choice
of operators, routings, fares and booking conditions at their disposal. The travel trade
responded to customers' demand to receive a broader offer of available transport options by
linking into the powerful CRSs owned or hosted by major carriers, and therefore serving as a
repository of travel-related information. CRSs enabled agents to swiftly, and literally on a 24-
hours basis, focus upon the global multiplicity of flights, fares and seat availability on a given
route and other leisure bookings (see Hanlon, 1996, p. 55 and Pompl, 1998, p. 242).
On the supply side, airlines were technically empowered to feed new offers, fares or other
product features into the reservation system, thus conveying the necessary product
information instantly to the respective points of sales. Market transparency consequently
intensified and communication errors decreased. At the same time, CRSs were given a
competitive status in the market, as they served as the most important means to distribute
airline and travel products.
The technical concept of a CRS comprises a host - the core-system operator - that is linked to
co-hosts. Co-hosts are companies purchasing the services of a host and feeding information
into the system which are then distributed. Co-hosts can thus be airlines, hotel groups, car
rental firms, or others, running their own sub-systems. Clients or subscribers of CRSs are
agencies making use of the network infrastructure to sell travel related products - front-office-
function - and to internally process information - back-office-function - sometimes using links
to back-office enterprise resource planning (ERP) software (see Gill, Changing Channels.
2000, p. 68). Information is constantly exchanged between host, co-hosts and subscribers in
order to provide all parties linked to and using the system with the most current data.
The most significant CRSs (also called GDSs, Global Distribution Systems) today and their
Current holding structures are:
• Sabre (The Sabre Group Holdings, Inc.): From 1996 until April 2000, 82,2% owned by
AMR Corporation, the primary owner of American Airlines, Inc., the remaining 17,8%
was in public ownership (see Sabre, 2000). Since April 2000, 100% publicly owned.
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• Galileo (Galileo International, Inc.): From 1997 until July 2001, owned by: public
(73,2%), a subsidiary of United Airlines, Inc. (17,6%); Swissair (7,7%); and other
European carriers (see Galileo, 2000). Since July 2001, 100% owned by Cendant Corp.
• Worldspan (Worldspan, L.P.): Owned by: Delta Air Lines, Inc. (40%); a subsidiary of
Northwest Airlines, Inc. (34%); American Airlines, Inc. (26%) (see N/A, About Us,
2002).
• Amadeus: Owned by Air France S.A. (23,36%), Iberia (18,28%), Deutsche Lufthansa AG
(18,28%), remaining 40,08% is held publicly (see N/A, Investors, 2002).
Most crucial for airline distribution, however, is not just being present in a CRS, but to have a
good position on the CRS screen. In highly dense markets comprising a vast number of offers,
only those airlines that are highly visible on CRS screens - i.e. being present on the first
screen, or on top of the first screen - will stand a chance of selling their products (see Beyhoff
et aI., 1995, p. 56). Airlines owning a CRS can distort their appearance for their own benefit.
There are several ways to influence an airline's appearance on a CRS. Among these system
biases are: display bias, connecting point bias, database bias and architecture bias (see Global
Aviation Associates, 2001, pp. 24-25 and Pompl, 1998, p. 252). The main goal of these biases
is to push a competing carrier off the CRS screen. The influence on the agent's booking
behaviour is further increased by CRS operators offering mandatory package deals, including
the purchase of certain hard- and software components.
The concern regarding biased CRSs lead to a proposed regulation that airlines be divested of
CRS ownership. However, governments abstained and decided to introduce certain codes of
conduct instead, thus explicitly forbidding display bias and discriminatory and unreasonable
charges. One loophole in these codes of conduct is alliance services and codesharing. The
USA as well as Europe have thus decided on certain rules according to which airline products
have to be presented on CRSs to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices. In
November 1984, the original CRS rules, enforced by the CAB took effect in the USA (see
Global Aviation Associates, 2001, pp. 29-31). In 1993, the European Commission established
its set of rules for CRSs. These rules include codes for system vendors, general participation,
information loading, processing and distribution methods, display codes, information
provision and reciprocity reg~lations, contractual design and service fees (see The
Commission of the European Communities, 1993).
Another aspect of CRSs is the huge volume of data they generate. Airlines do not just have
access to their own sales data, but, provided by CRS companies, also have access to their
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competitors' data, which give them a somewhat uruque position as opposed to other
industries. Furthermore, they gain insight into each of their distributing travel agents' sales
figures, not only for their own airline, but also for competing carriers. The CRSs capture
details of ticket sales, including data on carriers, travel agencies, city-pairs, and fares. These
data, which can be purchased by airlines, provide carriers with the means to develop detailed
information concerning all CRS-facilitated ticket sales and ticket prices, including each travel
agency's ticket sales on other carriers and each carrier's CRS-related ticket sales. Preparation
of meaningful market information requires the purchase of data from all major CRSs. Sabre
indicated that the price of its US domestic market data is approximately USD 60,000 per
month. Worldspan set its monthly price at approximately USD 17,000 (see United States
Department of Transportation, 1999, p. 8). The data are unusable until they have been
arranged in accordance with the purchaser's specifications, resulting in high processing costs.
The European and US codes of conduct require the discrimination-free release of the same
marketing data to all participating carriers (see Hanlon, 1996, p. 61). However, cost
considerations - data purchasing price and processing facilities - may restrict data acquisition
to only the largest carriers.
With all the mentioned advantages of CRSs, however, two inefficiencies of CRSs and GDSs
are currently being examined. Price inefficiency has developed from their oligopolistic market
structure, since the systems do not have an incentive to compete against each other in terms of
the booking fees charged to airline clients.47 The second inefficiency arises from the cost of
each booking. As a result of the decreasing costs of data processing and equipment, the
internal marginal costs of GDSs have been declining as well (see Global Aviation Associates,
2001, p. 41). These lower cost levels have never been passed on to the market, which gives
airlines an incentive to restructure their distribution strategies and focus more on online
reservation facilities. Low-cost carriers have traditionally embraced this strategy and are not
usually subscribers to or co-hosts of CRSs.
3.4.4.2 Online Reservation Systems
Online reservation systems are the most modern form of air transport service distribution. As
technology becomes more pervasive, customers begin to use tools formerly reserved for travel
professionals - the formerly proprietary network (such as a CRS) now becomes a shared
47 One large GDS company raised its fees from USD 2, I per segment in the early 1990 to USD 3,54 in the year
2000. On average booking fees by GDS have been raised by nearly 7% per annum since 1990 (see Global
Aviation Associates, 200 I, p. 4 J and p. 46).
130
Passenger Air Transport
infrastructure. With the widespread availability of Personal Computers (PCs) as well as
Internet services and its proliferation from the early 1990s onward, an increasing number of
leisure and corporate customers have been exposed to the e-commerce marketplace for air
transport service. It is estimated that by 2003 online travel sales will reach USD 29 billion and
thus accounts for a third of all purchases of commodities made online (see United States
Department of Transportation, Statement, 2000, p. 6).
Generally, air transport service's online distribution, as sorted by the front-end provider, can
be divided into the following categories.
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Front-End Provider Example
Table 3.5: Categorisation of Online Distribution Providers
Back-Office Systems
www.flysaa.com
Southwest Airlines
www.southwest.com
-Group-of-Airliiies-(Muiii:-------- ! -OrbifZr-------------------------------! -CR~ne:g~Woridspiirifor----------l These-iilrline-co-risortiahave------
1 : :
Carrier Online Travel i www.orbitz.comiOrbitz. Amadeus for Opodo), i repeatedly concerned
Agencies) IOpodo" i individual and customised I competition authorities.
Iwww.opodo.com!internal booking systems I
i i (planned for Orbitz) i
-----------------------------------------------tl --------------------------------------------1--------- L -------------
Multilateral Airline Alliances : Star Alliance i CRSs, individual and iWith the exception of Oneworld,
, I 'i www.star-alliance.com!customised internal booking i no real online travel facilities,
! Oneworld ! systems i however, portals with links to
j www.oneworld.com i i online booking sites of
: : I
j Sykteam I ! individual member carriers.
I I 1
Iwww.sykteam.com I i_______________________________________________+ 1 ---------------------------f------------------------------------------
CRS Online Platform : Amadeus i CRS 1
, 1 'i www.amadeus.net! j
_______________________________________________.1 1 ------------------------------~------------~------------------
CRS using other Provider i Travelocity 1 CRS (e.g. Sabre for ! First comprehensive travel
Names i www.travelocity.comiTravelocity) I reservation system on the
Iii Internet, established 1996
-6iiliiie-Travei-Ageiiciesa-iid---t-Ailieiiciiii--Express---------------tc-RS-(e:g~-GaiileoTor-Americail-r-------------------------------------------
Travel Malls originating from Iwww.americanexpress.comiEXpreSS) i
I I :
brick-and-mortar travel i I I
agencies iii-----------------------------------------------t------ L -L --------------------
Online Travel Agencies and : Microsoft's Expedia ! CRS (e.g. Worldspan for i
: I :
Travel Malls, purely 1 www.expedia.com j Expedia) i
i ! !dot.coms, third party! ! !
intermediaries i ! iI ! !-6ihir-6iiiiiie-JJisirib-utfo-ii------Tsid-or-S-uy-(Soutii-Africar------pilternaTauctioil-irivento-ry---------r------------------------------------------
Auction Sites iWWW.bidOrbuy.co.zaisoftware I
! ebay ! 1
i i !
1 www.ebay.comii
-iiiternefPortaIs-' .----------------:O:me-ricii-Oniiii-e---------------------Agreeme-nts-v:iiiti-CRS-or-------- ----------------------------------------------
Orbitz is Jointlyowned by: Delta Air Lines, United Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Continental and American Airlines with other
airlines signing as marketing partners (see US Department of Transportation, Statement, 2000, p. 3 and US Department of
Transportation, Testimony, 2000). Orbitz, however, was considered to be anti-competitive and was therefore under scrutiny by
~heUS Department of Transportation.
Qpodo is jointly owned by Aer Lingus, Air France, Alitalia, Austrian Airlines, British Airways, Finnair, Iberia, KLM and Lufthansa.
Individual Airlines/Suppliers Lufthansa's InfoFlyway
Own web sites WWW.lufthansa.com
Dedicated distribution South African Airways
web sites
www.aol.com
Yahoo!
www.yahoo.com
Comments
CRSs, individual and
customised internal booking
systems
usage of online agency's back-
office systems
Source: own overview
Individual airlines and online travel agencies use the Internet as an information dissemination
and revenue-generating channel. Usually the following basic components are offered by
airlines on their sites (see Law and Leung, 2000, p. 204):
• Product information
• Product pricing
• Online ordering
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Other extra benefits include:
• Fare discounts (so-called e-fares for bookings through online services only) and fare
conditions
• Ticket auction facilities
• Class upgrade possibilities
• FFP links
• Seats requests
• Meals requests
• Ticket payment and delivery services
Obviously, not all airlines render the same standard of online distribution service. European
and North American carriers, especially, seem to be more sophisticated in offering online
distribution services than airlines from other regions (see Law and Leung, 2000). This is
understandable due to the regional availability of Internet facilities, education and the travel
patterns of the population (see Bonn et al., 1999). In the USA, the country with the highest
Internet penetration, domestic airlines made 7-8% of their total sales online in 2000 (see
Feldman, Visualize Profits, 2001, p. 17). While the effects on distribution from the Internet
are substantial, the growth, however, is generally below expectations.
Three rewards arise from the air transport service business for consumer e-commerce, namely
for sellers, intermediaries and buyers (see Berryman et al., 1998, p. 152).
Sellers (see above) can reach more customers by offering new direct sales channels for
existing products. They can gather better information about clients, target them more
effectively and serve them better, literally in a personalised one-to-one way (see McDonald,
2001). For the first time, sellers and buyers can communicate directly over a data-rich
information channel. This allows airlines to get much closer to their web-using customers to
package offers to the individual customer's needs (see N/A, Webbed Wings, 2001, p. 21).
New product information can be updated real-time, therefore always making it up-to-date at
the respective point of sale, and drastically decreasing time to market. Cost reduction, through
greater process efficiency and bypassing the classic travel trade, is one of the main attractions
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of the electronic marketplace. Airlines can save on information expenditure for the travel
trade and for end customers. Distribution cost reductions of 75% are being estimated -
Lufthansa indicated possible savings of about DEM 200 million (approximately EUR 100
million) until the year 2005 (see United States Department of Transportation, Statement,
2000, p. 8, NIA, Lufthansa will die Fluglinie an der Spitze bleiben, 2000 and Global Aviation
Associates, 2001, p. 39).48 CRM and account information management as well as revenue
management become easier and can be integrated with the existing facilities.49 The possibility
of filling unsold seats with low-priced, online offers, or holding seat auctions on the Internet
in order to achieve a close to 100% load factor were two of the first considerations in favour
of online seat distribution (see Flint, Cyber Hope or Cyber Hype, 1996, p. 25).
Third party intermediaries, like Internet-linked CRSs, web design, ERP or CRM, also benefit
from the value creation of the electronic marketplace. However, the disintermediation
described above spurs a certain re-intermediation, since the vast amounts of information have
to be compiled and presented in an easy-to-use way with navigational support. Some CRSs
migrated to the Internet. The CRS Galileo is behind the web sites of United Airlines.
Worldspan provides the search engine, or transaction engine, for 80 airline web sites.
Amadeus claims to provide the search tool for 55 airline sites (see Gill, Changing Channels,
2000, p. 67). Sabre has initiated the travel web site Travelocity, which provides destination
information, the ways to get to there and offerings of multiple products for the trip. Thus
support of Internet distribution has developed into a main focus of the above-mentioned GDS
companies.
The best reward, however, is claimed to go to the buyers. Customer demands such as
transaction flexibility, service convenience, and customisation can easily be achieved, with
travellers now being able to access data and compare suppliers' offers. Travellers can avoid
time and space limitations by visiting one of the many web sites and completing the
information and reservation tasks from home or from the office, without being restricted to
travel agencies or airline sales outlets' opening hours. Online booking technology definitely
enhances some of the service industry's product attributes, where most attributes are
intangible.
48 A Delta Air Lines estimate pegs the cost of selling a ticket through a traditional travel agency at USD 34
compared to USD 2 when sold on the airline's website www.delta.com(seeMcDonald.2001.p.11).
49 The results of a survey showed that 60% of the questioned airlines rated CRM and security issues the most
important business issues associated with online travel sales. 39% found that revenue management was the most
significant business issue (see SlTA, 2000).
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The next distribution channel coming into focus for CRSs is wireless applications. The aim is
to provide travel data and booking capabilities via wireless networks to telephone handsets,
personal digital assistants and notebook computers. Sabre signed a deal in 2000 with UK-
based mobile phone service provider Vodafone. Amadeus has partnered with Swedish mobile
phone company Ericsson in order to develop hard- and software solutions to meet the new
demand (see Gill, Mobile Movers, 2000). The launch of UMTS services (Universal Mobile
Telecommunications Systems - a fast mobile data transfer standard) will see a widening of
possibilities for mobile applications.
Generally, the fast development of the Internet as a marketplace for travel products reflects a
frailty of the former, purely agency-based distribution system. The speed with which an
electronic market develops for any product will depend on the factors of current transactions'
inefficiency and on buyers' sophistication (see Berryman et aI., 1998, p. 155). Customer
dissatisfaction with and perceived deception by the travel trade, aggravated by poor
information flows, has spurred passengers' will to individually choose and purchase the right
product. Set against the background of increasing customer sophistication, enabling them to
clearly define product specifications and to understand the differences between vendors'
offers, the travel trade will move even quicker to electronic marketplaces.
The drawbacks of e-commerce in the travel industry have been and will be felt by many travel
agencies. Airlines capped commissions paid out to travel agencies against the background of.
the new online distribution methods. These income constraints drove many travel agencies
into bankruptcy. Further, the described new technologies are progressively rendering the
traditional agent infrastructure obsolete as providers and suppliers begin to understand how to
deliver information directly to their customers through multimedia, or, specifically, e-systems.
3.5 Summary and Implications
Competition between incumbent carriers is fierce due to the, often, oligopolistic market
structures. The situation has become increasingly rigorous through the emergence of new
business models, which are aggressively targeting traditional modes of conducting air
passenger transport. Highly profit-driven and cost-effective private airlines have never put
more pressure on flag carriers than today, and this market feature is expected to intensify in
future. Flag carriers often have higher operating costs than private airlines, may have more
employees than their size can support, own larger aircraft than routes and load factors would
indicate, or operate unprofitable services as mandated by government decree. In addition, the
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classic flag carrier traditionally has a comparably high production depth, a feature that is a
considerable burden to the airline's performance. In many cases, internal frailties result in
passengers' demands not being satisfied to an acceptable extent. Private carriers without these
constraints can often operate more flexibly, as they have leaner organisations and equipment
structures, pass their costs savings on to the travelling public, and can potentially operate
profitably and stimulate air travel. Private carriers have thus become the model-type of air
passenger transport providers.
Privati sing state-owned flag carriers to develop healthy airline competition is thus a goal of
most of the world's national governments. In more developed economies with modem airlines
and financial markets, privatisation proceeds quickly, although it may take governments some
time to elaborate attractive business cases that will bring in investors. Eventually, however,
virtually all the world's airlines plan to be privatised and will operate on a model of cost-
effectiveness and operational efficiency, but yet potentially competing heavily with one
another.
In a more developed, privati sed airline environment carriers have designed tools which help
them to retain passengers and push their products through their distribution channels. While
FFPs, CLPs and ALPs require investments for their establishment, they seem to compliment
best the incumbents' business models of offering comprehensive service in tightly-knit
networks. Comprehensive networks are thus the main condition for the establishment of those
tOols, but at the same time they require constant enlargement, also virtually, through
partnerships, in particular to compete with other airline networks. Low-cost carrier business
models do not make use of these tools and play their cards purely in the inexpensive fare
arena.
Service and value chain product providers will also be exposed to a new form of competition
on a horizontal level and certainly vis-a-vis their airline clients. Their protection from
competition by means of regulation will gradually fade and market forces will start to induce
strategic re-orientation and consolidation. Airlines will more and more di est their in-house
value creation and usc global markets to source supporting air transport ser ices.
The ecological debate has surrounded air transportation for a long time and this will continue
in future. Paired with the cost of transport and timing considerations, there is a driving force
to promote substitutes to air transportation. In the proximate future airlines have to internalise
these challenges. The proactive development of intermodal schemes to handle competitive
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threats will become a main feature of transportation in highly populated regions around the
world.
Network development will be another focus in the years to corne. Numerous elements
influence airline network development. These elements include government regulations,
aircraft capabilities and economics, passenger requirements, competition from other carriers
and other modes of transport, horizontal collaborations, and the maturity of an airline's
existing network. Over time, network development strategies have increasingly focused on
adding new non-stop services, boosting frequencies on existing routes; competing with other
airlines on their routes and building complementary gateway hub networks. Passengers will
avoid itineraries that require several connections and numerous segments to complete a
journey. Where possible, airlines will provide passengers with time efficient point-to-point
services on highly frequented routes, also in conjunction with terrestrial transportation. When
this is not economically feasible, passengers will prefer carriers that move them over a single
hub with one-stop connecting services to their final destination.
Itineraries' flexibility regarding regularity of services plays an important part in airline
rivalry. Hence, another reason for offering more frequency is their role as a primary form of
non-price competition, in particular between incumbent carriers. Whether fares are fixed by
regulation, or are forced to similar competitive levels under deregulation, in the long run they
rarely provide a vehicle for airlines to differentiate themselves in the marketplace. In the·
battle for market share and long-term profitability, incumbent competitors almost always
match fare reductions. With prices equated, the battle for market share takes place in the
service arena - also with a .downward orientation - with frequency of operation being a
deciding competitive factor. A fresh impetus for price competition, however, has been given
by the emergence of new entrants in the form of low-cost operators. Their business models, in
particular within densely populated regions, will proliferate in future and pose significant
competitive threats to established carriers.
As all airline types around the world, whether low-cost operators or incumbent flag carriers,
work to add city pairs and frequencies, build hubs, and effectively compete in global markets,
the infrastructure required to handle this growth will need to adapt. History shows that
infrastructure supply and air travel demand in specific markets are often not synchronised.
There is no one solution to the congestion problem - each region has its own unique set of
issues. Some remedies revolve around making the existing infrastructure more productive,
Examples include more banks of flights at hubs, overflying hubs, more flights at un-congested
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times of day, greater use of existing secondary airports, and use of complementary short-to
medium-haul rail service. Strategies that ease congestion often also support airlines' network
development strategies. Secondary hubs are established to better serve customers, reducing
congestion at primary airports, but equally supporting low-cost models. Rail connections are
being integrated with common ticketing and baggage systems. Airports naturally playa very
important, central role in providing infrastructure extensions. Their business models will need
to change as they become multi-modal traffic hubs and have to meet the specific demands of
the entirety of their group of users. Keeping infrastructure growing in tandem with travel
growth requires the combined leadership of governments, airports, citizen groups, airlines,
and other industry participants.
The distribution side of air travel services heralds revolutionary potential, and will
increasingly develop into an electronic marketplace. While the optimistic expectations, in
particular regarding the strength of Internet distribution, are not yet being met, airlines will
have to show more endurance in reaping benefits from their electronic sales efforts. It is
thereby not enough to merely focus on direct passenger contact within CRM strategies while
neglecting the travel trade. Trade intermediaries will be equally affected by new distribution
methods, but will remain a significant part of air transport service distribution. CRSs will
additionally be affected by new distribution methods and will have to come up with strategies
to prevent airlines from moving completely into Internet-based distribution.
Horizontal airline partnerships are currently and will remain a vehicle for supporting the
development trends mentioned above. Finance and investment requirements, operational and
commercial prerequisites as well as the ubiquitous complexity associated with globalisation
seem to be best met by interairline collaboration. They carl accommodate demands for further
globalisation and increased competitiveness, while at the same time allowing carriers to do so
Without taking on heavy investments and risky strategies. The trend of rather loose forms of
Partnerships will persist as long as the regulatory environment does not allow for a
concentration of the airline industry. Despite being unbound in nature, these partnerships have
to exploit the potential of collaboration to the highest degree in order to face competition.
More refined approaches to establish horizontal airline collaborations as well as managerial
expertise to manage such partnerships will thus be required in the near future.
138 Airline Collaboration
4 Airline Collaboration as a Competitive Tool - Nature,
Drivers and Forms
4.1 Introduction
Airline collaboration has become the definition and driver for an entire evolutionary phase of
air transport development (see 2.3.2 and 2.3.3) and there is no doubt that this tendency will
abide for some time. The reasons for this trend are closely linked to the emergence of
deregulated and liberalised markets and the rise of new competitive forces, both on the supply
and the demand side of the air transport industry.
The following paragraphs briefly and generally describe intercompany collaboration,
thereafter focussing on the various forms of joint business activities between scheduled
passenger carriers. The delineation of specific forms of interairline collaboration lays the
foundation for the development and understanding of a managerial model to detect and
enhance the beneficial effects of partnership activities.
4.2 Company Collaboration - Key Pointers
Company collaboration enjoyed extensive scholarly attention in the 1980s and 1990s (see
research and studies by Kogut, 1988, 1989, Hamel et al., 1989, Gulati et al., 1994, Leibold
and Slabbert, 1994, Bleeke and Ernst, 1995, Moss Kanter, 1994, 1995, Gomes-Casseres, .
1994, 1996, 1998, Barringer and Harrison, 2000 and subsequent references). The research
scope of extant literature on collaboration is both disciplinary and procedurally, highly
diverse. It covers the entire. range of partnership rationale, collaboration formation, value
creation, partnership management, boundaries and interfaces of interfirm linkages as well as
sources of difficulty pertaining to partnership dissolution (for an overview, see Spekman et
al., 1998). While there certainly are gaps in interfirm partnership research, the following
section, however, refrains from comprehensively and generally scrutinising collaborative
action between firms. The aim is to rather introduce and underscore selected key issues
regarding partnership theory and practise that are applicable in the international airline
partnership scene.
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4.2.1 Definition of Forms of Company Interrelationships
Collaboration is a generic term used for any type of economic partnership between two or
more firms (interfirm) or organisations and institutions (superfirmj.i'' A collaboration is
Commonly defined as any voluntarily initiated co-operative agreement between companies
that involves exchange, sharing, or co-development, and it can include contributions by
Partners of capital, technology, or firm-specific assets (see Gulati and Singh, 1998, p. 781).
The goal of collaborative arrangements is to enhance the strategic, competitive position of
each participant beyond what a particular organisation can achieve individually - yet
ultimately to achieve a collaborative advantage (see Lei and Slocum, 1992, p. 86, Moss
Kanter, 1994, p. 96, Spekman et al., 1998, pp. 748-749).
A detailed list of reasons that have been advanced for entering a collaborative agreement can
be extensive (see e.g. Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995, pp. 284-286). However, a broad
distinction between learning and business alliances can be observed. Learning alliances
describe collaborative agreements whereby partners hope to learn, acquire and intemalise
from each other technologies, products, skills and knowledge (see Kogut, 1988, Hamel,
1991). Business alliances maximise the utilisation of complementary assets by each partner
Contributing a distinctive capability in a particular value-adding activity (see Hamel, 1991,
Lei and Slocum, 1992, pp. 81-82, Koza and Lewin, 1998, p. 256, and Harrison et al., 2001).
More detailed reasons would fall under this taxonomy, e.g. collaborative agreements to
enhance market reach and marketing position, joint size effects, time-to-market advantages, or
the circumvention of national trade and investment regulation (see Devlin and Bleackley,
1988, pp. 19, Backhaus and Meyer, 1993, p. 331 and Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995, pp.
284-286).
The bandwidth of collaborative possibilities as part of the aforementioned definition reaches
from occasional exchange of information to a cessation of economic and legal independence
of the firms concerned. Collaboration thus covers the entire range from market-oriented (free
market transaction) to hierarchy-oriented (total intemalisation) co-operation (see Jackel, 1991,
p. 23, Bronder and Pritzl, Leitfaden fur strategische Allianzen, 1992, p. 45 and for an
intensive discussion and synopsis, see Sydow, 1992, pp. 61-74). Collaborative agreements are
50
SUperfirm collaborations are relationships between a finn and organisations outside the immediate value chain
of an industry, such as trade associations, government agencies, financial institutions, universities and unions.
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also not just confmed to conventional two-company partnerships. It is common to link several
individual firms, or already existing groups, to networks (see Gomes-Casseres, 1994, p. 62).
4.2.2 Taxonomy of Company Interrelationships
Literature on interfirm partnerships is deplete with many systemising models that seek to
address the problem of the often unclear and inconsequent terminological usage for
partnerships of different types (see Devlin and Bleackley, 1988, Kogut, 1988, Lei and
Slocum, 1992, Newman and Chaharbaghi, 1996, Spekman et al., 1998). To allow for a
standardised usage, the following paragraphs introduce a taxonomy of the most common
partnership activities applicable to the airline industry.
4.2.2.1 A Classification of Collaborative Agreements
Many models that systemise interfirm partnership activities have been developed from the
perspective of a particular industry branch, or are customised for a special type of company
linkage (see Lewis, 1990, pp. 91-202, Rotering, 1992, pp. 5-19, Klanke, 1995, pp. 12-24).
While those models certainly enrich the understanding of how firms collaborate, they are
often not easily transferable to other industries, or other types of firm collaboration. The
following model was chosen for the purposes of this dissertation, as it promises to be best
applicable to the current and future forms of interairline partnership agreements, and as,
within its classification, it allows the description of particular variants of collaborative
activities. The figure below illustrates different basic types of collaborative agreements,
wheteby the highlighted forms are of prime interest for the following discussion.
Figure 4.1: Coilaborative Agreements
[ Collaborative Agreements~
I
I _j_
Co-operation ~centration J.-------~~==============;_---------~---
I Collaborative 1·lndustry Associations ·AcquisitionsDirection -Task Groups •Mergers
I ;" ."""._ ·Lobbies
cl:!..qt1?ol!t&_~ -Cartels
b,'iri!c~l __~-> -Operative Relationships
FDI~g~l-- -> ·Strategic Alliances
·Capital Linkages
Source: Pompl, 1998, p. 102 and own supplements
Informal relationships such as social and professional networking are not part of the definition
of collaborative agreements. Also excluded from the systematisation above are market
Airline Collaboration 141
relationships that only require ad-hoc co-ordination and no further preventive and in-depth
organisation of the relationship (see Rofil, 1993, p. 47).
The direction of co-operation describes how collaborative activities are positioned with
regards to the individual company's value chain (see Bronder, 1992, p. 145). A general
grouping into horizontal, vertical and diagonal collaborative structures is practicable and
Widely accepted.
• Horizontal co-operation describes joint activities of companies on the same production or
trade level, i.e. with a similar or same value chain orientation (for a detailed discussion on
horizontal co-operation, see Lutz, 1993, pp. 50-52). Alternatively, horizontal partnerships
are labelled confederate alliances as they bring direct competitors together (see Dollinger
et al., 1997, p. 130). Horizontally oriented alliances typically strive to fuse similar, if not
the same, capabilities in the production chain. This study focuses on collaborative
agreements between airlines that have a horizontal orientation.
Vertical co-operation defines economic partnerships between organisations from
preceding or succeeding production or trade levels, i.e. with suppliers, distributors or
buyers. In this case, the contribution of the partners is complementary, not similar. Direct
contact between non-competing firms, which includes vertical collaboration, is also
referred to as conjugate alliances (see Dollinger et al., 1997, p. 130).
Diagonal co-operation defines collaboration between organisations from different
industries with generally entirely different value chain orientations. In this case, a linkup
of the value chain of the partnering firms is envisaged (see Bronder and Pritzl 1992, p.
32).
•
•
CO-operation, or collaboration in the narrower sense, generally describes partnership
agreements whereby the partaking companies maintain their distinct economic identity and
independence (see Jackel, 1991, pp. 24-25 and for a discussion of corporate independence, see
KJanke, 1995, pp. 14-19).
A classification into strategic alliances and operative relationships is primarily prompted by a
temporal orientation. Operative relationships usually arise with the necessity to procure
production and other input factors, as well as distribution associates from other companies,
Which add to the value chain. They can be horizontally or vertically focused. The prime
Constitutive characteristic of operative agreements is, however, that they are rather short- to
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medium-term oriented, are relatively noncommittal and require less organisational and
managerial involvement (see Lorange and Roos, 1991, pp. 61-62).
Strategic alliances are characterised by long-term goals which usually incorporate the
promotion of the current competitive advantage and a strengthening of future competitive
positions (see Sydow, 1992, p. 63 and Topfer, 1992, p. 176). In alliances between two firms,
these competitive benefits are either common, when they accrue to both firms, or are private,
when they accrue to one or the other (see Khanna, 1998, p. 341). It is obvious that common
benefits are to be envisaged, since they are more likely to represent the basis for sustainable
and lasting partnership success. These common, corporate benefit goals usually require
planning, a higher degree of formalisation, capital investment (internally) as well as resource
deployment and thus the involvement of a dedicated co-operation authority. However,
strategic alliances usually incorporate partial partnerships, i.e. they are focused on
collaboration of only certain business units or selected parts of a company's value chain (see
Backhaus and Plinke, 1990, p. 21, Lorange and Roos, 1991, p. 65).51 It is seen as an
advantage that only particular parts of a firm's culture and functions need to be meshed in
order to work together (see Lewis, 1990, p. 18). This gives strategic alliances a predestined
risk limitation, as the entire value chain is not covered and the company is thus operationally
less sensitive to failure of the partnership.
Strategic alliances are strongly characterised by the intra-alliance relationship, which is
influenced by the mixture of co-operation and competition between the companies. This
applies in particular to horizontal partnerships as they, per definition, bring potential or actual
competitors together. Inherent to this situation is the possibility of one company being
disarmed, and/or deskilled by a partnering firm, or that one of the partners is not in the
alliance for the long haul (see Hamel et al., 1989, p. 134, Ohmae, 1990, p. 19, Lei and
Slocum, 1992, p. 81, Netzer, 1999, p. 17). These competitive factors, which initially motivate
the venture, can only be redressed imperfectly and persist as sources of future instability.
Collaborative incentives can furthermore be offset by industry structural conditions that, in
the case of airlines, may reside in ownership clauses, or other regulative and political
restrictions which possibly can promote instability and rivalry among partners (see Kogut,
1989, pp. 183-184).
51 Backhaus and Piltz, 1990, p. 2 define strategic alliances exclusively for collaboration between actual or-
potential competitors and thus exclude vertical or diagonal collaboration.
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Instability and rivalry can ultimately lead to the termination of the partnership or one partner
taking the lead, and transferring the co-operational agreement into a level of concentration. In
addition, certain types of alliances seem to be more prone to early failure than others. In a
significant number of cases, strategic alliances are terminated due to one partner being
acquired by its ally (see Bleeke and Ernst, 1991, p. 133, Bleeke and Ernst, 1994). This is why
depth of integration has become an important factor in building trust and stabilising a
partnership (for a discussion of partnership trust, see Koza and Lewin, 1998, pp. 258-259,
Bimberg, 1998, pp. 422-423 and 5.6.1). Partnership intensity in strategic alliances is
determined by the legal depth of the co-operation, the reach, or scope of the strategic alliance,
input resources and the time frame of the co-operation. A thorough discussion of this issue
follows further below (see chapter 6).
Within the definition of strategic alliances a wide range of degrees of institutionalisation
occurs concerning the legal strength of co-operation - from rather loose agreements to cross
equity exchange (see Bronder and Pritzl, 1992, p. 34 and Hammes, 1994, p. 44). Capital
linkages are generally not in line with the classic definition of co-operation as they portray
Company concentration. It is, however, widely agreed that the existence of minority capital
investments does not contradict the definition of strategic alliances (see Hammes, 1994, p. 23
and Lutz, 1993, p. 45).
The reach or scope of co-operation defines value chain activities included in the partnership. 52
However, per definition strategic alliances cannot embody comprehensive value chain
COllaborations. Partnership intensity is further dependant on type and quantity of input
resources and the depth of collaboration in the respective collaborative area. Collaboration is
Potentially less close when information alone is exchanged, as opposed to additional
hardware, personnel and capital exchange. Despite the general agreement that strategic
alliances have a long-term orientation, the planned duration of a partnership can also be an
indication of the intensity of the collaboration. Some strategic alliances are based on gradual
agreements which increase in scope and, thus, intensity over the contractual period (see Lutz,
1993, pp. 54-55). However, the time frame of a collaborative agreement should also be made
dependant on the value chain orientation and, consequently, the scope of the partnership.
52 An example of the narrow and broad scope of an alliance is given in Zinn and Parasuraman, 1997, p. 140 and
fUl1herbelow in connection with partnership intensity.
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Know-how advantages can usually be realised quicker than cost-effectiveness in production
(see Bronder and Pritzl, 1992, p. 34).
Concentration is the other main area of collaboration. An important constitutive characteristic
feature of concentration is the existence of substantial capital linkages between firms. Capital
linkages can include the incorporation, or acquisition, of an independent firm and equity
stakes in a partnering firm. Mergers and acquisitions are not discussed in any detail in this
study. However, certain forms of capital linkages are of interest, in particular for an outlook
on the future of international air transportation.
4.2.2.2 Strategic Networks
Strategic networks generally describe wider forms of company collaboration and are mostly
understood as strategic alliances with multiple partners. Network theories have received
detailed attention by scholars, who have focused on organisation-scientific, sociological and
business managerial aspects, as well as strategic issues (see Sydow, 1992, Gomes-Casseres,
1994, Grandori and Soda, 1995, Grandori, 1997, Gulati, 1998). What becomes apparent,
however, are the breadth of research from various perspectives, and the multitude of
definitions of the network concept. The following paragraph describes the network
terminology in line with the focus of this research study and sets a foundation for a more
detailed discussion of the concept in the airline industry.
"Strategic networks are long-term, purposeful arrangements among distinct but related for-
profit organisations that allow for those firms in them to gain or sustain competitive
advantage vis-a-vis their competitors outside the network" (Jarillo, 1988, p. 32).
A strategic network in this regard is the realisation of competitive advantages through a
polycentric, but individually or commonly, and strategically managed form of organisation.
Such an organisation form is characterised by a complex reciprocal and co-operative, rather
than competitive, relatively stable relationship between a finite number of legally independent
and economically interdependent entities (see Sydow, 1992, p. 79 and p. 82).
Interdependencies arise as networks operate on a logic of exchange, which is a core feature in
network structures and irrespective of the collaborative direction" (see Sydow and Windeler,
1998, p. 267). Networks delineate clusters of organisations that work together more intensely
53 However, Backhaus and Meyer, 1993 describe networks as arrangements of only vertical and diagonal
orientation.
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than other groupings within the industry (see Ebers and Jarillo, 1997/98, p. 3). The position of
each firm in the network is directly dependent on its relationship with counterparts and
indirectly dependent upon the counterparts' relationships to others in the network.
With the progressive emergence of networks, a new form of overall competition has
developed globally: group versus group (see Gomes-Casseres, 1994, p. 62). Firms exposed to
this competitive environment, as parts of groups of allies, find themselves in the situation of
Collective competition (see Gomes-Casseres, 1996, pp. 6-7). The idea of collective
competition can be applied to how allied firms in rival groups organise themselves to exploit
specific goals. Collective competition often appears as a variant of oligopoly, i.e. representing
competition between a few powerful constellations and firms.
Network companies are usually legally allied on a longer-term basis. They interact on a
personnel-organisational level Gob rotation, mutual representation in supervisory boards,
etc.), on a technical-organisational level (i.e. inter-organisational IT, input factor exchange),
and on a managerial level (joint management structures and tools). Not all network companies
have to be directly linked to all others within the network, there must, however, be an
overarching collaborative agreement to which all network members are party (see Gomes-
Casseres, 1994, p. 65). Capital linkages might occur, but they are not a constitutional
necessity for networks. An aspect that exclusively applies to networks is that their action is
intentional. In comparison to other co-operations, a strategic network is more likely to
incorporate a set of explicitly formulated goals, a formal structure with a fixed allocation of
tasks and, very importantly, an individual identity (see Sydow, 1992, p. 82).
A cardinal objective of firms in networks is to possess the most optimal network position in
order to create a strategic competitive advantage. Positions within a network are therefore
interconnected and capture the complexity and multiplicity of the business relationships
eXisting between firms. Network relationships in mature industries are usually described as
being stable, and positions are embedded within the network. Network stability, either relative
Or latent, requires a degree of social embeddedness, which elucidates loyalty and trust (see
Gulati, 1998, pp. 295-296). In fast changing and volatile industries, however, network
structures are less stable, which leads to strains on the relationships and thus possible conflict
and termination. It is again a firm's position within a network that spells out its opportunities
and limitations regarding establishing, maintaining and terminating business relationships.
Being in control ofa unique resource required by other firms in the network will strengthen
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the existing relationship and initiate new relationships with firms in need of this resource (see
Low, 1997, p. 191).
As far as partnership benefits are concerned: with a higher number of firms involved in
networks, competitive advantage through co-specialisation is a key source of profit. Co-
specialisation, by which each network member carves out new profitable market-niches,
leverages the flexibility required to compete in a large number of markets. The network-wide
possibility of technology and know-how transfer and spillover, as well as regionally unique
skills and attitudes can enhance the network's abilities to establish ties with a larger number
of organisations. While these motives, among others, identify important driving forces that
lead to the construction of networks, they cannot sufficiently explain why networks are
formed. These individual motives are highly dependent on the specific industry, including the
players, the activities and resources, the regional or global structure, the existing web of
relationships and the role of power among their members (see Ebers and Jarillo, 1997/98, pp.
4-5 andpp. 17-18).
The establishment of a network usually requires the existence of at least one hub firm that is
in charge of the network's strategy, the value generation process and presenting the
environment with a harmonious and consistent appearance (see Jarillo, 1988, p. 32). Strategic
management is usually in the hands of the firm operating in a specific market and therefore
the hub firm(s) is or are responsible for operative issues as well as the forms and content of '
interfirm relationships. Despite the polycentric character of the network, the focal firm is
responsible for a meta-co-ordination of economical activities (see Sydow, 1992, p. 81). A
strategic, robust centre seems to be one of the key prerequisites for a successful network.
Strategic centres playa critical role as the creators of value which incorporates, among other
aspects, network-wide capacity building, and guidance with regard to a competitive strategy
between the members of the network internally and externally towards the environment (see
Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995, pp. 146-147). A hub firm's prime task is to orchestrate
responses so that the whole system capitalises on opportunities and realises both internal and
external development. This context is further illustrated in connection with global airline
networks (see 4.4.2.3).
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4.3 An Overview of Airline Partnerships
Following the basic introductory classification of company collaboration, the commg
paragraphs discuss the history of airline partnerships and scrutinise motivations for entering
horizontal airline co-operations.
4.3.1 History of Airline Partnerships
Ever since the establishment of public air transport, commercial airlines have co-operated on
various directional levels and in a wide range of functions. Whether the joint business focused
on operational, commercial or technical issues, training and personnel, or the standardisation
of procedures, carriers spun a web of co-operation amongst one another for operative reasons.
These forms of co-operation have been complemented by air transport industry associations
permitting superfirm collaboration (e.g., lATA, lCAO, AEA, etc.) to be in charge of the
lobbying for specific interests within national, regional and global political and regulatory
structures.
Historically, international aviation industry alliances can be traced back as far as 1945 when
lATA was primarily established to co-ordinate international air fares. The bilateral structure
of agreements that emerged following the 1944 Chicago Convention to initiate free
lUtemational aviation markets, included traffic rights (freedoms), fare regulation, routing
arrangements, schedule co-ordination, carrier designation and often embraced revenue
POoling - a distinct form of airline collaboration. The primary aim of the immediate post-war
structures was to protect non-US carriers at a time when, as a result of the Second World War
the USA had built up a dominant fleet of formerly military aircraft that could be transferred to
commercial uses. Subsequently, lATA was often used to protect economically inefficient
state-owned carriers, or groups of flag carriers from the rigors of market competition by
providing a stage for collaboration (see Button, 1997, p. 3).
The international legacy of air service agreements, both initiated and partly controlled by
IATA, has Iikewise called for co-operational measures, in order to reach understandings in
bilateral negotiations regarding tariffs, routes, designation, frequencies and capacities.
Deregulation and liberalisation obviously made these competition-restraining air service
agreements redundant for some integration regions, they do, however, still widely occur
prOpagating airline partnerships. While regulation has instigated airline collaboration in order
to Circumvent competitive restrictions, deregulation has opened up new ways for airlines to
JOintly compete. One of the most striking results of deregulation was the impetus it gave to
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the level of activity in airline mergers, acquisitions and, more intense yet further market-
oriented, collaboration within national boundaries, especially in Europe and the USA.
However, and as discussed earlier, air transport markets are not yet fully liberalised and
deregulated. Nations generally require airlines based within their borders to be majority-
owned and controlled by citizens of their countries. As a result, international mergers and
acquisitions, which would seem to make economic sense for airlines, are effectively
prohibited. But carriers are finding ways around these limitations. They are increasingly
entering into alliances, or collaborative agreements with foreign partners, similar to those that
have long been a fixture in manufacturing and, more recently, in the telecommunication and
energy industries. Covering a broad range of activities but stopping short of full-fledged
mergers, the pacts typically call for airline partners to share routes, jointly set fares and
schedules, integrate marketing and incentive programmes and combine aircraft maintenance,
catering, reservations, and a host of other operational matters (see Miller, 1997,p. 64).
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the growth of new forms of international alliances that
embraced somewhat different characteristics and served miscellaneous purposes. They have
been less institutionalised in that they have been, in most cases, formed by privately-owned
commercial airlines outside of any governmental or inter-governmental agency initiatives (see
Button, 1997, p. 4). Many co-operation agreements struck between carriers involve no or little
investment in equity. Some co-operations are on a bilateral basis, others on a multilateral one.
Areas covered by airline partnerships are diverse. The following figure puts certain types into
a historical perspective and categorises partnerships according to scope and benefits.
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Figure 4.2: Historical Development of Scope and Benefits in Airline Partnerships
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The statutory and regulatory environment after the US deregulation, starting in 1978, and
Subsequently in other liberalised markets, has allowed for a discrete increase in the maximum
scope of airline partnerships. The opportunity to engage in more extensive partnerships also
resulted in potentially more gainful collaborations. While the beginning of partnership
formation was marked by externally organised collaboration through IATA systems, the
development followed a pattern of incorporating more allies into what recently became
multilateral airlines networks. Generally, the figure above does not imply that all current
partnerships necessarily contain the most eminent pattern with regards to collaborative
benefits and scope. All the mentioned forms of partnership still apply currently, however, the
width and depth of co-operation have developed gradually over the last three decades, which
has spurred the proliferation of more intense horizontal partnerships.
Not only have alliances proliferated in type over the past decade, they have also boomed in
number. An annual survey attempts to track alliances involving major carriers and to report
changes in their main features. The following table shows the quantitative trend of alliance
forming in the global airline industry.
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Table 4.1: Airline Alliance Summary 1994-2000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Alliances 280 324 390 363 502 513 579
With Equity 58 58 62 54 56 53 52
New Alliances - 50 71 72 121 26 40
Number of Airlines 136 153 159 177 196 204 220
Source: Wood and Gallacher, 1998, p. 43, Gallacher, Partners for now, 1997, p. 26, O'Toole, The major Airline Alliance
Groupings, 1999, p. 36, O'Toole and Walker, 2000, p. 46
The growth in overall partnership activities is perceptible. Equity partnerships have been
rather stable in absolute figures, but increasingly playa less substantial role in relation to the
total numbers. The year 1997/1998 saw a peak in newly constituted partnerships, which can
be mainly attributed to the emergence of some of the main global multilateral groupings. The
exact number of airline alliances existing at present (2002) is unclear, not only because of the
dynamic nature of the arrangements, but because the term "airline alliance" is generic and has
no precise definition. Empirical evaluation thus becomes increasingly difficult. Evidence
strongly supports the contention that the last decade especially witnessed a mushrooming
growth in airline partnerships, with slower growth rates expected in the years to come.
4.3.2 Goals and Motivations for Airline Co-Operations
Each collaborating partner's comprehension of a partnership's pay-off is crucial for
understanding the incentives to co-operate and recognising the ways each can unilaterally
influence the alliance's outcome (see Gulati, 1998, p. 304). This cognition mirrors the original
motivation for an airline to enter into horizontal collaborations.
In the broadest terms, any form of collaborative arrangement can achieve the following more
or less overlapping objectives, which in turn motivate co-operational company action (see
Contractor and Lorange, 1988, pp. 9-15). These are:
• Risk reduction:
Dispersion and/or reduction of fixed costs
Lower total capital investment
Faster and safer market entry and payback
• Economies of scale and/or rationalisation:
Lower average costs through larger volumes
Lower average costs by using allied partners' comparative advantages
• Complimentary technologies and patents
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• Co-opting or blocking competition:
Defensive behaviour to reduce competition
Offensive behaviour to increase costs and/or lower market shares of other market players
Overcoming government-mandated trade or investment barriers:
Circumventing regulative barriers
Facilitating initial international expansion of inexperienced firms
•
•
In summary, the above-mentioned motivations for airline partnerships can be categorised into:
• Efflciency,
Effectiveness and
Learning motivators.
•
•
Efficiency motivators primarily entail the exploitation of cost-reduction opportunities in
horizontal alliances between companies having complementary and/or overlapping expertise
(see Harrison et al., 2001). Effectiveness motivators cover market-based motivations to
enhance a company's market position. In an increasingly competitive environment,
characterised by highly fragmented market segments and a constant strive to leverage one's
Core'competence, prospective alliance partners seek to expand their market share and/or size
(see Jarillo, 1988, Vander Kraats, 2000, p. 56). Efficiency and effectiveness motivators are
mainly part of the above-described business alliances and are thus closely related to market-
induced partnership considerations. Market-driven approaches to alliance formation are based
on customer-usage complementarity, and thus merge both concepts (see Dev et al., 1996, p.
12 and Bronder, 1992, pp. 92-122). Learning in the sense of know-how and best practice
transfer and the management of knowledge in learning inter-organisational structures has also
become an increasingly important factor in passenger carrier alliances (for an overview, see
lnkpen, 1998). An alliance offers an attractive opportunity to gain access to skills that would
not have been acquired had the alliance not been formed (for learning alliances, see Khanna et
al., 1998). In airline partnerships, all three motivators are usually addressed simultaneously,
With the above generally describing motivators to collaborate, figure 4.3 broadly summarises
SOme of the main goals of interairline collaboration in production, product and market
categories.
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Figure 4.3: Motivators and Goals of Interairline Partnerships
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Source: Schmidt, 1993, p. 40 and own supplements
It is mainly agreed that within the above-mentioned goals and motivators for interairline
collaboration, the main quantifiable effects are to be found in cost savings and revenue
generation. In addition, the circumvention of regulatory constraints is another key factor
motivating airlines to collaborate.
4.3.2.1 Cost Considerations along Value Chain Activities
Continuous and long-term unit cost reduction is a key necessity for the financial and overall
success of airlines (see Doganis, 2001, p. 14). Decreasing yields, a shift in passenger
composition based on changing demands, and the need to adjust to cyclical developments,
especially since September 2001, have driven concentration on disciplined expenditure
policies. Cost reduction considerations thus play an important role in a carrier's decision to
enter a partnership with another single carrier, or a group of carriers (also see discussion on
cost degression through corporate partnerships Lutz, 1993, p. 30 and Rotering, 1993, pp. 33-
38).
The one rationale behind airline alliances - to save costs - appears increasingly important,
given the near-term expectations of slower revenue growth in the coming years and the trend
towards decreasing yields. It is estimated that the overall cost saving potential, as a percentage
of the total cost due to alliance activities, can range from 1,9% to 11% depending on the costs
savings areas and the depth of integration (see Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000, p. 38). Cost
reduction opportunities, however, take some time to develop - typically 2 to 4 years,
depending on the complexity of the partnership organisation (see Howarth and Kirsebom,
2000, p. 32). Other authors estimate even longer periods of up between 5 to 6 years for an
alliance to start reaping its maximum benefits (see Tarry, Playing for Profit, 1999, p. 91).
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The following sections (4.3.2.1.1 to 4.3.2.1.6) scrutinise possible cost-effectiveness from
partnership action, specifically focusing on benefits induced by economies of scale, density
and scope using the structure of the primary activity stages of an airline's value chain.
Secondary value chain activities, thus management functions, are additionally elucidated
concerning their contribution to partnership benefits.
The figure 4.4 illustrates a typical airline value chain, which serves as a guiding premise for
the following paragraphs.
Figure 4.4: Passenger Airline Value Chain
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4_3_2_1.1Procurement and Finance
Procurement and finance is the first activity stage in an airline's value chain, but nonetheless a
perpetual function. Cost-effective procurement of input factors, such as technical equipment,
fuel and consumables, passenger service products and personnel-related expendables, has
become a vital necessity and is a focus of cost reduction strategies (see Doganis, 2001, pp. 14-
15). Pooling procurement over the boundaries of a single carrier unearths savings potential,
Which has made it a core motivator to enter into collaborative agreements.
Scale effects regarding fixed procurement costs are one rationale behind cost savmgs
expectations in joint purchasing. These fixed procurement costs need to be spent for
quotations, offer comparisons, quality control and administrative processes. Variable and
volume-oriented expenditure effectiveness in procurement is realised through high number
bargaining vis-A-vis suppliers. Moreover, joint procurement among partners, also by reaching
a critical demand-mass, merely increases the purchasing power pertaining to suppliers, which
further enhances cost savings. Suppliers, in turn, can pass on the benefits from their
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distinctive scale effects to the purchasing carrier. Star Alliance." members, e.g., purchase
goods and services for about USD 15 billion per annum. Joint purchasing could reduce prices
paid by 5 to 7% and, consequently, cut the bill by up to USD 1 billion a year (see Doganis,
2001, p. 78).
Aircraft purchase or lease agreements, in particular, are potentially positively influenced by
partnership action. If alliance airlines agree on fleet commonality, major savings can be
realised. The same applies to high volume agreements with lessors, irrespective of equipment
or manufacturer commonality. In addition to the savings in the actual purchasing phase, there
are almost automatically savings on the maintenance side, which are scrutinised below (see
4.3.2.1.3).
IT costs are an important single area of cost savings, both in terms of processing costs and,
more significantly, development costs. Co-ordination between alliance partners to reduce
development costs and investments when major systems become due for upgrades or
replacements, is a crucial cost savings area. The cost side, but also operational efficiency are
the reasons why IT integration is argued to be a prerequisite for beneficial airline partnerships
(see de Pommes, 1998, p. 27). In a survey, 49% of carriers which were somehow engaged in
collaborative agreements with other carriers, shared IT systems (see O'Toole, IT Trends
Survey 2001, 2001, p. 58). Common IT platforms and core systems, or common outsourced
IT systems (e.g. through Application Service Provision (ASP)) allow for cost-effective IT .
partnership structures. In other cases, alliances do not integrate their systems (e.g. Star
Alliance), but operate jointly developed multi-user systems as cross-platform communication
tools between allied carriers. These so-called middleware solutions (software which allows
different IT systems to communicate with one another) are only a phase to full integration
(also see Baker, Behind the Handshake, 2001, p. 67 for the status quo of alliance IT
strategies). It is estimated that in highly integrated airline partnerships, cost savings of up to
20% can be achieved in acquiring assets - including IT (see Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000, p.
38).
It has been argued that there is an increased need for capital in the airline industry. It is true
that airline management and operation endure many of the same capital-consuming
phenomena that are present in other industries. Marketing, information technology
54 For the composition of the Star Alliance, see below (4.4.2.3.1).
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expenditures and initial restructuring costs are good examples. Alliances can potentially be
used to counter this need for extra capital through dedicated know-how transfer among
Partners. On the other hand, the potentially increased attractiveness of partnership structures
through higher profitability levels can lead to capital markets behaving favourably towards
allied carriers.
4.3.2.1.2 Ground Operations
Ground operations, as part of the air transport value chain, comprise processes to handle
passengers, baggage and cargo while an aircraft is not airborne. In addition, ground operations
include the handling of the aircraft itself, which consists of loading and off-loading, cleaning,
refuelling and moving the aircraft. Potentially, ground operations contain positive size effects,
which are not necessarily dependent on the fleet size of an airline, or a group of partnering
carriers. It is rather network density that comprises distinct cost-effectiveness for airline
Partnership operations. Network density describes the number of an airline or a group of
airlines' flights handled at a specific airport. 55 Economies of density define production
advantages resulting from higher utilisation of production facilities, therefore minimising idle
capacity costs. In addition, scale effects occur, in the production of ground operations, and
unit costs can be lowered by increasing and concentrating demand. Economies of density are
thus the result of network density and lead to lower unit and production costs (see Youssef,
1992, p. 9).
A carrier only operating two or three services to a destination needs to, for example, supply
about the same number of ground personnel than if it were operating at higher frequencies.
This also applies to the provision of ticket counters, loading bridges, check-in and departure
gates, computer systems and terminals, lounges and flight dispatch (for station tasks and
expenses, see Weber, 1997, pp. 148-152). Positive cost effects in this regard can be achieved,
not by necessarily increasing the size of the network, but by increasing production and
Utilisation of station facilities. Financially, economies of density occur if unit costs decline as
a result of airlines adding flights or seats on existing flights (larger aircraft or denser seat
Configuration) with no change in load factor, stage length or the number of airports served
(see Steininger, 1999, p. 186). This is why ground handling is significantly cheaper at an
airline's own, highly-frequented hub, than at outer destinations. Co-ordinated partnership
55
Network density can be increased and yields benefits as airlines could possibly attract more traffic without
extending their individual route systems through co-operative agreements and consolidation of facilities (see
YOussef and Hansen, 1994, p. 416).
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action has the same positive cost effects, provided that production and handling facilities are
shared and run at higher capacities (also see Klein, 1996, p. 14).
Airline partnerships can capitalise on scale effects once they manage to jointly administer,
negotiate and purchase ground operations input factors. In some instances, joint deals between
a group of airlines and ground handling operators account for savings of between 10-20%
over current, individual contracts (see Pilling, Empire Building, 2001, p. 54). Even in
personnel, cross staffing can contribute to a commonly better utilisation of ground operation
employees.
To benefit from density effects and in seeking cost advantages from the common usage of one
ground operations provider, airlines occasionally acquire services from subsidiaries of
members of alliance configurations. For example, the Swissair-South African codeshare and
equity partnership also involved co-operation in ground handling, catering and apron
operations provided by Swissair's subsidiaries.56 While Swissair could sell services to its
partner SAA, it could additionally utilise its existing ground operations infrastructure in South
Africa more efficiently. This efficiency, in turn, could be passed on to SAA. In this sense, it
seems to be crucial to adapt and to commit to "family membership" in order to achieve
considerable savings and to avoid operational complications (see Buyck, The Big Move,
2000, p. 52).
Airport charges, as the last value chain aspect of ground operations, can be positively
influenced by the size of the operation. However, both airports and handling agents argue
vigorously that it is the shape of the demand peak, rather than volume that drives unit costs.
The potentiality of reduction of ground handling costs depends on the competitive situation at
a particular airport. Cost reduction opportunities will be influenced by the role of the airports
involved (e.g., if monopoly power still exists), whether or not ground handling is already
outsourced, and the dominance of individual alliance members at particular hubs (see
Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000, p. 32).
4.3.2.1.3 Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul
Maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) mainly include, as key functions, servicing of the
entire aircraft as well as assisting aircraft procurement with diverse supportive engineering
expertise. Generally, MRO can be sub-divided into three functional sections: engine overhaul,
56 The equity partnership of the two carriers was, however, dissolved at the beginning of2002.
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overhaul maintenance and line maintenance. Non-engine maintenance includes aspects of
airframe, avionics and landing gear (for checks and maintenance intervals and tasks, see
Koblischke, 1997, pp. 8-10).
Traditionally, airlines themselves account for a high share of their equipment maintenance.
For airframe segments' heavy maintenance, the quantitative share was 75% airline in-house
MRO, 15% airline third party MRO and 10% independent MRO in 1999 (see Roland Berger
Analysis in: O'Toole, Aftermarket Allure, 2000, p. 63). Carriers aim at driving down
maintenance costs by transforming maintenance departments into stand-alone businesses like,
e.g., Lufthansa Technik GmbH, or Singapore Airlines' SIA Engineering. The other way of
streamlining MRO costs is by outsourcing functions to independent maintenance service
providers and to aerospace manufacturers. These efforts can obviously be co-ordinated with
horizontal partners to thus reap economic benefits from high volume bargaining and other
size effects.
Engine overhaul contains cost savings potential through size effects, provided that
maintenance tasks can be carried out on a sufficient number of identical, or related, engines.
Cost. degression can be achieved through learning curve effects and know-how advantages,
through training costs-savings for maintenance staff and pooling effects in spare warehousing
as well as equipment and facility usage. Additionally, a single airline or a group of airlines, as
the buyers of aircraft engines, can enhance their negotiation position with engine
manufacturers if the total number of purchased engines or spares gives them an augmented
Purchasing power through volume effecta."
Overhaul maintenance describes the upkeep of an aircraft's fuselage and its components. It
requires a high degree of know-how and capital costs for spares, tools and maintenance
infrastructure. Learning-curve and pooling effects lead to lower staff and material expenses as
Well as the elimination of equipment duplication. However, the cost savings potential of
overhaul maintenance is lower than for engine maintenance (see Steininger, 1999, p. 175).
Smaller maintenance tasks and controls, on the apron, just before an aircraft takes off, are part
of line maintenance. Scale effects for these pre-flight and ramp checks are of limited overall
57
. The aircraft engine scene is, however, in a state of flux with engine manufacturers getting increasingly
InVolved in financing and maintaining engines.
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quantitative significance. As discussed earlier, network density and the flexible deployment of
technical staff can lead to cost savings in this area.
If allied carriers were to combine their fleet purchases, they would most likely achieve
volume discounts. In addition to the savings in the actual purchasing phase, there would
almost automatically be savings on the maintenance side, as the partners' more or less
identical planes could be jointly serviced. Airlines also experience positive cost effects in
negotiating maintenance deals with MRO operators, whether they are aerospace
manufacturers or other third party companies. This applies to all mentioned aspects of MRO.
In the long run, the maintenance savings could, in fact, be higher than those on the purchasing
side.
4.3.2.1.4 Flight Operations
Costs of flight operations are generally referred to as direct operating costs (DOC) and usually
include flight crew salaries and expenses, fuel and oil, airport and en-route charges (by ATC),
insurance, rental of flight equipment andlor crews (see Doganis, 1986, p. 76). Depreciation
and amortisation in this aspect include flight equipment, group equipment and property, extra
depreciation (in excess of costs), amortisation of development costs and crew training. These
costs usually account for 40% of an airline's expenses and largely occur irrespective of the
network output, and are thus temporarily fixed (see Steininger, 1999, p. 177).
The. simplest way of decreasing average unit costs is by means of higher and more efficient
equipment utilisation, also by filling denser aircraft seat configuration. This would lead to an
almost cost-neutral increase of output. Load factors or break-even load factors are
respectively indexes carefully monitored by airlines with an eye towards covering unit costs.
Airline partnerships can unarguably help to fill capacity, which consequently leads to
declining costs per passenger (see Klein, 1996, p. 14 and Lindquist, 1996).
Economies of scope hereby represent a main motivator and describe advantages created by
the simultaneous production of different products. Scope effects materialise once a single
airline, or one organisational entity can produce a range of products more cost-effectively
than several airlines producing one product or service each. The benefits, however, only arise
once inputs can be shared or utilised jointly without complete congestion.
A combined, cost-effective production of transportation services is generally best achieved
through hub and spoke systems (see chapter 3 for network configurations). The coupled
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production of transport services encompassing different destinations as well as frequencies
and connectivity within one network, result in network economies. Adding one spoke to such
a network increases the total number of flights disproportionally and, consequently, increases
traffic and, potentially, load factors. In tum, feeding and defeeding traffic allow for operating
larger aircraft on trunk routes with smaller unit costs per seat kilometre. Economies of scope
are the pivotal motivator for the development of dominant network structures. If an airline
Cannot build a critical hub size itself in order to achieve scope effects, partnering can redress
this problem. Feeder and defeeder services by smaller alliance partners are thus a regular
feature at hubs of main global carriers.
Even though hub structures account for a better utilisation of aircraft, idle capacity still occurs
as a result of seasonal, cyclical and otherwise motivated demand fluctuations. Wet leasing of
idle aircraft among members in a partnership can reduce costs and optimise aircraft
employment. 58 Joint aircraft utilisation planning furthermore supports the most efficient
equipment deployment within a partnership structure. However, the driving factor behind
positive DOC effects lies not necessarily in the fleet size, but is determined by the choice of
equipment. As pilots are only rated on a limited number of aircraft types, and cabin crews
require flight inventory training, operating a unified range of equipment has a positive effect.
Low-cost carriers take advantage of this commonality and intensively use their equipment,
which usually consists of only one type of highly utilised aircraft. This applies in an
exemplary way to the US light carrier Southwest Airlines, or Ryanair of Ireland, both only
Using Boeing 737 -series aircraft.
Cost considerations also motivate the joint creation and operation of network management
systems. The aim, tasks and systems structure of network management are discussed below.
The high rate of fixed costs to establish a network management system guarantees
intercompany cost sharing and cost degression. Additionally, economies of information and
economies of know-how play an important part in network management systems. Feeding
data into the system requires substantial capital investment, although scale effects apply. Joint
network management system operation, however, does not deliver full cost savings potential
unless airline partners agree on joint fleet planning and network development as well as
SChedule co-ordination. In general, it is estimated that about 12% of the direct costs of
58
Wet leasing describes the letting or hiring of aircraft with crew. The technical and operational risk remains
With the lessor.
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network management can be saved if airlines co-operate intensively in this area (see Howarth
and Kirsebom, 2000, p. 38).
Yield and revenue management systems optimise load factors by adjusting fares to demand
structures. Similar to network management systems, their initial and running costs are
positively influenced by scale effects. The fixed costs to purchase such systems as well as to
build up the necessary knowledge are reasonably high and can be spread among co-operation
partners. Similarly to network management, operational prerequisites have to be fulfilled to
fully take advantage of positive cost effects of joint yield management systems. Among these
are joint pricing strategies on joint routes (if allowed) as well as a physical or virtual
centralisation of the systems.
Positive volume effects are only achievable for certain variable DOCs for a limited time
horizon and if the fleet structure is not altered. One example of partly variable costs is labour,
which is consistently at the centre of carriers' cost cutting strategies (see Doganis, 2001, p.
14). Costs for crew (cockpit and cabin) can be decreased by flexible crew rotations and
smaller reserve capacities through cross-staffing. Crew rotations are easier to accomplish with
higher numbers of available crew, which happens with shared crews. Airlines are establishing
overseas crew bases with the aim to potentially staff crew on codeshare flights with partner
airlines. The system is reciprocated by allied carriers and used to a large degree as an inflight
marketing tool. Despite possible tension being created by the different criteria applied by
airline partners with regard to crew selection, working standards, training requirements and
other institutional and operational factors, costs are the driving factor for sharing and de-
locating crew. Job exportation is obviously a main incentive, as wage levels can be lower in a
partner's home market (see Cameron, People Movers, 1997, pp. 51-52). Indirect cost savings
through crew utilisation occur once staff are deployed more effectively among partners. Costs
for stand-by crew can be shared, flexible work plans can contribute positively to reducing
staff costs and training expenses can potentially be brought down once larger staff volumes
are trained. Crew training can be made more cost-effective if interairline partnerships manage
to agree on a common basis for recruiting, crew instruction and service delivery standards. In
addition, the above-described network density at partnership hubs comprises a further variety
of crew utilisation and rationalisation challenges.
There are significant economies of size - also with regards to network density - when
operating larger aircraft, since the labour input required, such as pilots, cabin crew as well as
flight dispatchers and ground handling staff, increases non-proportionally to aircraft size.
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Another approach, with the objective to increase staff productivity and bring wage unit costs
down, is to enter into partnerships with smaller independent airlines. They operate on behalf
of the larger partner on thinner domestic and short-haul routes. This practice effectively
means outsourcing or contracting out activities previously done in-house to a partnering
carrier. Cost savings of up to 10% can be realised in this area (see Howarth and Kirsebom,
2000, p. 38).
4.3.2.1.5 Passenger Service
Passenger service costs represent a crossover between DOC and indirect operating costs
(IOC). Ground personnel for check-in, gate and lounge services as well as inflight service,
entertainment and catering are important features in an airline's differentiation strategy, but
playa less significant role in contributing to cost benefits through scale effects.
Inflight catering is a high volume and high value business with airlines spending about USD
10billion per year (see International Flight Catering Association (IFCA), 2001). To reap cost
benefits through outsourcing value chain functions, airlines have been selling off their
kitchens since the late 1980s and early 1990s. To a certain degree cost-effectiveness and
operational efficiencies could be achieved through these strategic outsourcing decisions (see
Pilling, Drive to Outsource, 2002, p. 38-39). The air catering market is now dominated by
Lufthansa'S LSG Skychefs and GateGourmet, the former catering subsidiary of the Swissair
Group. Between them they control about 55% of the market and through scale effects can
offer competitively priced meals (see Pilling, Food for Thought, 2001, p. 48). The next step in
bringing down catering costs will be global catering deals for airlines or alliance partnerships.
It is estimated that about 10% cost savings can be achieved in catering through collective
buying power (see Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000, p. 38).
It appears that passenger requirements for inflight experiences are becoming ever more
demanding. The market, however, is not necessarily characterised by mere luxury, but rather
by products that convey the carrier's values and brand message. Low-cost carriers deliberately
offer bare essentials, while internationally operating carriers have entered the race to
introduce high-end entertainment and communication systems on their long-haul flights (see
Pilling, Flights of Fancy, 2001, p. 47). Inflight innovation frontrunners are the premium
classes, but airlines need to create a strong brand experience as a hospitality provider for all
their passengers. Individual passenger solutions, such as personalised TV sets with video on
demand, or Digital Versatile Discs (DVO) applications, represent the classic, but rather
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passive entertainment offers. Internet access is a more interactive way of providing passenger
entertainment and communication tools are in the course of being introduced. The next level
of service will see a more robust Internet access and the ability of passengers to use their own
mobile telephones on-board.
Technological innovation regarding inflight entertainment is characterised by ever shorter
product life-cycles, on the one hand and mounting costs to develop systems and upgrade
entertainment facilities, on the other. The total market expenditure for inflight entertainment
was estimated to be around USD 2,2 billion in the year 2000 with a 10% yearly growth rate
(see Word Airline Entertainment Association (WAEA), 2001). Broad-band Internet and
telephonic communication technology are costly to develop and to operate. Size effects and
the collective bargaining power of airlines or groups of carriers are relevant with regards to
sophisticated entertainment systems. Technology providers as well as aircraft airframe
manufacturers and suppliers will pass positive scale effects on to the purchasers and this will
lead to cost savings.
4.3.2.1.6 Marketing and Sales
Marketing is one of the most important, if not the most dominant, motivator for airlines to
enter into horizontal collaborative agreements (see Topfer, 1992, p. 174). Partnership
marketing can produce a host of operational and commercial variations. The focus, however,
is on illustrating possible cost savings potentials in marketing and sales processes in
collaborative airline agreements.
Market and passenger communications constitute a substantial cost factor in airline
I
marketing. Airlines' sales organisations account for considerable portions of operating costs,
but hold cost savings potential through scale effects. The set-up of marketing and sales
organisations in foreign countries and regions, or just outside airlines' home markets, usually
generates high expenditures and slows time-to-market. These initial expenses comprise
facilities costs, costs for market intelligence and staff. Airlines jointly competing in the home
market of one partner can offer a broader reach with a minimum investment. Reduction of
duplication in areas of sales, distribution and administration is likely to lead to a decline in the
number of employees and removal of redundant roles and tasks in shared locations.
One of the greatest barriers to entering a new foreign market is the cost of buying or
influencing market share and retaining customers. These costs occur in the form of travel
agent and corporate incentives and commission schemes, introductory fares, special
Airline Collaboration
163
promotions or advertising efforts. Through strong alliances, carriers can tap into an already
established passenger base at a fraction of the costs of full single market entry or penetration.
Existing passenger details and locally-specific consumer patterns, crucial for target marketing,
can be utilised - this decreases the deployment of resources and increases the speed to serve
the market.
Other sales tools like CRS, call centres, sales offices or Internet-based applications can be
jointly established, or dedicated responsibility can be assigned to a partner. Set-up and
administration usually turn out to be more cost-effective within partnerships. The same
applies to customer relationship management (CRM) and FFP systems that can be purchased
or developed, maintained orland amended, administered or outsourced on a lower expenditure
level, once realised in co-operative structures (see Association of European Airlines, 1998,
Pp.55-56).
The tools indicated above, together with marketing and sales processes could, however, even
be totally outsourced to a partner, which would guarantee the highest possible degree of cost-
effectiveness in distributing the air transport product in a non-home market. Members of the
Qualiflyer Group of airlines are strongly dedicated to the so-called "Home-Market-Principle",
Which involves distribution of the entire range of the multilateral alliance's products being
assigned to the home market carrier. Airlines like Northwest and KLM have merged their
marketing operations, including sales, and have abandoned distribution efforts in each other's
home region, allowing them to develop reciprocal marketing efforts that increase service at
lower costs (see Nelms, 1999, pp. 27-30).
Individual market entry usually demands high expenditures for awareness and image
Campaigns. An airline exploiting existing relationships with the advertising and public
relationship agencies of a partner, can substantially decrease costs and initial friction with
business allies (see Netzer, 1999, p. 61). The example of Northwest and KLM again shows a
successful implementation of joint advertising programmes, as each carrier has its assigned
regions to handle advertising for both operators (see Nelms, 1999, p. 30). Other alliances
fOllow different strategies, with the carriers being united under one brand, e.g. the Oneworld
brand (see 4.4.2.3), having jointly developed and published a global image campaign.
However, the campaign management is in the hands of the individual carrier in its respective
region of the world.
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4.3.2.1.7 Summarising Aspects of Cost Motivations in Airline Partnerships
Increasingly, airlines are paying close attention to strategies pursuing sustained profitability.
One of the key contributors is evidently cost cutting schemes. Airline partnerships can
ostensibly help to positively impact on a carrier's cost structure along the value chain.
Areas and dimensions of cost reduction depend on deepening levels of co-operation and
integration. This connection, also with reference to other collaborative benefits, is of cardinal
importance for the following delineation. A study (Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000) arrived at
the quantitative cost savings conclusions as illustrated in table 4.2.· The assumption that
expenditure reduction potential increases with the intensity of the partnerships was taken into
consideration by categorising the cost saving potential into different integration clusters. The
integration cluster continuum can be described as follows (see Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000,
p.5):
• Co-ordinated: limited operational and strategic co-operation
• Shared: co-ordination is tightened to realise operational cost benefits through integrated
facilities and services
• Unified: assumption of a new organisation structure with much of the business being run
under common control in a joint venture or "virtual merger" featuring significant equity
participation (which is, however, not essential)
To point out the position in the value chain, business processes have been assigned to value
chain levels and added to the table. Cost savings potentials are broken down with regard to
the integration intensity.
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Table 4.2: Quantitative Cost Savings Potentials
Value Chain Business Process Cost Cost Saving Potential
Position
Percentage of Co-ordinated (in % of Shared (in % of Unified (in % of
Total Costs business process) business process) business process)
Procurement! Acquire Assets 13,0% 0,5% 5,0% 20,0%Finance
Ground Service Delivery - 22,5% 4,0% 4,0% 5,0%Operationsl Ground Handling
Passenger
Service
Maintenance Maintain Assets 8,5% 1,0% 2,0% 5,0%
Flight Network 1,0% 5,0% 7,5% 12,5%Operations Development
Manaaement
Flight Demand and Pricing 1,0% 5,0% 7,5% 12,5%~erations Manaqement
Flight Operations Control 1,0% 5,0% 7,5% 12,5%~erations and Co-ordination
Passenger Service Delivery - 32,5% 0,0% 2,5% 10,0%Service Infliaht
Passenger Product and Service 2,0% 5,0% 7,5% 12,5%Service Development
Marketingl Sale and Distribution 14,0% 2,0% 15,0% 20,0%Sales
Marketingl Customer Relation 2,5% 5,0% 7,5% 12,5%t-!ales Management
Misc. External Environment 1,0% 5,0% 7,5% 12,5%
I- Manaqement
..Misc. Support Services 0,5% 5,0% 7,5% 12,5%
Misc. Business 0,5% 5,0% 7,5% 12,5%.... Manaqement
Cost Savings in % of
"- totalCO$t$.... Total 100,00% 1,9% 5.6% 11.4%
Source: Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000, p. 38 and own supplements
The study also concluded that for an airline with an annual turnover of USD 10 billion (e.g.
the range of Air France or Northwest Airlines), 600-800 full time equivalent staff will be
needed to work on the implementation of cost saving measures in IT, marketing, passenger
service operation and sales. Approximately the same level of effort is required in training.
Other functions, like yield management, network development, schedule planning,
tnaintenance, purchasing, legal, strategic and senior management will require a smaller
number of personnel - approximately 100 - but the costs and the impact on the departments
will be high. External costs such as new IT platforms and systems, advertising, airport
infrastructure charges, communications and training material, and professional advisors have
to be included in the calculation as well. The study estimates the total costs for an airline of
the above-mentioned size to be around USD 150-200 million per annum for the early years of
a significant multiple partner alliance. Thus, depending on the capitalisation policy and the
l11ake-upof costs in' anyone airline, it is likely that in the early years of an alliance the project
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costs will eat into the potential benefits from reduced costs to a significant extent (see
Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000, p. 40).
Combined potential revenue and cost benefits can produce a profit improvement of up to 14%
of revenue. In an industry where long-term return on sales of 5% would be considered good,
this is obviously an attractive ambition (see Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000, p. 41). However,
revenue and cost benefits behave differently - both in relation to time scale and to the degree
of integration (also see Tarry, 1999, p. 92). Cost reduction benefits are offset in the early
years by project costs (albeit being dispersed across the organisation) and require time to
achieve the deeper integration levels that are the source of sustainable benefits. Increasing
infrastructure costs, cost through complex co-operational problems, training and
communications expenses will most likely escalate initially (see Howarth and Kirsebom,
2000, p. 42). Cost increases within the co-operation are often the result of diseconomies
caused by the complexity of the joint business as well as integration difficulties (see Flint,
1998, Is Bigger Better?, p. 32, Doganis, 2001, p. 79).
Many of the above-mentioned cost savings potentials tend to be theoretical constructions in
airline partnerships. Joint purchasing of aircraft, for example, which contains huge
expenditure efficiencies, is far from being widely practised. Lufthansa and United Airlines, as
two of the core and founding members of the Star Alliance, have so far not managed to jointly
purchase equipment. And while Skyteam members may have a global agreement with Coca .
Cola, they do not have one with Airbus or Boeing. Cost-effectiveness and productivity are
core tasks of airline operations in the current period of accelerated structural and
organisational change (see Morrell and H-Y Lu, 2000, p. 81). However, there is a clear lack of
collaboratively realised cost benefits. Even where joint purchasing occurs, there seems to be a
tendency to collaborate on the smaller and less controversial items. Strategic purchasing only
takes place very infrequently. Currently, the achievement of cost goals through airline
partnerships in a comprehensive operational and commercial manner seems to be more an
idea than a business fact.
4.3.2.2 Market and Regulation Motivated Co-operations
Many interairline partnerships are market motivated and thus driven by external stimuli. It
seems that partnerships to achieve cost savings are important, but so far they have been less
common than market motivated co-operations. The following aspects of market extension and
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circumvention of restrictive regulations are inter-linked for international expansion outside
integration regions, but are discussed in separate paragraphs.
4.3.2.2.1 Market Extension and Market Share Gain
Access to new markets and market extension, as well as offsetting country-based
disadvantages through airline alliances, are seen as an attractive possibility to compete in the
marketplace.
While an airline may, for various reasons, be restricted from physically serving a particular
city in a particular country, alliances allow carriers to share passengers or to gain access to a
new base of air travellers at reduced cost and in a reasonable time frame. In addition, airlines
Cannot realistically grow themselves unilaterally into widespread networks, funded by their
oWn aeroplanes, airport facilities and employees. It is usually impossible for carriers to
duplicate the network coverage of incumbent carriers at their respective hubs. The only
sensible way of increasing reach and market share in the current regulatory and bilateral
legacy environment seems to be through horizontal partnerships. Alliances thus seem to be an
alternative to costly internal, unilateral growth strategies, or where expansion simply is not
permitted. These goals, extensions and market share gains are interdependent and are
discussed simultaneously.
The underlying emphasis in any marketing-driven airline partnership comes from a carrier's
determination to reap economies of scope by extending route networks. The motive behind
many of such partnership agreements stems from the fact that airlines that will be in the best
Position to compete in future, will also be those offering the most extensive networks,
regionally as well as globally. Additionally, the more routes a network comprises, and the
more these routes can be occupied, the more economies of scope are achievable. If this
growth in reach as well as in market share is achieved without an airline needing internal
eXpansion, but with external growth, the risks for the partners are limited and the main
partnership goals can be achieved.
Hub and spoke systems are often used to facilitate market development and extension, but
initially exhibit more economies of scope. The more cities an airline or a partnership structure
has in its system, the more valuable the hub is (see Flint, Is Bigger Better?, 1998 p. 32). This
Valueis solely represented by the network size through the number of connections offered and
other operational, organisational and financial advantages. By feeding traffic from one flight
to another, a partner's reach quickly expands exponentially, while the other partner enjoys
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increased load factors and greater profitability on its service" - as described earlier. Airline
yield may improve at hubs, but especially at dominant hubs and capacity constrained airports.
In highly concentrated market structures, average fares are usually higher than in more
balanced markets, which is usually due to airlines being able to charge hub premiums.
However, it needs to be considered that not all alliance-participating market players can
charge higher prices; only the dominant airline can. The determining factor for this
phenomenon is not primarily the concentration of market players, but the market share an
individual airline has in city pair markets (see Steininger, 1999, pp. 222-223). Nevertheless,
hub advantages almost automatically lead to market share gains. The establishment of fortress
hubs, i.e. dominant hub structures that prevent competing carriers or airline partnerships from
successfully entering a geographical market, facilitates market share prevalence. Increased
traffic feeding into established gateways to increase load factors and improve the yield mix,
make existing hub operations competitively more viable and contribute to hub market
strength.
Feeder traffic plays an important role in market-driven expansion strategies and in connection
with hub strength. Without an infrastructure shuffling passengers from neighbouring regions
to an airline's hub, high frequencies and a comprehensive network could not be operated
profitably. Even with low volume markets, airlines can link their hubs by making use of
commuter carriers. Commuter carriers or secondary carriers thereby fill a niche that large
incumbents refuse to enter. The choice of equipment and the service philosophy usually cater
specifically for [ow-volume, short-haul markets. As these regional airlines only serve a
limited number of geographically confined markets, trunk carriers usually need to establish a
I
range of co-operations with several secondary airlines to cover a sufficient number of smaller
markets.
One advantage of co-operating with secondary airlines is that they usually carry a large
portion of high yield business travel. Passengers choosing a regional carrier as feeder
transport to a trunk route will most likely select the allied trunk carrier for their onward
journey. This, however, requires the trunk carrier to increase the passengers' benefits and to
59 In principle, as a network grows, the degree of connectivity increases approximately as the square of the
number of airports served. For example, a single airline serving 20 airports from its main hub can potentially
provide 420 connecting and direct flights, or 210 distinct services (with outbound and return flights counted as
one service). If the airline forms an alliance with a partner also operating at 21 airports (with one common
airport), the number of possible connections increases to 1,640. These figures are, however, theoretical, since
some potential connections will be relatively unattractive, or already be available through interline traffic (see
Association of European Airlines, 1998, pp. 30-31).
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provide journey convenience by adjusting schedules and infrastructure at the hub. Successful
market extension calls for a far-reaching optimisation of traffic flows from remote commuter
markets into the global network. Globally operating airlines can thus only secure a high
degree of market penetration by means of optimising and extending existing hubs through the
creation of regional networks and/or the development of functional multi-hub networks. In a
next step, this regional traffic needs to be linked with the carrier's global network to offer
highest passenger demand satisfaction and convenience.
Integration of individual continental markets seems practical for carriers of the same continent
which do not possess a sufficiently sized intercontinental network, or which need to re-
dimension it. In Europe, this applies to flag carriers of geographically smaller countries
endowed with only a limited home market potential, which does not allow for high
frequencies on intercontinental trunk routes - such as Swissair and KLM. Competition for
these carrie~s arises from foreign airlines exploiting 6th freedom traffic rights with these
Countries in order to feed their own intercontinental networks. By way of poaching passengers
and exporting traffic to their own hubs, 6th freedom carriers can consequently pose a
significant competitive threat to home carriers of small countries (for air transport strategies
of small countries, see Antoniou, 2001). In order to defend their own competitive position, it
can therefore be beneficial for smaller carriers to enter partnerships with larger airlines and to
feed traffic into their respective international network. The home-carrier would thus serve as a
feeder, taking passengers originating from its own home market to the hub or multiple hubs of
an allied carrier. A small partner carrier would ideally have a home hub from which to collect
lOcal or regional traffic and shuttle it to a partner's hub and from there onwards to
intercontinental destinations. The intercontinental 6th freedom carrier would benefit from a
Virtual enlargement of its own home market. Sixth freedom traffic can thus turn into a
competitive advantage for the operating carrier, as it increases the size of its potential
passenger base and expands passenger awareness in the smaller partner's home market. On
the other hand, a partnership can stabilise the competitive position of a home carrier in its
Confined market, as feeder and defeeder services guarantee equipment occupancy and
POssible competition is "managed" as part of a collaborative agreernent.t"
It becomes increasingly important for carriers with a small home market, but a large
Intercontinental network to either co-operatively expand their home market base, or serve as a
60 Th'
IS set-up example applies to the partnership between Lufthansa and SAS (see e.g. Steininger, 1999, p. 239).
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feeder for other large carriers. In Europe, Swissair and KLM are leading examples of these
strategies. With the new strategic orientation of the former Swissair at the beginning of 2002,
the carrier had to decide whether to be a feeder for another network, or to feed its own hubs in
Zurich and Geneva through a range of partners." To efficiently and profitably operate its
large intercontinental networks, KLM too has to import traffic by means of transporting 6th
freedom passengers - ideally through partnerships (see Steininger, 1999, pp. 239-240). This
nonetheless implies the need for other countries and airlines to export traffic. Obviously, the
benefit for an alliance is enhanced once traffic importers and exporters form a partnership.
However, traffic exporters are not necessarily carriers with small home markets, but are
airlines that have not penetrated their home market sufficiently, e.g. Alitalia. The strategic
challenge and advantage of concluding a partnership with a carrier that has not penetrated its
home market, thus mainly lies in deterring non-allied carriers from poaching an exporter's
market.
There are more reasons for the attractiveness of market extension through network
enlargement. Besides the above-mentioned cost considerations, airlines seek marketing
advantages through widespread and interconnected network structures. Larger networks
attract more passengers, especially connecting passengers. Passengers see additional
advantages in being served online by one carrier or members of a partnership (quasi online),
rather than interline. The value of passenger loyalty programmes is naturally augmented once
a single airline, or consolidated flight operation, can offer a wide range of connections
allowing the passenger to earn and redeem FFP credits. FFP advantages as well as co-
ordinated fares and capacities among partnering carriers furthermore leverage a partnership's
position at a hub (see Gallacher, Power to the Plans, 1997,p. 34).
4.3.2.2.2 Circumvention of Regulative Market Growth and Market Access Restrictions
Market access through interairline co-operation has been discussed in some length in the
previous section (see 4.3.2.2.1). The reason for this type of strategic expansion action and the
general decision in favour of external growth lie in economic considerations, but are also
externally motivated by the statutory and regulatory environment. As a result of restrictions
on market entry, route designation, capacity and ownership, airlines have been and still are
prevented from introducing new services. Where other industries, whether or not formally
61 With Swissair's bankruptcy and its alliance network disintegrating in late 200 I, the re-Iaunch of the new Swiss
airline from Swissair's remnants and in conjunction with Crossair at the beginning of2002, will most likely
follow the strategy of being a feeder carrier to another larger alliance network.
Airline Collaboration
171
regulated, have succumbed to the economic pressure towards larger size, wider marketing
spread and true globalisation through cross-border acquisition and mergers, the airline
industry has been prohibited from doing so.
As a result of these restrictions, many domestic and regional markets remain protected and
can only be served by indigenous carriers. For example, while European airlines operate on
limited US domestic sectors, they may only carry traffic transferring passengers to or from
international flights at gateway airports. They are therefore unable to penetrate US domestic
markets, which account for about 33% of world air traffic, and build alternative US-based
networks capable of feeding their transatlantic and intra-European services (see Association
of European Airlines, 1998, p. 29).
In most cases, airlines are prevented from owning or acquiring a controlling interest in other
foreign carriers as a result of national regulation.f In order for airlines to be designated by
their governments to implement the traffic rights which their specific nations enjoy under air
service agreements, they must be substantially owned and effectively controlled by nationals
of that state (except in and among the EU member states). In addition, such legislation
typically requires de facto control to remain in the hands of home country nationals,
regardless of the size of the foreign stake (see Ourn et al., 1993, p. 16). For example, foreign
ownership of USA-registered airlines is limited to 25%, and hence European carriers are
unable to take control of established US domestic networks through acquisition. However, a
similar ruling applies to Europe where airlines must be in majority (51%) EU ownership.v'
Other countries have matching restrictions on airline ownership. There are various reasons for
these regulations, since many countries associate national prestige with an independent
national flag airline, and take-overs or mergers of such airlines by foreign interests would be
politically unacceptable and would undoubtedly be resisted. This virtual prohibition of cross-
Atlantic and other cross-border concentration outside integration regions characterises
alliances as a merger emulation, since this tool best mimics the positive effects of
Consolidation in a regulative environment that does not fully allow mergers and acquisitions.
62
63 National concentration, however, occurs widely (see Doganis, 200 I, pp. 57-63).
If a carrier were to be majority-owned by foreigners, this would result in a loss of traffic rights for that carrier.
Anomalies nevertheless apply: Cathay Pacific, for example, is a substantially owned and effectively British
Controlled airline, operating out of Hong Kong, which became part of the People's Republic of China in 1997.
ASA with other countries circumvented the fact that Cathay was not Hong Kong owned by replacing
"Substantial ownership and effective control" by "principle place of business' as a key criterion for designation
(see Doganis, 200 I, p. 49).
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Airline alliances do not just have an increasing impact on the negotiation of bilateral aviation
pacts.i" but they also circumvent the restrictive terms of agreements, allowing an airline to
gain otherwise-prohibited and desperately wanted access to foreign markets. Co-operating
with additional airlines is a means of tapping into worldwide traffic flows and enhancing the
global reach of a carrier's networks, which might otherwise be limited by the traffic rights
which its national government was able to negotiate. Where restrictions on cabotage prevent
international carriers from serving domestic routes and where, under existing bilateral air
service agreements, the domestic carrier has no traffic rights in the relevant international
route, airline partnerships seem to be a remedy in their strive for market extension by
circumventing bilateral agreements.
Apart from nationality and ownership rules, there is an abundance of other regulatory barriers
to airline mergers and acquisitions. Governments trying to suppress anti-competitive
behaviour, or to avoid the abuse of dominant market positions have established regulations to
prevent the distortion of competition. Control is either executed by governments directly, or
through special competition authorities. While these authorities may have a domestic
orientation, more and more bodies take decisions with an extra-territorial dimension. This was
the case with the proposed merger of Honeywell and General Electric in 2001, which was
blocked by the European Commission, despite the fact that it was a mainly US American
merger. The airline industry also falls victim to this regulation, which gives it an even bigger
driving force to engage in other forms of close co-operation.f
The above-mentioned factors describe incentives to form interairline partnerships, but also
highlight a principal paraddx of airline collaboration. Although deregulation and market
liberalisation made airline alliances both necessary and possible, the remaining vestiges of
regulation and competition control alliance forming to a certain degree and constrain the
forms airline co-operation can take.66 It is because of this that alliances are still in the phase of
emulating mergers and thus cannot reap the benefits of true concentration and competition.
Table 4.3 describes different evolutionary market stages in which alliances have different
64 See, e.g., the partnership negotiations between British Airways and American Airlines and the resulting
negotiations between the UK and the USA regarding open skies.
65 Intra-European partnerships are mostly scrutinised by the European Commission's competition directorate.
The latest example was the authorisation ofthe Lufthansa/Austrian Airline partnership (see The European
Commission, Notice pursuant to Article 16(3),2001 and Phillips, 2002, p. 15).
66 Paradoxically, the proposed close collaboration between American Airlines and British Airways is driven by
operational limitations for both carriers due to the regulatory, bilateral environment. However, the launch of their
comprehensive partnership has so far been hampered by competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic
demanding that the airlines relinquish slots and open their markets to more competition.
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focal points and characteristics (see Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000, p. 45). The highlighted
areas symbolise the current stages of development and thus describe the airline alliance
paradox.
Table 4.3: Evolutionary Alliance Market Stages - the Airline Alliance Paradox
MARKET DEVELOPMENT
Nascent Frenzied Turbulent Mature
Statutory Market Minimal Regulatory RegullJ#on relaxed Regulation liberalised Market Deregulation
Structure Freedom . mlnorJty foreign . fully-owned · free equity and. strict control on stake allOW$d subsidiary allowed capital flows
ownership • operating . market for · operating freedom. strict regulatory over- restrictions still corporate control · active market forride eXist emerges corporate control
Alliance Focus Market Skimming Market Access Market Growth Matket lntegratlon:
· optimised globalbusiness sYstem
Characteristics of Low-profile, non-equity Rapid formation of joint Dissolution of joint Full set of vehicles
Alliance based collaborations venturet\ ventures, emergence of
Environment cross-border M&As,
fully owner subsidiaries
Source: Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000, p. 45 and own supplements
The alliance focus has reached a stage of maturity with airlines striving for global reach and
growth beyond their traditional boundaries. The statutory market structure as well as the
alliance environment characteristics is trailing the airlines' abilities to participate in
globalisation and open competition. In sum, airlines thus have to utilise traditional
competitive tools - alliances - because of the structure of the external environment, despite
their own sophistication and readiness to move towards more contemporary approaches in
order to face a globalised and concentrated industry.
4.3.2.3 Revenue-oriented Motivations
Besides cost-driven incentives and motivators to circumvent regulatory hurdles, revenue
generation plays an equally important role in the formation of interairline partnerships.
Revenue-oriented motivators can have various beneficial impacts. The following discussion
distinguishes between marketing and market motivators.
4.3.2.3.1 Marketing and Distribution Motivations
M.arketing is seen as one of the paramount factors contributing to positive collaborative
effects in partnership structures, not just in terms of cost-effectiveness but also due to its
Immediate revenue potential (see Topfer, 1992, Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993). Demand
satisfaction thereby represents the focus of airline marketing efforts.
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Passenger numbers in collaborative airline structures can be increased for each individual
carrier as a result of marketing benefits by expanding scope and network spread (see Park and
Zhang, 1998 and Doganis, 2001, p. 75). Schedule co-ordination to optimise connection times
between alliance carriers can increase traffic and thus revenue. As discussed earlier, it serves
passenger convenience to offer fluid, seemingly on-line connections. All phases of the travel
experience; pre-, in- and post-flight herald positive aspects for travellers once online services
can be enjoyed. At a minimum, a partnership is likely to offer transaction-cost saving in travel
service purchasing, more convenient transfer times, shorter walks between inbound and
outbound gates at airports, the chance to collect points or miles on a single FFP, and in case of
problems and criticism, the liaison with only one passenger service department.
Schedule integration and co-ordination allows for higher frequencies and decreases in
schedule waiting time, flight time and waiting time for connecting flights. Optimising transfer
connections amplifies travel convenience and helps to lure traffic volumes from non-alliance
airlines or those with less suitable schedules. Especially time sensitive business travellers
prefer time-saving connections during peak business hours. In hub and spoke networks, co-
operations can allow higher frequencies and more destinations. Enticing passengers away
from other airlines and stimulating air traffic through beneficial connections consequently
increase revenue. Co-ordinated schedules and capacity planning can help to increase
efficiency of aircraft loads and thus contribute to additional revenue.
Furthermore, CRSs show co-ordinated and fluid virtual online routings higher on their
screens, which in tum influences distribution significantly. Under a code sharing arrangement
(see detailed explanation 4.4.3.2), international flights may be listed on CRS screens under
the airline codes of both carriers, even though the flights are only operated by one of the
alliance partners. This double listing of flights can crowd out competitive offerings, perhaps
pushing these offerings right off the screen, thereby allowing the alliance to divert passengers
from its competitors (see Dresner and Windle, 1996, p. 205).
Augmented benefits through alliance FFPs is considered to be another strong marketing and
thus revenue-generating incentive for carriers to engage in partnerships. It can be argued that
the FFP component is one of the most important parts of an airline alliance (see Gallacher,
Power to the Plans, 1997, p. 34 and Petersen, 1997). Being in an industry where commodities
are largely distributed, a functioning FFP is a powerful tool for product differentiation (see
Bhagwanani, 2000, p. 88). Hopes that loyalty programmes will increase seat sales by.either
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generating repeat business among loyal customers, or, if the programme is competitive
enough, by attracting new passengers, is the main motivation to establish FFPs.67
Along with the immediate effects on customer convenience through rewards for patronage,
come communicational aspects by using the FFP member database. Socio-demographic
customer information and data evidencing their travel patterns do not just represent valuable
sources for core product enhancement. FFP data can be used as distribution facilitators for
other travel-related products, such as all-inclusive or diversified offers, e.g. financial or
insurance services.
FFPs, agency loyalty programmes and CLPs all create economies of scope regarding the
reward structure for their respective target market, as it is easier to receive gratification from a
larger network or a bigger carrier. The attractiveness of FFPs with reference to the award
structure is determined by the width of destinations offered by an airline or a group of
airlines. This is why larger carriers, or FFPs being based on broader route networks, have a
competitive advantage above smaller airlines. As described above, commission overrides
represent additional incentives for agencies to retail the products of a carrier that already has a
powerful market position. The same applies to large networks. If a travel agency can cover a
wider range of client needs by distributing products of an alliance network, it will benefit in a
twofold way - by client revenue and commission payments of the airline or network.
A further marketing-motivated incentive supporting the formation of airline alliances is the
direct financial benefit for customers. Supported by a well-publicised study, Star Alliance
pointed out that the combination of codeshare partnerships, paired with US antitrust
immunity, could lead to customer savings on fares of up to 27% compared to inter-airline
pricing (see N/A, Star Alliance - What's New, 2000 and Brueckner, 2000, p. 9). Alliance
networks make immense communications efforts to advertise these financial incentives to
their clientele.
These passenger savings are m vast contrast to pncmg power. Pricing power, based on
network strength and hub dominance, is seen as a rationale behind revenue increases of
airlines involved in horizontal partnerships (see Jackel, 1991, p. 144). Yield premiums can be
harvested on high frequency routes between alliance hubs. These intra-alliance hub yield
67 Passengers are usually willing to pay a premium for a functioning FFP (see Proussaloglu and Koppelman,
1999). This premium increases with the value of the FFP, which is detennined by its scope.
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premiums can be approximately 10% above that of more openly competitive markets (see
Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000, p. 33). Premiums of this type especially apply to congested
gateway-to-gateway links between business centres in the North Atlantic market.
Furthermore, economies of information pertain to creating general awareness for a carrier and
its range of services and products. Once a passenger has been captured as a client of an
alliance, information effects assist in providing this passenger with the wide range of alliance
offers. It is also easier for the consumer to economise on search costs by using the airline
partnership for more than one service once he or she has become familiar with it (see Flint, Is
Bigger Better?, 1998, p. 32).
4.3.2.3.2 Market, Network and Hub Motivations
Alliances can lead to total market share increases for each participating carrier by an
extension of the geographical reach (see Doganis, 2001, p. 75 and above). The possibility to
enter markets, which are otherwise inaccessible, through alliances presents significant
revenue potential.
The feeding and dispersal of traffic to an increased number of destinations gives collaborating
carriers a lead over their un-allied competitors. Existing hub and spoke systems can benefit
from partnership programmes. In local or international markets, each partner can make use of
the partner's hub and spoke network to feed its own international routes and distribute traffic,
(see Dresner and Windle, 1996, p. 205). The above-mentioned benefits from market access
and market share gains through hub and spoke networks can be directly translated into
revenues. The size of the network plays an immensely determining role in its attractiveness to
passengers and thus for the distribution trade as described above. This especially applies to
high yield business passengers.
Fortress hub structures can be strengthened through airline partnerships as feed to and
dispersal of traffic during attractive, peak slot hours increase entry barriers for potential
competitors. A less openly mentioned motivator is thus the reduction of competition through
airline partnerships. Route-specific or regional alliances, in which partners serve the same
hub, usually lead to a reduction of effective competition. Mitigating effects on competition
and increases of market power with possible leveraged revenue potential occur where airlines
decide to co-operate on routes without a third competitor. Co-operation can be in the form of
one carrier completely relinquishing routes to the benefit of the partnering airline. ~other
form would be for both carriers to maintain their services, while offering codeshare
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connections and co-ordinating frequencies, schedules and joint sales efforts'" (see Doganis,
2001, pp. 79-80 and below for codesharing).
The effects on competition of both configurations are similar. The reduction or possible
elimination of competition serves monopolistic or duopolistic market behaviour, with
immediate consequences for revenue generation. Where competition is reduced, extra rents in
the form of hub premiums can be achieved in distributing the product to passengers (see
Borenstein, 1989, p. 357). In addition, higher capacity shares through partnerships lead to
disproportional increases in market shares by superior load factors (see Steininger, 1999, p.
224 and Jackel, 1991, p. 146).
Airlines with a strong long-haul but weak domestic or regional market benefit distinctly from
airline alliances. KLM was traditionally a long-haul carrier, with a very small domestic and a
weak European network. Through the development of key regional alliances in the UK,
Germany, Scandinavia and France, KLM managed to support its Amsterdam Schiphol hub
and thus its long-haul flights. KLM further entered markets of its alliances partners, importing
traffic, thus generating additional revenue.
4.3.2.3.3 Revenue Gain Quantification
In sum, revenue gains by airline alliances mostly come at the expense of competing airlines. It
is the redistribution of traffic rather than market growth that drives the additional revenue
generation (see United States General Accounting Office, 1995, p. 9, Park and Zhang, 1998,
p. 246, Tarry 1999, p. 92). However, it is likely that at least some revenue originates from
traffic stimulation caused by increased competition among alliances and between alliances
and other airlines in the short term.
The revenue success of airline alliances seems difficult to quantify. In an early study, the US
American General Accounting Office (GAO) calculated that the alliance between Northwest
Airlines and KLM produced an increase in ridership of 350,000 passengers for both carriers
in 1994. In revenue terms, Northwest could additionally generate between USD 125 and 175
million through the partnership (see United States General Accounting Office, Airline
Alliances Produce Benefits, 1995, p. 4). Lufthansa published extra revenues of DEM 500
million in 2000 as a result of all its partnerships, which is about 0,5% of Star Alliance's total
68 Swissair and Sabena 'dominated all major connections between Brussels and Switzerland after Swissair
Group's capital investment in the Belgian carrier. Lufthansa and SAS have dominated the German-Scandinavian
market since the start of their partnership in 1995 (see Doganis, 2001, p. 80).
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revenue and about 2% of Lufthansa's operative revenue in the year 2000 (see N/A, Lufthansa
AG - Investor Relations, 2000). Austrian Airlines once estimated additional annual profit
from its Star Alliance membership to be around USD 20 million in 2001, at a yearly turnover
of about USD 1,6 billion (see Feldman, Alliance Costs Start Building, 2000, p. 41). Some
authors consider that the potential revenue increase of airlines in alliances will fall into the
range of2-5% of revenue (see Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000, p. 35).
Although these gains are often relatively small compared to such measures as a carrier's
overall international operating revenues, they represent key sources of new traffic and extra
revenue for participating airlines in an industry characterised by razor-thin profit margins. The
magnitude of these gains depends on the geographical scope of the partnership arrangements
and the level of integration achieved by allied airlines. However, total gains from partnerships
need to take into account benefits on the costs side and other, qualitative advantages from
partnership action. It thus remains complex to quantify final success from interairline
collaboration.
4.4 Forms and Instruments of Interairline Co-operation
The aforementioned different co-operational motivators, macro-economical competitive
parameters and the regulatory environment (see 4.3.2) illustrate a fertile ground for airlines to
co-operate in different forms. The exact definition of what constitutes an airline co-operation
is vague, given the variety of continually changing institutional arrangements linking airline
activities. In addition, airlines have over time built a complex web of interlocking
collaborative arrangements covering various aspects of their business operation in different
geographical areas. Interairline collaboration thus clearly cuts across distinct and exclusive
agreements between a finite number of firms. They far more represent a net of different forms
and instruments of co-operations, often indirectly linking carriers that are otherwise fierce
competitors through specific collaboration.
The following section systemises these collaborative forms and instruments, using different
criteria. However, it is not the purpose of this section to comprehensively scrutinise
definitions of co-operation in the context of corporate strategies (for these, see e.g. Jackel,
1991, pp. 22-36). An introductory, summarising systematisation of forms of co-operational
airline agreements, is illustrated in the following figure.
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Figure 4.5: Forms of Horizontal Interairline Co-operation
HORIZONTAL AIRLINE
CO-OPERATION
I
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Low-entangled Highly-entangled
operative strategic
• Opportunistic • Commingling of assets
• Commercial orientation • Common goals
• Little or no formalised partnership • Geographically comprehensive
management required • Collaborative management authority
• Geographically constrained • Super-firm co-ordination
• Low exit barriers, little loss • High exit barriers, high loss
potential potential
L UHybrid Instruments and
Forms
• Collaborative instruments for
strategic and/or operative co-
operation
Source: own compilation
4.4.1 Low-entangled Operative Agreements
Operative airline collaborations require little institutionalisation and do not necessitate
collaboration authorities in the form of management functions. Their principal orientation is
to acquire supportive functions for selected value chain activities. Operative airline
Partnership agreements focus almost entirely on opportunistically exploiting joint sales and
distribution activities. They are usually short- to medium-term oriented, however, many of the
succeeding forms of collaboration have empirically shown a great temporal endurance.
4.4.1.1 Interline Agreements
The most recognised multilateral and operative airline agreements are interline agreements.
They are commercial in orientation and partners stay very much at arm's length. Interline
arrangements provide for the participating airlines' mutual acceptance of passenger tickets
(subject to restrictions, endorsement requirements and additional collections according to the
accepting carriers' tariffs), baggage checks and baggage transfer, and cargo waybills as well
as established uniform procedures in these areas (see United States General Accounting
Office, 1995, p. 13). In addition, interline agreements allow tickets of one carrier to be sold
through the distribution network of another carrier, or through associated distribution
Channels.
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The original blueprint for interline agreements was established by lATA, but participating
carriers need not necessarily be lATA members. Interline partners negotiate the agreements
themselves, while lATA provides the necessary contracts, travel documents and accounting
services, and facilitates the interlining process in its passenger tariff and service conferences
(see Economic-Plus Limited GRA, Incorporated, 2000, p. 5). As financial demands emanate
from interlining, lATA has introduced the lATA Clearing House, which deals with financial
streams between carriers (for the legal position of the Clearing House see Reckewerth, 1993,
pp. 176-183). Generally, every airline has multiple interlining agreements which, in turn, lead
through various collaborative combinations to a wide network of these arrangements (see
Schmidt, 1993, p. 105).
The IATA interline system has several principal benefits (see lATA, DG Competition
Consultation Paper, 2001, p. 5, and for a detailed discussion of economical benefits, see
Economic-Plus Limited GRA, Incorporated, 2000):
•
Reduced transaction costs by simplifying administrative procedures
Better and less expensive services for connecting passengers
Flexibility, particularly for time-sensitive passengers
The value of additional journeys (less the cost of providing for them) induced by an
enhanced quality product
• The economies of density that result from these additional journeys'"
•
•
•
Interline procedures mainly aim at providing maximum passenger convenience, and in the
event of irregular operations, at getting the passenger to his or her destination as quickly as
I
possible with the minimum of inconvenience, using the resources of all participants (see
lATA, DG Competition Consultation Paper, 2001, p. 4). Interline agreements entitle
passengers to purchase one ticket, even though various carriers provide transport services for
a specific itinerary, covering several sectors. They increase the flexibility for passengers as
long as the air ticket is interlineable, i.e. only lATA members or interline carriers participate.
The fare for such a ticket is not calculated on the basis of the sum of each leg's fare (sector
fare), but on the lower throughfare. Furthermore, passengers have a fare advantage as price
degression caused by distance o.ccurs. Using different carriers means the partaking airlines
69 This economic benefit arises because an increase in density of travel over part ofthe air network will enable
larger and more economical aircraft to be utilised. This will reduce airline operating costs which will, depending
upon the degree of competition in the marketplace, either enhance airline profits (add to the producer surplus) or
reduce fares (which will add to consumer surplus) (see Economic-Plus Limited GRA, Incorporated, 2000, p. 6).
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have to divide the revenue on a prorate basis. Prorate revenue allocation is generally based on
the length of the travelled segments, with short-haul legs, however, receiving a proportionally
higher cut of the revenue. For some airlines provisio-agreements have been negotiated. These
entail that the provisio-carrier obtains an even higher share of the profit than according to the
prorate basis (see Steininger, 1999, pp. 195-196).
Difficulties do occur when carriers do not accept a competitor's ticket for reasons that lie in
their individual pricing and product strategy. Once a carrier defies an interline agreement with
an airline which solely intends to enter a market, severe entry or extension barriers develop
for the new entrant. A passenger travelling on the new entrant will not be able to purchase a
supplemental add-on flight on the basis of the original ticket for the lower throughfare. As a
trend towards individual pricing proliferates, and due to the increasingly shrinking influence
of lATA as well as airlines' tendency to individually negotiate partnership agreements, one
Can expect interline agreements to lose significance.
4.4.1.2 Prorate Agreements
Prorate agreements are a typical form of operative airline marketing agreements. One carrier
agrees to sell capacity on a particular part of its network to another carrier for a previously
accorded fare. Revenues that one airline will pay another for carrying the latter's ticketed
passenger on a particular part of the former's network, will thus be fixed.
Prorate agreements often occur in the case of feed or dispersal services behind-gateways.
International carriers servicing a country or region's main hub but, because of regulatory or
commercial constraints, are not able to operate behind this gateway, often make use of prorate
agreements to distribute their traffic. Prorate agreements entitle passengers to purchase flights
to the desired destination, without being charged the accumulated single fares or sector fares.
Additionally, prorate agreements allow airlines to acquire seat capacity more cost-effectively
and thus to offer their passengers competitive throughfares." Prorate agreements are therefore
derivatives of interline agreements, but require more individually negotiated terms and are
thus usually more beneficial for both the user and the provider of the air transport service.
Special prorate agreements (SPA) underlie collaborative agreements, but most often with
codesharing pacts. With SPA, fares can be determined on routings operated multilaterally.
SPAs often govern partnership pricing when there's an inability to jointly set fares, usually in
70
Throughfares are less than the sum of the fares of the separate legs.
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cases where antitrust immunity is not granted. Under an SPA, each of the partnering carriers
specifies the revenue it requires to carry a passenger along its section of an interline trip,
which is, in turn, ticketed by the other carrier. The ticketing carrier then sets the overall fare
for the trip, recognising that the required amount must be paid to the collaborating carrier. In
contrast to simple prorate agreements, SPAs are the result of a more laborious bilateral
negotiation process with an active, collaborative influence on the fare structure.
4.4.1.3 Interchange and Blocked Space Agreements
Interchange agreements are concessions between carriers to partly or fully charter seat
capacity on certain routes to a partner. One can distinguish between the following forms of
interchange agreements:
•
On-behalf traffic: a carrier offers a service on certain routes on behalf of another carrier
Limited charter: a carrier charters capacity for a limited period to or from another carrier
Connecting plane or aircraft exchange agreements respectively: after having reached its
final destination, a carrier charters its aircraft to a partnering carrier which offers a
connecting service with its own crew
Blocked space: a carrier - the marketing carrier - charters seat capacity from a partner - the
operating carrier - on a longer-term basis
•
•
•
Blocked space agreements are certainly the most common and important form of operative
agreements. Blocked seat spaces are usually sold to the partnering airline for a fixed amount.
The marketing partner thereby takes the full capacity and distribution risk. This form of
blocked space agreement is generally referred to as "hard blocks". "Soft blocks", in contrast,
describe the marketing carrier's option to purchase seats in consignments. If the marketing
carrier is unable to vend the seat capacity, it can be returned to the operating carrier. In this
case, the distribution and capacity risk stays with the operating carrier, which usually charges
higher consignment fares. South African Airways and Nigeria Airways had a joint business
venture - a combination of on-behalf traffic and blocked space agreement - on SAA's route
from Johannesburg via Lagos to New York. Planes on the route were manned by an SAA
flight crew, while on-board service was provided jointly by the two companies. Nigeria
Airways was allowed to sell 109 seats out of the 330 on the flight. Blocked space
collaborations are comparable to partial wet-lease agreements, although the agreements do not
involve the entire aircraft seat capacity (see Beyhoff et aI., 1995, p. 11). The vast majority of
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blocked space agreements are point-specific. They are minor, targeted, operative affairs that
usually generate few controversies.
4.4.1.4 Pooling Agreements
Pooling agreements are contractual understandings between two or more carriers to jointly
serve one specific route. In most cases, they are the result of bilateral air service agreements
between nations that only allow a duopolistic competition structure. Capacities, revenues and
costs are split according to an agreed scheme. "Open pools" allow for revenue to be shared
according to the supply situation (number of flights, and seat capacity) without any limitation
on shared revenue. "Limited pools", however, introduce minimum shared revenue, or caps on
shared revenue (see Pompl, 1998, p. 108 and for a discussion of pool definitions, see
Reckewerth, 1993, pp. 248-249). Members of the pool co-ordinate their flight schedules and
sell and accept partners' tickets.
The advantages of pooling agreements reside in the fact that load factors and frequencies of
pooled flights can be increased. Through a joint publication of flights, the partnering airlines
can additionally target new and wider passenger groups (see Schmidt, 1993, p. 113).
However, the downside of pool agreements lies in the reduction of the involved airlines'
freedom of action and in blunting any competitive tendencies within markets regulated by air
service agreements.
Pool agreements have been prohibited for US airlines by US antitrust laws and were
disallowed for traffic within the EU in 1988. The termination of pool agreements in major
aviation markets has thus paved the way for other collaborative agreements.
4.4.2 Highly-entangled Strategic Agreements
Highly entangled strategic agreements focus on the commingling of airline assets. Their aim
at the time of formation is more long-term with a comprehensive scope regarding the
geographic expanse and business orientation. Strategic agreements are based on explicitly
formulated common goals for which members conjointly strive. Section 4.4.2.1 discusses
main forms of strategically oriented interairline partnerships.
4.4.2.1 Strategic Airline Alliances
Strategic alliances have become an increasingly popular concept to cover a broad spectrum of
Collaborative business arrangements. Over the last 10 years, there has been a frenzy of activity
in interairline partnership formation, regularly called strategic alliances. Strategic alliances
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can be described as "( ...) voluntary agreements between firms involving exchange, sharing or
co-development of products, technologies, or services. They can occur as a result of a wide
range of motives and goals, take a variety of forms, and occur across vertical and horizontal
boundaries" (Gulati, 1998, p. 293).
A strategic airline partnership or alliance generally includes the commingling of assets. The
purpose of this distinction is to categorise a strategic alliance in circumstances, in which parts
of each company - i.e. parts of the value chains - join to pursue a single set of business
objectives. This contrasts with contracts, or other agreements established to fulfil dual
objectives of the partaking companies. In this regard, commingled assets can be facilities,
aircraft, capital or personnel (see NIA, Airline Strategic Alliances: Definition and a Case for
Caution, 1993, p. 1). However, in antithesis to this definition, strategic alliances are not
necessarily only constituted by commingling assets. Interdependence in pooling individual
resources, or the reciprocal exchange of input and output factors also defines strategic
alliances. Furthermore, strategic airline alliances, as organisational arrangements and
operating policies, share administrative authorities and form social links between the partners
involved (see Mak and Go, 1995, pp. 63-64).
Summarising the general theoretical explanations of strategic alliances from the preceding
section, the definitions outline one fact: strategic alliance is a generic term for a host of forms
of interairline partnerships. The further use of "strategic airline alliance" as a superordinate
concept thus incorporates the following aspects:
•
Economically independent but competitively interdependent airline partners
Horizontal collaboration
Equity investment or exchange, although below majority margin
Existence of steering or co-ordinating collaborative authority
Initial long-term orientation with market-oriented goals and corporate efficiency
objectives
High exit barriers, high loss potential, and risk of sunk costs
•
•
•
•
•
Strategic alliances are defined as the co-operation between two independent, but economically
interdependent airlines, sharing- the goal to achieve common competitive advantages.
Competitive interdependence illustrates the specific relation between actual or potential
competitors which consequently leads to a collaborative - horizontal - direction (see Lutz,
1993, p. 39). As part of the following discussion, only horizontal airline partnerships form
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part of the definition of strategic airline alliances. In contrast to the general definition of
strategic alliances above, it is not necessary to limit the co-operation to selected parts of the
value chain. It is, however, questionable whether strategic alliances between firms that have a
broad collaborative value chain orientation, can maintain their economical independence.
Even close partnerships, like Northwest Airlines/KLM do not incorporate the entire value
chain, thus leaving sufficient autonomy for the partners.
Capital linkages between airlines are not in conflict with the definition of strategic alliances.
However, equity exchanges or investments must not enable one of the participants to gain a
controlling stake in the partnering firm. The 20% equity stake the Swissair Group held in
South African Airways until February 2002 thus constituted a strategic alliance.
Co-ordinated behaviour and common use of resources are used to gain or defend competitive
advantages over others. This only can be achieved once a steering authority is established.
Strategic alliances therefore constitute the existence of an alliance management or co-
operating steering department. In a very intense case of co-operation without equity stakes,
KLM and Northwest Airlines have a member on each other's board and dedicated alliance
management functions (see Buyck, The Reluctant Dutchess, 2001).
Strategic airline alliances need to have a long-term orientation and collaborative agreements
must serve a strategic corporate strategy. The strategic goal must be to achieve common
benefits, which can be roughly divided into production, market and product goals
accomplishing corporate efficiency, effectiveness and learning objectives (see Netzer, 1999,
pp, 50-62 and above). Some transatlantic alliances underscore their commitment and long-
term orientation by applying for antitrust immunity in the USA. This usually requires
organisational, commercial and operational adjustments, which can involve a strategic re-
orientation of the partaking airlines (for the Lufthansa-United Airline antitrust immunity, see
SaCher, 1997).
While commingling of assets leads to a dependency or hostage situation, exiting a strategic
partnership can be associated with high barriers. These might occur in the form of a general
high loss potential as a result of leaving the collaboration, and/or sunk costs for assets that are
trretrievably lost when departing the alliance.
The following describes some selected and significant strategic interairline partnerships.
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4.4.2.2 Franchise Agreements
Franchising has traditionally been a collaborative measure and strategic market extension tool
in many industry sectors. Quick service food suppliers (e.g., McDonald's), the beverage
industry (e.g., Coca-Cola Company) and clothing firms (e.g., Benetton), to name but a few,
have used product or trademark franchises as well as business format franchises successfully
on a global scale.
In aviation, franchising allows a carrier to diffuse its brand and generate revenues on thin
routes without necessarily committing major capital investments. Airlines ideally functioning
as franchisees are regional carriers, serving markets that are usually too unprofitable for
incumbents to enter or to penetrate. Industry development makes it imperative that carriers
funnel as much regional traffic as possible into their service networks, while the regional
carriers' limited resources make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to grow internally.
Strength-weakness profiles of franchisor and franchisee are thus usually complementary.
The established carrier brings a brand and a strong international network, usually through size
and scope, into the collaborative agreement. The franchisee serves regional and/or domestic
routes at lower operating costs. Instead of developing or protecting a share by entering the
regional carrier's market and engaging in predatory pricing, thereby destroying or severely
weakening the regional carrier and gaining a market which it cannot profitably or adequately
serve, the franchisor takes advantage of the regional carrier's twin competitive advantages,
namely size and its intimate knowledge of the niche market it serves.
In practice, one airline - usually an incumbent carrier - would permit another carrier to use its
I
name, aircraft livery, uniforms, service concept and brand image. Externally, the franchisee
would adopt the product or brand appearance of the franchisor completely, thus contributing
to significant branding effects. The incumbent carrier would sell these privileges to its
collaborative partner, often as part of a package in which the franchisor undertakes the overall
franchisee's marketing, sales management, revenue and yield management. In return, the
franchisee pays franchise and royalty fees, also in the form of other charges for supplementary
services like revenue accounting, departure control systems or various IT and consultancy
assistance. In fact, the franchisee _bears all of the operating costs involved in the franchise -
repainting aircraft, purchase of crew and customer service uniforms plus the cost of any
cosmetic changes needed to aircraft cabins and the corporate appearance. It is these aspects
which explain why franchise agreements can be described as licensing agreements, as the
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franchisee usually buys a licence to use the franchisor's intellectual property (see Moorman,
1998, p. 121). Besides branding effects, additional scale and network density and benefits
through the franchisee's feeder services, give the franchisor immediate revenues from these
financial charges.
The franchisee's benefits, apart from traffic increase, stem from the adoption of a usually
superior brand, marketing mix provision, including FFP participation and assistance, as well
as the possibility to operate interline, rather than online. Interline traffic however, is only
likely once codeshare agreements are established, or if the franchisee gives up its own
designator code for the benefit of the franchisor's code. Sharing a code with a global player
gives the franchisee a particular credibility in the travelling community and equips it with a
certain prominence in CRSs. In addition, growth potential surfaces through franchise
agreements. By exclusively providing feed to the incumbent's network, the franchisee can
reach a critical mass and operate more cost-effectively and thus stronger in its home market.
In order for the franchisor to exert control over the continuity of the franchise quality, regular
audits and compliance checks are conducted. These checks include areas such as
proGurement, management and organisation, personnel and training, procedures and manuals,
branding issues, service standards, security and safety, airworthiness, ground operations,
technical standards and engineering, as well as marketing and distribution. They thus cover
the entire value chain that needs to be in compliance with a catalogue of requirements laid out
by the franchisor. In addition, the franchisor demands that no alterations are made to the
franchisee'S organisation, financial and asset structure, its business strategy and development,
as well as networking strategy, without prior approval. Contravention of compliance checks
and contractual resolutions would ultimately lead to a cancellation of the franchise agreement.
To increase the influence on the franchisee's production process, the franchisor usually trains
franchisee's staff in areas like safety and security, customer service, engineering and
airworthiness issues.
The first franchise in the airline industry was concluded in 1967 by Henson Aviation as a
franchisee of Allegheny Airlines, a predecessor of USAirways. Allegheny developed the
"Allegheny Commuter System" as a franchise operation to serve routes they were not able to
operate themselves (see Steininger, 1999, p. 290). Franchising is now a form of collaboration
that is growing in popularity in international markets, especially in Europe where British
Airways has been 'successful in developing agreements. Starting its franchise activity in 1993
with CityFlyer Express (since 1999 a wholly owned subsidiary of British Airways),
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franchising produced an initial WIn-WIn situation. CityFlyer quadrupled the size of its
operation and posted significant pre tax profits in the first 5 years of its franchise agreement
with BA (see Moorman, 1998, p. 121).
In 1996, South Africa's Comair became British Airways' first franchise partner in Africa and
the first to serve and feed a market other than British Airways' core home market. Although
Comair initially remained a private company, distinct from British Airways, it traded in its
livery and commercial independence for British Airways' flight codes, CRS, sales promotion
and FFP, which helped to increase its ridership and strengthen its competitive position against
the incumbent South African Airways. In return, it fed British Airways' international network
with passengers from other Southern African regions, mainly through Johannesburg
International Airport.
The positive outcome of the first foray into the franchise market convinced British Airways to
pursue an aggressive franchise strategy, which now incorporates 12 franchise partners with
regional or feeder operators in Europe, Africa and the Middle East and, in August 2001,
serving close to 120 additional destinations (see N/A, British Airways' Extended Network,
2001).
The downside of franchising primarily lies in dependency, branding effects and costs. With
the franchisor effectively controlling the franchisee's entire operation through contractually
determined audits, compliance checks and various other obligations, the franchisee loses a
significant part of its economic autonomy. The augmented execution of control on the
franchisee has repeatedly been expressed by franchisor airlines either fully integrating
I
franchisees (e.g., CityFlyer), or taking stakes in their collaborative partners (e.g., Comair).
What used to be the virtue of small regional carriers, namely being capable of making and
implementing decisions quickly, might be lost through the approval process of the franchisor.
A further frailty of franchise agreements is the possible loss of the franchisee's original brand
name and value. In the case of Com air in South Africa, the franchisee is operating under
"British Airways operated by Comair", however the original brand name is lost, as it no
longer has any unique brand features for the travelling public. In the event of a termination of
the franchise agreement, this would imply that Comair would either have to try and revive the
old brand, or establish an entirely new brand identity. The costs of the franchise that has to be
born by the franchisee must be taken into consideration and might jeopardise the expected-
increase in revenue of the franchisor. As already mentioned, franchise fees and royalties need
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to be paid to the franchisor as well as initial standardisation costs which need to be laid out.
These have to be covered at the outset of the collaborative partnership as well as during the
entire franchise operation.
On the other hand, the franchisor's brand image can be negatively influenced by the
franchisee. The above-mentioned branding advantages could be diluted or destroyed if a
franchisee does not fully live up to the franchisor's standards. The latter situation generally
emanates from the situation that the passenger purchases a service which has been produced
by the franchisee, but which is marketed under the franchisor's brand name. Compliance
checks and audits try to avoid this situation, but the potential of negative brand effects
remains.
4.4.2.3 Multilateral Partnerships/NetworkslBlocks of Airlines
A global carrier alliance network is formed by a group of affiliated airlines with
complementary route structures capable of providing service to most of the large and
medium-sized cities around the world, particularly in North America, Europe and Asia (see
Oum et al., 1993, p. 15). Carriers partnering in a network can consequently build a strategic
group or block of collaborating firms (for an in-depth discussion of the concept of strategic
groups in aviation, see Albach, 1991, pp. 665-666 and Piepelow, 1997).
Airline networks need not necessarily be of strategic orientation, since they could be loose
forms of horizontally collaborating carriers. However, also with regard to the specific airline
networks to be described below, a strategic, highly-entangled focus can be assumed. In
accordance with the network theories described above, these airline networks are specific
forms of strategic networks, as they bring firms that are highly symmetric in terms of their
value chain, scope and resource commitment, and follow a similar strategic orientation,
together within an industry. Assets are regularly commingled and the partners endeavour to
find a common, explicitly formulated goal. Managerial functions are not carried out on an ad
hoc basis, but in structured managerial organisations to which each member contributes. Exit
barriers can be high and occur in the form of sunk costs emerging with the departure from the
alliance.
A global network or strategic airline group can collect or feed traffic from many points
throughout the world, channel that traffic onto its long-haul trunk routes and distribute it
through collection and dispersion systems on other continents (see Oum et al., 1993, p. 15).
Regional networks provide transportation within the airlines' home regions and feed traffic to
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the airlines' international gateways (see Golaszewksi et al., 1995, p. 1). The combination of
those two collaborative systems is effective for partnerships, because it allows quasi online,
seamless service between a variety of domestic and international points, taking advantage of
the multi-hub structure of its members. The particular size and scope of a route network
contributing to a collaboration is a unique resource, which makes an airline an attractive
partner for a multilateral group and gives it a strong position among its allies.I'
The following section introduces the major global networks, their managerial and strategic
implications and their main collaborative tools.
4.4.2.3.1 The Global Groupings
Today's global airline networks are not anonymous groups of carriers containing a vast range
of collaborative agreements, but branded structures of allies. In order to capitalise on
marketing effects, airline groupings have given their co-operations well-publicised brand
names. As a main marketing objective is to offer seamless passenger travel and to operate as
uniformly as possible, e.g. towards travel agents, organisations and passengers, airline
networks increasingly use umbrella brand concepts. It is believed that maximum benefits to
be realised from alliances occur when the grouping acts as a single company, which can be at
least partly achieved by common branding (see Berardino and Frankel, 1998, p. 83).
Despite their initial concept of establishing dominant superbrands at the expense of the
members' individual brands, networks have chosen dual branding strategies. While the
networks are globally promoted under the umbrella brand, the individual airlines' brands
sustain their customer appeal. The overview below introduces the most important and biggest
brands of global carrier networks and their member composition.
71 The network around Air France and Delta Air Lines is exemplary, based on the key resources of Atlanta
Hatfield Airport, which is the largest hub in the world, and France, as one of the most attractive tourism
destinations in Europe.
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Table 4.4: Global Airline Networks - Members as of February 2002 and Launch Dates
"Wings" - KLM/Northwest Core Members: Northwest Airlines, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Malaysia
Airlines. Associated Carrters ': Transavia, Kenya Airways (both KLM
stake). Launched in 1990 as a bilateral partnership between KLM and
Northwest Airlines.
Associated Carriers have equity or other close links to at least one of the core partners, but which are not closely tied to
another alliance.
2 Qualiflyer is the successor of the European Quality Alliance (EQA) which was formed in 1990 by Swissair, Austrian Airlines,
SAS, and Finnair, and Atlantic Excellence, launched in 1997 and including Austrian Airlines, Sabena, Delta Air Lines. Atlantic
EXcellence, which in turn succeeded the Global Excellence Alliance after Singapore Airline's exit in 1997, was officially
disbanded in August 2000 due to Delta's ties with Air France. Its future is at stake with the bankruptcies of both Swissair and
~abena in late 2001.
Ansett Australia went out of business in late 2001; Lauda-Air and T rolean are art of Austrian Airlines Grou
Core Members: Aer Lingus, American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay
Pacific, Finnair, Iberia, LanChile, Qantas. Associated Carriers: TWA,
23 regional Affiliates. Launched in 1998.
Core Members: Air Europe, Air t.iberte, Air Littoral, Crossair, DAT Delta,
LOT Polish Airlines, PGA Portuqalia Airlines, Swissair, TAP Air Portugal,
Turkish Airlines, Volare Airlines. Launched in 1998.2
Core Members: Aeromexico, Air France, Alitalia, CSA Czech Airlines,
Delta Air Lines, Korean Air Lines. Associated Carriers: Air France
Stake in African Carriers, Aeroflot. Launched in 1999.
.,..:t STAR ALLIANCE'~ Core Members: Air Canada, Air New Zealand, All Nippon Airways,Ansett Australia, Austrian Airlines, British Midland, Lauda-Air, Lufthansa,
Mexicana, SAS, Sin~apore Airlines, Thai Airways, Tyrolean, United
Airlines, Varig Brasil. Associated Carriers: Virgin Atlantic (Singapore
Airlines stake), Spanair (SAS/United Airlines), Braathens (SAS, still to be
completed). Launched in 1997.
Source: misc. airline information
To visualise the size of the above-mentioned networks, the following pie chart shows their
respective ASK.
Figure 4.6: Distribution of Global ASK by Airline Network, 2002
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Source: N/A, Airinfo Alliance: General, 2002
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The five contenders in the field of global airline groupings represent close to 60% of the
overall world passenger transport market. Star Alliance is presently the largest network with a
share of more than 20% of the world's ASK. The network groupings have been relatively
stable for the greatest part of 2000 and 2001, however, shifts occurred in late 2001 and are
expected in the near future as well. With the events of September 11th, 2001 having had a
drastic impact on global aviation, network building went on hold from late 2001 until the
beginning of 2002. The future of the Qualiflyer Group is unclear and largely depends on the
strategic orientation of Swissair's successor airline. However, in the light of a recovery of
global air transport markets, a new impetus is to be expected in extending the scope of the
more powerful groupings.
To evaluate alliance groupings based on other than size and ASK shape, Merrill Lynch has
developed a benchmark. The so-called Merrill Lynch Alliance Index is based on the following
evaluation criteria (see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 1999, Merrill Lynch &
Co., 2000 and Winch, 1998, p. 20):
•
Geographical network including: number of destinations, number of unduplicated route
kilometres, number of departures, ASK, and kilometres flown
Market size including: passenger revenue, number of passengers, and RPK
Network density including: passenger revenue per unduplicated route kilometres, RPK per
unduplicated route kilometre, and number of departures per destination
Financial strength including: pre tax margin, and debt as per cent of capital
Regulatory freedom: includes the number of open skies agreements in the multilateral
network
•
•
•
•
The index describes individually chosen, yet objectively measurable parameters to generally
evaluate airline alliance groupings. Important parameters are those relating to network size
and scope. As revealed above, the primary motivation for the formation of multilateral airline
groupings is the expansion of traffic reach, which can best be achieved by aligning carriers
from different regions under one umbrella brand. Based on a scoring system, the index ranks
the relative strength of the groupings. In the 2000 survey, Star Alliance lead the five-strong
group of carrier networks in the index (see Merrill Lynch & Co., 2000).
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4.4.2.3.2 Current and Future Network Configuration Characteristics
In accordance with the theoretical explanations of networks above, the set-up of multilateral
airline partnerships follows two distinct forms, which reflect the scholarly concept of hub
firms or strategic centres.
• Type 1: One mega-carrier or larger carrier creates an alliance network by allying with
several junior partners in each of the other continents. The senior partner is responsible for
network policy and co-ordination, including CRS, pricing, and capacity decisions,
provides much of the long-haul international services and operates major hub airports in
the network.
Type 2: An alliance among large senior partners, one from each continent, supplemented
by regional feeder carriers within the continents as junior partners. The senior partner is
responsible for efficient network operations within the continent itself, including the
operation of continental hubs (see Oum et al., 1993, p. 18).
•
Undoubtedly, Qualiflyer, through its organisation around Swissair, was a Type 1 network.
Swissair cannot be regarded as a mega-carrier, although it was significantly larger than its
partners in the multilateral partnership.f Besides being responsible for much of the
intercontinental traffic, Swissair had long been in charge of the provision of ground handling
and other support services (catering and IT) for the entire network. Swissair's parent Swissair
Group has, however, already, or is in the process of divesting from these functions. Qualiflyer
is essentially a European grouping, with Swissair having lost its US American and Asian
partners, when long-standing allies Singapore Airline and Delta Air Lines joined other
networks. The grouping has experienced a major setback with founding member Austrian
Airlines leaving to connect to Star Alliance in 1999. Qualiflyer has not been able to attract
any new members and is considered to be a candidate for integration into another network.
With the bankruptcies of both Swissair and Sabena, the strategic re-organisation of the former
and the loss of some smaller regional carriers in late 2001, the future of Qualiflyer must be
regarded with reasonable scepticism. Presently, Qualiflyer is mainly a linkage of carriers held
together by the common FFP programme; strategic development has been reduced to a
minimum. As Swissair has close ties to American Airlines, Oneworld could be a prospective
new partner, marking the end of the Qualiflyer Grouping.
72 S .
wissair's revenue in 1999 was USD 8,684 billion as opposed to the USD 1,288 billion of Turkish Airlines
and USD I, J 49 billion of TAP Air Portugal, which are the second and third largest partners in the partnership
(see O'Toole et aI., 2000, pp. 68-72).
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Star Alliance is a typical Type 2 network. Star started with a group of S carriers (Lufthansa,
United Airline, SAS, Thai Airways and Air Canada) and has grown to a IS-member strong
grouping without having lost a single participant. Due to its maturity, and its lead in setting up
the multilateral partnership, Star has managed to cover every continent with a traffic network
provided by at least one of the indigenous and dominating continental or regional carriers.
Major exceptions in coverage are, however, Russia and the former Soviet Republics and
China, with Star working intensively to line up the necessary carriers for entry. With the
exception of Thai Airways and Singapore Airlines, the partners' route networks complement
one another. Senior partners in the collaboration have one or more continental hubs with a
solid traffic base, which already serve as, or have the potential to be developed as
international gateways. Collaborations with regional carriers, e.g. Lufthansa's Team
Lufthansa, supplement hub feed with local or regional traffic.73
Oneworld is a Type 2 airline network. It is made up of the world's largest and most
prestigious airlines. Oneworld, however, lacks reach in Asia and, compared to Star, in
Oceania. It nevertheless gained ground in Australasia with Star member Ansett Australia
going out of business in late 200 I and Qantas now pursuing regional expansion strategies. In
general, Oneworld has been held back by the inability of its core members, British Airways
and American Airlines, to gain US antitrust immunity for their traffic across the North
Atlantic. As the bilateral partnership is not perceived to offer sufficient customer benefits to
offset potential reduction in competition, the exemption from antitrust laws has not been
granted. The process is additionally pending, because a decision demanded by the European
Commission Directorate regarding British Airways' slots at London Heathrow, could not be,
reached. A positive outcome of antitrust negotiations would be welcomed, as this would also
pave the way to an open skies agreement between the UK and the USA. In a singular attempt
to expand the partnership, British Airways entered into merger talks with KLM in 2000,
which were called off after several month of negotiations. As the entire grouping hinges on
the unresolved relationship between British Airways and American Airlines, ties between its
partners are not very strong and further changes in the composition are to be expected.
Skyteam, another Type 2 network, has achieved a critical resource input by recruiting Alitalia
and Korean Air Lines as members. The US and French governments reached an agreement on
73 Lufthansa Team is an association of largely independent, although closely co-operating local and regional
carriers such as Augsburg Airways, Cimber Air, Cirrus Airlines, Contact Air and Rheintalflug. They operate in a
franchise manner for Lufthansa (see N/A, Team Partners, 200 I).
Airline Collaboration
open skies in October 2001, which was a precursor to gaining US antitrust immunity from the
USA for the partners Air France and Delta Air Lines in December 2001. The accord will spur
the pace of Franco-American air transport development. However, Skyteam still has to attain
reach in most parts of Asia, Oceania and South America as well as on the US West Coast.
KLM and Northwest's collaboration with the tentative name Wings, is based on the long-
standing, highly integrated bilateral relationship between the two core carriers. They gained
US antitrust immunity in 1992 and account for more than 80% of the network's traffic (see
Baker, The Global Groupings, 2001, p. 42). In its basic structure it is a Type 2 network,
although lacking feed from affiliated regional carriers. The network has significant
comparative weaknesses in all regions but the Middle East and North America. A virtual
merger between Alitalia and KLM in 1998 was expected to ease the situation in Europe.
However, KLM withdrew from the deal in early 2000 due to mismanagement in establishing
Milan Malpensa as a hub airport and uncertainties about Alitalia's privatisation.
In summary, figure 4.7 illustrates the geographic characteristics by numbers of destinations of
the large multilateral airline networks in respect of the world's continents and continental
regions.
Figure 4.7: Destinations Served by Network and Region in February 2002
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Source: N/A. Airinfo Alliance: Destinations, 2002
Other than the typological classification and the geographic reach of networks, there are
certain other characteristics of the airline networks' membership configuration. First mover
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advantages seem to be crucial in the establishment of successful networks and had been
foreseen quite a number of years before the establishment of the first significant multilateral
partnership (see Oum et al., 1993, p. 19). Star Alliance's early and strategically, as well as
regionally balanced collaborative strategy gave it a sustainable lead in reach over its
competitors (see figure 4.7).
Given the size of the North American market, having a US carrier among its members is
claimed to be a configurational pre-condition for a successful global network. Consequently,
the total number of global networks might be determined by the number of large, globally
operating carriers in the USA. In this case and under the current regulatory legacy, US carriers
will retain their hubs and current domestic networks.
The same applies to the Asian market. The sheer size of the Asian air transport market, in
which China is one of the key growth areas (for growth in the Chinese market, see chapter 2),
supports the contention that the services of an Asian carrier are essential for the establishment
of a successful network. A shift in forces in the Asian market can also be expected. Thai
Airways has been upset by the entry of Singapore Airlines into Star Alliance. Being in the
process of privatisation and strategically discontent with Star's membership structure, it is
likely that Thai will enter some other network in the near future.
After a phase of analysing the concept of global groupings, identifying prospective partners,
which were subsequently collected and sometimes changed among networks, multilateral
groups of the above kind are far from being stable constructions. There has never been much
turbulence in multilateral partnership composition, but the multilateral network scene is still
I
in a state of flux. While one can view the fewer changes in alliances structures as indicating
increasing stability, networks can be regarded as inherently open-ended and ever-changing by
nature. Cyclical developments, such as the aviation crisis in 2001, will continuously impact
on the composition of multilateral partnerships. The regulatory environment will most
certainly confirm an inherent instability. Once consolidation of airlines is widely legally
accepted, the basic task of global groupings will shift to concentration. This is why greater
stabilisation of airline groupings could be marking the prelude to a fundamental reshaping of
alliance strategy in the form of consolidation.
4.4.2.4 Equity Alliances
Airline equity partnerships involve the purchase of stock and equity, either um- or
multilaterally and reciprocally, in one or multiple carriers. Per definition, they thus potentially
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pertain to the collaborative agreements of concentration, although they can also be part of
strategic alliances if minority shareholdings exist. They suggest a more long-term
commitment between carriers, allow for some, or majority, control and influence over a
partnering carrier's planning decisions and its entrepreneurial destiny. While fmancial
linkages do not consequently lead to commercial advantages merely based on investment
considerations, airline equity partnerships also include the entire spectrum of integrative and
collaborative measures, such as codesharing, marketing agreements, technical co-operation,
outsourcing provision and vertical and horizontal disintegration, to name but a few. It is these
other forms of collaboration among the value chain scope that motivate many equity
collaborations. The execution of control through equity linkages plays a central role and is
often used to influence a carrier's decisions with regard to its suppliers, IT systems or other
service and product providers.
Capital linkages in domestic markets have long been exercised, although cross-border equity
partnerships are a less common feature in the airline industry. One of the first partnerships
that involved the exchange of equity across the Atlantic was the alliance between British
Airways and USAir. In 1993, British Airways' USD 400 million infusion into USAir was
granted immunity from antitrust laws by the US Department of Transportation. British
Airways held a 24,6% stake and 3 seats on USAir's 16-member board of directors. The share
could optionally be increased to 40,7% though, with voting rights limited to 25%, as restricted
by United States airline ownership laws. Furthermore, it was preconditioned that the control
of the airline was exercised by US citizens (see United States General Accounting Office,
1995, p. 32). Although USAir's main benefit from the alliance was the investment - capital
that was critical to the viability of the financially struggling airline - USAir also benefited
from some added revenues, due to other collaborative instruments, increased interline traffic,
FFP links with British Airways and wet leasing of three aircraft to British Airways for
transatlantic operations. However, the financial involvement of British Airways in USAir was
terminated in 1997 mainly because of the partnership'S unsatisfactory results and British
Airways' newly formed alliance with American Airlines (see Doganis, 2001, p. 63).
The equity partnership between KLM and Northwest Airlines, which started in 1989 with
KLM buying a 20%, USD 400 million stake in the American carrier, also did not last.
Difficulties with two private shareholders over the governance structure of Northwest, finally
lead to the termination of the equity binds between the carriers in 1997 (see Tully, 1996).
I<.LM consented to resell its stake to Northwest over a period of three years. The carriers will
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then hold just one seat on each other's boards, compared to the past three (see Nuutinen,
1997, p. 9 and Buyck, The Reluctant Dutchess, 2001).
Other well-publicised equity partnerships were, for example, Swissair's capital linkages with
some European carriers, of which the link to Belgium's Sabena could be considered the
closest, managerially as well as financially (49,5%).74 In addition, Swissair Group held a 20%
stake in South African Airways, which was bought back by the South African Government in
February 2002.
The stake in South African Airways, as well as the 26% share KLM holds in Kenya Airways
are both shareholdings that the African governments requested as part of the privatisation
process of their national carriers (see Buyck, The Reluctant Dutchess, 2001). Lufthansa has
often strongly opposed equity partnerships as a form of collaboration and the required glue for
collaborative agreements. It has, however, formed a variety of minority financial linkages
with its partners, most markedly a 20% stake in its Star Alliance partner, British Midland, in
2000 (for a comprehensive overview of airline equity partnerships, see Ombelet, Airline
Alliance Survey 2001, 2001).
In the theoretical definition of strategic alliances, equity partnerships are often seen as a
conditio sine qua non for the success of partnerships. Empirical studies of the earlier airline
partnerships indicated a higher success rate for closer equity collaborations (see Lindquist,
1996, p. 12). For contemporary airlines, however, it seems that a successful partnership does
not necessarily need equity exchange (also see Nuutinen, 1997, p. 9). Cross-border fmancial
linkages or those outside integration regions especially occur to a lesser extent. If nothing
else, evidence proves the decreasing significance of airline equity partnerships in comparison
to the overall number of collaborative agreements.
74 Swissair Group had established a strategy of distributing its own services and products (e.g. IT, catering, and
ground handling) through Swissair's stakes in other airlines. However, both Swissair and Sabena went into
liquidation with Sabena disappearing as an individual brand and Swissair being revived by a bank consortium in
late 2001.
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Figure 4.8: Total Number of Equity Partnerships
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Source: Wood and Gallacher, 1998, p. 43, Gallacher, Partners for now, 1997, p. 26, O'Toole, The major Airline Alliance
Groupings, 1999, p. 36, O'Toole and Walker, 2000, p. 46
Reasons for the above trend can lie in the financial situation of airlines generally, as well as
the bilateral traffic right structure and national ownership clauses. Airlines easily fall victim to
global cyclical business developments and other highly publicised events and are thus
predisposed to little profitability or even market exits. This sensitivity makes them
comparably unattractive for capital markets and funds from within the airline industry. With
regards to cementing an alliance by means of getting involved in highly-entangled equity
Partnerships, the above-mentioned examples of failed attempts have also lead to a certain
reluctance to execute financial infusions - at least on a global scale. It is simply not
sufficiently proven that equity partnerships lead to more stable alliance relationships and that
governance power of the airline investor can be executed to a satisfactory extent. In addition,
national ownership clauses and ownership restrictions in air service agreements make it
difficult, if not impossible, for carriers to enter into horizontal majority equity partnerships.
4.4.3 Hybrid Partnership Instruments and Forms
The above-described forms of airline partnerships are generally attributable to either high- or
lOw-entangled partnerships. These forms, however, make use of instruments to operationalise
their partnerships of which some - e.g. codesharing, FFP collaboration - have already been
mentioned. In turn, partnership instruments can be stand-alone airline collaborative
Configurations as well, e.g., a route specific codeshare partnership, geographically confined or
a marketing collaboration. They thus occur in a hybrid pattern, both between operative and
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strategic alliances and being instruments to the former, or by existing as independent
partnership forms.
4.4.3.1 Marketing and Distribution Alliances
Marketing or distribution alliances exemplify hybrid instrumental and formal collaborative
orientations. They usually incorporate a variety of collaborative instruments under the
umbrella of distinct partnership forms and focus on particular sections of the value chain.
Marketing alliances usually comprise the following instruments:
• Codesharing
• Sharing of designated routes under bilateral aviation agreements
• Joint or distinct feeder services
• Cross-participation in partner's FFP
• Collaborative advertising and promotion
• Sharing of sales offices, General Sales Agencies (GSA) and call centres
• Joint electronic distribution methods
• Shared or co-ordinated product design (inflight/ground, interior/exterior)
• Sharing of airport facilities in the partner's markets
Marketing collaborative agreements are thus a generic term under which a diversity of
primarily distribution-focused measures falls. Whether a marketing alliance has an operative.
or strategic orientation must, in contrast to some other theories, be determined by its scope
and the depth of its integration within the operation of participating carriers. Sharing of sales
offices and joint FFPs can, for example, have strategic implications, once commingling of
value-adding activities applies (for different types of FFP collaboration see Petersen, 1997).
In this case, per definition, the partnership could be considered strategic. If, however, the
spatial dimension of a marketing partnership is either limited or differs between the partners -
e.g. a large carrier having a GSA agreement with its smaller partner in the latter's home
market - the perceived or intended business orientation of such an understanding can strongly
contrast.
The following introduces some of the most prevalent interairline distribution agreements.
4.4.3.1.1 Computer Reservation System/Global Distribution System Collaboration
As described earlier, it has been a core necessity for airlines to distribute their products to the
travelling public via the travel trade through CRSs. The possibility of two-way, 24 hour and
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basically global communication with trade intermediaries have made CRSs the most valuable
distribution tool for passenger carriers. It is for this strategic importance, also in the sense of
market intelligence they generate, why airlines initially developed and kept control of these
channels.
Development, hosting, maintenance and distribution of the systems themselves have and still
do require substantial funds and know-how resources. Traditionally, airlines have formed
Partnerships in the establishment of three of the four most significant CRSs, namely Galileo,
Worldspan and Amadeus," which made them virtual hosts and co-hosts at the same time.
Carriers tried to design CRSs to best serve their individual distribution needs, which also
motivated their lasting control of these channels. One of the collaborative goals in setting up
CRSs was the immensity of financial resources required in building and maintaining world-
Spanning communicational computer systems. In joining forces with a number of other
carriers, funds could be raised and a critical initial mass for the usage of these systems could
be assured. In distributing CRSs to other clients, namely other co-hosts and subscribers/users,
CRS partnerships have aimed at building oligopoly power, also in establishing standards for
the electronic distribution of travel-related products.
Carriers are, however, in the process of divesting from their CRS shares. Regulation and
competition authorities have eyed CRSs for a long time, in particular banning a biased display
of those carriers that are shareholders of the systems. The sophistication of CRSs has
increased, migrating from pure host-to-subscriber distribution systems to integrated IT tools
with back-office functions. In particular the integration with other IT and communication
systems, especially the Internet, has forced CRSs to more adequately meet the challenges of
individualised travel distribution and purchasing processes. The complexity and inability to
reap premium rents from the ownership of CRSs have motivated carriers to decrease their
involvement. American Airlines sold its shares in Sabre in 2000 and some other airlines have
also divested from Galileo (see Global Aviation Associates, 2001, pp. 34-35).
In the wake of forming global airline groupings, however, another form of CRS partnership
has surfaced - namely that of CRS commonality. For the best usage of booking and
communication facilities, CRSs in global airline groupings should best be common. CRS
commonality in multilateral partnerships is, nevertheless, far from being established. While
75
Sabre was owned by US carrier American Airlines. For the shareholding structure, see above.
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British Airways and American Airlines are the founding members of Oneworld, they still both
operate their individual CRSs - British Airways using Amadeus and American Airlines
utilising Sabre. The same applies to the members of the Star Alliance, which have not opted
yet for the common employment of one system. With airlines withdrawing from their
financial involvement in CRSs, the next step in being partners in CRSs will thus be the usage
of common reservation systems.
4.4.3.1.2 Online Distribution Collaboration
Online air transport product distribution systems are genuine solutions to bring the customer
the highly valuable and perishable commodity on which real time information can be made
available electronically. Airlines use different online tools to distribute their products
business-to-consumer (B2C); these were described above. In order to capitalise on size and
scope effects, knowledge advantages, bargaining power in respect of the travel trade and
reaping savings potential from dis-intermediation, airlines have repeatedly pooled their forces
when establishing Internet-based distribution facilities.
One firm, Orbitz (www.orbitz.com). has triggered intense scrutiny by US competition
authorities, mainly due to the fact that it is jointly owned by American Airlines, United
Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines and Northwest Airlines. Competition
authorities and consumer advocates saw a market-dominating power in the joint venture of
the mentioned carriers, allowing them biased online distribution of specially discounted fares '
(see, e.g., United States General Accounting Office, Testimony of Jeffrey G. Katz, 2000 and
N/A, Consumer Groups Come out against Airlines' Orbitz Project, 2001). Orbitz is dedicated
to taking shares from the dominant US online agencies, namely Microsoft's Expedia
(www.expedia.com) and CRS Sabre-owned Travelocity (www.travelocity.com) and thus aims
at reintegrating online sales capabilities into the airlines' core businesses. The European
equivalent to Orbitz is Opodo (www.opodo.com).createdbyAerLingus.AirFrance.Alitalia.
Austrian Airlines, British Airways, Finnair, Iberia, KLM and Lufthansa. Opodo was launched
in late 2001 after repeatedly having postponed the starting date.
Both multilateral online travel portals claim to address the traveller's needs by offering
unbiased online travel services with low and flexible fares. As customers want to be able to
compare and buy offers from a wide range of airlines by visiting just one site, the two portals
maintain that they offer a comprehensive choice of airlines and their destination as well as
linked tourism services (see Grobben and Buyck, 2001, p. 8). The question raised by
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consumer advocates and competition authorities, however, is whether the collaborating
airlines truly manage to display an extensive scope of travel offers in an unbiased manner.
The possibility of influencing the passenger's choice towards products of one of the owning
airlines' products would make sense.
The only multilateral umbrella brand partnership also functioning as an online travel portal is
Oneworld (www.oneworld.com). The website clarifies that merely the member carriers'
products can be purchased. Other multilateral partnership Internet sites do allow for the
possibility of online bookings, although link or refer to the allied carriers' individual sites."
The collaborative composition of Opodo and Orbitz points out one peculiarity. Each of the
joint business ventures brings together core members of the competing global alliance
groupings. What is postulated as being advantageous for member carriers in blocks of
airlines, namely the far-reaching benefits from a global grouping, does not seem to work for
electronic distribution channels. While Opodo initially focused on central Europe, Orbitz also
does not want to step beyond USA borders in the first years of its operation. The competitive
necessity to offer online travel service distribution is a regional phenomenon, which
consequently interferes with the concept of global blocks of carriers. Further developments of
the Internet and global availability of online services on a larger scale will show whether the
regional online portals will endure or whether multilateral groupings will manage to sell
products using their particular umbrella brand or superbrand concepts.
4.4.3.2 Codeshare Partnerships
Codesharing is probably the most widely described form of interairline co-operation and has
been scrutinised in detail by scholars, as well as regulatory and competition authorities and
practitioners. Since first appearing in the US domestic market in 1967 and internationally in
1985, in an agreement between American Airlines and Qantas, code sharing has been the
fastest growing type of collaboration with about 70 new arrangements concluded each year
between 1998 and 200077 (see Beyhoffet al., 1995, p. 17, Dresner and Windle, 1996, p. 202
and NIA, Playing for Position, 2001, p. 41). The following paragraphs describe the typology
as well as competitive implications of codeshare collaborations.
76 For partnership network websites see www.qualiflyer.com; www.star-alliance.com; www.skyteam.com,
~Ww.klm.com, www.nwa.com, www.oneworld.com.
The figures are based on a survey of collaborative agreements of the world's top 200 mainland carriers.
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4.4.3.2.1 Typology of Codeshare Partnerships
Codesharing is a mechanism by which two carriers share each other's two-letter designator
codes on flights, or by which one carrier permits a second carrier to use its airline code.78
Codes can be shared unilaterally and bilaterally, denoting that either the operating carrier
always remains the same on certain routes, including the codeshare, or that carriers
reciprocally exchange duties as the operators of the flights. Codesharing can quantitatively be
limited to route frequencies and be restricted to certain booking and travel classes, but always
entails reciprocal FFP acceptance."
A further classification of codesharing is by the type of flight operations to which it is
applied. Itmay specifically be used on parallel or on complementary operations that connect
gateways (see Oum et al., 1996, p. 190).
Parallel codesharing or gateway-to-gateway operations connect principal ongm and
destination cities on trunk-line routes, which usually involves 3rd or 4th freedom traffic (for
freedoms, see 2.5.4). The operating carrier provides the actual equipment and crew, and
distributes seats under its code. The marketing carrier, however, is not involved in the
physical production of the air transport service, although it distributes the flight as its own.
Parallel codesharing usually applies reciprocally revolving, thus bilaterally.
The other form of codesharing on behind-gateway operations is the so-called complementary .
codesharing (see Oum et aI., 1996, p. 190). Feeder and dispersal traffic connect main hubs of
participating carriers with outer stations that carmot be served by the marketing carrier for
legal or operational reasons In this case, a unilateral codeshare usually applies for non-
domestic markets, since cabotage rights are rarely granted outside integration regions.
Both forms of codesharing can be performed unilaterally, i.e. with only one operating carrier,
or bilaterally or reciprocally with all carriers involved in the agreement of physically
operating the service. However, there could be limitations on reciprocal codeshare services
due to the absence of traffic rights.
78 Commercial flights are identified with alpha-numerical codes, composed of two parts. The first part is the
unique, two-letter airline designator code, which is assigned by ICAO. The numerical part of the code is
determined by the airline itself and identifies the origin and destination of the flight. E.g., LH573 is a Lufthansa
flight from Cape Town to Frankfurt. These codes are used in CRS, schedules and ticketing as well as in airline
guides and on airport information boards.
79 In September 2001, Singapore Airlines and Virgin Atlantic signed a nonreciprocal codeshare on flights-from
London Heathrow to Singapore according to which Virgin Atlantic places its code on Singapore Airline's
flights. The codeshare is restricted to economy class and limited to three flights a week only.
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With regards to the geographical dimension, one can generally distinguish national,
continental and intercontinental codeshare connections. National and continental connections
allow the marketing carrier to virtually serve the operating carrier's national or continental
destinations under its own code. Examples are Lufthansa being able to offer United Airline's
US routings as its own - beyond the US-destinations that Lufthansa serves itself, and Thai
Airways offering beyond-gateway, continental-Europe, quasi-proprietary destinations that are
also being marketed under a Lufthansa code. The same applies to intercontinental
complimentary codesharing where the marketing carrier is entitled to virtually serve
destinations even beyond the operating carrier's continental home region. This satellite
code sharing as well as continental code sharing are usually tied to the availability of traffic
rights, as ih and 8th freedom traffic is usually involved.
The figure 4.9 illustrates an exemplary set-up of a transatlantic US-European carrier
code sharing and summarises the descriptive dimensions of codesharing.
Figure 4.9: Transatlantic Codesharing Model
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Based on different commercial sales agreements, seats on codeshare flights can be distributed
by the participating carriers. Free sale agreements would allow both carriers to equally
distribute seat capacities on all codeshare flights. Blocked space agreements have been
described above and apply to codesharing agreements as well. The classification into soft or
205
206 Airline Collaboration
hard blocks allows for different forms of risk allocation. Seat swap agreements in code sharing
partnerships are distinct forms of blocked-space agreements where the same defined blocks of
seats are assigned for distribution by the revolving operating and marketing carrier.
4.4.3.2.2 Competitive Implications
As with some other forms and instruments of airline partnerships, it is the carriers' legal and
economic inability to effectively increase the reach of their networks, that drives codeshare
partnerships. Along with the circumvention of limitations in bilateral ASAs, code sharing
offers some significant economic benefits to participating airlines:
• Higher frequencies to destinations already served (parallel codesharing)
• New destinations, not physically served by a partnering carrier (complementary
codesharing)
• Traffic feed between domestic and international routes
• Quasi-online connections
Parallel codesharing allows the participating airlines to show greater frequencies of flights to
destinations than they actually operate, thereby increasing their perceived market service on
those particular routes. Airlines are furthermore qualified to expand their combined market
share on international routes and to increase the share in their respective home markets (see
Beyhoff et al., 1995, p. 24).
Code sharing makes concentrated hub and spoke networks more valuable by facilitating
connections to networks on the other side. Hub and spoke operations, particularly the
"banking" of flights that are a concomitant of effective hub and spoke operations, can be more
efficient if carriers co-ordinate their flight schedules and operate codeshare systems. By
allowing traffic to be consolidated and correspondingly trans-shipped between flights,
codeshare operations can enhance load factors and allow airlines to reap the benefits of the
existing economies of scope and scale. By consenting to co-ordinate schedules, two allied
airlines increase the potential amount of traffic that occurs across their combined networks.
Market share gains from network extension are, moreover, magnified by extending the
codeshare operations to and from spoke destinations at both ends of the partner carriers'
networks (see Oum et al., 1996, p. 188). Formerly marginal feeder or defeeder routes can be
positively influenced by the wider customer base. Routes can be sustained and the risk of new
route development can be shared among codesharing partners (see Beyhoff et al., 19'95, pp.
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25-26). These share gains can be supported by competitive distribution strengths in the
respective home markets.
Consumers prefer to book connecting flights on the same airline. Evidence indicates that
consumers generally favour online over interline connections, the most optimal still being
non-stop direct services. Passengers believe that online connections involve shorter terminal
walking distances, thus making connecting flights easier, allowing for smoother baggage
transfer, and believe that flight schedules are generally co-ordinated. From the customer's
perspective, codesharing gives the impression of an online service and offers some features
related to this service, such as single check-in, common FFP and co-ordinated flight
schedules. Interline flights reflecting two or more carrier codes, suggest a drop of quality. The
quality of codeshared connections is perceived to be almost as high as a single carrier
connection, which makes it a cost-effective marketing tool (see United States General
Accounting Office, 1995, p. 14).
It is this passenger preference that leverages the effects of codeshare flights' listings on CRSs.
Moreover, travellers have traditionally suffered a dearth of information regarding their air
transport options, which was compounded by the introduction of CRSs. CRSs provide the
interface between the carriers and the travelling public. Airlines make use of the information
channels provided by CRSs to stimulate traffic flows and to decrease information
asymmetries. Connecting flights, appearing online as the result of a codeshare agreement,
have in the past been listed ahead of true connecting flights in CRSs. The EU, however, has
now banned a preferential display of codeshare flights on CRSs (see Pompl, 1998, p. 111).
The succession-determining factor in most CRSs is the flight time for a city pair connection.
However, the preferential treatment of online connections still finds application in domestic
air services in the USA.
In addition, a flight can be listed in a CRS at least twice, resulting from the shared codes of
the participating carriers. This so-called screen padding shows codeshare connections more
often on a CRS than other air links. To avoid excessive screen padding, especially for
mUltiple connection flights or multiple codesharing, the EU, in a codex, has demanded that
CRS operators, vendors and airlines limit the number of listings of the same flight in a CRS to
only two (see European Commission, 2000, p. 7). Nevertheless, screen padding is not
restricted in the USA and thus gives codeshare partners a definite competitive lead over their
competitors (see Steininger, 1999, pp. 298-299). Both, the priority display of codeshared
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flights as well as the possible multiple listing of flights on CRS screens significantly enhances
the chances of the flight being sold by a travel agent.
Airlines' attempts to increase their market presence through commercial partnerships have
placed codesharing under considerable public attention, since it is perceived to be a means of
indirectly increasing market access. Parallel codesharing has recently been the focus of
competition authorities, as a reduction of rivalry can be expected from parallel services
between capacity-constrained hub airports (for the example of British Airways and American
Airlines, see Brueckner, The Economics of International Codesharing, 2000, p. 2).
International codesharing is therefore dealt with in some bilateral negotiation processes in
such a way that underlying traffic rights are required in order for codeshare service to be
approved. When a third country is involved - in the case of complementary, continental or
intercontinental codeshare services - specific provisions in bilaterals may be obligatory.80
Codesharing is regularly considered to be an operative and purely marketing-driven
instrument of co-operation, since partners continue to operate and use their assets
independently. While the latter is true, codesharing contains some organisational and
regulatory implications that justify, at least partly, a strategic orientation. Codesharing is often
an integral part, if not the basis, for highly integrative, common-goal-oriented business
partnerships such as global airline networks. The organisation and preparation of codeshare
partnerships, especially in networks, can strategically influence an airline's business
operation. Schedule integration or harmonisation between the partners can strongly impact a
carrier's performance in O&D markets. Service and technical requirements, operational
adjustments or legislative prerequisites in order to be an eligible codeshare partner can
substantially impact on an airline's corporate organisation..
The US Department of Transportation, in co-operation with the Federal Aviation
Administration, for example, demands compliance with codeshare safety guidelines (see
United States Department of Transportation, Code-share Safety Program Guidelines, 2000).
Codesharing agreements among US carriers and between US and non-US carriers need
government approval, which involves an application process (see Dresner and Windle, 1996,
p. 206 and above). Market development and penetration, as a dedicated corporate goal of a
80 This is especially true ofbilaterals with the USA. Since 1991, codesharing has been part of the US open skies
bilaterals, and thus requires antitrust immunity (see Doganis, 2001, pp. 33-37). However, codesharing that has to
be part of bilateral agreements makes one of its key motivations, namely circumventing ASA restrictions,
absurd.
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codeshare operation, can thus require strategic decisions. Set against the background of the
prerequisites mentioned above, it is also the significance of the codesharing agreement in
relation to the airline's overall size that can give this collaborative instrument a true strategic
dimension. British Midland is a valuable partner for a host of airlines seeking access to the
UK hinterland, due to its London Heathrow slot access, although many of the foreign
code sharing carriers might not rank this particular codeshare too highly. For British Midland,
in tum, these partnerships are the key competitive factor in gaining desperately required load
factors (see Feldman, Code-sharing Promiscuity Pays, 1997, p. 37).
4.4.3.3 Management Partnerships
Management partnerships rarely occur in international aviation. These partnerships can be
best described as one airline, or a designated management section of an airline taking leading
control of the managerial activities of another carrier. Another form of management
Partnerships constitutes airlines deciding to incorporate a distinct multi-airline management
facility. This was, for example, the case in the SwissairlSabena partnership. The two airlines
Were partly managed by joint governance structures, which included marketing, sales and
human resources.
In September 2001, KLM and Air Namibia consented to KLM taking over the management of
the then debt-ridden southern African carrier. The Namibian government had been actively
involved in the search for a management partner. An equity involvement by the Dutch carrier
is most likely to follow. A further management partnership was established between British
Airways' consultancy arm and the Greek carrier Olympic Airways in 1999. The basic aim of
the limited management partnership was to turn the struggling airline around. British
Airways, however, terminated the contract in July 2000 after having declined to take up an
option of a 20% stake in Olympic (see Baker, Olympic hunts for new Suitors, 2000, p. 21).
Both Garuda and Philippine Airlines were managed by foreign airline executives in attempts
by the governments to rescue the state-owned carriers (see Doganis, 2001, pp. 16-17).
Management partnerships are usually tied to other collaborative measures. In the now defunct
SWissairlSabena management collaboration, the Swiss carrier held a 49,5% stake in the
Belgian national airline. They had a widespread codesharing agreement, a joint FFP and were
both founding members of the Qualiflyer group of carriers.
Management partnerships can thus be highly strategic, as the SwissairlSabena example
Shows, or rather operatively and consulting-driven, as exhibited in the British
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Airways/Olympic case. The former showed all the signs of strategic action with extremely
commingled assets, common goals and geographic comprehensiveness. The latter was rather
opportunistic, focused on turnaround management and, at least for British Airways, motivated
by revenue generation through consulting activities.
4.4.3.4 Miscellaneous Interairline Collaborative Instruments
The subsequent paragraphs briefly discuss some further collaborative instruments between
airlines. The list does not claim to be comprehensive, but an attempt is made to recognise
some of the most significant instruments.
4.4.3.4.1 Traffic Handling Agreements
Through traffic handling agreements, one airline is made an agent for the ground handling
procedures of another carrier. Handling agreements usually include all ground handling of the
aircraft, passengers, freight and mail at stations where a partnering airline, or other ground
handling companies cannot provide the required services. Due to increasing deregulation and
liberalisation of ground handling services, handling agreements among airlines will be less
significant in future, as privately owned and specialised companies will increasingly provide
ground handling services (see Gill, Ramp up, 2000).
Airports, as the current dominating providers of handling services and independent handlers,
are in a consolidation phase, with alliances being formed. However, airlines still do 55% of'
handling themselves and airport providers account for another 10% of the market. The
concentration, though, is far from being as high as in other aviation support services with the
top two airline-owned handlers having a combined market share of 10% (see Pilling, Empire
Building, 2001, p. 52). This is likely to change with the trend to divest from and disintegrate
handling subsidiaries, which is seen as an important step towards necessary market
consolidation.81
What will, however, impact on the ground handling scene are global airline networks
negotiating common deals for all their members with particular ground handlers. These
common handling agreements, to reap the benefits of economies of scale and scope, can be
limited to certain airports or may include provision for handling entire countries or regions.
81 Lufthansa sold its ground handling subsidiary, GlobeGround, in 2001 as did SwissAir Group its handling
wing, Swissport. The companies are number one and two respectively in international ground handling.
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Classic, singular traffic handling agreements between carriers providing these services will
consequently diminish in the future.
4.4.3.4.2 IT Collaboration
Airlines are increasingly recognising IT as a strategic issue of vital importance to profitability.
The network supplying most of the communication infrastructure for airlines was initially
founded in 1949 as a joint venture by 11 international scheduled carriers under the name of
SITA (Societe Internationale de Telecommunication Aeronautiques). SITA operates a
worldwide standardised network of mail transfer (SITAMAIL), a system for radio
communication (SATELLITE AIRCOM) and provides data networks linking CRSs (see
Pompl, 1998, p. 23 and Jackel, 1991, pp. 65-66). It is the world's leading provider of global
telecommunication and information solutions to the air transport industry and has recently
also moved into the field of application service provision (ASP). Among SITA's more than
700 customers are airlines, aerospace companies, airfreight organisations, travel and global
distribution companies, airport authorities and governmental institutions. Under this umbrella,
Airlines are jointly developing and operating IT systems.
SITA's task primarily lay in linking the flow of data and communication between carriers,
which could then be standardised in the years after SITA's incorporation. In turn, internal IT
is often highly specialised and provides individually designed systems, which have become
more capacious and complex and are exposed to short product life-cycles.V In-house IT
systems therefore pose a certain risk to the user carrier as the costs of developing and
supporting an IT infrastructure in-house are extremely high. On the other hand, airline
Collaborations call for swift and smooth transactions and thus require minimised IT friction
among partners.
Airlines can potentially save IT costs through the joint development, maintenance and
Upgrade of systems. However, airline collaborations approach common IT infrastructures very
cautiously. Building new, common systems and ERP solutions (Enterprise Resource
Planning) takes time and money. In addition, regulators scrutinise common IT development
and strategy. Common revenue management systems leading to joint pricing would only be
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The following systems are classic internal IT systems: crew scheduling and optimisation, reservation systems,
yield management revenue accounting, and inventory functions such as aircraft dispatch, maintenance and
engineering, operational control, travel distribution issues, e-business, multi-access communications, departure
Control, passenger, baggage and cargo handling, and Internet transaction systems (see O'Toole, Partners in IT,
2000, pp. 50-51).
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allowed in the USA once an airline partnership has attained immunity from antitrust laws.
Airlines fear losing control of costs and prices and therefore, in some instances, oppose the
idea of sharing information with a partner through a common system. In some partnerships,
e.g. between KLM and Northwest Airlines, the considerations of loss of control and costs
have lead to two independent software systems being run to manage revenue. However, their
individual systems are at least partly integrated.
Swissair and Sabena had, under their joint management, fully integrated their IT systems. In
late 2000, Star Alliance established StarNet to link its members' legacy"systems with a multi-
user outside system, using Internet Protocol (IP). The nature of this IT architecture allows
easy and cost-effective links to the partners' individual systems. According to estimates, this
so-called middleware solution saved the members of the Star Alliance USD 2 billion in
conversion costs (see Baker, Behind the Handshake, 2001, p. 67). A similar IP solution,
although restrictedly focused on FFP issues and irregular schedule data (delays and
cancellations), was incorporated by Skyteam and called Skyteamnet in 2001 (see McDonald,
Speaking the Tongues, 2001, p. 39). The downside of these middleware solutions can be seen
in their minimal affiliating character, as members can quickly disentangle from the block of
airlines without the risk of high sunk costs.
In an advanced, regional approach, Star IS consolidating its alliance operations around
regional centres in the Americas, Europe and Asia. Star will thus try and integrate IT systems .
in the three regions, with the regional junior partners adjusting to the IT systems of the senior
allies.s3 Although only a partial integration of the block-wide IT structure, their choice leads
to more commonality within the multilateral partnership.
In multilateral relationships, however, compromising on IT collaboration becomes
exponentially more difficult with each new member entering. For example, to structure a
common revenue management system, several options are possible: one entity's revenue
management governed by one airline; a neutral service bureau as part of an outsourcing
process; separate systems having partial sharing of data, or a bid price system that allows
buying or brokering of seats among partners on a real-time basis. With each partner having its
own philosophy of how to operate both an individual and a common revenue management
system, the possibilities for shared structures are multifarious. This complexity has lead to
83 E.g., Star Alliance members British Midland and Austrian Airlines switching over to Lufthansa's IT system.
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only 49% of the top 100 airlines becoming members of a global alliance by having some sort
of shared IT structure (see O'Toole, IT Trends Survey 2001, 2001). Considering this
background, outsourcing IT on an individual or common basis is increasingly becoming a
requirement in airline partnerships (see Pilling, Drive to Outsource, 2002, p. 40). The future
will probably bring more joint IT outsourcing action than common in-house IT structures (for
further information on specific outsourcing strategies with SITA, see O'Toole, Partners in IT,
2000, pp. 50-51 and Moorman, A Helping Hand, 1999, pp. 66-68).
4.4.3.4.3 Business-to-Business Transaction Collaboration
Similar to airline collaboration in the distribution of their products to the customer (business-
to-consumer, B2C), carriers aim at achieving cost savings and increasing their market power
by pooling forces in business-to-business (B2B) transactions. Traditionally, carriers have
pooled forces in technical B2B matters with specific reference to aircraft spares. With the
current rise of virtual marketplaces through e-cornmerce, carriers can potentially revolutionise
business processes, allowing them the benefits accrued from streamlined purchasing and
supply chains, namely lower costs, reduced inventory and improved asset management.
Buyer-centric, supplier-centric or neutral e-marketplaces are being developed in the aerospace
industry in order to !ink air carriers with buyers and sellers of airline-related goods and
services (for different models ofB2B e-commerce see Berryman et al., 1998, pp. 152-154).
Among the largest buyer-centric B2B marketplaces are aeroXchange and Cordiem. While the
first is owned by airlines only, the latter B2B portal is a joint venture between buyers and
sellers. AeroXchange is a partnership between Cathay Pacific, FedEx, JAL, KLM, Lufthansa,
Northwest Airlines, SAS, Singapore Airlines, Air Canada, Air New Zealand, American West
Airlines, ANA, and Austrian Airlines. AeroXchange is a globally-focused marketplace,
Cordiem, in turn, concentrates on major European and US American carriers and original
equipment manufacturers (OEM) as members. They are: American Airlines, Air France,
British Airways, Continental Airlines, Delta Airlines, Iberia Airlines, Swissair Group, United
Airlines, and United Parcel Service. The OEM members are: Honeywell International, Inc.,
United Technologies Corp. (parent company of Pratt & Whitney) and Goodrich Co. Other
B2B marketplaces are either smaller, collaborative set-ups, Internet start-ups, or single
Company e-rnarketplaces filling niches or directly competing against each other (see Hulley,
2001, p. 1, Walker, Maintaining an Edge, 2000, pp. 57-61 and Fitzsimons, 2001). However,
the mentioned large marketplaces exhibit one distinctive feature. B2B e-commerce
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collaboration, or joint ventures, develop irrespective of ties between carriers established in the
form of strategic or operative commercial partnerships or B2C e-commerce.
The general development of the international e-commerce scene and the immediate benefits
for participants will prove whether the current status of B2B e-marketplaces will prevail. The
total value of procurement transactions in the international air transport industry is estimated
to be between USD 200 and 300 billion a year (see Walker, Plane dotty, 2000, p. 66). A major
benefit in e-marketplaces for airlines is seen in reduced inventory costs. Twenty per cent
inventory reduction can be potentially expected from pooling and real-time visibility of
inventory among larger carriers (see Hulley, 2001, p. 2). On average, airlines already using
B2B applications (35% in 2000) estimate that they can achieve between 12% and 13% cost
savings through B2B (see SITAlAirline Business, 2000, p. 16 and O'Toole, IT Trends Survey
2001, 2001). Already established commercial partnerships can certainly help to integrate e-
commerce collaboration. So far, however, little has been done to embrace common electronic
B2B solutions within already established airline partnerships.
4.4.3.4.4 Technical Collaboration
Historically, airlines early on started co-operating in technical affairs in order to capitalise on
pooling effects, but also to make use of individual know-how in particular MRO aspects.
An airline-based technical forum, the International Airlines Technical Pool (IATP), comprises .
about 100 carriers collaborating in purchasing spares. The prime goal of this collaboration is
to cut spares' storage costs. IATP is, however, currently losing significance as airlines are
individually, or in newly formed buying consortia, purchasing spares directly from the
manufacturer. They are thus moving away from collectively buying large tranches of spares
for onward use by IATP shareholders.
The incorporation of the ATLAS consortium by Air France, Alitalia, Lufthansa and Sabena in
the early 1970s was purely aimed at reducing maintenance costs for the airlines involved.
ATLAS enabled member carriers to share their technical resources over similar aircraft types.
Notably, ATLAS was composed of European airlines whose respective fleets, in isolation,
were not large enough to sustain a dedicated in-house maintenance operation. In this
partnership, each airline specialised in dedicated aspects of maintenance and the agreement
additionally encompassed co-operation and fleet co-ordination. In essence, the entire joint
maintenance programme revolved around the common agreement on which aircraft tY(Jesthe
airlines would each operate, working to shared specifications and quality standards. A form of
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bartering was established by which experienced carrier A would do maintenance work on
certain equipment for carrier B. Carrier B would, in exchange, use its specific experience to
maintain other equipment of carrier A. Tax avoidance advantages could thus be achieved and
organisational complexity alleviated by minimising payment flows between the parties.
Similarly structured, and based on the very same motivation, was KSSU - a consortium of
KLM, SAS, Swissair and UTA - the latter an airline which was later absorbed into Air France
(see Hanlon, 1996, pp. 208-209 and for a more detailed description, see NIA, Airline
Technical Alliances - Evolutionary Trends, 2001, pp. 54-56).
However, ATLAS and KSSU fell apart when the allied carriers were being privatised and
went their own separate ways in terms of fleet planning. Since then, the maintenance
Partnerships have ceased to be based on cost/work sharing models with minimum monetary
transfers (see N/A, Airline Technical Alliances - Evolutionary Trends, 2001, p. 58). The
original idea of benefiting from collaborative action based on co-ordinated fleet planning and
practice assignment, could not be sustained.
A current maintenance consortium is Swiss Air Group's and Lufthansa's joint maintenance
venture, Shannon Aerospace. Not allied in a commercial partnership, the two carriers
managed to successfully establish this joint heavy maintenance project in Ireland through
their maintenance subsidiaries SR Technics and Lufthansa Technik respectively.i" In this
business, the carriers involved do not just reap benefits from the mere know-how and cost
synergies, but also from the lower labour costs in Ireland. Similar to the Shannon Aerospace
example, the joint venture of Air France Industries and its SkyTeam partner, Delta's
SUbsidiary, Delta TechOps try to gain substantial third party business rather than directly
benefiting from scale effects with immediate advantages for the partnering carriers.
Most technical collaborations occur outside the major partnerships. Only about 7% of
marketing alliances also co-operate in joint engineering and maintenance as well as joint
inventory and purchasing (see SH&E, 1999). Technical partnerships thus seem to be a
phenomenon outside the widely-known, more marketing-oriented, collaborations. It seems
that technical and commercial partnerships do not work for each other, as maintenance does
not figure highly in the motivation for getting together. However, there appears to be a
general move to more individual airline agreements with manufacturers and MROs. Smaller
84
At the time of this writing, the future of Shannon Aerospace was still unclear due to Swissair's bankruptcy.
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airlines prefer straightforward contracts between each other and with technical providers,
while the bigger carriers particularly tend to shift capital exposure to airframe OEMs, by
means of consignment stock leasing, rather than collectively purchasing their own spares
pools (see N/A, Airline Technical Alliances - Evolutionary Trends, 2001, p. 60).
4.4.4 Summarising Aspects of Forms and Instruments of Collaboration
The above could only partly capture the multitude of forms and instruments of horizontal
interairline collaboration. Airlines are creative in finding ever new-fashioned ways of
operatively and/or strategically joining forces for the benefit of their economic survival and in
pursuing the provision of increased customer service.
Collaborative agreements are therefore as individual as the participating carriers. While the
airlines' value chain activities and certain quasi-standardised functional collaborations (e.g.
codesharing, GSA) provide a general framework for horizontal alliances, their separate
organisation and design vary greatly. Specific individual motivations, distinctly varying
company organisations and macro-circumstances, as well as the perceived and actual success
of collaboration lead to discrete set-ups and the ultimate evolution of partnerships.
However, two key evidences in partnership development signify a certain pattern. Airlines are
increasingly building blocks of collaboration, whether multilateral umbrella brand
partnership, multi-party B2C collaborations, maintenance and procurement consortia, or'
others. Collaborative strength thus seems best achievable by establishing groupings
quantitatively beyond the classic dyad organisation. Airlines do not, however, ally with the
same partners in each of their grouping constructs. The member composition of these blocks
is different and reflects the distinct demands that airlines have vis-a-vis the collaborative
objectives and their partners. This is why the second key evidence is concerned with the
airline industry increasingly migrating into a network economy. Networks allow for an array
of direct and indirect, deliberate and unintentional linkages between carriers. These
connections ultimately affect all players of air transportation. In the current stage of air
transport evolution, only this multitude of linkages seems to promise economic gains.
The fact of individual partnership building as well as the migration into networks mandates
requirements for successful partnership management, which are discussed in chapter 5.
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4.5 Critical Views of Airline Collaboration
In General, airline collaboration is not unanimously welcomed. Critical Issues of airline
collaboration originate from various sources, of which the main are:
• Regulatory and competitive censure
Demand-driven disapprobation
Industry-inherent critique
•
•
A comprehensive discussion of these areas would not serve the purpose of this research
project. However, selected aspects are introduced, supplemented by a more detailed
discussion of negative partnership effects in a later chapter (see 6.3).
4.5.1 Regulatory and Competitive Criticisms
A main censure of carrier collaboration resides in the doctrine that if two airline competitors
form an alliance, the result may be a reduction in competition and/or an increase in air fares,
as the carriers collude instead of compete (see Park and Zhang, 2000, pp. 367-368).
A reduction in competition would occur if two carriers that operate on overlapping non-stop
and connecting routes form an alliance and eventually cease to rival each other. If markets
have capacity constrained airports, competition may be further hampered, or even eliminated,
because of potential competitors' inability to obtain take-off and landing slots, gate space and
access to other critical airport infrastructure (see Youssef and Hansen, 1994, p. 430, Dresner
and Windle, 1996, p. 203, Vander Kraats, 2000, p. 61). Moreover, airline partnerships among
carriers operating hub and spoke networks normally enhance demand for the entire joint
network and increase the power of the networks in the respective hub markets (see
Borenstein, 1992, p. 55 and Stragier, 1999, p. 1). The effects of hub premiums in this regard
Were discussed above. These issues are potentially the case with regards to the negative
elements of the proposed British Airways and American Airlines partnership. The two
carriers already provide close to 70% of services between London Heathrow and the main US
gateways. The situation would worsen if, ceteris paribus, they would succeed in their pursuit
of antitrust immunity in the USA (see United States General Accounting Office, International
Aviation: Competition Issues in the US-U.K. Market, 1997, pp. 2-3).
On this exemplary basis, governments are generally assessing whether international airline
partnerships are competitive ventures offering profit and traveller salvation, at least until
regulatory barriers fall, or malevolent schemes aimed at replacing government restrictions that
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prevent competition with marketplace restrictions (see Feldman, 1994, p. 173). The gradual
disappearance of regulatory constraints in global aviation during the past 20 years has
particularly increased competition between market players, but at the same time it inflated the
risk of anti-competitive behaviour. This is why competition-supervising agencies are
constantly eyeing airline collaborations, their use of collaborative instruments and the
incorporation of collaborative forms. However, competition supervision is not a standardised
procedure. Generally, global alliances between carriers are exposed to the competition rules
of different constituencies. Airline co-operations across the North Atlantic are mainly subject
to the competition laws of the EU and the USA, which might lead to two or more competition
authorities reaching conflicting or incoherent decisions.
The forms and instruments of interairline collaboration that national authorities generally
judge to be anti-competitive can therefore vary. Airline partnerships within the USA, or
between a US and a foreign carrier require government approval if they incorporate either of
the following forms and instruments:
• Marketing and codesharing agreements
• Joint operations with revenue pooling, fares and inventory control, joint marketing and
sales, network planning, standard service contracts and shared marketing data - in this
case antitrust immunity is needed
• A foreign carrier's equity participation In a US airline'" (see United States General
Accounting Office, 1995, p. 23).
The US government sees a potentially injurious impact on its home airline market by all of
the above-mentioned collaborative forms and instruments and thus requires approval for these
alliance constellations (for a discussion of domestic welfare implications by airline alliances,
see Clougherty, 2000). However, the main impact on collaboration develops from the ruling
that no cabotage rights are granted to foreigners and because of airline ownership restrictions.
Although the US government expedited the alliance movement through its protectionism and
initial deregulation, it prevents full co-operation or cross-border concentration from occurring,
due to its investment barriers and limitations on operation (for a critical discussion, see
Doganis, 2001, pp. 45-46).
85 Equity participation in a US carrier is limited to 25%.
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The European Union has widely abolished restrictive legislation for airline collaboration on a
Europe-wide scale. Circumventing the negative effects of a protective policy concerning its
member states' carriers, the EU has allowed every EU carrier to serve any city pair in the
Community, including pairs within the territory of a single member state. However, some
restrictions do still apply. Ownership by nationals or companies from non-member states is
limited to 49% (see Niejahr, 1998, pp. 11-12). Basic Community competition rules affect the
European airline industry, mitigating perceived harms to competition through a series of
remedies. Accordingly, the EU Commission still has to approve airline partnerships which, in
some instances, can take an economically unjustifiable period (for an exemplary discussion of
the EU merger regulation, see Flores Jr., 1998, p. 1101).
The situation is worsened by airlines and regulative agencies' differing approaches regarding
the scope of possibly competition-harming behaviour. Whereas airlines forward arguments on
the effects of global competition (macro), the EU Commission scrutinises rivalry on selected
connections (micro) (see Jegminat, 1997, p. 62). The EU is currently even questioning the
right of carriers to attend scheduling and interlining conferences, claiming that these
conferences are against consumer interests. However, the possibility to apply certain group
exemptions can also be adopted by the European Commission, giving way to potentially
restrictive alliances" (see Stragier, 1999, p. 2). The current situation is unsatisfactory for
airlines. The Board of Airline Representatives in Germany (BARIG) has urged the European
Commission to deal with regulation on airline alliances in a more market-oriented way, while
also safeguarding the interests of small and medium-sized carriers (see BARIG, Resolution,
1998).
The bilateral regime is still prevalent in Europe, despite the integration region being a single
market. Thus, flights between EU Member States and non-EU countries are still regulated on
the basis of distinct bilateral agreements, which impose a variety of restrictions on individual
airlines and partnerships. Legislation impedes airlines from entering into full cross-border
mergers without the airlines involved potentially losing their traffic rights. On the other hand,
us carriers and their alliance partners can fairly freely enter the ED region and serve almost
any destination, while European carriers can only serve selected US destinations from their
86 A prominent example of exemption is the SAS/Lufthansa partnership in their joint venture to cover services
between Germany and Scandinavia. The European Commission accepted that the partnership agreement fulfilled
the requirements for an exemption, especially those regarding the promotion of economic progress and the
benefit to consumers (see Flores Jr., 1998, p. 1102).
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home country. This practice is considered discriminatory and distorting, and has lead the EU
to threaten selected air service agreement between some of its member states and the USA
(see Knibb, Play by the Rules, 2000, p. 74).
4.5.2 Demand-oriented Criticisms
Demand-driven opposition arises from the consumer of the air transport service. Many of
these concerns are basically expressed by constraints that regulatory and competition
authorities establish to restrict airline collaboration. The main concerns potentially developing
from airline partnerships regarding negative effect on passenger are:
• Limitations on route networks, frequencies and connectivity
• Disadvantageous fare development
• Drop of product quality standards
• Reduction of safety and security standards
As a premeditated reduction of competition is a key goal for airlines forming partnerships, the
effects on passengers can be potentially negative. The decrease of effective competition is
most marked in route-specific or regional alliances. If two carriers previously competing on a
route without a third competitor decide to co-operate with only one partner serving the route,
a duopoly situation turns into a monopoly. Fares can be negatively influenced by
monopolising or cartelising O&D markets. A situation where airports are also capacity
constrained aggravates the situation, as the possibility of alternative supply is diminished and
disproportionally high premiums can be charged by hub carriers. Consumer advocates have'
repeatedly warned that alliances, paired with antitrust immunity and already existing hub
premiums, lead to significantly higher fares than in free and unrestrained market
environments (see Reynolds-Feighan and Berechman, 1998, pp, 274-275), Cast in this
context, co-operating airlines can also hold back capacity growth and refrain from passenger-
friendly schedule co-ordination. Both issues can have a negative effect on consumer welfare.
Codesharing as one marketing instrument of airline co-operation is critically discussed in the
business as well as in the legal and political environment. It is seen as a possible form of
misleading passengers in their choice and during consummation of an airline product. The
concerns primarily arise with the possibility of screen padding and other forms of CRS bias.
Despite codes of codesharing. conduct being established by industry associations and
governmental authorities, passengers still feel misled by codesharing as CRS's display
algorithms and airlines' information policies can lead to misinterpretation. As a result,
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competition can be virtually reduced because a travel agent, who habitually books flights
from the screen, would not provide consumers with information on a competing flight option.
Triple listings of the same flight option also reduce the efficiency of travel agents who
attempt to identify all alternatives for their customers.V Competitors, even those with lower
fares, might be crowded out and pushed to lower, less utilised screens (see Hemphill, 2000,
pp.22-23).
Other sources of conflict and opposition are the possible deception of passengers. Passengers
in the pursuit of online services might feel deceived by actual interline transportation on a
complementary codeshare (see Triller, 1995, and N/A, Moving towards Consumer Protection,
1995, Beyhoff et al., 1995, pp. 41-42). Parallel codesharing can potentially lead to dissatisfied
passengers, as the operating carrier, per definition, is not necessarily the same as the
marketing carrier, from which the transport product has been purchased or whose services
were expected. In the case of product quality differences, or safety and security contrasts with
clear disadvantages on the operating carrier's side, passengers can rightfully feel defrauded.
Codeshare alliances require a high standard of agreements on service levels among partners
and uniformity in hiring and training staff to ensure that the consented and communicated
level of service is accomplished and maintained. While it should be in the partnering airlines'
immediate interests to avoid quality variances, they must also ensure that passengers are
informed about the codeshare situation and the identity of the operating carrier.
Closely linked to codeshare agreements are FFP links between carriers. While in most forms
of multilateral alliances and codeshare agreements, FFP miles can be reciprocally collected
and redeemed, the flight award procedure among partners poses problems and can lead to
customer dissatisfaction. It is often the result of too little seat allotment for award flights,
different mileage tiers for selected sectors, award procedures and IT issues among partners
that lead to customer aversion (see Hemphill, 2000, p. 23).
A further issue that should be addressed with regards to inconvenient effects on passengers, is
the adverse impact of alliances on the expansion of direct services. Codesharing has
repeatedly discouraged development of direct services and forces circuitous routings onto the
travelling public. This is most often the case in routings that were once attractive destinations
87 Triple listing is not allowed in the EU.
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for a single carrier, but under a partnership can be served more efficiently through a partner's
hub operation.88
On the other hand, several studies prove the positive effects for consumers of air transport
products by airline partnerships. The US Department of Transportation has empirically
proven that the major alliances operating on the North Atlantic have lead to traffic stimulation
and fare reduction (see United States Department of Transportation, International Aviation
Developments, Second Report, 2000, pp. 4-5). Traffic stimulation primarily originates from
network reach, mainly through connecting traffic and lower passenger yields. Fare savings of
multilateral alliances have been empirically evaluated in another study with a specific
reference to codesharing in the Star Alliance. The results show that membership in a
multilateral alliance, using codesharing, and within the current status of immunity from
antitrust legislation, has lead to fare reductions of 27% for interline passengers compared to
unaligned, non-immunised carriers (see Brueckner, 2000, p. 2 and also Park and Zhang,
1998). However, this data applies to interlining passengers only. Whether airline co-operation
on direct city pair markets does have an anti-competitive effect and leads to rising fares, was
not evaluated.
4.5.3 Industry-inherent Criticisms
Opposition to airline co-operation also comes from the industry itself. Although most
international carriers are horizontally allied in some form or another, and the phase of
shopping for and swapping of partners seems to have lost momentum, some airlines are
reluctant to commit to partnerships. Perceived conflicts, spur that reluctance, but also an
endogenous resistance towards the concept of alliance building does so.
ICarriers lining up in groups can create virtual monopolies on routes between the hubs of
alliance partners, permitting the exercise of considerable market power in hub-to-hub markets.
Entry to such routes is inhibited, not just by airport capacity constraints and artificially built
entry barriers, but also by government regulation. It is this potential, and the exercise of
market power that motivates opposition among competitors. Virgin Atlantic has vehemently
been opposing and is legally challenging the proposed partnership between British Airways
and American Airlines as being harmful to the passenger and the industry's interest.
88 E.g., the once direct services of Swissair from Zurich to Cape Town were routed to Johannesburg, the hub of
Swissair's former partner, SAA. Passengers were then carried domestically to Cape Town on SAA.
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However, it is widely consented that Virgin follows a vested interest in opposing the
alliances, as British Airways/American Airlines affect markets Virgin currently serves.
Lufthansa has entered a widespread partnership with Eurowings in the regional central
European market, monopolising a number of routes. After regional and domestic carriers
complained to the German competition surveillance authority, Lufthansa had to compensate
the complainant with marketing support and the provision of frequencies (see N/A,
Pressemeldung des Bundeskartellamtes vom 06.03.2001).
The airlines' call for governmental control is seen by some as the necessary cure to curb anti-
competitive alliance impacts: in turn it deters others from entering into airline co-operation.
Governments that suspect collusion to reduce competition and increase fares, lead action to
control alliance agreements. Carriers thus fear being obstructed from receiving sufficient
dividends from their partnership-organisational efforts and resource allocation. One factor is
time. The example of British Airways and American Airlines shows that approval by
competition agencies can take unforeseeably long. Costs can also occur in the form of
compliance costs that are incurred in order to design the partnership in accordance with the
demands of competition or regulatory authorities (see Steininger, 1999, pp. 163-164). A
partnership is simply only worthwhile if the benefits adequately outweigh opportunity costs
and if the risk of sunk costs can be minimised (see Lutz, 1993, p. 230 and Klanke, 1996, p.
56). To have unrestricted control over key assets is an important aspect in this costlbenefit
calculation. The fact that airline partnerships are forced to give up slots at congested hubs, or
have to actively support competitors, in exchange for receiving exemption from antitrust laws,
has recently caused serious internal friction within alliances.
Two other main issues that alliances will be dealing with are labour and safety. Pilots unions
typically disfavour alliances, since they fear jobs will migrate to the lower cost carrier. Pilots
of all major airline alliances have thus agreed to co-operate with one another to protect labour
rights. The pilot unions of the Wings Alliance partners wrote a constitution to establish a co-
operative organisation; Oneworld and Star Alliance pilots have formed similar groups to
protect jobs and have a voice in alliances affairs.
As alliances become more firmly grounded, and in the light of increasing security
Considerations, safety concerns are coming to the forefront. Certain carriers have suspended
their codesharing with other carriers as a protest against their safety standards, e.g. Delta once
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discontinued its partnership with Korean Air Lines due to safety problems (see Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 1999, p. 3).
A further airline concern worth mentioning, although this has not yet materialised on a larger,
cross-border scale, due to the continued regulatory constraints of global aviation: in a
significant number of cases, company alliances end with one partner being taken over by its
counterpart (see Bleeke and Ernst, 1991, p. 131). Currently, global aviation is not in a
consolidation phase, but experience from other industries indicates that the possibility of full
take-overs is imminent. This especially applies to partnerships between differently-sized
carriers, where the smaller and less powerful airline must fear being taken over by the larger
partner.
Objections to partnerships also emerge from more internally-oriented issues which carriers
believe to be associated with airline collaboration. Cannibalisation of positive alliance effects
through size-driven partnership complexity is one argument against airline partnerships (see
Flint, Is Bigger Better?, 1998, p. 32). This complexity might develop from organisational and
managerial issues arising with airline partnerships.
Airlines involved in or preparing for horizontal partnerships can be distracted from their core
business tasks. This distraction classically evolves from human, material and financial
resource allocation to prepare, negotiate, implement and manage the partnership. Personnel
must be assigned to various integrative tasks, which can lead to managerial and operational
discontinuity. The formation period can thus be costly and cumbersome (see Koot, 1988, p..
350). Most evident is resource allocation in IT, where integrative tasks can be extremely
demanding and can pose a serious threat to daily business processes'" (see de Pommes, 1998,
p.26).
The joint achievement of competitive or collaborative advantages in airline partnerships,
relies on both partners merging or bringing together selected parts of their value chains. The
constitutive characteristic of commingling assets illustrates this coalition for strategic
alliances. However, this set-up constitutes a certain dependency on the input and the
dedication of the partners' collaborative accomplishment. The possibility of one partner
behaving selfishly or opportunistically, jeopardises the partnership. A leakage of proprietary
89 In the case of Austrian's entry into the Star Alliance, configuration expenses were about USD 42 million of
which 40% had to be laid out for IT harmonisation (see Feldman, Alliance Costs Start Building, 2000, p. 41).
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knowledge to the partner who may later use this knowledge to erode the firm's advantage,
also demonstrates the dependency of both partners in their pursuit to jointly reap the benefits
of their agreement (see Day, 1995, p. 297). Dependency and appropriation considerations are
an important concern and can lead to organisational opposition to alliance building.
Other disadvantages perceived by airlines to be obstacles to entering into partnerships are
multifarious. The terminology synergy or relationship capital summarises some of these
factors and the set of understandings and practices that facilitate collaboration (for an
extensive discussion of the concept of partnership synergy, see chapter 6). If decision makers
do not see sufficient relationship capital, they will oppose a collaboration (see Gomes-
Casseres, 1996, pp. 85-88).
The following describes possible frailties in airline relationship capital components.
•
Management styles, company cultures and modes of operation may be different,
producing disputes requiring resolution by top management.
The entire business strategy of one partner may need to be abandoned or changed to
accommodate new, collaborative strategies. This in particular applies to smaller, junior
partners of multilateral alliances.
Too little depth in personal relationships between counterparts in each firm (see Lutz,
1993, p. 168).
One partner not fulfilling commitments made to the other in a reputable manner.
Negative lessons drawn from experience on what does and what does not work in
relationships.
Inability to rely on decision making and on a notion of fairness based on best practise.
Mistrust among partners as expectations of mutually assured reciprocity does not occur.
Little mutual forbearance as the commitment to accept short-term costs in the pursuit of
long-term benefits is not commonly accepted.
Agreements on marketing strategies and branding issues may not be achievable, or may be
time consuming, thus leading to negative image effects (see Shearman, 1992, p. 120). This
especially applies to umbrella brand concepts.
Standard of service commonality might not be achieved.
Sharing of costs and benefits can lead to controversies.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The cost-side in alliances involves a further opposition category. Latecomers in multilateral
partnerships are usually confronted with an entry fee. These are costs to switch to alliance-
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wide standards, links to reservation systems and marketing, but also higher prorates and other
commercial arrangements that represent a type of endorsement fee. Entry fees are based on a
prospective partner's revenue and additionally compensate the founders of the multilateral
alliance for brand and other developments (see Feldman, 2000, Alliance Costs Start Building,
p. 41). Multilateral alliance requirements towards a new member can add to those costs.
Service and safety, as well as technical and financial compliance and requirements largely
contribute to the endorsement of a new partner." Entry fees in multilateral partnerships can
be substantial and can lead to decisions not to enter.
Other costs to be borne by alliance members in fulfilling alliance-wide standardisation
requirements can represent sunk costs. The establishment of common FFPs, IT systems,
service commonality or other compliance issues can be associated with high entry fees and in
the case of an exit, are lost investments. The example of some of Swissair's former regional
partners going into liquidation themselves after Swissair's demise, underscores sunk costs and
dependency concerns.
4.6 Summary and Implications
There has been a worldwide trend to forming horizontal partnerships in every industry for
quite some time, and air transportation is no exception. As for other industry sectors, airline
collaboration does not occur without - often justifiable - criticism and substantial political and
regulatory hurdles, which influence its development and impact on the type of collaboration
allies agree upon.
The nature of interairline partnerships is defined by a motivational spectrum, ranging from
operative goals to strategic objectives and, very closely, attempts to emulate mergers.
Anticipated positive cost and revenue considerations are the quantifiable effects from
horizontal airline partnerships. One key standard intent in carrier collaborations is, however,
their potentiality to circumvent persisting regulation, which still inhibits global consolidation.
To date, horizontal airline linkages occur primarily through marketing alliances - operative as
well as strategic in orientation. While the collaborative areas referred to in theory as well as
90 The US DOT announced in 1999 that it would set up a system whereby it would not approve any new
codeshare partnerships until the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) had approved the partner's safety auditing
programme. Star Alliance performs audits of safety, maintenance, finances, products and other areas. If these
audits conclude that the airline is fulfilling the minimum requirements set, then a codeshare might be made
available to the airline.
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by airlines themselves essentially contain the entire passenger air transport value chain,
currently, the main focus in practice is on marketing and the leading part of these partnerships
are rather unbound by nature. Therefore, revenue enhancement objectives as well as market
access considerations outweigh the cost savings potential that might occur in establishing
joint marketing organisations.
Very few alliances may, however, be characterised as almost strategic and de facto merged
airlines in form and function - where this is possible. Features such as joint branding, loyalty
schemes, common management structures, equity linkages and some form of joint strategic
planning process manifest close connections. They will certainly further develop into even
more complex webs of links, with the general trend in collaborating inclining towards more
integration of operations, and drastic changes being expected in strategy and support
functions.
Generally, there are many forms and instruments airlines use for their - often multilateral -
collaborations. These types of collaboration reflect the linkages' basic intentions and vary in
their closeness. Profound partnership depth and width are therefore not necessarily a signal of .
the partnership's quality. Some relationship intentions might be satisfactorily achieved with
low profile, shallow collaborations. The really important challenges of global airline
consolidation are, however, easier achievable through more attached relationships,
incorporating a wide variety of functions. With some carriers being able to engage in closer-
type partnerships, a threat emerges for other airlines in trying to catch up with consolidation
and in advancing their ties to others. Closely-knit global alliances will exert common control
OVerrevenue management, fleet planning and scheduling in order to realise the benefits - for
passengers and the companies - the tight alliance as an emulated merger is supposed to
deliver. Distribution will take new forms. Joint efforts to cut out the middleman, and
migrating to direct, ticketless air transport sales structures, will be increasingly attempted on
platforms which mimic classic brick-and-mortar travel agencies.
However, airline consolidation, also in its prevalent emulated form through partnerships,
Cannot be described as overly effective. Existing national ownership and control provisions
ensure that de jure global airline entities, both in form and in function, cannot presently exist
outside the main integration regions. Antitrust regulation - developed to protect consumers
from monopolies - also has an impact on the pace of airline industry consolidation, and
continues to restrict some large-scale consolidations. The trend of creating collaborations
Which aspire to function as global airlines, but which are not structured and do not appear to
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be globally operating airlines, is based on the long tradition of skewed development in the
international airline industry. In addition, airlines currently lack the will and certainly the
managerial capabilities for merging, thus mirroring other global industry trends.
The task at hand is the creation of an efficient, secure, global-spanning, and profitable air
transportation industry, unencumbered by major regulative interference and exposed to free
and fair market forces. In the medium term, the uncertainty engendered by the regulatory
system stunts and distorts the development of airlines. However, airlines are required to live
with these circumstances and they will need to accumulate expertise in order to meet the
challenges associated with collaborations. Many carriers lack the confidence and
governmental proficiency to take the bold technological, organisational and financial steps
required to create the individual airline and the airline network of the future. And thus they
also lack sophistication to operate horizontal partnerships. The success of future airline
partnerships will be predicated on their efficiency, financial strength and access to global
markets, or the dedicated service of niches. Regulation will dictate if, when, and how this can
occur. It can either continue to inhibit these developments, or it can play a leading role in
directing and nurturing them.
In the long term, it is very probable that governments will reduce foreign ownership
limitations on airlines, just as they have been reduced in other global service sectors such as
telecommunication, financial services and energy. For the time being, airline collaboration is
the only vehicle to overcome these limitations. In the short- to medium-term, airlines which.
can cope with the challenges of this interim situation - between deregulation and full
liberalisation - will prosper. Only once commercial carriers comprehend the task of forming
webs of horizontal links, will they be able to lever themselves to an advantageous position
that will guarantee survival upon the commencement oftrue globalised airline consolidation.
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5 Delineation of Prerequisites and Key Success Factors of
Airline Collaboration
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter described the basic motivations as well as the forms and instruments of
airline collaboration, during which it also became apparent that many airlines are not alliance-
sophisticated and are not always able to face the challenges of partnership management and
operation successfully. Yet to be discussed are the prerequisites for genuinely thriving airline
partnership ventures with sustainable competitive advantages. To determine these
prerequisites, the imperatives prior to entering a partnership and the key success factors while
in a partnership need to be evaluated.
The discussion of prerequisites and success factors opens up numerous queries about airlines'
initial collaborative capabilities. Evidence in the global alliance scene strongly suggests that
there are systematic and structural differences in collaborative proficiencies. These
capabilities are built by airlines as they gain more experience with partnerships and the extent
of this learning may affect the relative success of those carriers with alliances (see Gulati,
1998, p. 308). Other theories take the stance that it is not so much experience, but rather
conceptualisation of collaborative tactics and strategies that lead to success (see Khanna,
1998, p. 340 and Kogut, 1988, p. 322-323). This poses questions on what these capabilities
are and what the systematic tactics might be that airlines could use to intemalise these
capabilities.
This chapter is structured according to the organisational sequence of events in entering
collaborative agreements and important partnership-managerial measures to ensure
sustainable success in interairline partnerships. The figure below summarises the key aspects
to be discussed.
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Figure 5.1: Event Sequence and Key Partnership Prerequisites
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This chapter follows the described methodology of a combination of a thorough investigation
of secondary resources and empirical evidence and inductive theory building (see chapter 1
and the interview guideline in the appendix). Empirically-gathered information from the
mentioned primary sources, particularly supports the quest to delineate the most salient steps
and configurational aspects in the process of airline alliance formation and its management.
Suitability and
Selection
5.2 Strategic Decree and Organisational Prerequisites as First Steps
Towards Interairline Relationships
• Collective Competence • Fundamental Fitness
and Commitment • StrategiCSuitability
• Definition of Scope • Cultural Fitness
Horizontal partnerships are just one of a range of business development alternatives, through'
which an airline may proceed to improve or alter its competitive position. Horizontal
interairline collaboration is fast becoming a mainstay of competitive strategy, but should also
be regarded as a transitional ploy through which more permanent solutions may be found. The
current phase of interairline collaboration too needs to be evaluated as a stepping stone
towards the emerging phase of air transport development, namely globalisation and
consolidation. Airlines are consequently required to invest more resources, deploy more staff
and start to appreciate the soft aspects of collaboration and are, in fact, gradually becoming
more alliance sophisticated as they do so (see Parkhe, 2000, p. 2). The following discussion
describes issues for successfully establishing airline relationships, based on organisational
prerequisites and presuming that a strategic decree for a horizontal partnership has been
reached.
Source: own compilation
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The basic and initial uncertainty m strategically deciding to establish an interairline
partnership is to determine whether an organisational qualification is prevalent. What often
appears to be neglected in the very nascent stages of partnership planning processes is,
however, imperative prior to succumbing to the putative necessity of horizontally joining
forces: a company should analyse its own ability to collaborate. A decision should be made on
the basis of a thorough evaluation of other growth or expansion strategies as well as the firm's
own experience with alliances, the prevalence of such alliances in the industry (social
comparison) and the regulatory, institutional and cultural constraints (see Bronder and Pritzl,
1991, pp. 44-45, Schmidt, 1993, p. 51, Koza and Lewin, 1998, p. 258, Spekman et al., 1998,
p. 762). The outcome of this self-analysis should be whether or not it appears feasible for an
airline to enter a co-operation, based on its own organisational fitness (see Gulati, 1998, p.
293 and Moss Kanter, 1994, pp. 99-100). Organisational fitness is, additionally, an important
component through which carriers can early on assess possible areas of co-operation along the
value chain spectrum, and thus deal with the managerial and organisational implications and
challenges of partnership action.
A definition of the partnership objectives is crucial. As alluded to earlier in this dissertation,
the objectives set prior to entering a partnership, mirror the motivations for utilising this
expansion strategy (see 4.3.2). The typical classification of the broad alliance motivators into
learning and business alliances, efficiency and effectiveness motivations as well as costs,
regulation and market-oriented partnership drivers, has been introduced before (also see
Jarillo, 1988, Hamel, 1991, Lei and Slocum, 1992, pp. 81-82, Koza and Lewin, 1998, p. 256).
A consideration of partnership objectives based on these motivations includes the scale and
scope of the desired collaboration with regard to the value chain elements and the number of
partners to be involved. The value or role of company areas in the collaboration must be
determined up front, agreements on relative priorities must be reached and the objectives'
compatibility with the existing business must be audited and ensured (see Applegate, 1998, p.
54).
Compatibility of partnership objectives and the firm's abilities are a deciding success factor.
In aviation especially, it often seems that alliances are entered into based on opportunity and
market pressure, rather than harmony with the firm's overall goals (see Walters et al., 1994, p.
5). Partnership objectives, depending on the scale and scope of the envisaged co-operation,
must thus be embedded in the airline's strategy. Airlines, for example frequently establish
marketing partnerships. Marketing-collaborative objectives can touch activities, programmes
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and strategic issues as well as various resources and organisational topics and market-related
dimensions, thus covering a broad bandwidth of company performance (see Topfer, 1992, pp.
179-182). This comprehensiveness determines that operative and strategic partnerships must
consequently correspond and co-evolve with the airline's overall strategy (see Arifio and
Torre, 1998). While partnership or alliance strategy is regularly described from an in situ or
ex-post point of view, it is, however, crucial to successfully establish partnership-strategic
guidelines prior to entering into collaborative agreements (see Gomes-Casseres, 1998, p. 7).
This would also entail that airlines understand their relative power within a partnership. As
downright balance of power due to size, financial propensity or other differences cannot be
achieved, airlines must evaluate their comparative strength and authority in prospective
partnerships and deduce strategic implications.
Equally important as part of organisational fitness is the assessment of individual excellence
(see Moss Kanter, 1994, p. 100). The pursuit of future collaborative opportunities must be
accompanied by the airline's ability to underscore its own competitive advantages and
strengths. Airlines seem to neglect the fact that alliance formation is both a passive and an
active process. The deliberate search for a partner is one option. Being an attractive,
approachable partner for alliance-seekers is yet another possibility. This passive approach,
however, requires an airline to advertise its strengths in a way that it becomes an attractive
and valuable ally in alliance structures. The status of an organisation in the industry therefore
strongly affects its reputation (for reputation in collaborations, see Dollinger et aI., 1997). The
greater this reputation, the wider the airline's access to a variety of sources of knowledge, and
the richer its own collaborative experience, making it an attractive partner. In the airline
industry, the signalling properties of standing are important since the attractiveness of a
potential partner can be gauged from its status, which also depends on the other carriers
already tied to this partner. This phenomenon has important behavioural consequences. If a
carrier's discrete status is likely to enhance the attractiveness of an ally, airlines will have a
tendency to seek high-status partners (see Gulati, 1998, p. 301). Individual excellence
consequently drives membership of bi- or multilateral airline collaborations.
The ability to co-operate and the partnership-organisational fitness are further based on the
staffs personal as well as collective competence and commitment (see Bronder, 1993, p. 20).
The agreement on a shared vision and competence in co-operation-related issues promote
trust towards the future collaborative orientation and towards prospective partners.
Responsibilities, obligations, and compromises contribute to laying the bedrock of a gainful,
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long-term partnership and constitute partnership-organisational fitness as well as the ability to
co-operate on the staff level. In addition, every partnership can experience conflict between its
members, originating from operational frailties or simple, interpersonal difficulties. It is
therefore of the highest importance to create a general understanding that company
collaboration always goes hand in hand with conflict potential. Sensitivity towards conflict on
all staff levels facilitates the establishment of venues for equitable conflict resolution in later
stages of the joint business venture.
An initial definition of and pledge to the partnership scope must be reached. While the scope
of the partnership has to be established in detail between the partners, an initial scope
definition, as part of the organisational prerequisite to entering a partnership, is crucial. This
scope definition can therefore entail issues such as geographical boundaries, product and
service categories, customer segments, brands, technologies and assets brought to the
partnership (for scope of alliances, see Khanna, 1998, p. 340 and for partnership intensity, see
6.4. and 6.5).
Although the most rational approach to building airline partnerships would entail taking
graduate steps along a spectrum of increasing partnership intensity, airline experience has
shown that this is not necessarily the case. Airlines that have wished to minimise their risks,
have opted for a trial stage of minimal integration and have usually been disappointed with
the results, therefore further eroding their willingness to attempt greater degrees of
integration. Successful airline co-operations appear to require a critical mass of integrating
activities, covering a broad range of the airline value chains, and a critical scope of activities.
The critical scope of activities would also include geographical reach, product categories,
customer segments and brands in terms of the integrative activities being implemented across
the participating airlines' full networks."
5.3 Partnership Planning, Search for, and Selection of Horizontal Partners
An appropriate partner match offers the greatest opportunity for partnership effectiveness.
The choice of the right partner can yield important competitive benefits, whereas the failure to
establish compatible objectives, or communicate effectively can lead to insurmountable
problems. Furthermore, the need to understand all partners' similarities and differences is
paramount in ensuring the success of alliances. With the web of partnerships emerging in the
91 See also further below (6.4 and 6.5) for critical scope with regard to partnership synergy.
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airline industry, and.the forms and instruments of collaboration taking increasingly different
configurations, the appropriateness of partner selection has a critical impact on the alliance
success (see Devlin and Bleackley, 1988, p. 21, Bucklin and Sengupa, 1993, p. 32, Dev et al.,
1996, p. 12, Hitt et al., 2000, p. 449, Dyer et al., 2001, pp. 39-40).
Due to the limited predictability of partners' behaviours and the costs of opportunistic partner
conduct, entering alliances is associated with a certain moral hazard. Rapid changes in the
aviation and regulatory environment may lead airlines to alter their specific alliance needs and
orientations over time, thus affecting their ongoing partnerships. Discernment is required in
building partnerships, because of the need to represent the interests of stockholders and labour
groups that have been made certain promises, commitments to airports, debtholders and other
stakeholders and obviously vis-a-vis a certain market position that should not be squandered.
To build ties that effectively address needs and objectives while minimising the risks posed
by the aforementioned concerns, dedicated partnership planning must be implemented (see
Gulati, 1998,p. 300).
The first, yet overlapping, sequence of events of partnership building includes investigation
and pre-selection (planning and search), partnership fitness evaluation and the final choice of
a partner in horizontal airline relationships. As airline collaborations greatly differ in form and
depth of integration, partnership planning may have more or less intensive forms. The
following descriptions, assumptions and recommendations are exemplary, based on a
partnership planning process for a strategically-oriented airline co-operation.
5.3.1 Partner Investigation and Pre-Selection
Just as a person's decision to get married is tied to the availability and eventual choice of a
I
specific partner, an airline's decision to enter an alliance is closely linked to its appropriate
partner selection and may even be determined by that partner's availability (see Dacin and
Hitt, 1997, p. 3, Gulati, 1998, p. 299). Partnership building starts with the investigation of
prospective partners. As indicated earlier, organisational and company-strategic prerequisites
as well as compliance with partnership objectives must be met prior to committing to a
partnership strategy.
The first step of investigating prospective airline partners is not a very complex task. Airline
competitors, however geographically limited they may operate, are reasonably easy to
identify due to their inherent market prominence. Route structures, size, equipment, the
overall financial situation and market position, are usually well-publicised information. The
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same applies to an airline's traffic rights, as these are commonly based on government-
negotiated air service agreements. The absolute number of generally available prospective
airline partners is certainly determined by the market size and the competition structure. If a
partnership-seeker's intention is market expansion, it is obvious that the smaller the market to
be entered into is, the fewer the number of prospective partners there will be, all of which
naturally funnels the group of possible allies. The investigation process for prospective
partner airlines is thus of a less laborious nature than in other, more fragmented and less
public industries. Information on an airline's management and strategy, personnel policies
and labour relations, its shareholder structure and product and quality-related issues are harder
to investigate and often involve more detailed inquiries and even physical inspection.
However, in determining whether the investigated carriers can be pre-selected, this
information is mandatory and needs to be collected in audit processes which can typically
entail the following hard compliance facts:
•
Network consistent with the partnership-seeker's expansion and competitive aspirations
(complementary/overlapping)
Size, wealth of partner's markets, relative dominance (leader or follower) and competitors
{see Berardino and Frankel, Keeping Score, 1998, p. 84)
Existing partnership agreements
Endowments of assets (traffic system, routes, brands, hubs, aircraft, and slots)
Endowment of constraints (labour agreements, national regulations, and bilateral
agreements)
Financial management and resources, and financial indexes (profitability, asset and debt
structure etc.)
Productivity
Management structures, and managerial personnel
Growth and development potential
Reputation of service, safety, punctuality and security
•
..
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Each investigated and pre-selected partner should meet some minimal prerequisites to bring
the desired complementary strengths to the partnership. As most airline partnerships are
market expansion and marketing-oriented, complementary and supplementary networks are
argued to be the most important criteria in the selection process (see Schmidt, 1993, p. 54,
Klein, 1996, p. 14 and, more generally, Harrison et al., 2001). Ideally, the strengths
Contributed by the partners are unique, although they complement each other. The goal is to
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develop synergies between the contributions of the partners, resulting in a win-win situation
for both or all (see Walters et al., 1994, p. 5 and chapter 6 for synergies). The basic purpose in
the phase of investigating prospective partners is to determine the equilibrium between the
desired expectations from a partnership and the potential of a future partner to fulfil these
prospects.
Whether an airline discloses its investigation of a prospective carrier's operation to it, depends
on the partnership-seeking carrier's strategy. The decision for an open or concealed
examination approach in relation to a prospective partner, lies primarily in the competitive
environment and whether or not the airlines had previous business links. Nevertheless, it is
more common to conduct this very first stage of partnership formation in a concealed manner.
5.3.2 Partner Suitability and Selection Based on Fitness Categories
A final choice of a prospective partner is based on the investigation and pre-selection process.
It is usually at this late point that a partnership-seeker discloses its intentions to enter into
negotiations on a collaborative agreement to a prospective ally. However, evaluation of the
prospective partner is not yet completed. It has indeed moved beyond the phase of testing
compatibility on historical grounds, but now enters a stage of intensified critical scrutiny of
the partner's soft and less tangible facts, unpublicised information and constraints under
which the ally might be operating (see Berardino and Frankel, Alliances: The Next Step,
1998, p. 68). The aim is to evaluate - in due diligence processes - whether the partners
mutually suit each other, which ultimately enhances the effectiveness of the partnership that
may lie ahead.
Partnership suitability, based on relatedness, is often clustered into partner fits or partner
match, which describe mutual understandings in specific fields, or the overlap of partnership
scope (see Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993, p. 34, Rodermann, 1995, p. 255, Khanna, 1998). The
most important of these fields are summarised in the following paragraphs and can serve as a
guideline for due diligence and audit processes (for partnership due diligence, see Zhang,
1998 and Applegate, 1998, p. 52 and chapter 6 for audits).
5.3.2.1 Fundamental Fitness
Partner evaluation of fundamental fitness reveals the results of partner investigation and
entails further partnership suitability criteria. Fundamental fit considerations contain issues
related to the business environment and behavioural aspects. As part of these considerations,
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the partnership-seeker has to evaluate whether the desired collaborative advantages are to be
achieved with a pre-selected partner in a specific market and in a certain time frame.
Alliances generate synergies once they manage to combine strengths by eliminating
weaknesses. This complementary strengths/weaknesses profile equips associated airlines with
a wide range of possibilities with which to increase the value of their companies. A potential
partner has to be assessed with regard to its possible contribution to the success of the
partnership. Ideally, the partners must qualitatively contribute equally to the overall
partnership objectives through their specific business strengths (see Bleeke and Ernst, 1995,
p. 99 and Klein, 1996, p. 15). The staff, labour relations, management, financial situation, and
organisational set-up of the partnering firms must fundamentally make a sustainable
contribution to the collaboration. Furthermore, more detailed information on the airline's
product portfolio and marketing organisation (including FFPs and CRSs) as well as brand
issues must be gathered and evaluated. In a first step, fundamental fitness must prove the
appropriateness of these areas for a possibly successful collaboration.
Risks emanating from the partnership have to be determined in the light of their implications
for the planned collaboration and the individual firms. These risks may lie in a potentially
aggravating competitive position due to partnership-efficiency- and effectiveness-harming
market action and regulatory hurdles (see also chapter 4.5 on critical issues and opposition to
airline collaboration). Particularly rivals' legal and competitive actions in defence of their
market position, and other, infrastructure-restraining reprisals are almost the norm for airline
Partnerships. The case of American Airlines and British Airways has, for example, shown an
initial lack of fundamental fitness because regulatory opposition as well as industry-wide
disagreement has impeded the partnership formation process.
The partnership-seeker has to assess whether the collaboration will create a loyal partner or
eventually, after termination, a new competitor. Predictions of this kind are usually hard to
make, however, and if applicable, the collaboration track record of the prospective partner can
serve as a certain rule of thumb for an evaluation. Additionally, the evaluation process must
examine the management's experience with collaborations and their distinct behaviour in
partnership situations.
Essentially, fundamental suitability entails the question of whether the airlines involved
Would discretely or jointly be more successful. Balanced power positions, often claimed to be
a key factor of successful partnerships, should however, be questioned generally and with
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specific regard to the airline industry (for power imbalances, see Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993,
p. 34 and Bleeke and Ernst, 1995, p. 99). Especially the above-described configuration
consisting of multilateral partnerships with senior and junior partners, substantiate size-driven
power imbalances. These imbalances are an unquestionable fact of alliance building and must
be included in the exploration of fundamental partner fitness.
Personal relationship is rightfully mentioned as an integral part of fundamental fitness. The
initial establishment of a successful partnership depends on the creation and maintenance of
comfortable relationships between executives of the future partners (see Moss Kanter, 1994,
p. 99). If chemistry is absent, if personal and social interests between decision-makers cannot
be shared, fundamental fitness is at stake.
Ideally, macro-economical and environmental considerations also form part of fundamental
partner fitness, since the nature of the environment and the interorganisational context
exercises an influence over the development of an alliance. The political and/or ownership
relationship between a future partner and its host government can have an impact on the
progress. In the case of the KLMlAlitalia virtual merger, the slow privatisation process has -
at least partly - lead to the termination of the partnership. Similarly, this applies to the position
an airline has in a corporate super-structure. In this case, fundamental fit criteria have to be
applied to the parentlholding company as wei 1.92
Regulatory considerations also form a mandatory part of partner fit evaluation. The existence
of partnership-supporting traffic rights and air service agreements has a strong impact on the
establishment and evolution of airline collaborations. However, in some cases, governments
only allow carriers of their country to co-operate with airlines complying with the defined
I
requirements. The US DOT, for example, only approves codesharing partnerships between
US and foreign carriers once they have proven that the agreement is in the public interest, and
that a pre-determined level of safety is met (see United States Department of Transportation,
Code-share Safety Program Guidelines, 2000). Nevertheless, it is not only risks that are
associated with regulatory fit considerations. In a more liberalised environment, the
emergence of progressive market principles can imply new, profitable partnership
development options to be covered by fit observances.
92 This, for example, applies to the case of the Swissair Group. While Swissair itself was an economically viable
carrier, its holding, Swissair Group ran into serious financial problems due to its expansion and portfolio
strategy. The bankruptcy of the holding lead to a chain reaction ending with Swissair's demise and the
mentioned problems for the Qualif1yer Group of carriers (see Buerkle and Smith, 2002).
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5.3.2.2 Strategic Fitness
It is widely acknowledged that the concurrence of partnering firms' strategic goals is the
central success criterium. This complementary orientation towards a common collaborative
long-term target forms the core part of strategic fitness - and, moreover, means the pursuit of
an alliance strategy. Strategic fitness ultimately helps to prevent partners in a collaborative
venture from behaving opportunistically and destructively while they optimally pursue
congruent objectives. Strategic fitness can thus also be seen as an imperative for airlines' co-
evolution in partnerships. The ensuing paragraphs illustrate the most prominent strategic
fitness criteria.
5.3.2.2.1 General Strategy Fitness Criteria
Business planning and strategic goals should be openly discussed among potential airline
partners and reviewed as part of the strategic fit evaluation process. Ideally, the possibility of
a comprehensive harmonisation of planning issues in the respective collaborative areas must
be envisaged between the allies. Niche collisions, i.e. the result of separate deals producing
untenable overlap between co-operation and competition, should a priori be ruled out (see
Perlmutter and Heenan, 1986, p. 142).
There has to be a common understanding of mutual benefits with advantages and
disadvantages, yield returns, gains and losses to be mutually divided (see Bleeke et al., 1992,
p. 120 and Klein, 1996, p. 15). Partnering airlines should have similar or complementary
endowments and developmental orientations in terms of market positions, competitive
capabilities and strategy. The partnership-seeker ideally assesses itself and the proposed
relationship from the prospective partner's perspective. The determination should lead to a
clarification of the potential advantages the future partnering airline sees in the partnership
(see Devlin and Bleackley, 1988, p. 21).
It is seen as a key prerequisite for alliance success that comprehension of the alliance's
payoffs is crucial to the understanding of the fundamental incentives to co-operate (see
Parkhe, 1993 and Gulati et aI., 1994, p. 61). A mutual orientation in planning issues not only
suppresses the tendency towards opportunistic behaviour, and hence the need for further
safeguards, but also provides an opportunity for airlines to jointly earn greater rents (see
Madhok and Tallman, 1998, pp. 330-331). The competitive significance of a win-win
situation developing from complementary resource allocation should thus be explored. Before
mutual benefits in airline partnerships can be realised, carriers must demonstrate to each other
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that they are fully committed to the alliance. Without this fundamental demonstration of
mutual trust, the alliance will not have the resilience to cope with start-up frustrations,
inevitable setbacks and changes in the external conditions. The foundation of mutual
commitment is the recognition by each partner that the ally brings assets and capabilities that
will enable the airline partnership to accomplish what neither can do alone. To lay the
foundation for the development of an alliance strategy that is consistent with the individual
partner's strategies, each partner must be willing to share strategic information such as cost
data, market intelligence and facts on future schedules (see Berardino and Frankel, Alliances:
The Next Step, 1998, p. 68). This is seen as an early test of trust and commitment and
ultimately a sign of strategic fitness (see Walters et al., 1994, p. 7).
A consensus on possible forms and instruments of the collaborative agreements and their
developments should be evaluated. In addition, and as indicated earlier, airline partnerships,
starting out with a critical partnership mass, often follow trial and discrete stages of co-
operation formation and advancement. Agreements should be reached on the general direction
and the perceived intensity in developing airline partnerships. Differing ideas on how
intensive individual partnership contributions have to be, can lead to asymmetric resource
input (see Bleicher, 1992, p. 272). It is important to evaluate compatibility with regard to
contribution bundling of the value chains prior to establishing a partnership. The quest for
strategic fitness must scrutinise each envisaged value chain collaboration aspect, as well as to
which extent the partnership goals can be strategically reached.
Different forms and instruments classically mirror the motivators of each partner for entering
the collaboration. It is thus of highest concern to thoroughly determine and accommodate the
underlying motivations for entering a partnership. Taking time to understand the future
partner's real strategic strengths and weaknesses is important for the evaluation process.
Superficial similarities or complementary features can be misleading. This is why it is
essential to make an effort to realise the partner's motivations for collaborating.
Closely linked to considerations of forms and instruments of the partnership is compatibility
concerning organisational systems with which to manage and stabilise the partnership (see
Bleicher, 1992, p. 276 and Gomes-Casseres, 1998, p. 6). Airlines have often entered
partnerships in the past without appropriate managerial structures to cope with the demands of
maintenance, conflict resolution and the innovative improvements of the collaboration. With
carriers increasingly being members of alliances, the existence of such structures can be
assumed and must be a requirement of strategic fitness. The consideration of the potential
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partner's organisational and management structures and decision-making processes is of key
importance.
Power as one factor of fundamental fitness has been mentioned above. Set against the
background of forms and instruments as well as value chain connectedness, the development
of power constellations in a partnership must receive great attention. Even if power is, or
should be, balanced at the outset of the partnership, strengths may change over time, creating
a shift and leading to unanticipated configurations. The assumption of managerial tasks, the
contribution of key functions and balance of learning and teaching in a partnership can
strategically impact on the power equilibrium (see Bleeke and Ernst, 1995, p. 99). Austrian
Airlines and Swissair once were equal partners in the Qualiflyer Group of Airlines. However,
opportunistic behaviour and different corporate strategies shifted power towards Swissair
which, among other issues, lead to the termination of the partnership. Power developments
thus should be strategically anticipated to avoid future conflict.
A strategic fit process should also scrutinise the status quo of the prospective partner to
deduce a strategic and sustainable aptitude for collaboration. Based on information collected
during the identification phase, financial capabilities, dividend and re-investment. strategies,
employment policies, compensation programmes, hiring strategies, profit and growth
orientation and financial and accounting practices should be scrutinised and critically
reviewed in the light of the partnership objectives. Convergence should additionally be
achieved in key success factor areas such as service quality, safety, image and branding as
well as technical competence (see Youssef and Hansen, 1994, p. 418).
The time scale of the collaborative agreement is very important. Airline partnerships, III
particular with regard to the changing regulatory environment, are not necessarily perpetual
business ventures. An initial idea and possibly an understanding of the individual time
horizons of the co-operation and the occurrence of payoffs should be reached. Joint business
ventures regularly lack commonly agreed and formulated quantitative and qualitative
partnership goals. Accords reflecting the individual expectations regarding the temporal
OCcurrence of partnership returns should be reached to avoid disappointment (see Dacin and
Hitt, 1997, p. 3).
Standing out from the narrower definition of strategic issues, but yet part of its managerial
and strategic fit implications, is partnership trust. While trust is often argued to be manageable
in situ, it must also be judged as a key compatibility component prior to entering a
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partnership. Three common elements of trust are uncertainty, vulnerability, and control. The
greater the uncertainty surrounding future events, the greater the trust required in reassuring
partners of mutually adaptive behaviours in response to unknown future circumstances. This
future-oriented view supports the notion that trust has to be determined and established at the
outset of a partnership. With global airline networks still being in a partnership building
phase, the anticipation of future developments affecting prospective partners is a key strategic
fit. Vulnerability describes the loss potential in a partnership. The greater the potential loss by
opportunistically exploiting opportunities in an alliance, the greater the trust required. Loss
potential, however, hinges around the depth and width of integration in partnerships. A mere
block space agreement surely comprises far less loss potential than a partnership
incorporating common branding strategies. The third element involves control. The lower the
control exercised by one alliance partner over its allies, the greater the trust required from that
partner (see Parkhe, 1998, Understanding Trust in International Alliances, p. 220).
In summary some of the key general strategic fit criteria to be evaluated are:
• Mutual pay-off/benefits
• Forms and instruments of collaboration
• Underlying motivators
• Managerial structures
• Power status quo and development
• Partner's aptitude to collaborate and to co-evolve
• Time scale/duration of collaboration and materialisation of benefits
• Trust
5.3.2.2.2 Network and Hub Compatibility Fitness Patterns
Before entering a partnership, the assessment of the prospective ally's traffic network is
strategically vital. Analysis of the status quo of the traffic system and the traffic figures'" has
to be carried out with reference to network opportunities relating to the medium- to long-term
network development as well.
Network complementarity is a fundamental component of partnership fitness. Whether airline
partnerships envisage covering local, regional, international or intercontinental markets,
93 Traffic figures analysis with regard to network compatibility can, for example, include the prospective
partner's local and international point-to-point traffic and connecting traffic with specific reference to traffic in
competition to the partnership-seeker's own network.
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individual networks to be merged should always emphasise different geographic zones.
Especially in multilateral airline groupings, little or no overlapping route networks result in
less friction among partners. The example of Singapore Airlines and Thai Airways, both
members of the Star Alliance and serving similar regional markets, has shown overlapping
networks of individual carriers in global groupings to be the source of constant member
irritation. However, similar network structures can also be beneficial in partnerships, provided
that one carrier operates from a hub which holds growth capacities. In this case, the basic
objective would thus not be market entry, but rather further penetration to achieve additional
frequencies and feeder, as well as defeeder services (see Steininger, 1999, p. 244).
The choice of a prospective partner in a different region or continent for market
entry/penetration purposes is directly linked to the choice of the partner's hub. Hubs form
strategic gateways to the partnership networks and to un- or under-served markets. The
location and size of the hub hereby plays an important role. As a key prerequisite and fitness
criteria, partnership airlines' hubs or operating airports should ideally be situated far from
each other to avoid inter-partnership competition and cannibalisation. Hubs of partner carriers
should incorporate a large enough market and should be situated in regions with sufficient
growth potential - preferably business centres or tourist attractions. Growth potential should
also apply to the hub airport itself, which in turn is determined by the regulatory framework
(national as well as bi- and multilateral) and other, local political, infrastructure and
environmental concerns.
The size of an airline's hub operation is directly related to the size of its feeder network. Hubs
serving as strategic gateways for global networks require a sufficiently measured traffic
catchment area and a well-sized feeder network to take advantage of density effects. Density
effects, on the other hand, require slot and gate availability, especially at capacity constrained
airports, which then lead to a disproportionate execution of market power - the above-
described hub premiums (see Berardino and Frankel, Keeping Score, 1998, p. 83). Hub-
generated market power should be further audited for partnership fitness with regard to
marketing advantages that also lie in the field of economies of information through agency
and corporate loyalty programmes.
The quality and attractiveness of a prospective partner's main airport or hub play~ another
role in evaluating strategic partnership fitness. Transfer passengers enjoy entertainment,
shopping and waiting facilities. Business travellers prefer proximity to business centres and
possibly business facilities on-site. Well-established intermodal traffic connections, parking
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facilities for individual transport, high standards of safety and security directly serve the
passengers' core needs. Technical issues, such as ground handling as well as air traffic
control, should also be considered while assessing an airline's partnership compatibility.
In summary, hub and network evaluation should ideally include the following aspects:
•
Network and hub status quo
Network overlap or complementarity
Network development opportunities
•
•
5.3.2.3 Cultural Fitness
Cultural fitness is increasingly discussed as one of the most important single success aspects
of intercultural business partnerships (see Perlmutter and Heenan, 1986, p. 146, Bleicher,
1992, pp. 281-285, Lorange and Roos, 1992, p. 353, Ensign, 1998, p. 665). This notion
largely originates from empirical evidence suggesting that cultural mismatch or monocultural
settings lead to partnership difficulties and ultimately to failure (see Harrigan, 1988, p. 225,
Bittner, 1996).
In this context, culture entails business and corporate cultural aspects, which are largely based
on ethnic and societal cultural traits, styles and values. Corporate culture evolves from a
firm's previous experiences with transactions and interactions with the environment as well as
from its individual business' cultures. Staff contributes to the ethnic and societal component
of corporate culture simply through their individual cultural backgrounds and the way they
socially interact (see Breuer, 1994, pp. 62-63 and Podsiadlowski, 1998, pp. 196-198). The
SwissairlSAA equity and codeshare partnership exemplary summarised the cultural
challenges to be met by airline partnerships, whereby the Swiss, an entirely privatised carrier,
entered into a reasonably close relationship with an African, fully state-owned airline.
94
The airline industry in its current phase of becoming more globalised through partnership
building, is in particular affected by the need for cultural fitness (see Bissessur and Alamdari,
1998, p. 331). Flag carriers advertising national identities very specifically require a cultural
fitness evaluation when entering into culturally distant interairline partnerships (for cultural
distance and co-operation implications, see Park and Ungson, 1997). Cultural compatibility
should thus be envisaged.
94 The two carriers' relationship was dissolved in February 2002 due to Swiss Airlines' insolvency. ~
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Cultural compatibility in airline partnerships basically describes the allies' willingness to
accept the counterparts' cultures in order for the collaboration to endure successfully. Factors
originating from cultural fitness in particular are the adaptability of goals and strategies,
enhanced communication and adequacy in judging the partner's behaviour (see Bruch, 1998,
pp. 178-179). In partial summary of these factors, trust can also be a consequence of cultural
fitness as it allows the growth of confidence in the partner's action. Building trust may be
harder when cultures are highly dissimilar, since homogeneous expectations and shared
assumptions about the partnership may not readily exist." However, the greater the similarity
of societal and corporate cultures, the greater the knowledge of and familiarity with the airline
partner's modes of thinking and behaving may be, hence the greater the comfort level and the
lower the learning cost and time.
Most ideally, cultures should assimilate in order to create a new, common business culture.
However, the majority of collaborative agreements in the airline industry do not allow for this
intense form of culture transformation. This can have several causes. Often, partnership
intensity does not require nor support assimilated cultures. Where only operationally,
functionally or geographically limited parts of the value chain are affected by the partnership,
entire business cultures must not be assimilated.
So far, many airline partnerships that have identified the requirements of cultural fitness,
however, have opted for less drastic approaches to deal with individual cultures. Pluralism is
seen as an option to handle the challenges of different cultures." The aim is cultural
coexistence, but taking a constant adaptation process into consideration. Carriers must
therefore endeavour to establish a compatible system of common values and governance
styles, in particular in the light of ethnic cultures and national identities (see Bronder and
Pritzl, 1991, p. 50 and Perlmutter and Heenan, 1986, p. 146). The evaluation of cultural
fitness must scrutinise the applicability of compatible cultural systems and understand the
strengths and weaknesses of the partners' cultures in order to fend off conflict.
Among senior staff of both parties and those employees directly dealing with partnership
issues, cultural fitness often presupposes a consensus in the ways of doing business. The most
95 This context is also used to classify possible trust in business relationships based on societal cultures (see
Parkhe, Understanding Trust in International Alliances, 1998 and Parkhe, Building Trust in International
Alliances, 1998, p. 424).
96 Other reactions to corporate cultural differences, besides assimilation and pluralism, can be culture take-over,
Subculture split, and culture resistance (see Bleicher, 1992, p. 283 and Schmidt, 1993, p. 79).
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often cited reason for inadequate cultural fitness is insufficient means to integrate differing
societal and ethnic cultures, both at senior management level and at the front line. Cultural
evaluation processes must thus entail due diligence on human capital. The merger between
Air Canada and Canadian Airlines - although culturally extremely close - was preceded by a
comprehensive assessment of the Canadian Airlines officer corps (see Bell, 2000, p. 106). As
indicated before, whether cultures should be assimilated or remain plural, depends on the
intensity of the collaboration. However, human traits, styles and values as the bearers of
corporate culture should be thoroughly scrutinised in order to understand, learn and accept the
counterpart's culture and, ultimately, to mitigate risk (see Podsiadlowski, 1998).
5.4 Final Choice and Configuration of Airline Partnerships
Once the above-described fitness areas have lead to a positive result for one or the other
partner, the selection process is complete. As the evaluation of partnership fitness is usually a
bilateral process between prospective partners, the sequence of events to the final choice and
the contractual fixation of the partnership is an evolutionary process. This final evolution
towards partnership formation is usually strongly supported by interdisciplinary due diligence
and auditing tasks, which need to be co-ordinated and comprise one of the last steps towards
partnership formation (see Zhang, 1998, p. 57). The next step would thus entail agreements on
the configuration of the airline partnership.
In this context, the successful configuration of the airline partnership must most importantly
reflect the following issues:
• Co-operation motivation
• Partnership fits
The above-mentioned issues, which have been described intensively (see chapters 4.3.2 and
5.3.2), buttress the entire partnership configuration phase and must be carefully taken into
account. Neglect of these components can lead to mis-configuration, conflict and, ultimately,
the failure of the collaboration. Again, the structural configuration is directly related to basic
motivations for entering the partnership and partner fitness criteria, and must be mirrored by
the co-ordination of partnership due diligence or audit processes.
Principally, key success factors for the sustainability of the competitive advantage of the
structural configuration of interfirm partnerships are as follows (see Day, 1995, pp. 298-299):
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• Durability and not vulnerability of the partnership configuration to rapid depreciation or
obsolescence because of the pace of technological change, shifts in passengers'
requirements and the changing regulatory environment.
• Barriers of casual ambiguity for competitors in comprehending how collaborative
advantages are achieved. These barriers mainly lie in the tacit and explicit knowledge of
alliances, the culture and support processes that cannot directly be observed or emulated
from the outside.
• Deterrence of duplication of partnership building. Early adopters or first movers in
partnership formation build up a significant structural, managerial and organisational
know-how and are thus sought-after candidates for other partnerships. Lagging firms who
attempt to emulate the first mover's advantage are forced to approach less desirable
partners.
These structural key success factors should be applied to the below-mentioned areas.
5.4.1 Collaborative Forms and Instruments
Careful consideration has to be given to the choice of forms and instruments and thus the
delivery mechanisms of airline partnerships. Many modes of airline partnerships that need to
be applied to satisfy the varying individual needs of airline collaboration have been described
above (see chapter 4.4). These needs originate from the basic motivations for establishing
horizontal partnerships and are further characterised by the partner-investigation process and
the partnership fitness audit. A description of the range of possibilities of different partnership
mechanisms based on motivational aspects would be extensive and complex, given the
multitude of individual collaborative objectives. However, some key thoughts with regard to
the most gainful application of collaborative measures need to be mentioned.
The decision for or against a specific form and instrument of airline collaboration should
follow a sequence of events. After the recognition and definition of motivators for
collaboration, the above-described succession of choice and scrutiny of partners should be
employed. The decision regarding the most promising modes of interairline collaboration
should ideally be based on the outcome of these considerations. However, in most partnership
formation processes the alignment of forms and instruments of collaboration with the ally's
capabilities and partnership fitness seems to be ignored. A pre-defined goal, i.e. partnership
objective, is often linked to a precise idea of the collaborative measure. An airline seeking a
behind-gateway codeshare partner to enter a specific market, is certainly a viable objective. In
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the process of partnership formation based on this motivation, one step of the sequence of
events must always be embraced: the exact form of airline collaboration has to be tied to the
partner's individual suitability. In recent years, many interairline partnerships have caused
internal friction, because of the absence of basic suitability. Passengers thus did not welcome
codesharing agreements, because of different service standards. Basic safety levels could not
be met, or unanticipated cultural hurdles lead to disturbances. Only if the partner's
endowments of the above-mentioned kind support the establishment of a specific
collaborative form or instrument, success is at least partly guaranteed.
The aspect of partnership suitability as a prerequisite for the choice of appropriate partnership
instruments and forms is closely related to collaborative uniformity. A further condition for
successfully choosing forms and instruments of airline collaboration is thus for partners to act
as uniformly as possible in their respective collaboration areas. Airline partners must take
their combined assets and deploy them ultimately, subject to whatever constraints they face.
Even though the partnership is geographically and functionally limited, resources must be
fully and unchangingly deployed within this limitation. Uniform behaviour may, however,
face hurdles and the issues are not abstract. Each partner embarks on an alliance with a
community of diverse stakeholders, such as passengers, personnel, investors/stockholders and
other parties whose interests need to be represented, and who have been given certain
promises. However, collaborative action means for partners to ideally give up selected
individual procedures in favour of alliance procedures - thus potentially creating friction with
interest groups. The action partnerships want to take, may even be at the expense of a
particular partner or stakeholder and some of these actions may not be easily reversible (see
also Dresner and Windle, 1996. pp. 207-210). For example, one carrier in a multilateral
I
partnership may be asked to stop serving a particular city pair. Once it leaves the market,
provides less or no passenger convenience, releases airport slots and its station personnel, and
stops selling in the local market, its presence is lost and its opportunity may not be easily
recoverable - at least at an economic price. This partnership move might, however, serve the
collective overall partnership's purpose and thus be mutually beneficial.
Collaborative forms and instruments must ideally represent comparative advantages for the
allied carriers. It is not enough to enter a market to increase share by way of horizontal
collaboration, it is furthermore imperative to achieve a leading position vis-a-vis other rivals
operating in this market. Marketing tools such as joint sales, common or reciprocally accepted
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FFP, unique service concepts and network configurations, can leverage the partners' positions
in the marketplace, increase entry barriers and deter duplication.
Managerial, operational/commercial and legal conditions must finally support the decision for
collaborative instruments and forms to create an environment that brings to fruition the
benefits of the collaboration. The legal background must outfit all partners with the incentives
to behave collaboratively and to the highest benefits of the partnership.
5.4.2 Market and Hierarchical Airline Relationships
Generally, a distinction between two different broad forms of collaborative company set-ups
is feasible. One is non-equity co-operation and the other form are equity partnerships up to the
point of concentration as indicated by figure 4.1.
There is no particular evidence as to which alliance set-up provides the most collaborative
benefits. Some scholars and practitioners regard financial ties as the cement of a relationship.
In equity partnerships, partners are more committed to each other, interests are more easily
harmonised, and exit barriers, as well as loss potential are too high to discontinue the
collaborative agreement. Execution of control through fmancial links in complex, highly
integrative collaborations is consequently argued to be the only mode with which to discipline
key partnership resources and avoid opportunistic behaviour (see Schmidt, 1993, p. 63).
Financial interest is argued to lead to board level commitment, securing the implementation of
mechanisms that safeguard the benefits of the alliance (see Lindquist, 1996, p. 12).
Privatisation of airlines and their search for collaborative agreements is often linked to capital
investments. The benefits are two-sided. Governmental owners see the share to be purchased
as an entry fee into a partnership and a first step towards further privatisation and a possible
merger, while the financier's idea of the investment is to enhance the partnership
compatibility of the privati sed carrier. This example is highly applicable to the 20% stake
Swissair bought as a first phase of South African Airways' privatisation.
Contestants of equity stakes between airline partners question whether collaborative interests
can be harmonised more easily (see Nuutinen, 1997, p. 9). Unilateral capital linkages
potentially hold the danger of perceived power imbalances, which can destabilise the
partnership. Furthermore, under the current regulatory and bilateral regime, the holding of
majority cross-border investments in carriers is largely not permitted. In turn, minority stakes
may not result in the desired entrepreneurial influence on the partnering carrier. Opponents of
capital linkages additionally argue that the gluing effect of equity investments is diluted by
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the possibility to easily divest from shares on capital markets. These views support the notion
that in the current legislative environment capital linkages do not have the potential to
stabilise collaborations in a sustainable manner.
Examples of the success and failure of both set-ups are multifarious. Whether Singapore
Airline's investment in Virgin Atlantic and Air New Zealand", or British Airways' equity
partnership with Qantas lead to sustainable alliance success is difficult to attest. On the other
hand, KLM and Northwest's financial ties were dissolved and so was the partnership between
British Airways and US Air (for KLM and Northwest's history of capital links, see Tully,
1996). Swissair's intensive partnership strategy through equity links proved to be a failure to
the extent that the entire Swissair Group was in jeopardy even before the events of September
11th, 2001. As a matter of fact, equity investments in strategic partners increase in a
disproportionate manner as opposed to overall partnership building (see table 4.1: Airline
Alliance Summary). This suggests that the majority of airlines do not see equity investments
as a key requirement to successful partnerships.
On the other hand, the prospects of further liberalisation of ownership rules and the probable
consolidation of global aviation may support strategies involving equity linkages. The overall
claim of using the current development stage of "competition of groups" (see 2.3.3) as a
springboard for entering a "competition of mergers" might be a good reason to become
financially involved in a horizontal orientation.
5.4.3 Structural Configuration Requirements for Unequally-sized Carriers
Collaboration between smaller, regional carriers and larger airlines are much desired, but pose
mutual risk, and this is why certain principles have to be taken into consideration.
While in partnership with a larger trunk carrier, a small carrier has to be immensely alert. The
reduction of the junior partner to a mere subsidiary of the large counterpart, with little own
competencies and control is a fact of airline partnership building but, for obvious reasons, has
to be avoided. The business power wielded by the larger partner may result in the destruction
of the junior partner's corporate culture, its business self-confidence and its entrepreneurial
spirit. Particularly low-cost, niche market carriers have developed distinct corporate values
and styles that serve as central drivers for their continuous development and advancement.
97 Singapore Airlines' investment in Air New Zealand (ANZ) involved a write-off due to the collapse of ANZ's
subsidiary, Ansett Australia, and subsequent government recapitalisation.
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These soft factors are important motivational aspects and champion employee commitment
(see Freiberg, 1997, p. 171). In turn, it is especially these distinct features that larger carriers
seek in allying with smaller counterparts. Southwest Airlines, for example, rigorously
shunned entering into any agreement with a larger carrier, as it saw its corporate philosophy
being at risk. In the case of a non-equity partnership, and where no brand or other integration
is envisaged, both partners have to ensure that the smaller partner's business self-confidence
and independent corporate characteristics remain intact by all means possible.
It is widely known that smaller regional carriers operate at lower unit costs than their larger
counterparts, which is one of the reasons why they are able to serve routes that are
unattractive to larger airlines (see Barton et al., 1994, p. 31 and Doganis, 2001, pp. 126-162).
However, regional carriers might, from their comfortable position of being allied with a trunk
carrier, neglect their own cost management. Since their cost-effective operation is one key
incentive for a trunk carrier to enter into an alliance, carelessness with this attribute has to be
avoided. Possible means of doing so are detailed contracts with specifications regarding
organisational standards and controlling mechanisms safeguarding sustainable cost discipline.
Incumbents are often required to collaborate with a number of smaller carriers to gain access
to various low volume markets. It is important to stimulate partnership-wide competition
between these carriers, even though they operate in different geographical regions. Inducing
competition among junior partners enhances the negotiation position of incumbents and
increases efficiency of the small carriers. Incumbents should, moreover, influence their junior
partners in such a way that they defend their home market or gain a competitor's share and
feed it into the network of the allied carrier. This essentially means that a regional carrier
should ideally operate exclusively for its senior partner and to avoid passengers being lured
from the home market into the competitor's market. If a regional carrier does feed traffic to a
competitor's hub, it needs to be guaranteed that the feeder traffic does not offer attractive
interline connections to a competitor's long haul flights that are in direct competition with the
partner's flights on these routes'" (see Steininger, 1999, p. 232 and example ibid.).
However, a limited number of smaller carriers are in a reverse competitive and negotiation
position. British Midland, for example, being a medium-sized airline with revenue of
approximately USD 1 billion, controls a significant number of peak-time slots at Heathrow
98 Eurowings, now a Lufthansa ally, had been feeding traffic into Air France and KLM's networks, but
discontinued this in the light of its alliance with LH.
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airport (see N/A, Airline Rankings - Financials, 2000, p. 72 and Feldman, Code-sharing
Promiscuity Pays, 1997). This asset obviously leaves the carrier vulnerable and brands it as an
attractive partner for airline collaborations. Larger carriers thus have to consider the asset-
based strength of British Midland in their partnership negotiation and configuration process.
Therefore, exclusivity speculation has to be surrendered in lieu of more market access
motivation. This applies to the South African market as well. While both the competing
Lufthansa and Swissair have partnership agreements with the local SAA, SAA's feeder
service supports directly contending intercontinental routings out of Johannesburg to
Frankfurt and Zurich.
5.4.4 Route Structure and Network Design
Network compatibility has been given detailed attention with reference to the strategic fitness
of partners, as network suitability is seen as an imperative at the outset of a partnership.
Individual partner's networks need to be adjusted to the overarching necessities of the
collaboration, while demands on network reconfiguration increase with the intensity of the
partnership. Partnering carriers in close co-operation should consequently realign their route
networks accordingly to take advantage of existing and potential benefits from the alliance.
The notion of networks as comparatively static constructs thus has to be given up in favour of
a concept of flexible routing adjustment processes within collaborative agreements (see
Dresner and Windle, 1996, p. 207-210). Whether individual networks are complementary or
overlapping, equal or differently sized, certain requirements regarding common network
design emanate from the status quo of the individual networks.
5.4.4.1 Overlapping Networks
I
Overlapping networks commonly occur when partners serve the same or similar national or
regional, as well as main international or intercontinental trunk routes.
Network redundancies have to be re-designed in a way that passengers can be offered an
attractive product and that other, cost- and revenue-oriented collaboration motivations can be
best achieved. Based on the assessment of the extent of network congruence, servicing of
overlapping routes has to be re-assigned to one partner, arranged in a revolving structure or, if
supported by passenger numbers, can be invariably operated by both or all partnering airlines.
Frequencies should ideally be adjusted, taking the availability of other flight equipment that
can be utilised, and guaranteeing highest load factors, into consideration. Specific attention
should also be paid to schedule issues, such as attractive timing of flights and quasi or real
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online connectivity within the banking structure. Fares of partnering offers are to be
harmonised and the distribution of the realigned network must ensure equal treatment of the
operating carrier.
The goal of these actions is to increase the attractiveness of the jointly offered air transport
service in order to avoid cannibalisation of the partners' offers. However, and especially at
capacity constrained airports, network harmonisation can lead to confrontations regarding the
allocation or distribution of key assets, such as slots and gate space. A carrier withdrawing
from its slots in favour of a partnering airline should most ideally receive compensation either
in the form of other routings, or by an allowance from the profits from the formerly served
destination. However, agreements of this kind should be precisely negotiated and
contractually fixed in order to avoid opposition or disappointment.
The effects on competition of joint network design are, however, evident. Partnership
alignment of formerly overlapping networks leads to drastic reduction, if not elimination, of
competition. Partners have to be aware of the negative effects that their co-ordinated
behaviour might have on consumer welfare, which could likely lead to action by competition
authorities. In the local German market, the partnership between Lufthansa and Eurowings
has sparked a response from the German cartel and competition surveillance authority,
Bundeskartellamt. The erstwhile competitors monopolised 4 domestic routings, adding to 66
out of 86 domestic markets served by Lufthansa without competition'" (see N/A,
Pressemeldung des Bundeskartellamtes vom 06.03.2001).
5.4.4.2 Complementary Networks and Multiple Connections
If the partners' networks are complementary - which is most desirable - a multiplitative
instead of a mere additive joint network structure must be aimed for. This integration effort
has to maximise (quasi) online connections offered by the partners. Online connections
should therefore be higher in number than the sum of the destinations served by each alliance
partner - a mathematical equation which can be accomplished by co-ordinated partnership hub
and spoke networks resulting in multiple hub structures (see Oum and Taylor, 1995, p. 25).
This goal might require the alliance carriers to alter their international route structures and
emphasise alliance hub-to-hub routes (see Dresner and Windle, 1996, pp. 207-210). Hubs and
99 In order for the partnership to be officially acknowledged, Lufthansa had to compensate another domestic
carrier with frequencies and marketing support.
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gateways can be affected by a partnership in such a way that an ally has to abandon its current
routing structure to serve new partners. This is usually only the case for smaller carriers.
However, the possibility of route adjustment in favour of partnership objectives is part of the
configuration process of complementary networks. Aer Lingus once hub bed through
Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport, feeding medium haul traffic into KLM's network. After the
decision to join Oneworld, Aer Lingus had to restructure its network and feed passengers into
British Airways' hub at London Heathrow (see Doganis, 2001, p. 220).
It is a complex task to align large carriers' collaborative complementary networks operating
their own hub structures, in order to build a continental or global network with multiple hubs.
The main objective is to offer a range of O&D online, or direct connections that can be served
more attractively by an alliance network than by individual carriers. Transfer traffic plays a
vital role in merging networks. Flights to a partner's hub should be scheduled in such a way
that they fit into the partner's banks of flights to ensure best possible connectivity (see Martin
et al., 1997, p. 57). Double connect markets are a principal focus point. These are O&D
connections between partners' non-hub airports and other non-hub airports via their
respective hubs. Lufthansa, for example, offers beyond-gateway codeshare flights from
Frankfurt to Bangkok and onwards on Thai Airways to Melbourne/Australia. Besides the
requirement of an efficient connection between the strategic partner gateways, such as short
total travel times, high seat capacities and high frequencies, sophisticated network
configuration in the Lufthansa/Thai Airways connecting market has to typically ensure:
•
Attractive departure timing in Frankfurt
Maximised online connectivity - little stopover wait time - for transferring passengers in
Bangkok to Melbourne
Schedule alignment and capacity allocation of Thai's Bangkok defeeder service for locally
or regionally connecting passengers originating in Frankfurt
Attractive scheduling and capacity allocation (compatible to its bank structure) of Thai's
feeder traffic with the intercontinental flight to Australia
Favourable scheduling of the outbound flight to Melbourne
Attractively scheduled and functioning defeeder services in Melbourne
•
•
•
•
The example demonstrates the various demands on network development in a multilateral
partnership, which are further complicated by time shifts and lags as well as infrastructure
constraints. New market development should consider these harmonisation challenges as well
as size, growth potential, passenger mix, and competitors in the O&D markets. On the basis
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of an evaluation of these factors, an alliance network must determine whether a specific
destination can offer all allied carriers a satisfactory outcome, or whether the connection
should be left to other partners or to competition. However, if traffic volumes in O&D
markets, satisfies the servicing via different partners' hubs, connecting traffic within a
partnership should be multilaterally synchronised (see Steininger, 1999, p. 265). This is, for
example, the case in Star Alliance's Frankfurt-Melbourne connection via Bangkok on Thai
Airways and Singapore on Singapore Airlines. Partnerships concentrating too much on single
and double connect markets, should, however, be cautious since new entrants might enter the
market and service these routes directly. On the other hand, connecting traffic might often be
the only way to compete in markets where direct O&D links are not feasible (see ter Kuile,
1997, p. 68). Partnership networks have to find a balance between these constraints and the
obvious challenges.
5.4.5 Contractual Design
Partnership contracts serve at least two purposes. They are firstly a contractual stipulation of
the terms and conditions of the partnership and, secondly, coercing the members to
intensively busy themselves with the details of the motivations and goals of the collaboration.
However, contracts per se do not guarantee alliance success. The eventual value of a
partnership contract depends on the original partnership fitness, which is partly based on the
individual objectives of the collaboration. Contractual design can certainly create a legal
environment supporting accurate collaborative behaviour, but it cannot cover an embedded
partnership mismatch and lack of objectives.
Contracts can be centrally negotiated and designed by the future partnership management
body or de-centrally by the departments involved in the co-operation. Core issues of a
partnership contract are:
•
The legal set-up and/or incorporation of the partnership
The stipulation of the goals of the partnership
Details of the temporal dimensions (total duration, target accomplishment)
An agreement on the exclusivity of the contract, i.e. exclusion of other, similar
collaborations within a certain geographical region or with particular competitors
The functional and proprietary stipulation of the dedication to the input production
factors, investments and services, human resources and skill areas that are to be
contributed by the partners (see Gahl, 1990, pp. 40-41)
•
•
•
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• The governance, management structure and instruments of co-ordination activities, such
as dispute resolution, reporting systems and collaborative working groups
• The allocation of benefits and other forms of compensation
• Details regarding the withdrawal of a partner and/or the dissolution of the partnership
A partnership should ideally have a limited duration, which needs to be specified in the
contract. It is most desirable to contractually fix long-term partnerships, as the length mirrors
the intentions, emphasises the commitment, and supports the stability of the alliance (see
Berardino and Frankel, Alliances: The Next Step, 1998, p. 71). As partners cannot be forced
to stay permanently in the partnership, and economic and environmental changes might call
for the termination of the collaboration, cancellation clauses with notice periods have to be
formulated. These clauses are not merely legal necessities, but additional tools with which to
establish partnership permanence and to avoid hasty termination. Notice periods thus have to
be well thought out. Periods of only some months do not warrant allies staying within a
partnership, as they do not represent a temporal sanction potential. Being aware of the
immanent dangers of short contract and notice periods, KLM and Northwest Airlines have
contractually fixed their joint operation at a 10-year period (see Nuutinen, 1997, p. 8). In
contrast, allies may desire swift dissolution as internal or external changes demand different
contractual terms, or a new composition of the partnership. These contrasting requirements of
stability through contract periods and the necessity for rapid escapes have to be well balanced
in the contractual design.
Another form of contractually induced stability derives from contract penalties. The claim to
established partnership longevity can be made once penalties or contingent claims are severe
enough to manifest a viable exit barrier for partners unilaterally cancelling or breaching the
contract, or to preclude ejection (see Berardino and Frankel, Alliances: The Next Step, 1998,
p. 71). Break-up fees are to be paid by the leaving ally to its partners as compensation for the
lost alliance opportunity. These are similar to contract penalties but they have a less
penalising character. Conversely, penalties can also be payable to carriers as a compensation
once they are asked to leave the partnership. Ejection penalties are additionally perceived to
stabilise airline partnerships, as they motivate enduring partnership composition. Legal
stipulations in the partnership agreement that inflict penalties for a lack of collegial behaviour,
or authorisation of violative behaviour, thus represent legal safeguards which, in tum, deter
opportunistic conduct (see Parkhe, Building Trust in International Alliances, 1998, p. 426).
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Nevertheless, the notion of sanctioning notice periods and contract penalties has to be
critically evaluated, especially in light of the sequence of events to be followed in establishing
an interairline partnership. Ideally, a dedicated organisational fitness and partnership
compatibility assessment should result in the selection of a viable and trusting partner, thus
not requiring any legal sanctions or penalties. However, the current status of legal stipulation
in airline partnership agreements proves that risks, mistrust and perceived inherent instability
associated with horizontal collaboration need to be overcome by contractual design.
In contrast to penalties and sanctions, partnership contracts should positively motivate the
stability and prosperity of the agreement. The incentives can be various and are closely linked
to the forms and instruments of the collaboration. KLM, for example, pays its partnering
regional and commuter carriers higher profit shares if they schedule their flights to
Amsterdam in a favourable way (see Steininger, 1999, p. 353).
Contractual design should also include modes to guarantee equitable terms between small and
large airlines in the partnership. Power imbalances might result in a constant threat to small
carriers to lose control as well as autonomy and economic potency to the bigger partner (see
Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993, p. 39). The larger partner can redress this by offering economic
support by means of operational and commercial aid. These stabilising features can include
possible loans, e.g., to purchase new equipment, or consulting support in areas such as
marketing and IT.
Contracts can never sufficiently stabilise an alliance on a long-term basis. Legal agreements
must decrease potential misunderstanding and consequent misbehaviour in a partnership, help
to build and increase trust and finally leave sufficient room for constant adjustment vis-a-vis
the changing market environment (see Hamel et al. 1989, p. 134).
5.5 Airline Collaboration Governance Structure
As the importance of partnerships has grown, so has the necessity for strong management
leadership, especially in balancing individual airline interests with the demands of global
alliance membership. The set-up of the partnership management organisation is essential to
delivering the promised value proposed by the partnership. This is because an alliance, in
contrast to a merger, does not provide unified decision-making authority, and the decision
processes are bound to get more complex in multilateral partnerships. The following sections
touch some key prerequisite issues of governance structures in interairline partnerships.
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5.5.1 General Configuration Characteristics
Organisational studies scrutinise the diversity of partnership structures within organisations
and view structure as a mechanism to manage uncertainty. Other research on contract choices
in alliances and the extent of management structures and the hierarchical controls they
embody, have been primarily influenced by the focus on appropriation concerns in alliances,
which originate from contracting hazards and behavioural uncertainty at the time of their
formation (see Gulati, 1998, p. 302 and Park and Ungson, 2001, p. 37).
The logic of hierarchical controls as a response to appropriation concerns is based on the
ability of such structures to assert control by authorisation, enable monitoring and align
incentives. The fact that an airline may have entered a wide array of partnerships also
suggests that it needs to simultaneously manage this portfolio and address conflicting
demands from different partners. Furthermore, if a carrier is at the centre of a network, it must
pay particular attention to a series of strategic and organisational issues. Developing such a
portfolio perspective on alliances merits further consideration especially since many carriers
are now located in an array of partnerships. In addition to this, other ex ante factors play an
important role in evaluating the appropriate set-up of governance structures. It is thus seen as
a key principle to successful partnerships to clearly define a strategy and assign
responsibilities to partnership collaboration management (see Walters et al., 1994, p. 7).
While organisational and partnership fitness as well as configuration deal with underlying
prerequisites for carrier partnerships, co-operation governance describes the organisation of
authority to develop, create, steer and control a collaboration in situ. Suitability evaluation
functions are preparatory tasks, however, they also represent managerial challenges that need
to be supported by appropriate structures. As a second sphere of collaboration governance -
the links to the partnering firm, and the development of the partnership - also needs to be
organised. Only once the connection to the collaborating partner follows organisational
principles, can the relationship capital be exploited and the partnership be successfully
advanced.
The organisational set-up of partnership management can typify various forms and differs
with the carriers' sizes, the instruments of collaboration and their depth, power asymmetries,
interdependencies and other ex ante factors. In some cases of horizontal airline collaboration,
no governance structures have been formalised and management and adjustments of the
partnership are made on an as-needed basis. Partnerships are declared to be at risk of
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becoming no more than a haphazard collection of firms with limited benefits for the
participants without a collective governance structure (see Gomes-Casseres, 1994, p. 66). A
dedicated partnership management function is seen to be a key prerequisite of successfully
governing collaborations. This dedicated function co-ordinates all partnership-related
activities within the organisation and is charged with institutionalising processes and systems
to improve knowledge management, increase external visibility, provide internal co-
ordination and eliminates both accountability problems and intervention problems (for
partnership knowledge management strategies, see e.g. Mowery et al., 1996, Inkpen, 1998,
Leibold et al., 2001). The success of alliance management has been empirically proven.
Enterprises with a dedicated partnership governance function achieve a 25% higher long-term
success rate than those firms without such a function (see Dyer et al., 2001, p. 38).
In summary, no specifically pre-defined set-up is necessarily a recipe for the gainful
organisation of managerial structures. Flexibility towards the challenges in all of the
partnership's life-cycle phases is a key requirement (see Spekman et al., 1998, p. 663).
Basically, a management model has to be chosen in which the possible benefit potential
surpasses the costs of increased conflict as well as complexity and therefore the costs of co-
ordination. An integral demand for a successful collaborative management organisation is to
find a division into internal - intra-firm - and external - interfirm - tasks, thus dealing with the
administration of preparatory and procedural roles.
5.5.2 Internal Management Organisation and Control
The internal organisation of partnership management varies with the size of the airline, the
extent of the partnership, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and the very strategic
importance horizontal partnerships are given as part of the airline's overall business. To
describe structures of collaboration management individually would thus be a task of
organisational sciences. At this point, some key aspects of internal collaboration management
are introduced, which can be generally applied to airline partnership management structures.
The most important internal organ is a co-operation steering committee (see Klein, 1996, p.
15, exemplary for Lufthansa's partnership governance). The steering committee defines goals
of the partnership, the general alliance strategy as well as the global positioning of a possible
network. Committal tasks thus form part of an airline's organisational fitness. Steering
committees can also be charged with creating manuals and guidelines with tools and
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templates to help to manage specific aspects of the partnership life-cycle.l'" While most
airlines have, as part or their corporate organisational structure, some form of corporate
development and network management department, the steering committee acts as a project
management device in preparing, and ultimately launching, a particular partnership.
Intra-firm line managerial and corporate supporting functions are thus co-ordinated and duties
are assigned. Markets to be entered into, or further developed by means of a partnership, are
scrutinised as well as prioritised and possible forms and instruments of co-operation are
discussed. This decision is based on marketing, operations, technology,-labour and regulatory
issues (see Spencer Stuart, 2001, p 81). With regard to market-related issues, some carriers
have appointed alliance management positions with a specific geographic focus. On the basis
of the steering committee's tasks, partners can be pre-selected. In a next step, suitability or
partnership fitness is scrutinised, also with the aid of further supporting functions. The
steering committee thus incorporates preparatory duties and devises further steps for
prospective interairline collaborations.
First talks on the partnership and a further assessment of the required partnership fitness are
usually performed by the executive boards of both carriers. The executive boards thus usually
discuss strategic issues and the negotiating parties determine further regulations and the
direction of their partnership. Supporting functions define configurational aspects and design
the partnership contract under the general supervision and guidance of the steering committee.
The steering committee's tasks after the contractual and operational completion of the
collaboration are to monitor the initial results and to report to the executive board. In 'many
cases, the steering committee dissolves shortly after the initial phase of partnership operation.
To constantly promote and advance partnership issues, an internal partnership management.
organisation serves as a knowledge pool and governance entity within an airline. While
steering committees regularly dissolve after having successfully established an alliance, a
permanent partnership management department needs be charged with capturing the tacit and
codified knowledge of partnership building, management and dissolution. Manuals prepared
by steering committees can be further refined, training programmes in alliance governance
issues, or platforms for internal networking among staff involved in the partnership can be
100 Such templates can, e.g., include guidelines for designing the business case for a partnership, a partner
evaluation form based on partner fitness, negotiation templates outlining the roles and responsibilities of
different departments, tools to measure partnership performance and a collaboration-termination checklist (see
Dyer et aI., 200 I, p. 39).
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proposed. Staff and line management should be given access to information on particular
issues, types of partnerships, or phases of partnership life-cycles in order to make appropriate
decisions. Internal co-ordination is another important task of inward partnership management.
This task would comprise requesting the resources necessary to support the airline's
partnership initiatives by having the organisational legitimacy to reach across divisions and
functions (see Dyer et aI., 2001, pp. 40-41).
Consistent partnership controlling is ideally performed by a dedicated organisational entity
embedded in the internal partnership management organisation and ultimately in the overall
airline management organisation. 101 This partnership controlling function incorporates
surveys on the income and costs of partnerships through benchmarking processes
incorporating both internal and external views and goals on the collaboration. In addition to
this financial evaluation, issues like franchise audits, security and safety standards audit,
airworthiness and customer service can form part of controlling processes. To achieve these
objectives, each co-operation ideally is equipped with business plans on the basis of the
economic, strategic, generally quantifiable and qualitative partnership goals, which are
compared with the actual situation. Additional information originating from the partnership
operation supplements the data requirements. According to plans and the discrepancy indexes
for achieved network, sales, quality and capital, success can be determined. Alliance
controlling is an important function and success factor and its results can be used as a basis
for decisions on further developments of the single partnership or multilateral extensions (see
Netzer, 1999, p. 226).
Figure 5.2 illustrates the functional delineation of alliance controlling.
101 Evidence suggest that 76% of all companies in a survey that form partnerships have some kind of formal
metrics in place to assess the partnership performance (see Dyer et al., 2001, p. 41).
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of interfirm partnership management is to provide a balanced communication and working
platform, to be flexible towards changes in the partnership and to allow for swift conflict
resolution. Co-ordinating strategic priorities among partners is another purpose of this
management organisation. A partner company's individual initiative, e.g., in establishing an
Internet-based distribution system, might be in conflict with the overall collaboration.
Partnership management must thus alleviate or solve conflicting strategic action among allies.
In addition, mechanisms for communicating which partnership initiatives are most important
to achieving the overall strategy need to be established (see Dyer et al., 2001, p. 41).
External management of multilateral partnerships and umbrella brand concepts are somewhat
more complex. In the case of the Star Alliance, an independent management companyl03 has
been jointly incorporated with distinct hierarchical structures. Corporate duties as well as line
management functions are individually assigned to committees, whereby the respective
function leaders are permanently delegated (see Feldman, Making Alliances Work, 1998, p.
30). The committees are generally recruited from members' managerial staff and/or from the
strategic business units. Depending on the importance of the functions, appointments can be
semi-permanent to permanent. The reasons for this set-up are obvious. Partners in alliances
want to participate actively and permanently in the process of production and allocation of the
partnership's benefits. Additionally, the conception of neutral, unbiased and non-
discriminatory partnership behaviour can best be realised by contributing individual mandates
in multilateral committees.
A further demand made on highly integrative partnerships is to ensure continuity in bonding
personnel responsible for the interface between the firms and the partnerships (see Gulati,
1998, p. 307). A salient operational challenge to this type of partnership management
I
organisation is, however, to remain flexible towards industry and cyclical changes and to have
structures and governance that allow for growth. The tasks of the committees differ according
to line managerial and corporate orientation. Whereas line management functions incorporate
duties that mirror core functions of the individual carriers, corporate functions are attributed
to the external partnership organisation as an autonomous business organism. The entire
organisation reports to a Chief Executive Board, or an Alliance Management Board, which
consist of top-level management from the partnering carriers.
103 Star Alliance Services GmbH with three core business units covering: products and service, commercial,
loyalty and marketing.
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Figure 5.3 describes the set-up of a typical internal as well as external alliance management
organisation from a single airline's perspective. The external organisation is mentioned in
regard of both bilateral and umbrella brand partnerships as they might occur simultaneously.
Figure 5.3: Partnership Management Organisation
I Internal Organisation Dependent External Organisation
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5.6 Airline Collaboration Safeguards - Selected Key Areas
Company co-operation is never automatic and thus must be structured to provide incentives
for performance. To protect against the hazards of opportunism, airline transactors may
employ a variety of safeguards. The purpose of safeguards - as control mechanisms to induce
the perception of fairness and equity - is to provide the control and trust necessary for allies to
believe that engaging in the partnership will give them a competitive edge (see Dyer, 1997, p.
537). Generally, safeguards can entail managerial issues, which have been described above,
but also configurational aspects, which are scrutinised below.
5.6.1 Trust and Avoidance of Opportunistic Behaviour
Trust has been repeatedly mentioned with reference to suitability criteria and the need for the
establishment of a partnership management organisation. The existence and degree of mutual
trust and understanding between allying parties are two of the key success factors of stable
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partnerships (see Lorange and Roos, 1991, p. 60, Hosmer, 1995, p. 379, Birnberg, 1998, pp.
421-428, Gulati, 1998, p. 307, Cullen et al., 2000). Trust has consequently been examined in a
wide variety of organisational and social settings and, accordingly, conceptualised in different
ways (for an overview, see Hosmer, 1995).
The role that trust plays, and the degree of trust required, vary with the orientation and the
type of the relationship as well as the individual people level. For a general comprehension of
trust in relational exchanges, it needs to be understood that trust is a human matter - because
individuals as members of organisations, rather than the organisations themselves, trust (see
Koza and Lewin, 1998, pp. 258-259, Zaheer et al., 1998, p. 124). To better appreciate this,
three common elements of trust definition can be considered (see Parkhe, Understanding
Trust in International Alliances, 1998).
The first element involves uncertainty. The greater uncertainty surrounding future events and
a partner's responses to those coming events, the greater the trust required. Trust plays the role
of reassuring partners of mutually adaptive behaviours in response to unknown future
circumstances (see Cullen et al., 2000, p. 225). The transitional status of the airline industry,
which is characterised by deregulation and consolidation as well as cyclical developments,
results in an unstable context for partnership-seekers and alliances. Certainty regarding future
developments cannot be achieved comprehensively. This is why managerial and
organisational structures in interairline partnerships need to establish supporting measures in
order to decrease uncertainty and to amplify trust.
The second element involves vulnerability (see also Hosmer, 1995, p. 390). The greater the
potential loss through a partnership, the greater the trust required. Highly integrative
partnerships, i.e. airline franchise agreements or umbrella brand/superbrand concepts,
represent large loss potentials for participating carriers. While high integration is seen as a
binding factor, it also obligates partnership trust in order to reach the desired collaborative
intensity. This trust to proceed jointly on a partnership route must be constituted prior to
entering a collaboration, as the perceived benefits will only surface once a partner believes in
a particular partnership structure. In this sense, trust lowers the perceived likelihood that
opportunities representing significant vulnerability will be exploited by an airline partner, and
it permits better sharing and greater specialisation of resources.
The third element involves control. The lower the control exercised by alliance partners over
others, the greater the trust required from the partners and vice versa. As a consequence,
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negotiations for control mechanisms are less costly under conditions of high inter-
organisational trust, because agreements are reached more quickly and easily as parties are
more readily able to arrive at a satisfying conclusion (see Zaheer et al., 1998, p. 125). If
partner control is not desired, or partnership discipline cannot be monitored, confidence in the
partners is indispensable. In contrast to hierarchical organisations, control in partnership
organisations is more difficult to execute. This is especially the case in standardised and
loosely collaborative forms and instruments. Simple codeshare agreements, or other
marketing and sales co-operations are easy and quick to implement, but difficult to control.
Demands to and challenges of adequate control increase with the intensity of the partnership
and the number of allies and might result in control gaps. However, in defiance of concepts
propagating trust as a substitute for control, this control gap needs to be filled by adequate
managerial solutions, of which some have been described above.
These elements lead to interrelated roles of trust in inter-organisational exchanges (see
Aulakh et al., 1997, p. 167). Trust can thus deter opportunistic behaviour, as confidence will
lead to partners passing up short-term individual gains in favour of the long-term partnership
interests. A second result of trust is its at least partially substituting effect on hierarchical
governance, when ownership-based control is not viable or economically feasible. The last
role of trust originating from the above, is its market performance and efficiency implications.
The preceding elements and roles characterise trust, but it remains to clarify how trust can be
generated. The forms of trust production in partnerships can be multifarious. Measures
generating trust can be classified into process-based trust, characteristic-based trust and
institutional-based trust (see Parkhe, Building Trust in International Alliances, 1998).
Process-based trust is founded on the consistency of an airline's past collaborative behaviours
and tends to generate expectations of predictability and an impression of trustworthiness (see
Aulakh et al., 1997, p. 168). A trust-producing mechanism that lies within an airline's
management control deals with meeting expectations of a continuing, mutually productive
relationship in the foreseeable future. These expectations of future profits and stable
relationships promote present co-operative behaviour and are positively related to the market
performance of the partnership. Long partnership contract periods can thus potentially cast a
shadow back, generating trustful behaviour (see Parkhe, Building Trust in International
Alliances, 1998, p. 422). The shadow of the future is tied to the alliance's time horizons,
frequency of interactions, and behaviour transparency. Long-lasting negotiated partnership
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life spans refer to a far-sighted outlook towards a collaborative relationship and reflect that
high value is placed upon future payoffs from the relation.
Characteristic-based trust requires information about the partners and can thus serve as a
psychological explanation for the detailed evaluation of partnership fitness (see Aulakh et al.,
1997, p. 170). International airlines seek partners that may be quite dissimilar in their
background characteristics. Two of such characteristics are societal/ethnic cultures and
corporate cultures of partnering firms (see 5.3.2.3 for cultural fitness). The greater the quality
of being culturally alike, the easier societal and business interaction. Conversely, trust
building may be harder when cultures are highly dissimilar, since homogeneous expectations
and shared assumptions about the partnership may not exist as readily. It is important to
realise that with sufficient investment of time and effort, the obstacles to trust building,
imposed by differences in characteristics, can be effectively managed.
The discussion above suggested that process-based trust may arise from past or future
interactions, and characteristic-based trust may arise from attributes of a partner, such as
societal and corporate cultures. But each of these requires detailed, specific, non-transferable
information regarding a partner. However, this information is not always available and fast-
changing circumstances can quickly render accessible information outdated. Another way -
institutional-based trust - relies on trust generation through formal mechanisms. The more
assured a company feels that its alliance partner will follow through on its promises, the
trustworthier, by definition, the partner will be.
The first mechanism - seeking to prevent wrongdoing before its occurrence - requires a
display of good faith on both sides. Each individual airline or the partnership organisation can
take actions that lock it into the alliance and create costly obstacles - exit barriers by means of
I
penalties and contingent claims - to casually abandoning the relationship. For example, non-
specific assets, such as aeroplanes, are salvageable if an alliance breaks down; such assets
therefore provide no clear cues about the desire to co-operate or to cheat. But alliance-specific
assets, such as customised IT systems, branding, product design, co-ordinated schedules,
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networks and slots are not easily re-deployable. These assets act as a hostage that coerces
carriers to remain in their partnership and behave collaboratively.l'"
The second mechanism of institutional-based trust seeks to promote concerted behaviour by
reducing potential gains from deception through prospective punishments after the incident.
Opportunism can be deterred through contractual safeguards or legal stipulations in the
partnership agreement that inflict penalties for lack of co-operative behaviours or authorising
of transgressing behaviours. By anticipating at least some of the possible contingencies, and
by stipulating appropriate provisions and punishments for each contingency beforehand, such
measures attempt to produce clearer expectations and fewer surprises, and thus increase the
level of confidence in each other's likely behaviour. Companies typically hope that these
safeguards never need to be used, so their purpose is deterrence beforehand and thus
preventive, and not revenge or punishment afterwards.
Consequently, management can purposefully cultivate trustful interairline relationships, but
trust is difficult to enforce. However, demands for trust enhancement and the degree to which
airline partners are tightly bound into an alliance are what management needs to balance. One
of the dangers for alliances is a partner being self-sufficient, and little motivated to further
develop the partnership. This might occur in partnerships where exit barriers are so high that
no partner can afford to leave. Alliances live off steady growth, development and adjustment
to the changing environment. Each of these trust-building factors are, to some degree, within
management's control, and each factor therefore merits attention during the design and
implementation stages of an alliance and while the partnership is in operation.
5.6.2 Collaborative Network Management
The principle underlying network management is the assumption that profits are maximised
When an airline optimises its total network rather than individual routes (see Farkas et al.,
2000, p. 180). The focus on traffic optimisation, operationally as well as financially, has thus
shifted from a route-specific view to an integrated systematic approach. Network management
orchestrates airline traffic and takes financial and operational responsibility and is thus seen
as one of the most crucial, as well as one of the most complicated roles in airline governance
(see Barton et aI., 1994, p. 33). With airlines forming horizontal links and combining their
104 An example of a non-redeployable hostage is KLM and Northwest's distribution structure. KLM has given up
its sales and marketing organisation in North America and, in tum, Northwest Airlines has given up its
organisation in Europe, Africa and the Middle East.
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individual routing structures, alliance network management certainly receives augmented
attention as part of collaborative safeguards.
While network management also incorporates tasks such as product design, its core function
lies in the arrangement of efficient route configurations and the provision of adequate
equipment and staff. This purpose is based on the notion of individual routes being part of a
wider web of O&D markets, which should be optimally inter-linked to offer maximum
connectivity and passenger convenience. Network management plays an equally important
role in airline partnerships, in particular considering the endeavour to increase online instead
of interline connections. The scope, however, is wider, and usually more complex, as
individual schedules of partnering carriers need to be combined and co-ordinated (see Weber,
1997, p. 54).
The number and quality of O&D pairs III an airline partnership can be increased by a
systematic configuration of combining direct point-to-point traffic with connecting traffic.
Optimised co-ordinated schedules also impact on flight density and profitability, and
potentially result in a diversification of the client base. However, on the whole, airline
partnerships can only capture the aforementioned potential of network management if they
can act on the following four levers (see Farkas et aI., 1997, pp. 180-182):
1. Destinations, schedules and flight connectivity: Destinations and schedule decisions play
a key role in partnership network management, as they are the fundamental input factor
and provide the desired market access. Connectivity determines how airline partners'
flights interact with each other in order to produce most convenient O&D connections I 05
(see also Netzer, 1999, p. 175).
2. Matching resources'and demand: Aircraft and crew assignments should always be flexible
and detailed processes. The optimisation of equipment allocation depending upon
fluctuations in passenger demand can be achieved by short schedule planning periods.
This will decrease fleet and crew costs and has a positive effect on load factors.
3. Airport transfer facilities: An airport's physical configuration may impact on the
possibility to transfer passengers. Network management must consider infrastructure
issues and influence the physical disposition of partner airline's airport presence.
105 For a detailed description of connectivity, see chapter 3.3.2.
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4. Governance structure and data input: The establishment of a joint network management
organisation to overcome data input and processing constraints and increase performance
is crucial to a successful operation. Only if all partners commit to data feeding and
processing, thus sharing their individual actual and future schedule information, can
network management lead to the desired results.
Various elements and the usage of different supporting functions can achieve these levers.
The following figure illustrates processes, elements, functions and tools as well as governance
and data input structures of a typical joint partnership network management.
Figure 5.4: Partnership Network Management
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The first level describes processes of network management and their respective individual
elements. Many of these elements are still subjected to isolated treatment, and are thus not
delivering overall optimised results. Aiming at the most flexible and dynamic solutions,
information on revenue management, pricing and fleet assignment are to be pooled, hence
both demand and supply can be controlled across a network. In addition to this internal
infonnation, external data, such as marketing information and market intelligence on
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competitors' actionl06 as well as data concerning the macro environment, are crucial (see
Martin et al., 1997, p. 61). This decision-making process is based on a number of supporting
functions and tools, which produce the necessary information in order for the elements of
network management to develop the most effective output.
Increasingly, the supporting functions are electronically organised, given the amount and
complexity of information and the deduction and interpretation of results. Predictive and
statistical tools, as well as other internal and external data generation systematically and
analytically process information, and help to achieve the best possible solution regarding joint
schedules, as well as connectivity for partnership O&D markets.
Data input is an ambitious task for joint network management. Challenges mount with the
number of partners and the intensity of the collaboration. To organise governance
collaboratively or individually, common data input and process structures are key demands
made of productive network management. As discussed before, airline partners tend to be
loath to disclose information that might affect their competitive position. Overall partnership
governance structures and, in particular, network management must consequently provide
incentives, such as valuable network management payoffs in a trusting environment, in order
for allies to provide the data to a satisfactory extent.
It is claimed that independent and centralised network management organisations can render
partnership network management tasks most effectively (see Martin et aI., 1997, p. 61).
Airline partnerships do not yet exploit the revenue potential of joint network management and
limit their route co-ordination to single approaches. A paradigm shift is consequently required
of airline partnerships. Carriers, being in a collaborative relationship, have to abandon their
individual authority _I at least partially - in favour of overall network-optimising systems.
Solutions might turn out to be disadvantageous for the individual player, but improve the
results of the whole. Therefore trust between partners must be built and mechanisms to share
profit on a fair basis be established. Rapid changes in the marketplace and the need for swift
reaction strengthens the demand for common network management structures. A centralised
network management could be the solution to the turbulent economic environment, as it
would provide a bias-free, overall network optimisation, which can potentially avoid conflict
106 This external data could be collected by MlDT (Marketing Information Data Tapes) which are compiled by
CRS providers and give detailed information on flights and passengers, such as origin and destination, flight
number, date, booking class, and number of total passengers.
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among airline partners. Another benefit from a centralised network management unit could be
its IT solutions, know-how transfer and immediate cost saving possibilities, particularly for
smaller carriers.
However, centralising network management requires careful consideration of the trade-offs
between complexity and co-ordination costs. If the majority of partnership traffic takes place
in the individual sub-networks, the incorporation of a centralised network management unit
might turn out to be contra-productive (see Steininger, 1999, pp. 270-273). This is particularly
the case in complementary, behind-gateway codeshare operations. The other main opposition
to centralised network management solutions lies in the obstinate reluctance of airlines to
share data and give up control of this key function. It remains a trusting partnership
management's task to persuade allies to take advantage of the operational and financial
benefits of joint network management structures.
5.6.3 Joint Product and Service Management
Partnership-wide product and service management helps to offer an alliance-specific service
chain to alliance passengers. As, to a large degree, each airline usually bases its differentiation
strategy on individualised service aspects, it is crucial to merge or harmonise the partnership's
services in order for the passenger to experience the promised alliance product features.
5.6.3.1 Flight Connections and Passenger Service
As discussed, airline passengers prefer online to interline connections, which essentially
motivates carriers to co-operate. For infrastructure, technical, economic and regulative
reasons it is unavoidable for passengers to connect itinerary flights within a partnership.
Emulating real online connections with quasi partnership online offerings is thus a necessity
to live up to the alliance's service promises.
In accommodating the service promises of seamless travel, global partnership passengers
should be given the convenience of only one check-in for their entire online trip.
Seamlessness accordingly includes baggage through-checks, seat reservations for all
connections and boarding passes issued once at the beginning of the journey. While technical
(IT and conveyance) and organisational prerequisites usually prevail, airport infrastructure
and layout must support these passenger demands as well. Ideally, the arrival and departure
gates of connecting flights should be situated close to each other in order to allow short
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passenger transfer distances, decrease the risk of lost baggage and enable quicker transfer
times.107 Waiting areas and lounges as well as flight information facilities should be present.
General agreements have to be established between the carriers regarding handling and
safekeeping of delayed passengers. Delays should be dealt with in partnerships by organising
and offering passengers alternative connections. This, however, requires appropriate
communication and exchange of information among the airline partners, preferably before the
actual event of a delayed flight (see Beyhoff et al., 1995, pp. 39-40).
The communication process with the passenger in offering seamless travel is another
important issue. Passengers must never be exposed to communicational interface problems
between airline partners. The external communication of a carrier partnership network with its
passengers must be clear and unanimous. This demand becomes crucial in the event of
problems such as delays, lost baggage or other issues of pre- and inflight convenience or
loyalty programmes. Airlines in partnerships tend to pass problems and their solutions on to
the carrier that feeds passengers into the alliance network, or to the operating carrier in
general. However, each individual partner must give the greatest care to every passenger
complaint within a network. This calls for cultural adjustments amongst staff, who usually
only feel responsible for his or her carrier's service. In addition, the availability of appropriate
IT and communicational tools must be ensured, in order to address these problems.
5.6.3.2 Core Product Harmonisation
A persistent obstacle in codeshare partnerships and, to a limited extent, in franchise
agreements and other branding collaborations, is passenger disappointment with product and
service-related features of the operating carrier. Issues of passenger deception relating to the
air transport core product were described above. In terms of technical and output quality, the
I
value of every interaction with the passenger determines the passengers' level of satisfaction
and must be consistent within the partnership (see Gronroos, 1995, p. 253). This necessitates
strong product harmonisation attempts of the core inflight product and certain pre- and post
flight product features.
Product harmonisation, however, is not a trivial task given the history of individual carriers'
diversified product development and the tradition associated with particular features.
Reluctance to relinquish or alter these product peculiarities is certainly comprehensible and
107 Quicker transfer times also have an effect on a connecting flight's CRS position, as swift transfer receives
listings higher up on the screen.
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has to be expected. The depth of integration, which reflects the purpose of allying, and the
agreed or perceived life-span of the co-operation are determinative factors of product
harmonisation.
In operative and certain hybrid forms of partnerships, it appears sensible to introduce cost-
effective standardised product elements to propound minimal product homogeneity. Elements
to be harmonised during the inflight phase can lie in food and beverage concepts, as these
features are comparatively easy to synthesise and, on the other hand, play an important role in
the customer's product perception. Besides harmonisation with regard to the common catering
quality, airline partnerships can use recognition-oriented amenities. Part of the operating
carrier's catering concept could typically be to offer the marketing carrier's special catering
items. Serving SAA's wines on a Lufthansa-operated LHiSAA codeshare, surely honours
original SAA passengers and demonstrates the association of the two carriers.
Rotation or partial assignment of partners' flight attendants could be another inexpensive
means of decreasing possible quality gaps and creating a hospitable climate (see Cameron,
People Movers, 1997). The presence of service personnel from a passenger's home, or
preferred carrier or from the marketing carrier, impersonating the partnering carrier's cultural
values and linguistic background, creates trust and boosts alliance commitment. This
remembrance-based harmonisation can be supplemented by a more partnership-focused
harmonisation. Characteristic product elements could possibly be introduced. Souvenirs or
special food or beverage offers, which are individually designed and typical of the alliance
network, possess a high degree of further recognition (see Steininger, 1999, p. 278).
Partnerships intended and designed to be more strategic in orientation should not only adjust
product features to one another, but also mutually develop new products. Some of the above-
mentioned product reconciliation characteristics thus also apply to strategic partnerships - to a
more intense degree, however.
Joint product development tends to be cost-effective and joint procurement holds potential for
scale effects. However, local and regional market differences based on ethnic and religious
specifications, have to be taken into consideration. This especially applies to food and
beverage items and entertainment contents. Cabin configuration should also be reconciled on
a long-term basis. Particularly, premium class passengers wish to experience network-wide
Consistency in seating configuration such as leg space, seat pitch or sleeper seats, and in
enteliainment infrastructure (see Shifrin, Atlantic Luxury, 2001). Yet, common standards with
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regard to the aforementioned cabin configuration elements should naturally also apply to
economy class. The longer the flights and the more costly the journey, the more important
seating configuration -is. Consequently, codeshare operations or partnering airlines operating
overlapping networks can be affected by the passenger's preference based on inflight service
quality differences. In close partnerships, airlines must thus try to harmonise product features
as consequently as possible, to avoid passenger discontent and minimise the risk of biased
buying behaviour. An example of high product homogeneity is KLM and Northwest Airline's
joint business class called "World Business Class", where seating configuration, and inflight
services are completely identical.
Passenger service on the ground is equally important to influence the traveller's perception of
an airline and its partners. Cost considerations playa role in merging ground services to avoid
idling of ground staff and allow for a more efficient use of equipment and infrastructure.
Quality differences in ground operations can be eliminated, or curbed by airlines merging or
closely co-operating in servicing and handling their passengers. In addition, a common
ground service product, including all respective ground-based elements of the value chain,
can sharpen the alliance's identity and promote its advantages.
One of a range of product harmonisation features, for example, is joint lounge access.
Lounges for premium passengers are costly to set up and to maintain and thus represent cost
savings potential in airline partnerships. On the other hand, lounges play an increasingly
important role in product strategies of carriers, targeting the business sector. Usage of a
carrier's lounge facilities by a partnering airline, however, equals outsourcing of a ground
service element and thus loss of quality control. Often airlines are very reluctant to surrender
control of a prestigious ground service element and to be at some other's mercy. Conversely,
I
joint lounge usage can again furnish the alliance with more compelling, unique product
features. 108
To completely harmonise inflight product features is an almost impossible task as long as
airlines wish to keep their distinct identities. While multilateral partnerships - whether formed
as umbrella brand concepts or less intensive collaborations - build their corporate identity
based on the individual identities of their member carriers, complete product harmonisation is
neither wanted nor feasible. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, individual airlines rightfully see
108 In Bangkok, Star Alliance members once had a total of 13 lounges, which have now been reduced to 7.
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their distinct identity as a key competitive element and core asset given the amount of
resources invested to establish the brand (see Nelms, 1996, p. 34). Joint branding and product
strategies are therefore regarded with much scepticism. From the passengers' perspective,
total harmonisation is as little desirable. Variations in product design and characteristics are
perceived to be a welcomed peculiarity, often linked to a cultural distinctiveness of the
operating carrier. Air travel in a foreign continent or region is often associated with special
inflight product characteristics such as Singapore Airlines cabin attendants' traditional
dresses. Some other airlines have built their products around other myths and backgrounds,
like Virgin Atlantic's relaxed, unconventional and innovative inflight service. However, it
remains a necessity for quality standards to be similar and technical product features to be
comparable among partnering carriers.
5.6.4 Collaborative Branding and Marketing
Airline partnerships are becoming more and more prominent. In the public eye, the
dominance of global multilateral grouping is increasing, not only due to their widening scope,
but also because of dedicated common branding strategies under which individual carriers
jointly operate. In discussing airline partnership safeguards, the question of reasons and the
.
most suitable set-up of alliance-wide branding and marketing surfaces. The following sections
emphasise these issues.
5.6.4.1 Umbrella and Superbrand Concepts
Individual brands are important marketing tools and generally long-term investments. As
brands represent valuable monetary assets, they are consequently a critical economic factor
(see Rao and Ruekert, 1994, p. 87). Meanwhile, traditional airlines are seemingly melding
into one another in greater alliance spheres, blurring categories and creating whole new sets of
competitors. In this maelstrom, it is not surprising that carriers find it difficult to differentiate
themselves, not only to customers but also to investors and prospective employees. A winning
brand strategy - one that is integrated into a company's overall business strategy - can make a
tremendous difference in overcoming these challenges. A powerful brand can cut through the
clutter of the marketplace, heightening awareness of the air transport product or service and
shifting demand in its favour.
The air transport product, which is primarily a commodity, is differentiated by its producers
through quality and design features. However, the success of an airline does not only depend
on worthy service, but on its image projection and reliability. Brand names carry meanings
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that consumers come to value, and brand names have utility, because as sources of
information they identify the manufacturer (see Rao et at, 1999, p. 259). This makes the
brand a hostage, as it conveys to the consumer the identity of who to punish should the
product not perform as expected (see Rao and Ruekert, 1994, p. 89). Perceptions of quality
and reliability are projected by the image of a carrier, which in turn is directly associated with
its brand name. This perception influences a passenger's ticket-buying process by providing
information about the product's expected quality and thus decreases uncertainties.
Airline brands and images not only project values of quality through passengers' own
experiences, but also through marketing communication campaigns, highlighting the
sophistication and uniqueness of the product. As airlines sell a range of product variations
(destinations, fares, service types, loyalty schemes) under the same brand name, brands
become valuable, and create significant economies of scale and scope in the production and
use of product and brand information (see Steininger, 1999, pp. 204-208).
What applies to individual airlines is equally applicable to airline partnerships, which
consequently seek to balance the interests of individual brand identities and the advantages of
overall partnership brands (see Nelms, 1996, p. 34). Airline groupings have thus equipped
their multilateral partnerships with distinct brands and promote these alliance trade names to a
more or less intensive extent. The drivers for air carriers to engage in alliance branding are
diverse and can range from ease of market access, customer satisfaction, cost-effectiveness
and revenue motivation, to exclusivity and partnership exit barrier considerations.
A core motivation in establishing alliance brands is to constitute member brands under the
umbrella brand's name in foreign markets. This, for example, would be the case in United
Airlines trying to gain access to the French market and competing with the local incumbent,
Air France. United would rather jointly sell the much stronger Star Alliance brand than the
individual United Airlines label (see Beirne, 1999, p. 23). Entering the home market of a
partnering carrier under the alliance's umbrella brand can yield additional benefits. The
association of the entering airline as an ally of the home carrier under one umbrella brand can
have positive effects on the pace and success of market entry. This typically applies in the
case of American Airlines establishing brand awareness in the Hong Kong market by using
the brand suction of Cathay Pacific, an ally in the Oneworld group of carriers.
A key concern of umbrella branding is how to signal quality in a situation where several
partners commonly support one alliance brand (see Rao and Ruekert, 1994, p. 89). Umbrella
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branding does not require airlines to abandon their individual corporate identities, but to
establish brands parallel under a newly built identity, thus creating brand allies. The set-up of
a global alliance network requires associations with a range of individual and, occasionally
lesser-known airlines, while different underlying organisational set-ups are conceivable. The
allies' brand qualities in this composition are, however, not necessarily equal and credible
communication of the alliance brand can be troublesome (see Rao et al., 1999, p. 259).
Consequently, the choice of carriers operating under the common umbrella brand must follow
basic principles of partnership selection, but - more importantly - should recognise individual
brand and quality considerations. Omission of those requirements can jeopardise the entire
umbrella brand operation as customer sanctions can be expected, thus leading to the forfeiting
of a built reputation. Communication must consequently not only propagate the composition
of the multilateral partnership, but key features that generate the image and signal quality of
the umbrella brand (see Beirne, 1999, p. 23). Those image features can be its global reach,
commitment to safety and security, a common understanding of quality and FFP. Carriers
amalgamated under one umbrella brand therefore provide the passenger with information on
what is to be expected during the journey, especially while the quality of the umbrella brand
product is difficult to observe (see Rao et al., 1999, p. 260). Herein lies a key area of possible
passenger advantage and a touchstone of brand quality. Only once the passenger associates
benefits with the umbrella brand, can the brand image be used successfully, since it receives
true customer value.
Other than being united under a common umbrella brand, partnering carriers also establish
discrete, jointly-branded products. It was mentioned earlier, that KLM and Northwest Airlines
have developed a joint business class product. Another example is joint FFP under one name,
e.g. Qualiflyer Group's FFP, called by the umbrella brand's name, Qualiflyer. Since common
products are usually perceived to be identical, this strategy is more efficient than umbrella
branding from a communicational point of view, as it furnishes the passenger with surety
regarding consistent quality and reliability of the product. From a conceptual standpoint, this
approach is associated with less risk, as integration is limited to defined areas of joint
operations.
A widely propagated scenario is to completely abandon individual brands and either use a
partner's brand - which happens in the case of franchising - or join brands under one network-
wide superbrand. The franchising brand strategy works widely for smaller carriers. The logic
of abandoning an individual brand in order to benefit from the franchiser's superior brand is
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the key motivator for franchisees. However, a superbrand concept, which is converted into a
single brand under which all participating carriers operate, is a difficult goal to achieve. These
impediments are multifarious, but primarily lie in the individual carriers' reluctance to
abandon their brands, based on brand value considerations. Additionally, an anticipated
passenger opposition towards brand mergers result in hesitant common branding approaches.
As a matter of fact, none of the international airline groupings have so far reached the stage of
assigning priority to the superbrand to the detriment of individual brands. Consequently,
brand integration will only occur if the regulatory environment allows for mergers and take-
overs to happen. However, even if this scenario ever actualises, it is doubtful that merged or
acquired carriers will relinquish brands. If the individual brand value holds more potential
than a new brand or the strategic partner's brand, it would make no sense to give it up. For
now, umbrella brand concepts are a platform of common standards and operational
procedures as well as name tags for membership in multilateral groups of carriers. Further
consolidation may lay the foundation for the organisational functioning of superbrand
concepts. Whether they will perform remains to be proven.
The following figure summarises the above-mentioned possibilities of brand integration.
Figure 5.5: Tiers and Degrees of Brand Integration
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Airline management should take extreme care in forming highly integrative brand alliances of
the above-mentioned kind. Circumspection of brand alliance concepts is well reasoned and
driven by the recognition that an umbrella brand or superbrand can be associated with another
brand of poor quality. Conversely, a prospective member of a multilateral partnership needs
to first establish that the quality of the umbrella or superbrand is valuable, and likely to
remain so, and then, given its likely costs, assess the potential profits from the association. In
highly competitive markets such as air transport, damaged brands can have significant
monetary consequences. Airline partnership management should take cognisance of the
vulnerability of their own brand to future economic situations and sanctions from irate
consumers, should their individual, umbrella or superbrand be associated with lower quality.
In general, however, given the multitude of individual motivations for sharing or commonly
developing a brand, it is difficult to advise on whether or not airlines should engage in
alliance branding. From a customer satisfaction perspective, brand alliances are an appropriate
strategy when the quality of the product is unobservable before the purchase and the producer,
i.e. the individual airline, wants to signal quality by means of associating itself with other high
quality allies.
5.6.4.2 Market Communication
Joint market communication within airline collaboration is an important instrument to create
awareness among passengers, the travel trade and other stakeholders in the joint services.
Until recently, partnering carriers neglected to sufficiently convey information about the
instruments of their partnership action to trade intermediates and passengers (see Beirne,
1999, p. 23). The confusion that still surrounds codeshare agreements, specifically with regard
to CRS display and the concomitant passenger deception, is due to little or ineffective market
Communication. Published schedules and information on frequencies propagate the individual
market effects of partnership action, but tend to ignore basic consumer information on the
Collaborative instruments. Facts on the composition of the partnership, the basic terms and,
most importantly, the benefits that passengers can gain, need to be conveyed to the market
(see Nelms, Getting Their Act Together, 1999, p. 27). While airlines have long been discrete
organisational entities, they must now establish a communicational policy that entails
Customer and trade education regarding their collaborative activities.
Communication efficiency and cost-effectiveness too still require greater exploitation. Joint
promotion, also of less intensive partnerships, is still the exception rather than the norm.
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When in January 2001 SAA and Qantas agreed on a blocked space codes hare agreement for
the routes Johannesburg-Perth and Johannesburg-Sydney, each carrier individually advertised
the new schedule. In this particular case, separate market communication was certainly due to
the low-involvement, operative blocked space agreement. However, a joint promotion of the
routes could have been more cost-effective and efficient in reaching and educating a wider
market base, thus pre-empting conceivable passenger irritation.
It seems advisable for participants in multilateral alliance networks to promote the broader
partnership umbrella brand in their respective home markets. Lufthansa, for example, always
adds the Star Alliance logo to all its communicational campaigns in the German market. This
equips other Star Alliance carriers with an indirect market exposure through umbrella brand
recognition that they would otherwise not receive. Especially for the purpose of brand
development, envisaged communication campaigns have to evaluate whether they can also be
beneficial in prioritising the umbrella brand by discounting individual carriers. Inmany cases,
shares of airlines in foreign markets do not justify intensive individual marketing campaigns.
Pooling marketing efforts, however, spreads the costs over a wider base and promotes the
entire network. In addition, scale effects arise when purchasing marketing and communication
services. Star Alliance has therefore committed itself to joint marketing in all offline regions
(see Nelms, Getting Their Act Together, 1999, p. 36).
However, not even all of the current multilateral groupings have yet reached this stage of
collaboratively marketing of their joint range of products. On the one hand, this reh.~ctance
lies in the participating carriers' lack of commitment to engage in collective strategies. This
unwillingness originates from carriers not wishing to give up their as yet small market share
and brand status in favour of an umbrella brand concept. 109 On the other hand, umbrella brand
I
products are often not sufficiently harmonised in order to allow for joint communication.
Consequently, market communication can only yield benefits for all partners once the
common wellbeing has precedence over individual success. The most important objection to
establishing reciprocal marketing efforts comes from the regulatory regime that, in many
countries and for many forms and instruments of airline partnerships, does not allow joint or
co-ordinated marketing campaigns. If allied carriers cannot jointly market their product, the
benefits of mutual market communication are at least partly diluted.
109 Joint communication would thus be equally beneficial in markets, where all members of the multilateral
partnership have an equivalently low market share or operate offline. Market share constellations of this kind
are, however, unlikely, given the different size and geographic focus of multilateral partnership members.
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5.6.5 Distribution Management in Airline Interrelationships
With one of the key motivators of airline partnerships being revenue generation, it is
questionable whether the above-described configurational aspects of airline collaboration are
beneficial per se, or if they merely represent supporting constructs for exploiting synergies in
distribution. The following paragraphs touch on some core aspects of distribution
management and develop prerequisites for successful interairline collaboration in the
marketing arena.
5.6.5.1 Pricing
Pricing plays a central role in airlines' distribution and differentiation strategies, given the
competitive environment and patterns of passengers' price elasticity (for determinants of
airline pricing, see Doganis, 1986, pp. 206-208 and Shaw, 1990, pp. 26-28). As schedules are
usually unalterable on a short-term basis and only within timetable periods, pricing and yield
management are critical instruments in filling aircraft seats. Pricing regulations and regulative
action have been widely abolished for individual carriers - with the exception of cases of
predatory pricing or unfair high or low pricing - in the main integration regions after the
removal of substantial regulatory constraints (see 2.5 for deregulation in pricing). This greater
sovereignty in setting airfares further highlights its competitive importance and organisational
challenges.
While airline partnerships should ideally concentrate on the wellbeing of the collaboration,
pricing has become an issue of co-operation management and organisation (for pricing as part
of partnership agreements, see The European Commission, Commission Notice Concerning
the Alliance .... , 96/C 289/04 - 96/C 289/06, pp. 4-13). The closer airlines collaborate, the
more harmonised fare structures need to be in order to avoid customer confusion and biased
buying behaviour. Passengers discovering that umbrella-branded codeshare partners follow
different pricing strategies for the very same product, rightfully feel irritated. Comprehensive
joint pricing strategies need to redress passenger irritation. Joint strategies furthermore have
the advantage of decreasing discrete co-ordination efforts for pricing opportunities, offering
competitive fares for jointly served O&D markets, which, accordingly, enhances the total
result.
In solving the problem of fare opacity and to enhance synergy, partnership airlines need to
seek alliance fares that are transparent, interlineable and represent sufficient incentives for the
allied carriers to commit to the partnership. Interline fares would be set by carriers to
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maximise joint profits from varIOUS markets where they provide interline, quasi-online,
services. However, the setting of interline fares can take on different methods, as the basis of
fare determination can vary.
A very elementary pricing method underlies lATA fares. lATA fares, which are set in
periodic multilateral tariff conferences for O&D markets, allow for interlineable connections,
but are minimally competitive and come with the restriction to share profits according to
distance-based prorating formulas'I'' (see Pompl, 1998, pp. 202-211 and Brueckner, The
Benefits of Code sharing and Antitrust Immunity, 2000, pp. 6-7). Carrier fares or sub-fares are
set by each partnering carrier according to individual revenue demands on routings operated
by joint services. Carrier fares are usually lower than lATA fares, but only apply to the
issuing carrier and are not endorseable. However, sub-fares per se do not provide partnering
carriers with a competitive advantage as long as they are not co-ordinated. Interline traffic,
whereby two carriers individually optimise their subfares, might have a disadvantageous
effect on the total O&D service. In solving this problem, carriers must co-operate in setting
the overall O&D fare and consequently enhance revenue and profit generation (see
Brueckner, The Economics ofInternational Codesharing, 2000, p. 3).
To circumvent disadvantageous profit spread, special prorate agreements (SPA) have to be
negotiated between partnering carriers, allowing for a fair profit share. Such agreements
provide leeway to offer competitive throughfares within the entire network. Nevertheless, it is
important that a universally applicable SPA be negotiated to avoid time and cost-consuming
fare bargaining for separate O&D markets (see Steininger, 1999, p. 310).
Regulatory authorities are well aware of joint pricing efforts and the effect that monopolies or
oligopolistic competition structures can have on fare development. This is why joint pricing is
prohibited in most markets. An exception is airlines operating under immunity or exemptions
from competitive laws or antitrust regulation!" (see above and Stragier, 1999, p. 2). Equipped
with immunity, carriers can thus collaborate in a fashion that is impossible under traditional
pricing arrangements.
110 lATA fares lost significance with deregulation, but still occur in interline transport (see Pompl, 1998, p. 208).
III Terms of competitive exemptions differ according to the geographic regions concerned. In Europe, airlines
can co-ordinate certain functions once they have been exempted from competitive rules. Antitrust immunity
roughly determines the same in the US markets.
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Depending on the intensity of the co-operation, different collaborative pricing measures are
conceivable. However, to exploit pricing benefits to the utmost degree, the following discrete
steps can lead to worthy results (see Steininger, 1999, pp. 313-314). In a first phase, airlines
should agree to alliance network fares on the basis of SPAs. Under the assumption of legal
feasibility, these alliance fares should quantitatively allow for optimised results from interline
services.
The next phase should include agreements on joint pricing policies, paired with the exchange
of information and mutual consultations regarding pricing topics. The above-mentioned
example of subfares only presents benefits once airline partners exchange data on the effects
of individual fare variations. The following exemplifies this context under sterile market
conditions:
Two carriers jointly operate in the O&D market A-C, with carrier 1 serving A-B and carrier 2
serving B-C. They have agreed on subfares, are therefore able to offer a competitive O&D
fare. However, carrier 1 decides to increase its fare level with an overall increasing effect on
the A-C fare and consequently lowering demand. Since airline 1 is earning more on each
passenger, it might come out ahead, even if traffic is lower. The consequence for carrier 2 will
be adverse. Charging the same subfare, but selling it to fewer customers, carrier 2 will
unambiguously be negatively influenced by carrier 1's action (see Brueckner, The Benefits of
Codesharing and Antitrust Immunity, 2000, pp. 6-7). To avoid this set-up, partnering carriers
should formalise their information policy concerning pricing decisions and establish a set of
rules regarding fare level variations.
Regional assignment of pricing authority among allies would be a further phase in
harmonising fare determination. Pricing authority does not imply that a carrier can set fares
autonomously in a partnership, but by analysing market trends and by advocating fare
recommendations to its partners. This authority could be assigned to a carrier that has the
higher market capacity and has the most refined market knowledge.
Joint pricing would be the ultimate form of pricing co-operation, provided there is immunity
from antitrust laws. Partnership pricing can be organisationally achieved by an independent
entity merely dealing with pricing issues. The organisation would be responsible for
OPtimising the income or the contribution margin in the entire alliance network. Nevertheless,
the merger of airline pricing tasks in partnerships poses a substantial threat to the individual
carrier, as autonomy would be decreased significantly by outsourcing a core business
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function. To avoid opportunistic behaviour by partners, structures and incentive mechanisms
have to be established in order for carriers to behave optimally collaboratively in pricing-
related issues (see Steininger, 1999, p. 314).
5.6.5.2 Yield and Revenue Management
From the perspective of the above-mentioned pricing decisions, airlines are interested in
knowing how to best exploit revenue potentials by way of high load factors and capacity
management, while maintaining acceptable levels of service.
To maximise revenues, the airline industry uses the practice of selling identical seats for
different prices, which is commonly referred to as yield management or seat inventory
control. Yield management is an example of a more general practice known as revenue
management or perishable inventory control, in which a commodity or service - with no
differences in the marginal production costs - is priced differently depending on various
restrictions on booking or cancellation, e.g. non-refundability or partial refundability.i'f This
price discrimination is fuelled by demand variations in air transport service between elastic
and inelastic travellers (for a discussion of discriminatory pricing, see also Hanlon, 1996, pp.
157-170).
The common thread in pricing discrimination and demand-based service restrictions IS
ultimately the perishability of the commodity: a seat on a particular flight is worthless after
the flight departs (see Subramanian et al., 1999, p. 147). The airlines' short-run problem thus,
is not a decision about production levels, but one of allocating a fixed number of output Units
among customers paying different prices and having different demands. The yield
management function within an airline seeks to optimise income, given the fixed capacity
flying between city pairs, and the various price levels and restrictions facing them by
forecasting passenger demand and controlling the sale of the available seats - also by way of
overbooking flights. In doing so, the yield management department seeks to reduce revenue
dilution and prevent unnecessary decreases in revenue and yield (see Botimer, 2000, p. 105).
An airline's profit-maximising price discrimination is usually solved by complex
mathematical/statistical programs (for a review of such techniques, see Weatherford and
112 Further booking restrictions can be: advance purchase requirements, required Saturday night stop overs,
blackout periods (discount travel not available on certain days), peak vs. off-peak travel requirements, weekday
vs. weekend travel requirements, flight validity restrictions (good for travel between ...), ticketing purchase
restrictions (purchase tickets by ...), required round trip travel, flight routing restrictions, and FFP mileage
accumulation restrictions (see Botimer, 2000, p. 102).
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Bodily, 1992). A few standard steps can describe a simplified version of optimal capacity
allocation through price discrimination. Firstly, the airline must segment the market into
groups of passengers with distinct demands. These segmentation clusters can describe, e.g.,
travel purposes, individual values, life-styles, and demands vis-a-vis the travel service, like
booking lead times and restrictions. Secondly, the airline creates restrictions that separate the
categories of service offered to the customer groups. For example, requiring a sleeper seat and
high re-booking flexibility will in many cases separate business travellers from leisure
travellers. In a third step, the carrier establishes a fare price for each category based on
anticipated demand and financial considerations. Finally, the airline allocates its fixed aircraft
inventory among the categories. For example, for 130 coach seats on a particular routing, the
airline might create 3 fare categories: deep discount, discount, and full fare, requiring,
respectively, 14-day advance purchase and a Saturday stay, 7-day advance reservation and a
Saturday stay, and no restrictions. The airline allocates some portion of the 130 coach seats to
each of these categories, which is generally referred to as nesting. Over a period of months, as
the flight time approaches, the airline may reallocate seats to categories depending on sales. In
principle, the prices may remain constant over time, while the availability of fare categories
changes as seats in categories with lower fares become filled and the category becomes
unavailable. This typically implies that the discount and deep discount seats primarily go to
leisure fliers, and that business travellers, who cannot meet the restrictions, pay full coach
fare. A yield management system thus constantly varies seat capacities allocated to booking
classes and according to expected sales figures (see Reece and Russel, 2000, p. 1003 and for
an intensive discussion of a yield management example, see de Harris and Peacock, 1995, pp.
36-38).
To collaboratively reap the benefits of optimised revenues, airline partnerships have to
commit to joint yield management. The example illustrated above visualises the challenges of
yield management in the case of joint operation and joint marketing of a flight. Airlines with
individually segmented customer bases, somehow have to reach agreements on how best to
satisfy their passengers' demands by variably pricing their joint product. In codes hare
agreements, a common understanding needs to be established on who gets access to capacities
of a codeshare flight, how individual overbookings will be handled and how passengers will
be paid damages in the case of overbookings. Finally, the participating carriers have to come
to a solution about who carries the distribution risk of joint efforts (see Steininger, 1999, p.
315).
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The better the exchange of information functions are in line with the above-mentioned
systematic demands of yield management, the more accurately booking behaviour can be
predicted and the better revenue can be maximised by booking class assignments. Exact
booking prognosis also allows for more precise decisions regarding overbooking rules, thus
decreasing the possibility of passengers being denied boarding despite confirmed bookings.
There are different ways of handling a codeshare flight regarding its yield management. Most
commonly, the operating carrier maximises revenue through its own yield management
system, which, however, excludes the overall partnership demands. The following describes
different ways of yield management in airline partnerships with a collaborative focus:
In blocked space agreements - in particular hard blocks - the operating carrier manages yield
for its own fraction of the seat capacity, while the marketing carrier uses its own yield
management system to market the prepaid seat contingency (see Steininger, 1999, pp. 315-
316 and Beyhoff et al., 1996, p. 11). The downside of this procedure lies in the separate
optimisation of capacity blocks. If demand develops unevenly for the marketing carrier and
capacities cannot be swiftly adjusted, discrete optimisation can lead to suboptimal results.
Depending on the overall intensity and width of the collaboration, the carriers should consider
implementing yield management systems that can quickly reallocate capacity in the case of
mismatched demand structures and redress the threat of unrealised revenue potential.
To avoid friction of fixed seat allocation, real time codesharing is used in airline partnerships.
This form of revenue optimisation does not require a joint yield management system, but Joint
access to a CRS. One of the codeshare partners will handle the flight on its proprietary IT
system. The other partner will be given access to the system information through a CRS and
can then make the relevant bookings. This allows the entire capacity to be optimised in one
system, while collaborating partners have mutual access to the capacity.
The biggest challenge is responsibility allocation regarding managing yield. While the
operating carrier incorporates the highest economic risk from the codesharing, and should
therefore be responsible for optimising the trunk traffic, its yield management does not
optimise connecting complementary traffic. This could be achieved by assigning yield
management responsibility to the partnering carrier operating the connecting flight. In
general, the carrier that can potentially aggregate the highest revenue, for example, through
multi-connect routings, should generally be responsible for optimising revenue.
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The set-up of joint access to proprietary yield management information requires a number of
information technological adjustments. IT systems and CRSs have to be interfaced and they
must be capable of communicating with each other. Allies' booking classes and respective
fares need to be harmonised. In some instances, a carrier's booking classes have to be
translated into the other airline's booking class structure. British Airways and all of the
Oneworld alliance partner carriers, for example, commonly changed and standardised their
booking classes in 2000.
However, especially while practising beyond-gateway codesharing, individual yield
management systems might not sufficiently optimise results, as the focus is on single carrier
point-to-point traffic and not multilaterally operated O&D traffic. This necessitates yield
management systems to be implemented for O&D markets or the entire network. In some
instances, carriers will have to accept partial income reductions to maximise overall
Partnership performance, which requires a good deal of trust in each other and the capability
to quantify the benefits of such joint activities. On the IT side, huge efforts would have to be
undertaken to create and implement joint systems among partners (see Steininger, 1999, pp.
319-321). However, with the depth of the partnership and the size of the collaborative efforts,
.
investments in joint yield management would be set off by the benefits in optimising
revenues.
5.6.5.3 Relationships with the Travel Trade and Corporate Clientele
Airlines' relationship with the travel industry and corporate clients was generally described
above (see 3.2.6.2 and 3.4.3.2). The following discussion specifically focuses on collaborative
distribution. Airline partnerships can thereby potentially jointly build powerful international
distribution systems with large client bases, market knowledge and awareness through their
Collaborative presence in several markets (see Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000, pp. 39-40).
Travel agency and corporate client loyalty programmes have an influencing effect on the
decision process on the products of an individual airline or a group of carriers. Airlines' large
capacity market shares make them attractive air transport service providers and generally
levers their position in the distribution process. The combination of allies' market shares
would consequently result in a promotion of the non-linear reward structure of collaboratively
organised commission override and corporate loyalty programmes. Reaching a relevant or
critical market share collaboratively can multiply the support to be expected from the travel
trade and corporate clients. Members of the Qualif1yer Group of carriers, for example, could
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only achieve a significant share of the South African market against incumbent home carrier
SAA, while collaboratively targeting distribution intermediaries and corporate clientele.
In approaching the travel trade and corporate clients, cost savings arise from consolidating the
sales force, thus avoiding redundancies and saving on transaction costs. Trade intermediaries
and bulk clients equally benefit from dealing with fewer sales representatives, who in turn
represent a higher aggregated market share. In consolidating the sales organisation, the
distribution responsibility should ideally reside with the incumbent home carriers. This
applies, for example, to KLM and Northwest Airlines and Qualiflyer's home market
principle, where the member carriers market the joint product individually in their respective
home markets (see Nelms, 1999, p. 30). Inmarkets where none of the partnering airlines has a
dominant position, or is the respective flag carrier, it is advisable to pool the sales forces of
the individual airlines. This set-up was exhibited by the Qualiflyer sales organisation in the
South African market that collaboratively served both the travel trade and corporate clients.
However, the complete merger of sales forces represents a radical solution and thus finds little
realisation. Airlines fear losing control of one of their key assets with potentially suboptimal
results in revenue generation and market share development, especially in foreign markets.
An even greater risk from outsourcing distribution to a partner develops in the case of a
detachment. Accordingly, a partnering carrier can find itself in a situation without a sales
force in a foreign market. Austrian Airlines was confronted with this situation after it had left
the Qualiflyer Group in favour of Star Alliance. However, the Qualiflyer Group was in an
equally difficult situation as it had lost its sales agent in Austria. Merging sales forces, or
outsourcing sales to the partnering carrier additionally entails the problem of support
asymmetries by sales staff Sales forces of a competitor-turned-partner might not push the
ally's sales sufficiently, but influence customers in favour of their employer. The likelihood
of opportunistic behaviour, is thus a key rationale for airlines being averse to sales force
partnerships.
To avoid unsound effects when collaboratively developing sales organisations, a single airline
should ideally follow a sequence of events. Before committing to a common sales force,
airlines need to take intermediate steps to evaluate whether the new sales structure could be
beneficial. Airline partners offering complementary networks are less likely to experience
opportunistic behaviour in a prospective common sales force than if the partners' individual
products are substitutive. If networks overlap, there is a potential threat of competition
between the sales interest of the airlines involved. In this case, airlines need to review the
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intensity of competition in O&D markets and in particular passenger segments, e.g. price
sensitive leisure traveller and flight time sensitive business travellers. Swissair and Turkish
Airlines, e.g., served Johannesburg-Frankfurt via their respective hubs in Istanbul and Zurich.
While the O&D markets were the same, the joint Qualiflyer sales team could easily segment
passenger demand by fare - Turkish being slightly cheaper - and travel purpose - Swissair
offering better connectivity for business travel to Frankfurt. In complete network overlap, in
particular in direct O&D connections, sales cannibalisation and opportunistic marketing
behaviour is, however, still possible. Allies need to segment their markets on the basis of
connection details and service features of the discrete offers. The assignment of specific
passenger target groups to distinct airline partners in the network has to be communicated to
the sales organisation in order to ensure as little inter-partnership rivalry as possible.
A further way to avoid unrealised revenue through opportunistic or antipathetic behaviour
within the joint sales force would be to advance incentive schemes for collaborative sales.
The incorporation of an independent sales entity, organised as a profit centre, could be one
way of doing so. Sales staff would no longer be employed by an individual airline, but by an
independent sales company. Through a target and budgeting system, partnering airlines could
serve as performance guidance and review systems.
Essentially, to reap cost benefits and profit from organisational effectiveness and efficiencies,
airline partners should co-ordinate, if not consolidate, their sales structures. Opposition to
these collaborative concepts stems primarily from trust considerations which can be redressed
by an adequate partnership fitness evaluation and dedication to mutual alliance commitment.
5.6.5.4 Direct Sales
Direct sales are cost-effective alternatives to distribution through travel trade channels.
Distribution of airlines' products, cutting out sales intermediaries, commonly includes
proprietary city centre offices, call centres, and sales offices at airports. Passenger
consultation, reservation and ticketing naturally form part of the sales service with immediate
CUstomer contact being a key feature of this kind of distribution.
Major airlines usually operate city centre offices in high visibility inner-city locations. These
flag shops are usually established to offer one-to-one product consultation, for image building
and brand awareness purposes and to highlight the airline's presence, especially in foreign
markets. Sales offices at airports play a less important role when consulting with the
passenger, but they have an essential distribution function for depositing and collecting
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tickets. As for other airport infrastructure, joint operation signifies significant savmgs
potentials. Higher office utilisation, less idleness among staff and office equipment, as well as
increased bargaining power in respect of landlords through the pooling of rented space,
accounts for cost savings. Generally, the pooling of over-the-counter ticket sales by airline
partnerships additionally increases the attractiveness of the offer for the customer. While an
English national might be reluctant to approach an Iberia sales facility due to the perception
of its limited product-range and its less elaborate and exposed image, this unwillingness might
be redressed by a joint Oneworld counter.
Physically, joint facilities constitute one of the key demands of joint direct sales. An English
customer, for example, might not be as educated about the output spectrum and performance
of the entire Oneworld alliance as about its member British Airways. Customer instruction
concerning the composition of the partnership and product range is thus essential. However,
this status has not yet been reached, nor is it desired, since the promotion of partnerships
and/or umbrella brands is seen as less effective than discretely establishing or enhancing
single airline awareness. As indicated before, some carrier networks dismiss efforts to
syndicate sales in the home country of a member airline, as this would entail a dilution of the
carrier's home market brand status (see Beirne, 1999, p. 23). Consequently, globally and
publicly visible joint direct sales only produce the coveted economic results regarding cost
and revenue structures if the partnerships, umbrella or superbrand concepts are sufficiently
established and accurately communicated.
Telephonic trade through call centres is a relatively cost-effective way of consultation, ticket
sales and other travel-related service and products provision to the travelling public. In
addition, modem call centres allow for intermodal travel consultation, such as support
I
services for Internet-based and travel trade sales (see Wallace and Hulme, 2001). So far, no
multilateral partnership has collaboratively and internationally consolidated its call centre
operations. Airlines, however, see the need to concentrate their call centre activities and to
establish a global web of facilities. Motivated by capturing call overflow, providing 24-hour
service through time zone differences and benefiting from lower cost levels, Lufthansa's
subsidiary Global Telesales has so far established centres in Kassel (Germany), Berlin, Cape
Town, Dublin, Los Angeles, New York, Toronto and Melbourne. The focus of these call
centre activities is primarily on Lufthansa's service and, to a lesser extent, targeted on all Star
Alliance members. However, pooling effects can be realised, since individual call centre
offices of either joint or existing call centres take over the sales tasks of allied carriers.
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Positive size results occur in negotiating hardware procurement, as well as in the provision of
communicational services and infrastructure. Especially telecommunication and IT facilities
can be centralised, which are then easier to set-up and maintain. Staff recruiting and training
can be concentrated and thus be handled more cost-effectively.
Following the example of Lufthansa's call centre structure, internationally dispersed airline
partnership call centres could handle regionally differing peak hour calls better and
accommodate distribution demands of different carriers from various regions during different
times. Joint airlines sales efforts also result in a broader product spectrum, which becomes
particularly apparent in foreign markets. A partner being a locally established home carrier
would give its allies significant distribution advantages through its existing direct sales
structure. The Qualiflyer Group has accordingly decided on the home market principle, which
assigns the entire network's regional or national distribution duties to the respective home
carrier.
However, negative aspects of opportunistic behaviour and the poaching of passengers within
the network is generally associated with collaborative direct sales. The mechanisms leading to
unrealised revenue and less efficient collaborative direct sales are similar to those mentioned
above in respect of travel trade and corporate client distribution. However, technical
solutions, such as system bias, can diminish sales consultants' prejudiced behaviour. A pre-
selected limited availability of product options supplied to the consultants in call centres, or
direct sales facility reservation systems, can influence sales staffs consulting practice and
ultimately steer customer choice. In addition, reservation systems can individually serve
clients of a certain airline - upon identification e.g. verbally, by FFP membership or by
individual airline number dialled - and prioritise offers and product categories in favour of the
client's preferred carrier (see Steininger, 1999, p. 335). To avoid complicated systematic
solutions, it is necessary that both the client and the sales personnel are well educated in
respect of the joint products. Only if demand mirrors common air transport service offers, and
if sales staff can satisfy this demand with unbiased product information, can positive effects
be realised using j oint direct sales.
5.6.5.5 Internet-based Distribution
Internet-based distribution is an ever-important tool for airlines. With an increasing number of
individuals and households having access to this medium, the widespread availability of
secure payment methods, and well-designed and easy to navigate websites the introduction of
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airline online services sites with booking facilities is becoming a regular feature in aviation.
Over 80% of carriers distribute their tickets on the web, even if in relative moderate numbers
(see O'Toole, IT Trends Survey 2001, 2001 and 3.4.4.2 and 4.4.3.1.2 for types of Internet-
based distribution methods and collaborative efforts).
While airlines join forces with competing carriers to develop and maintain travel portals,
multilateral umbrella brand partnerships have widely failed to do so. The only multilateral
partnership presently operating a true online travel portal is Oneworld (www.oneworld.com).
All other multilateral networks mentioned above refer to the airlines' individual websites for
travel arrangements, and only allow FFP reward bookings (Qualiflyer) or automatically direct
the customer to a partner's website upon identification of the customer's home country
(Kl.M'Northwestj.l:'
The incentives for carriers in establishing Internet-based distribution however are substantial.
United Airlines for example achieves the following benefits. Selling a ticket in the travel
agency environment is a 16% cost-of-sales proposition. Selling through its own web sites only
means a cut of 10% (see Flint, E-United, 2000, p. 74). Airlines are consequently strategically
focusing on dominating the online ticket market. They however prefer their own web sites to
those of online travel agencies and joint airlines' sites. A survey revealed that in 2001, 63%
(up from 60% in 2000) of the sample carriers saw their own website as the most important
web-based service. Surprisingly, only 9% rated joint alliance sites or alliance websites to be
most important - with a 1% point drop from 2000 (see O'Toole, IT Trends Survey 2001,
2001).
Airlines seem to be wary to loose control over a sales channel once Internet-based distribution
is partly outsourced to a partnering site or an umbrella brand portal. The other reason for their
reluctance lies in the lack of support from financial markets. With the hype in new economy
markets coming to an abrupt end in 2000/2001, the availability of funds for the development
of online sales strategies and IT solutions became scarce. Some airlines deliberately formed
independent companies for their e-commerce distribution strategy in the mid to late 90s to
take advantage of the immense market confidence and flow of capital. While sales results
initially however did not reach expectations and further financing proved to be difficult, some
of these efforts were abandoned and independent incorporation of airline e-commerce
113 See websites: www.qualitlyer.com; www.star-alliance.com, www.skyteam.com, www.klm.com,
www.nwa.corn, www.oneworld.corn.As of20.02.2002.
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organisations occurred to a lesser degree. Cannibalisation between too many offers of online
travel services on the Internet is another apprehension of carriers. Being financially and
organisationally involved in own websites, joint e-commerce travel portals, auction sites, and
others, airlines fear that further supply on the Internet jeopardises the profitability of the
current providers.
Most ideally, and to sustain the concept of umbrella brands, multilateral partnerships should
establish online booking facilities. The service promise of global reach can only be upheld
once the customer receives the opportunity to purchase this offer under the banner of the
multilateral partnership. Failing to do so will essentially leave partnership revenue potential
untouched and substantially undermine the brand-building venture.
5.6.5.6 Frequent Flyer Programme Co-operation
The effectiveness of a FFP correlates strongly with an airline's capacity share in a market.
The larger the share and an airline's proprietary network, the more advantageous a FFP
becomes for passengers in collecting credits, in receiving FFP statuses and in redeeming
attractive awards. Because of the non-linearity of FFP award structures, it is important to
aggregate as many miles as possible in only one loyalty programme. Passengers are
consequently induced to collect credits by being loyal customers. This is why FFPs are
important tools for carriers to potentially dominate their home market.
However, in foreign markets, airlines' FFPs are far less effective. Small network sizes and
little frequencies result in narrow incentives for passengers to collect and redeem miles. Once
carriers are in collaborative agreements to mitigate the effects of inferior market presence,
they should thus also strive for FFP co-operation.
In joint FFPs, passengers must be enabled to accrue and redeem miles in the individual
partnering carriers' networks. Entire alliance networks could thus produce loyalty among a
large client base, provided that FFPs are reciprocally acknowledged. This equals a quasi
market extension as the partners' loyal group of passengers can be added to their own FFP
member base. FFP linkage consequently is an integral part of codeshare agreements.
Lufthansa and SAA operate a series of codesharings, complementary and behind-gateway.
The carriers have consequently linked their FFPs Voyager and Miles & More, so that
members of each loyalty programme can collect miles, regardless of the operating carrier.
Mileage redemption also works for both airlines. Whether a passenger has collected miles on
the Voyager or the Miles & More account, reciprocity in accepting miles for award flights is
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guaranteed. FFPs thus are a strong competitive tool of alliances to even fight airlines in their
home market. SAA's biggest rival in the intercontinental and local markets is British
Airways. The British carrier and its local franchise partner British Airways operated by
Comair offer one loyalty system - Executive Club - which gives the partnership a strong
instrument to rival incumbent flag carrier SAA.
Due to this market power, regulatory authorities have been scrutinising FFP co-operation and
actions have been taken (see Gilbert, 1996, p. 581). In the case of the merger between
Lufthansa and the regional carrier Eurowings, the German competition authority
Bundeskartellamt ruled that routes formerly served by Eurowings and Lufthansa have to be
transferred to a new operator, European Air Express (EAE) thus protecting its market entry.
In this connection, however, most important is the fact that EAE will be given access to
Lufthansa's FFP Miles & More without' being an otherwise legally fixed partner I 14 (see N/A,
LufthansaiEurowings: Kartellamt segnet die Fusion unter Auflagen ab, 2001 and N/A,
LufthansalEurowings Cleared Subject to Obligations, 2001).
As prerequisites for the gainful establishment and operation of a partnership in FFPs, some
criteria have to be met. Firstly, collaborative FFPs should entail the entire network of the
partnering carriers. The possibility to accrue miles on the network's exclusive routes leads to
passenger confusion and dilutes the advantages of the programme alliance. In their codeshare
between Johannesburg and Dubai, Emirates and SAA only reciprocally accepted each other's
FFP on this specific route. Passengers travelling on either SAA or Emirates' remaining
network and using the non-operating carrier's FFP, cannot expect to receive' any FFP
credits. I IS This configuration hinders loyal passengers from using the partnering carrier's
entire network regularly. Collaborating airlines need to design their respective FFP
I
transparently and make it easy to comprehend, which is best achieved by committing totally
to reciprocal FFP co-operation.
Ideally, procedures regarding the accrual of status miles and mileage tiers to reach a frequent
traveller status need to be harmonised. Base or bonus miles are usually accruable for any
eligible transaction with an FFP partner airline. Status miles are, however, often solely
114 The ruling of the Bundeskartellamt can be extended to Lufthansa's main competitor on the German market,
Deutsche British Airways as well (see N/A, LufthansalEurowings: Kartellamt segnet die Fusion unter Auflagen
ab,2001).
115 This set-up is mainly due to the blocked space arrangement in their codeshare, which was never designed to
be a comprehensive partnership.
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granted to those FFP members making use of the FFP host carrier.l " Theoretically, this
situation can lead to peculiar situations. While a passenger is a SAA Voyager member, but a
regular customer on Lufthansa flights, bonus mileage collection on the Voyager account is not
a problem. However, the additional gratification for loyalty, the classification into an elite
ridership status, e.g. gold or platinum membership, would not apply, as status miles are not
accrued on the carrier issuing the FFP. The inability to gain a status would, for example, bar
the passenger from entering lounges, or from receiving other value-added services. This
configuration strongly contravenes the idea of seamless travel and equal passenger treatment
in airline collaborations. Multilateral partnerships have, nevertheless, largely agreed on
network-wide mileage collection for status classification as well as redemption. However,
reciprocal acceptation of partners' passenger statuses for rank-related value-added product
provision has still been not fully achieved.
Generally, partnering airlines should ideally harmonise their FFP policies. This harmonisation
should include:
• Equal accrual policies regarding base and status miles, also with regard to bonuses in
accruing miles for premium class travel.
Harmonised award mileage thresholds. The required miles eligible for bonus flights might
differ drastically in alliance networks. This in tum can draw award travellers from one
airline to one where miles can be redeemed at a lower level. The same applies to
thresholds for elite programmes.!" Most ideally, passengers originating from different
member carriers in a partnership should be able to accumulate the same benefits and
receive the same qualitative awards for their loyalty. Differences do, however, apply. The
example of SAA and Lufthansa illustrates these imbalances (for a similar calculation, see
Bhagwanani, 2000, p. 91). The carriers operate a codeshare with reciprocal FFP
participation between Johannesburg (JNB) and Frankfurt (FRA). While both carriers grant
5,400 FFP miles for economy class flights from JNB to FRA, the number of miles needed
for an award flight differs. SAA Voyager Club members must redeem 60,000 miles for an
economy ticket JNB-FRA-JNB, while Lufthansa Miles & More members must use 70,000
miles. The logical result would be that regular passengers collect miles in the FFP that
•
116 Status miles are thus also not accruable for any other FFP partner transaction like credit card usage, hotels,
rental car services, and others.
117 While, for example, a Miles & More member needs 150,000 miles to receive gold status, its Star Alliance
partner, Air Canada, gives its FFP members the same status, with similar privileges for only 35,000 miles (see
Bhagwanani, 2000, p. 93).
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ultimately gives the best benefit - in this case, SAA.118 Aside from any other incentives
for airline customers to choose a specific FFP, the example illustrates the service
imbalances that occur in partnerships. To avoid these imbalances and customer
discontentment, Star Alliance chose, as of October 2001, to introduce a common
quantitative system of mileage collection and redemption to all its members.
• Equal passenger service benefits, such as lounge access, excess baggage, preferential
check-in, and free upgrades for FFP member statuses.
• Full reciprocity in redeeming the award in the individual FFPs. Reciprocity in collecting
miles does not necessarily imply the ability to redeem miles collected in the one FFP to be
applicable for awards with a partnering airline (see Rose, 1998, p. 204).
• Equal handling of mileage accrual on special fare tickets. Some carriers completely rule
out mileage accrual for special fares, whilst others in the same network do allow for miles
to be collected in full, or at least at a fraction (see Bhagwanani, 2000, p. 89). This was
long the case in British Airways' mileage acceptation policy, which did not allow youth
fares to qualify for mileage accumulation.
• Equal mileage expiration. Carriers are increasingly changing their policies to unlimited
validity of accrued miles. However, among partners different regulations still exist. Air
France introduced a non-expiring policy for its miles in 2000, a move influenced by its
partner Delta Air Lines, which has long had such a policy.
• Equal lead periods for award redemption. Blackout dates for mileage redemption, lead
times for award applications and supplementary payments for short-notice award
applications vary significantly between airlines and should be equalled in partnerships.
• Equal policies in transferability of awards. While, e.g., SAA allows awards to be
transferred to anyone, Lufthansa's Miles & More members can only transfer miles to first
I
grade family members to a limited extent.
• Equal policies regarding the seat capacity available for award travel.
The Lufthansa/SAA example regarding mileage levels for awards, proved that distinct FFPs
can have a competitive impact on each other. To avoid possible cannibalisation or a new
competitive front, FFPs in close carrier collaborations can also be exclusively offered in
liS Under certain circumstances, this configuration can lead to a disadvantageous position for SAA. A passenger
might only buy and fly on Lufthansa, but collect miles (awarded by SAA) on its SAA Voyager account and
redeem the miles for a free intercontinental flight on SAA. While Lufthansa receives the yield from this
passenger (as the passenger is not a codeshare traveller), SAA has to accommodate the non-paying award
traveller.
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individual markets. KLM and Northwest Airlines have thus chosen to establish their
individual FFPs in distinct markets, which ideally embody the carriers' core markets.
In multilateral and highly integrative alliance networks, airlines should consider abandoning
their individual FFPs in favour of a network-wide FFP. Cost savings potential are substantial
and smoother operation and less interface problems could be experienced. In addition, a
merged FFP would send out a strong signal to passengers as well as to competitors about the
seriousness and the intensity of the partnership. The Qualiflyer Group of airlines has done so
in merging their individual FFPs into the Qualiflyer Programme. The decision to merge FFPs
should, however, only be considered by carriers with a long-term interest in the partnership.
The process of de-merging a common FFP would be associated with an image loss and result
in substantial costs.i'"
Shared information between FFP providers is not just a necessity to harmonise their products,
but can also be used for marketing and CRM purposes (see Gilbert, 1996). Database
marketing plays an important role in FFP co-operation. FFP member databases represent an
immense marketing potential, since they contain valuable personal and demographic
passenger information as well as data on individual travel patterns, which ultimately makes
them surrogates for measuring customer value (see Schmengler and Thieme, 1995, p. 131-
132). Data warehousing and linkages between other discrete airline systems, such as revenue
accounting or yield management, could make an FFP an even stronger tool (see Flint, Value
beyond Miles, 2000). Airlines are, however, hesitant to share these data as they see them as a
main source for the development of marketing strategies and thus fear that an exchange would
foster misuse.
In summarising the above, and to provide leads on how to collaborate successfully regarding
loyalty programmes, the following separate steps should ideally be taken:
•
Reciprocal FFPs throughout the entire network
lIarmonised FFP policies
Elimination of competition between the individual FFPs
Joint usage of FFP data
Integration of the partners' FFPs or establishment of an entirely new partnership FFP
•
•
•
•
119 Currently, the members of the Qualiflyer Group are in the process of deciding whether to maintain the
common FFP or to re-establish individual FFPs.
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5.6.6 Joint Information Technological Partnership Configuration
In configuring airline partnerships, IT demands play an increasingly crucial role. The reasons
primarily reside in the nature of air transport that is internally highly dependent on
information technology exchange and processing requirements within the industry, as well as
with its environment.
Different forms and instruments of IT collaboration regarding standard applications, ERP
software, other internal operation systems and IP based systems have been described above
(see 4.4.3.2.1). Collaborative activities are mainly based on the notion of saving on
development and maintenance costs and of enhancing communication and processes within
partnerships. The key prerequisite of IT configuration in airline partnerships is thus to
establish IT compatibility in the respective collaboration areas promptly and effectively.
However, these goals are currently not achieved - neither individually nor collaboratively. On
average, airlines spend about 2,8% of their revenue on IT, a comparatively low figure,
considering its strategic importance. This view is supported by IT professionals, since they
quantify the expenditures to successfully develop and maintain the competitive IT edge of
commercial carriers as approximately 5% of their revenue (see O'Toole, IT Trends Survey
2001,2001).
The reasons for this disdain are operational and functional insufficiencies such as the dearth
of skilled personnel, especially with airline experience, the sheer lack of financial capabilities
and resources being concentrated on disparate proprietary legacy systems. IT is further
perceived to be a business supporter rather than a business driver. In addition, the fair
judgement of IT integration as complex, especially the orchestration of multilateral
partnerships among members, results in less dedicated integration approaches.
Finally, while airline partners might be willing to share reservation, check-in and FFP
information, carriers are reluctant to share financial and revenue data or details on agreements
with high-level customers (see Baker, Behind the Handshake, 2001, p. 68). The result is that
less than 50% of all airlines share IT application or systems within their partnership, which
again contradicts the widely accepted view of IT as a key success factor (see O'Toole, IT
Trends Survey 2001, 2001). This limitation on investment is having significant implications,
since the arrival of digital integration is constantly changing the demands made of customer
sales and CRM, airport operations as well as aircraft maintenance and revenue management.
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The challenge for airline partnerships is thus to make time and resources available in order to
gain a lead as early as possible. Strategies culminating in a coherent collaborative IT set-up
must be formulated, resources attributed and plans implemented as promptly as possible (see
Azoulai, 2000, p. 11). IT should be made part of the partnership enterprise's core strategic
planning, with the following sequence of events being planning and implementation
prerequisites.
•
Commitment to a collaborative IT strategy, most ideally agreements and decisions on
board level (see de Pommes 1998, p. 27). This managerial commitment should be feasible
according to technological fitness.
Assessment and definition of key areas of IT co-operation, functionally and
geographically, based on the degree of integration, and fundamental as well as strategic
partner fitness. This assessment is decisive as the type, size, instruments and forms of
operation call for different solutions regarding for example, revenue and inventory
management. The same applies to ticketing. While one airline might have implemented
ticketless travel, a partner still uses paper tickets. The varying level of technical
sophistication among prospective members, as well as the size of the airline operations
consequently affects the development of a supporting IT vision and implementation
strategy (see de Pommes, 1998, p. 29).
Definition of the resulting information technological requirements, based on the
aforementioned assessments.
Decisions for either a stand-alone multi-user communication tool, or a fully integrated
approach. The advantages and disadvantages are obvious. While the usually IP-based
stand-alone solutions are less costly, more standardised, less user-training intensive and
allow for swift expansion to other carriers, these middleware solutions have a less binding
character. Fully integrated approaches are more expensive and time-consuming in
development and implementation, and, under certain circumstances, can be interpreted as
anti-competitive by regulatory authorities.V'' However, they allow for more specific,
partnership-related data warehousing and processing, while not requiring any translation
tools.
Agreements on common usage of one CRS. CRSs are in many cases excluded from
collaboration in IT. This is often due to the entrepreneurial involvement a partner might
•
•
•
•
~20 This applies to common revenue systems of carriers operating in the USA without having gained antitrust
Immunity (see Feldman, This is Progress?, 1999, p. 46).
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have in a CRS company, long-term contracts, or simply a strong commitment to a specific
CRS provider.
• Possibility of a further integration of other IT functions into the common system.
121
The
collaborative system must allow other tools and functionalities to be added in the course
of the partnership to respond to changing environmental and internal conditions and
requirements.
• Communication of the new collaborative IT vision to all levels of the organisation (see de
Pommes, 1998, p. 29).
Collaborative IT requirements will be given more attention in future airline partnerships. IT
solutions are attainable, communication is made quicker and more reliable due to increasingly
narrow world-spanning data webs. The possibility of IT outsourcing and ASP facilities
intensifying IT usage and common strategies is widely available. The organisational
involvement of airlines in the development and maintenance of IT systems can thus decrease,
while the widespread availability of solutions poses a competitive threat to use IT effectively.
What applies to individual carriers is also pertinent to airline partnerships. With some bi- or
multilateral partnerships being early movers in collaborative IT technology, thus capitalising
on - as yet marginal - benefits, coherent IT becomes a key issue in partnership configuration
to profit from synergy effects and, ultimately, to be in an advantageous competitive position
5.6.7 Codesbaring Guidelines
Having described different forms of code sharing and their competitive implications in
separate text sections above (see 4.4.3.2), it remains to clarify the key prerequisites that make
codesharing a successful collaborative tool.
Codesharing links networks of co-operating carriers. Theoretically, codeshare partners can
jointly market the partners' entire network as quasi-online connections, thus giving both allies
significant competitive value. Consequently, codesharing should comprise as many feasible
destinations as possible in partners' overlapping, or complementary networks. It is, however,
purposeless to offer codeshare connections that do not give customers any additional benefits.
A passenger arriving in the morning on an SAAfLH codeshare flight, operated by Lufthansa,
from Johannesburg to Frankfurt will benefit from a LH connecting codeshare to Dusseldorf
within an efficient connectivity period. No major benefits, either for the passenger or for the
121 IP is used by some multilateral partnerships as a cross-platform communication tool, which allows additional
functions from the partner's legacy system to be added (see McDonald, 200), p. 39).
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airline codeshare partner would, however, be generated by a codeshare connection to London
on the afternoon of the same day. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, SAA itself serves London
directly, and, secondly, an efficient connection period is not given. Codeshare must thus fit
into the established schedules of the partners, or the parties must be willing to change
schedules in order to offer attractive and feasible codeshare connections within the banks of
flights.
A further demand made of codesharing is its bi-directional feasibility. Only once the volumes
or development potentials on both ends of the O&D markets are large enough are codeshare
operations justified. For the above-mentioned example, both, the Johannesburg-Dusseldorf, as
well as the Dusseldorf-Johannesburg markets must quantitatively and qualitatively (travel
class composition) support the codeshare operation. The carriers' willingness to reinforce the
codeshare by actively promoting and selling O&D connections relates directly to feasibility.
This can be achieved by sales motivations, such as prorate agreements for the marketing
carrier, or other sales incentive payments.
Reciprocity is another prerequisite to successfully establish codesharing. If operationally and
legally practicable, carriers should equally contribute to complementary and parallel
codeshare operations. While unilateral codesharing exists, it contains the risk of unbalanced
contribution and allocation of benefits. The now terminated partnership between British
Airways and USAir was based on such an asymmetrical agreement. Their codeshare only
involved flights on USAir's network within the USA. USAir did not list British Airways'
transatlantic flights, or connecting flights out of London as its own. The reasons resided with
the bilateral agreement between the USA and the UK not allowing for this type of codeshare
operation. In addition, USAir did not even request such authority from DOT. Consequently,
the effects of the codeshare were more valuable for British Airways than for USAir, as BA
kept most of the revenues resulting from the agreement (see United States General
Accounting Office, Airline Alliances Produce Benefits, 1995, pp. 32-33). Trying to maximise
benefits unilaterally, the codeshare partnership had lost its focus to collaboratively prosper,
Which eventually lead to its termination.
The sharing of risk and the allocation of benefits must be clearly defined by the type of
codesharing, e.g., freesale versus block codesharing. Airline partners should be flexible in
altering general types of codesharing to accommodate individual demands and maximise
revenue for all involved.
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The distribution chain frequently opposes codesharing because of its inherent risk of
passenger deception. A demand developing from this likely passenger reaction and the
possible sanctions associated with them, is for airlines to ensure comparable quality standards
in all aspects of the air transport service value chain, the fare class assignment, passenger
loyalty aspects and the provision of sufficient passenger information.
To summarise, codeshare action should only be established once the following factors are
principally achievable. In the process of a priori partnership fitness evaluation, airlines
seeking codeshare partners should consider these aspects and be prepared to alter their own
organisation in order to achieve maximised codeshare benefits.
• Given a feasible operational and regulatory background, equal contribution and benefit
allocation should be envisaged.
• Both directions of O&D connections must be practicable and successfully sellable.
• Connectivity of behind-gateway codesharing must be effective.
• In the case of blocked space codesharing, the agreement must be supported by special
prorate agreements.
• If benefits are mutual, in the case of a unilateral codeshare, the marketing carrier should
receive a sales incentive payment.
• Consumer protection and welfare Issues such as quality, compatibility and sufficient
information should be guaranteed.
• Codesharing must be well-communicated throughout all levels of distribution.
• Codesharing must be flexible in accommodating short-term demands of the collaborating
carriers.
I
5.6.8 Collaborative Airport Operations Management
To a significant extent, seamless travel, which is one of airlines' driving motivations for
entering into partnerships, is procedurally realised by airport operations. To establish
frictionless airport transactions, ticketing, check-in, lounge access and baggage handling,
procedures should be delivered in accordance with network-wide standards. In many cases,
the demands made to procedurally and qualitatively offer ground service standards congruent
with the partnership's promises, are only attainable by arranging airport infrastructure and co-
ordinating ground service provision within an alliance network. While cost savings in joint
passenger handling are argued to be spin-off benefits, this aspect should also be taken into
consideration (see Buyck, The Big Move, 2000, p. 53).
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To increase connectivity - the much cited benefit from airline partnerships - allies should
ideally be situated in the same terminal, should share or operate neighbouring lounges and
should have concentrated aircraft stands and common handling operations.If However,
congested airports with dispersed and size constrained terminal infrastructure do not always
allow for alliance partners' closely positioned check-in, waiting and service facilities.
Especially European airports, which were habitually built close to city centres, are very size
constrained, and were never designed to be classic transfer hubs. Partnerships thus most often
find themselves in the situation of not being able to offer convenient connectivity due to
airport layouts that simply do not allow for inter-partnership transfer (see Baker, Slow
Shuffle, 2000).
The notion of alliance terminals has long been the focus of airline partnership management.
The requirement of physical closeness of alliance partners at airports best demonstrates
adhesion between allies and allows for untroubled passenger service. On the other hand,
airport authorities need to realise that it is also for their benefit that alliances are situated in
close vicinity to each other. An increase in transfer traffic via alliance hubs highlights the
airport's importance and enlarges its revenue stream. The negotiation process for terminal
space has thus changed. Airport authorities are now dealing with groups of carriers, for which
facilities have to be provided. In some instances, however, the co-operation of airport
management is described as reluctant, with preferential treatment being given to the home
carrier - particularly at government-controlled airports. Airlines have to be aware of this
situation.
Airport re-design and extension must be considerate in fulfilling the accommodation needs of
the ever-growing alliances, while carriers themselves must lobby and manage their specific
plans to collaboratively smoothen passenger service and ground handling. This is why in
Some multilateral partnerships special staff are assigned to implement alliance relocation
programmes at airports. These airport task groups within multilateral partnerships co-ordinate
the co-operation between airport authorities, ground-handling agencies and partnering airlines
in all airport-related issues. Lufthansa has followed a unique route in the lobbying of its
alliance airport needs by jointly developing and building the new terminal at Munich airport
with the local airport owner (see Pinar, 2000).
122 According to some industry executives, smooth baggage transfer among airline partners, in particular, is the
most important issue to be solved in airport operations in order to deliver seamless travel within an alliance (see
Buyck, The big Move, 2000, p. 53).
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Airline partnerships have to focus on the closeness of their collaboration before deciding on
cost intensive, collaborative airport measures. While it can be a long-term venture to develop
or build an alliance airport infrastructure, the partnership itself might not endure. Before
negotiating or planning common alliance terminal layouts, carriers have to ascertain the
sustainability of the partnership. Initially, an accurate partnership fitness evaluation should
have proven the potential stability of the collaboration, while partnership management should
have built-in safeguards for the partnership's perseverance. As environmental factors can
influence the cohesion of allies, the partnership should be evaluated with regard to its
durability prior to engaging in airport-related investments. Provisions regarding the flexible
layout of the alliance airport appearance in case of changes in the partnership composition
have to be taken into consideration. On the other hand, airlines must strongly and individually
make their alliance demands known to airport authorities in order for them to accommodate
the alliance's needs.
5.6.9 Collaboration in Sourcing and Outsourcing Non-Core Functions
As previously discussed (see 3.4 and figure 4.4), non-core business functions, of which
vertically-orientated production input is a component, have always been a part of an airline's
proprietary value chain. Historically, airlines thus had a high production depth. Swissair
Group, the holding company of Swissair, was a very diversified company offering a wide
range of services to its own holdings and investments, to airline partners in the Qualiflyer
Group, as well as to third parties (see Machatschke, 2000). It is not only since the financial
problems faced by the Swissair Group at the beginning of 2001 and its subsequent demise -
which was substantially due to its scattered holding structure - that the airline industry has
opposed maintaining in-house diversification. Increased demand for market orientation
brought about by deregulation and intensified competition, forced airlines to divest from
business units with supporting functions. Simultaneously, new possibilities arose to source
airline input factors cost-effectively through markets, with B2B online solutions being among
the latest trends. Consequently, airlines, with some exceptions, deliberately reduced their
production depth through outsourcing or procurement via third parties.
In part, airlines are suspicious of outsourcing, as they fear relinquishing their authority over
traditionally controllable business units and input factors. Concerns about dependency and
appropriation caused by the sourcing of products and services that were once integral parts of
the value chain, furthermore highlight airlines' reluctance (see Pilling, Drive to Outsource,
2002, p. 38 and for outsourcing strategies see Rutner and Brown, 1999). In some way, airline
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partnerships can present an answer. Acquiring services or products from an alliance partner
can, to a certain degree, guarantee compliance with quality standards and fair and reliable
business conduct. Outsourcing within a partnership can additionally help to reduce transaction
costs, since business interactions have already been established among the transacting
partners. Reciprocal partnership reliance likewise propagates outsourcing within airline
collaboration. Accordingly, both formal and informal influence can be exercised on the
quality of the outsourced product or service.
Standardisation is seen as another positive aspect of intra-partnership product and service
sourcing. While costs are generally positively affected by standardised high volume output,
standardisation in multilateral partnerships' commitment to core-product and value-added
product harmonisation signifies advantageous aspects as well. Implementation of
collaborative efforts in service and product design as well as in IT aspects is thus facilitated.
Especially with regard to the above-mentioned IT integration, standardisation of products
sourced within the partnership can avoid interface and implementation obstacles. Lufthansa's
subsidiary, Lufthansa Systems, increasingly provides IT solutions to members of the Star
. Alliance, furnishing them with the quality of a standardised product and allowing them to
adapt more easily to one another. This applies to ground handling and catering as well. Many
members of the Star Alliance have consequently switched to the services of GlobeGround or
SkyChefs, Lufthansa's respective ground handling and catering subsidiaries, in order to reach
a higher level of standardisation.
Pooling resources for the development and production of non-core business functions within a
partnership structure can also facilitate addressing the concerns regarding outsourcing.
Pooling generally helps to best allocate resources and to concentrate know-how within a
given group of partners and can drive the attainment of a critical size (see Steininger, 1999, p.
344). Best practices in separate parts of the air transport value chain are often spread over the
entire alliance. Lufthansa is, for example, known for its technical expertise, while Singapore
Airlines is globally renowned for its above-standard inflight service. Consolidating best
practices to make them freely available within a partnership adds qualitative as well as
quantitative advantages. Joining intra-partnership products and service procurement, further
guarantees that allies will gain sufficient control over price and quality.
The demand to procure services and products jointly is probably one of the most basic and
trivial motivators for collaboration, and yet the most difficult to implement. Reality proves
that these theoretical concepts are far from being practically implemented. While outsourcing
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and procurement through markets are increasingly well organised, intra-partnership strategies
to commonly reap these benefits have not become highly sophisticated. Individual airlines
establish and use, e.g., B2B portals, but do not do so in their individual alliance sphere. The
potential of collaboratively souring input factors thus remains largely untouched.
In constituting the above-mentioned areas of collaboration in procurement, pooling and even
outsourcing, some prerequisites have to be fulfilled. Alliance partners can only benefit from
joint action once specifications and logistics as well as distribution concepts have been
harmonised. It is equally important for alliance partners to compare costs for which they are
individually billed. However, this seems to be the core problem in procurement alliances.
Airline partners are not willing to procure jointly and openly, as they often do not wish to
disclose expenditures to their partners, which especially applies to aircraft (see Steininger,
1999, p. 346).
Alliance partners need to undergo a paradigm shift in order to take full advantage of the
positive effects of procurement collaboration. Changing paradigms requires that an alliance
partner deliberately offers its products and services within the group of allies. Airlines would
be more likely to use the products or services of a befriended alliance partner, than those of
unknown suppliers, or business partners. The relationship between the partners should be
accustomed to identifying each other's needs and to developing superior products on a
partnership-wide scale. Personal contacts with alliance partners should be used to sell and
source products and services. This gives transacting airlines significant competitive
advantages over external suppliers, especially if the transactions are of mutual interest. On the
one hand, the procuring carrier increases its attractiveness as an ally in a partnership, and, on
the other hand, the producing carrier provides the receiving carrier with a sense of trust and
security. Each individual airline could thus establish itself in a buyer/seller matrix of
relationships among all partners.
5.6.10 Collaboration-enhancing Human Resources Management
Human resources issues have been repeatedly described as obstacles to efficient partnership
operations. The immanent danger of opportunistic personal behaviour in all matters of
collaboration stems from the reluctance of staff to collaborate with erstwhile competitors.
While the importance of staff-related issues in alliance operations is well known to allies,
little is done to redress the problems associated with them. Individually and/or
collaboratively, advanced human resources management can mitigate the risk of anti-
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collaborative staff behaviour. Accordingly, interairline partnerships require a special class of
personnel management to successfully prepare, negotiate, handle and control collaborations.
The two spheres represent discrete, yet linked, demands made of human resources in
interairline alliances: skills and attitude. Skills are embedded in a company, a group of
employees, or a particular person. Ideally, alliance management skills should incorporate (see
Spencer Stuart, 2001):
•
Strategic viewpoint and VISIOn:understanding where and how value can be created
through synergies among carriers (see Spekman et al., 1998, p. 764)
Marketing knowledge: specifically cross-marketing, branding and, ultimately, sales issues
Operations skills: in a nutshell, to operationally ensure that the promise of seamless travel
is kept
Technological proficiency: with specific regard to IT
Understanding in handling regulatory bodies
Experience with labour relations and labour strategies, in particular in connection with
alliance-based labour negotiations and action, as well as innovative value propositions
(see examples in Hom and Barkin, 1998)
Mediating skills in balancing the needs of the individual airline and the overall partnership
network
Ability to handle politics within the airline and the partnership, as well as dealing with the
dynamics of a group of parties
Good relationship management skills: building consensus with employees, layers of
management, and different cultures; convincing staff within the partnership that the
alliance is important and wielding authority to commit the airline to the partnership
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
While the first of the above-mentioned skills are functional line or staff skills, and general
business knowledge gained from educational background and experiences, the latter are
competencies to handle the intensely social nature of partnerships. These are, to some degree,
unteachable diplomatic skills in social adeptness, flexibility, persistence, determination and
result orientation - ultimately a social and alliance mindset (see MacAvoy, 1997, p. 13 and
Spekman et al., 1998, pp. 764-765).
Consequently, executive partnership managers must be carefully selected, which might be a
difficult, but not impossible task. However, aligning the attitude and perception of the
workforce remains complex. Partnership deficiency is often attributed to lack of staff
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commitment, whether sales personnel do not collaboratively distribute the partnership's
products, check-in staff lack responsibility for partnership-related issues, or cabin crews do
not sufficiently recognise the demands of partners' passengers on board. Especially front-end
employees, who are in direct client contact, have the potential to convey either a positive,
united and flawless image of the airline collaboration or the apposite - that the partnership is
merely a loose collaboration between individual carriers.
Image-damaging action visible to the consumer most probably has immediate effects on
collaboration. What is, however equally, dangerous to a partnership operation, is a lack of
commitment by commercial or technical staff. The possibilities of such a lack of commitment
are multifarious. Technical staff might not give as much attention to maintenance details vis-
a-vis a partnering carrier as to the own airline; infrastructure planning might not include the
partner's demands to a satisfactory extent, or general communication with an ally might be
tardy and inefficient. A third category, which affects the latter two, is a lack of organisational
structures for partnership action. While, e.g., two carriers are global allies, organisational
structures might not allow for the carriers' sales managers to co-ordinate their activities in
third-country markets.123 Furthermore, a dearth of resources and commitment might not allow
for the establishment, or proper internal and external partnership management of structures.
Key questions are how and from where the human resources opposition to partnerships
originates. The most obvious answer seems to be the general reluctance to act amicably
towards former competitors. Aviation has long been without significant competition through
regulative separation and protection. After deregulation, however, global rivalry and profit
orientation lead to increasingly aggressive competitive configurations. To enhance staff
commitment and to increase output, these new competitive circumstances were well
propagated by top management. However, after alliances have been formed, thoroughly
established foe images need to be abruptly relinquished, which leads to staff facing
conversion dilemmas. Competitive stereotypes are difficult to eradicate and personnel, at least
for a transitional period, cannot easily adapt to the new situation.
123 An example serves to illustrate this situation: two closely allied European carriers, both operating services to
South Africa, did not have any managerial structures or tools in place to give either their South African sales
managers or regional general managers the opportunity to co-ordinate their sales action in the local market. As
alliance-related issues were the responsibility of the Europe-based alliance management departments, the local
staffs' hands were tied as far as the co-ordination of their activities was concerned.
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Secondly, the new collaborative status competes with the brand-based self-image. Airlines
have long built strong corporate identities based on product quality and status, which have
been emotionalised, externally as well as internally (see e.g. for Southwest Airlines Flint and
Donoghue, 1997, p. 43). Airline employees see a dilution of their brand self-image through
partnerships, especially those collaborations incorporating brand consolidation, umbrella
brand or superbrand concepts. Whether or not justified, the results are usually prejudiced,
destructive behaviour towards the passengers and staff of the collaborating airline.
Thirdly, staff perceive collaborations as jeopardising their own position. While cost-
effectiveness is a keyword in collaborations, personnel, especially in high-wage European and
North American countries, fear retrenchment due to outsourcing. Negative consequences
originating from this perception might lead to action by individual staff members and by trade
unions (see Hom and Barkin, 1998 and Spencer Stuart, 2001, p. 81).
Fourthly, employees have difficulties in understanding a partner firm's business culture and
its employees' societal and ethnic culture (see Bell, 2000, p. 106). While cultural fitness is
one of the most important suitability criteria, and top-level management might be able to cope
with the challenges of different cultures, this is not necessarily so for the wider personnel
base. The mere fact that a partner's corporate language is foreign to staff, can lead to friction.
This is equally applicable to communicational standards, bartering and simple dress codes,
which may potentially lead to destructive behaviour.
This is why sophisticated human resources management, organisational structures and general
governance as well as internal communication should offset any kind of negative effect on
horizontal partnerships. Communication seems to be one of the most important of the latter.
Unless airlines are multilaterally organised under an umbrella brand, education regarding
partnership issues is more the exception than the rule. The goals, the content and the members
of the partnership must be systematically communicated to all employee levels. Cultural
differences should be actively disclosed in order for staff to comprehend specifications in
interacting with the partner - also by way of dedicated culture management. According to the
above, it is not just a necessity to train and inform front-end staff about the alliance, but the
entire workforce should be included. A comprehensive partnership spirit must be built with
total dedication from top leadership and information must be continuously provided to the
staff in case of ad hoc inquiries as well as more detailed requests.
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The possibility of motivation through gratification for collaboration-enhancing behaviour
should be envisaged for some functions. Another form of motivation and enhancement of
staff knowledge regarding the collaboration is to exchange staff from all hierarchy levels
among partners, possibly on a rotational basis. Some of the multilateral networks provide
platforms for staff get-togethers, also by means of regular meetings in a demonstratively
informal atmosphere, e.g. Lufthansa's Partner Forum. The organisers' key intention is to
familiarise participating staff with the partner's ethnic and business culture and to become
acquainted with one another.
Airline partnerships have to appreciate the driving as well as the sanctioning potential of staff
in airline collaborations. While the degree of conceivable staff sanctions varies with an
airline's individual position in a partnership, managerial structures and communicational tools
need to be in place to mitigate the risk of negative effects on collaborations.
5.6.11 Joint Policies vis-a-vis Regulatory and Competition Authorities
The current legal and regulatory environment mitigates the possibilities of airlines operating
freely and consolidating in a manner that has long been a standard in other industries. There
are indeed carriers that still prosper under regulated global air transport competition, but for
most carriers, and certainly for passengers, the current status cannot be satisfactory. Airline
partnerships represent an attractive way to partly circumvent regulation, but in establishing
partnerships, airlines quickly encounter operational boundaries instituted by national
authorities trying to regulate air transport. The question is how carriers can jointly enhance
their position vis-a-vis regulatory bodies, in order to advance their collaboration and
ultimately to be offered ways to true consolidation.
Liberalisation has been spurred by the existence of airline partnerships. Airline collaboration
reflects the evolution of carriers in a global network industry. The USA in the early 1990s
particularly wanted to improve service for travellers and shippers, while maintaining its
leadership role in international air service. These two issues, globalisation and sustaining
competitiveness were only achievable through partnerships, which airlines had been building
for some time, and which needed to be encouraged and facilitated. Access and traffic rights
were thus required to address business and passenger requirements. Nationally, the trends that
were experienced in aviation induced new paradigms in giving carriers business opportunities.
Consequently, liberal air service understandings - particularly open skies agreements - were
desired means by which to equip the airline industry with the required operational freedom.
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Open skies agreements, specifically for traffic with the USA, are usually tied to antitrust
immunity granted to individual airline partnerships. KLM and Northwest Airlines were
pioneers in this field, as they motivated their application for antitrust immunity with their
strategic goals to exploit the potential benefits of their partnership more fully. In 1996,
pressure from Lufthansa and United Airlines spurred the German government to bring
forward the implementation of a full open skies agreement with the USA (see Doganis, 2001,
p. 35). In January 2002, Air France and Delta Air Lines received antitrust immunity from the
USA, paving the way for open skies agreements between France and the USA.
On the other hand, partnerships have also hindered the development of modern, liberal air
traffic accords. The case of the bilateral quarrels between the UK and the USA strongly
hinges on the application for antitrust immunity by British Airways and American Airlines.
The USA made their approval of the application conditional, which for now has been rejected
by the carriers.l'" Horizontal airline collaborations thus have certainly stimulated more
liberalised ASA, with passengers and competitors benefiting. Co-ordinated behaviour towards
state authorities advances the applicants' positions, but also can push open new opportunities
for other market players. It is this connection that makes airline partnerships generally, and
specifically by co-ordinating their behaviour, valued as one of the most important drivers to
further deregulation and liberalisation of the global air transport markets. Figure 5.6 depicts
this connection.
Figure 5.6: Deregulation and Liberalisation Spiral
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liberalised &
deregulated
Markets
Source: own figure
124 As of February 2002.
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5.6.12 Realisation and Distribution of Benefits in Airline Partnerships
The realisation of benefits from interairline partnerships by distributing the gains is of great
importance, initially for the choice of the partnership and thereafter during its operation. This
demand, although logical and trivial, can be difficult to achieve, particularly considering the
organisational and commercial set-up and the determinants leading to the success and failure
of airline collaborations. Whereas the incorporation of a joint venture as an independent
entrepreneurial entity allows for the distribution of benefits based on the initial input of the
collaborating firms, the situation for airlines and their occasionally loose collaborations is
somewhat different.
While the provision of input factors, such as flight equipment, can rotate or alter among allies,
and seats in, e.g., codeshare free-sale agreements can be distributed through various channels,
a pre-determined quantification of benefits by the common operation is almost impossible to
achieve. Quantification becomes even more intricate through the inherent characteristics of an
airline's products. The air transport product's features of batch production and simultaneity of
output and consumption specifically yield certain difficulties in quantifying the benefits of
horizontal interairline collaboration. Before accurate benefit distribution can be carried out,
performance tracking systems, measuring the value of the partnership, need to be in place.
The notion of fairly portioning the benefits among partners is important from a profit
generation, cost-effectiveness and market access perspective. However, what is equally
important is the avoidance of opportunistic behaviour and the inducement of collaborative
action among partners (see Doganis, 2001, p. 220). The fact that airline partnerships are prone
to and allow for multiple areas of expedient conduct was previously discussed. Especially
partnership action in overlapping networks can be influenced by the particular interests of the
allied parties. Pre-defined equitable apportionment of gains can provide closer binds among
partners, enhance trust and harmony and can decrease transaction costs of a permanent and
recurring negotiation of benefit allotment (see Gahl, 1990, p. 67).
Different models of revenue sharing have thus been developed to avoid friction among
partners, to provide incentives to stay in a collaborative relationship and to tackle the
technical and operational challenges of fairly distributing benefits. However, revenue sharing
needs regulatory approval, particularly for multi-connecting O&D markets, as pooled and
shared revenue on certain legs can lead to anti-competitive behaviour by airline partnerships.
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Incremental revenue sharing apportions the incremental benefits of a collaboration. A basis
for benefit allocation is usually defined upon the results of the individual airlines' reference
period prior to collaborating. After implementing the alliance, an evaluation of the extent to
which benefits have developed from the collaboration, needs to be conducted. The change in
revenue will be shared according to an initially agreed model between the operating and
marketing carrier in a codeshare agreement and other partners in a multilateral collaboration.
Incremental revenue sharing is an easy tool with which to distribute benefits among partners,
but it is a comparably weak incentive for airlines to behave co-operatively. As the incremental
revenue generated by the partnership is small in most instances, airlines do not feel a strong
motivation to discontinue opportunistic behaviour (see Steininger, 1999, p. 368-371, see
example, ibid.).
Total revenue sharing does not just divide the incremental, but also the total revenue for a
given spectrum of flights operated collaboratively. Which flights will be included in the
calculation largely depends on negotiations of the partnering carriers. A possible spectrum of
integrated flights can range from selected intercontinental flights, flights operated only in
overlapping parts of the networks, to comprehensively including all flights in a partnering
carrier's network. The share is based on pro-ratio calculations which are predicated on, for
example, original capacity (ASK) and class mix, original yield mix, original load factor, hub
attractiveness, brand status of an alliance partner or strength of the sales organisation (see
example in Steininger, 1999, p. 371). Essentially, a revenue sharing model has to take into
account the individual production and sales input. The establishment of a fair sharing model
can thus entail a larger number of parameters, which have to be taken into consideration in
order for airlines to receive an impartial compensation for their collaborative action. A
systematic approach, supported by IT structures and linked to other IT systems, can thus be
difficult. No participating carrier should be worse off - after being compensated - than before
the partnership and the distribution of benefits must mirror the individual carriers'
contribution to the network.
Profit-sharing is probably the most intensive form of benefit distribution. As costs and income
are shared, this form practically emulates a merger. Striving for an optimisation of the overall
partnership result rather than the individual members' results, is a key demand for
constructive collaboration. This form of benefit distribution thus indeed has positive aspects.
The system - if not adjusted to a pre-partnership situation - has inherent difficulties, especially
once partners' cost structures - formally and quantitatively - differ drastically. A carrier would
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have to be responsible for a partner's inefficient cost management and would sacrifice parts of
its own benefits. This, in turn, would decrease the incentives for partners to enhance their
product quality and their internal organisation. Similarly to the above-mentioned revenue
sharing tools, profit-sharing should therefore ideally calculate the historical status of income
and cost prior to entering the partnership as well as the exchange of information on an
individual airline's future financial commitments.
The organisational set-up of the benefit distribution schemes mentioned above can be
multifarious. One key demand for revenue or profit-sharing systems is to be linked to flexible
revenue or yield management systems. This is a demand which is not easy to fulfil,
considering the constraints to sharing these competition-sensitive data.
A solution could be to appoint an independent service bureau with the task of sharing
revenues. This neutral third party could induce the airline partners to keep score of the
benefits and costs and how they are distributed. The entity would include representatives from
each of the partners and would be charged with maximising the net benefits of the alliance
and helping the partners to reach agreements on the distribution of benefits. To facilitate the
process, it would create and operate a formal system defined by the sum of the alliance's
parts, the constraints, endowments and opportunities of each of the partners - and the single
objective of maximising joint benefits. The formal system could typically be based on
different cases. The historic case would calibrate the system by replicating the market shares
and revenues of the allies before the partnership. A base case adjusts for actual and-
contemplated changes in the competitive environment, assuming that the partnership has not
yet been formed. The alliance case finally accounts for the benefits of the partnership by
estimating the changes in market shares, revenues to the individual parties and changes in
passenger composition (see.Berardino and Frankel, Keeping Score, 1998, pp. 83-84).
In short, a commonly agreed formula for quantifying and re-allocating partnership benefits to
individual members will need to be devised in order to underscore the mutual benefits of the
alliance to each of the partners. The formula for benefit allocation must be based on a
composite of individual carrier performance - historically as well as currently - measured
against agreed performance objectives as well as overall partnership profitability (see
Berardino and Frankel, Alliances: The Next Step, 1998, p. 71).
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5.7 Summary and Implications
Interairline partnerships are currently the main competitive device in the passenger arr
transport industry. Their formation and operation should consequently receive the highest
attention. Evidence suggests, however, that airlines lack partnership configurational and
managerial capabilities from the outset of the collaboration until its end. This is why the
section above described key procedural and configurational issues spanning the entire
collaborative life-cycle.
Interairline partnerships, due to their often loosely structured nature, do not effectively exploit
all potential gains from their collaboration. Usually this can be explained by the inability to
grasp the entire beneficial partnership capacity in all collaborative areas, and on the other
hand, by the friction among allies that prohibits smooth partnership operation. However, the
two issues often concur. A lack of harmony, the inability to reap full gains and the ultimate
failure of partnerships, underscore the fact that civil passenger airlines have not yet managed
to internalise the key demands of horizontal collaboration. While the macro environment and
the industry itself are currently not ready to face the challenges of real market-driven
concentration, the successful command of partnership capabilities becomes even more of a
competitive advantage. Only those carriers and networks that implement best practices in
collaboration configuration will be at the forefront of competition once true consolidation is
established.
The above discussion has delineated some core aspects of partnership set-up and operation
that assist airlines to better achieve mutually acceptable results from collaboration. The clear
definition and internalisation of prerequisites and success factors in airline partnerships can
essentially lead to the avoidance of conflict and the improvement of the realisation of
partnership returns. In the best case, airlines intensively formalise the process of establishing
and operating horizontal partnerships on the basis of the previously-described issues, ideally,
following the mentioned sequence of events. Formalisation would entail the establishing of
self-evaluation and partnership due diligence processes, demarcation of the range of possible
collaboration areas, and the dedication to the forms and intensity of the partnership.
Discrete stages of concluding partnership activities and selecting appropriate allies must be
followed to avoid rushed decisions and inappropriate collaborative orientation. In the earliest
stages, partner fitness assessment can detect suitability in the light of the allies' respective
strategies, their individual characteristics and the envisaged type of co-operation. The
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6 The Synergy Audit Model - a Framework for Assessing
Linkages in Interairline Partnerships
6.1 Introduction
Synergy is a popular term, especially in connection with the motivations for, performance
patterns and results of collaborative company activities. But while synergy is regularly
referred to, the terminology lacks proper description in the context of horizontal
collaborations. Despite synergies surfacing in many collaborative' functions, and thus
appearing in various quantitative and qualitative evidences, there is no overarching concept
nor an overall measure suggesting the potentiality of synergy. Furthermore, models associated
with the detection and continued assessment of synergies during a partnership's entire life-
cycle are currently non-existent.
The need for managerial capabilities to govern and advance interairline linkages to essentially
enhance the benefits of their collaboration has been indicated (see 5.6). The distinguished
requirements can now be addressed by scrutinising the synergy nomenclature in its various
descriptive dimensions. In addition, the findings made lead to the development of a model to
detect and enhance synergy in airline partnerships - the synergy audit.
The synergy audit consists of a number of individual parts and causal relations that are
subsequently discussed and delineated. The focus of the synergy audit is on the synergy
concept as a nucleus. It additionally incorporates a synopsis of the previous chapters'
findings, particularly those referring to prerequisites and success factors. Based on a
distillation of collaborative drivers and the most suitable configuration of interairline
I
partnerships, a framework for detection and advancement of collaborative benefits can be
conceptualised.
Epistemologically, the methodology used is as introduced. The combined analysis of both
primary, empirical data and secondary sources of information forms a synthesis towards the
development of a synergy audit (see chapter 1.5 for the methodology and the appendix for the
interview guideline). The development of the support tool A.PIE (Airline Partnership
Intensity Evaluator) was assisted by another round of intensive discussions with recognised
industry experts.
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6.2 Synergy - a Description with Special Reference to Company
Interrelationships
The term synergy is of Greek origin and is composed of syn, meaning with or together, and
ergon, which means deed/work/opus or to be active. In essence it means "to work together".
Synergy is thus equivalent in meaning to the term co-operation. Etymologically originating
from the Latin co, for together, and operari, to work, co-operation means "to work or act
together toward a common end or purpose" (see The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language, 2000). Both terms thus have etymologically equivalent meanings: "concur
or co-action". The combined usage, in particular in business science, occurs regularly -
tautology notwithstanding (for an intensive empirical study on the terminological usage of
synergy, see Rodermann, 1999, pp. 10-35 and for tautologies, see Bierck, 1999).
The term synergy finds application in every scientific discipline, but is only metaphorically
used in a similar fashion. Social sciences, natural sciences and theology use the terminology
synergy in related, yet different connotations (see Sandler, 1991, pp. 8-10 and Rodermann,
1999, pp. 36-37). Synergy in social sciences, for example, describes the co-action of groups
and individuals as well as creative processes such as problem-solving mechanisms (see Krebs,
1996, pp. 14-16). Natural sciences apply the term synergetics to outline the interaction of
research matters from distinct disciplinary perspectives (see Rodermann, 1995, pp. 258-259).
Synergy, for example, has come into medical usage to describe the combined action of organs
- e.g., to produce circulation - or joints - to produce movement. In pharmacology, synergy
describes indications caused by the joint usage of two or more drugs. The biological meaning
refers to unique species in an ecosystem that adapt and coexist (see Eisenhardt and Galunic
2000, p. 92).
The aforementioned disciplines all employ synergy in a neutral, descriptive way. The focus is
on the delineation of the interaction of the respective objectives of scrutiny, either intra-
disciplinary or inter-disciplinary. However, all definitions or individual utilisation have their
systematic perspective in common. Synergy as a terminology describing the act and the
results of working together should always be een within formal boundaries. A more
practically-oriented definition of synergy could consequently be the "( ...) behaviour of whole
systems unpredicted by the behaviour of their parts taken separately" (Buckminster Fuller
1975, p. 8). This delineation mirrors the original impartial meaning of synergy.
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Business science also employs a systematic descriptive approach, although paired with a
qualitative synergy appraisal. Synergy is now entrenched in management jargon and the
investment community where it is used prolifically as well as indiscriminately (see Campbell
and Luchs, 1992). Narrowly defined, the integration of at least two intellectual or physical
value creation processes by jointly using production factors, should lead to cost savings
and/or revenue enhancements in a given period (see Ropella, 1989, p. 21 and Osegowitsch,
2001, p. 18).
The often cited 2+2=5 arithmetic - as a synonym for synergy - dates back to 1965, when
business scientist Igor H. Ansoff described synergy as the main component of his product-
market expansion strategy options. The embedded synergy theory denotes that a firm seeks a
market posture, where the combined performance of current and future strategic business
units should be greater than the sum of the individual partS.125 Synergy is thus a benefit - the
additional value increment - to be achieved by interrelationships between business units of a
single firm (see Ansoff, 1965, p. 75, Goold and Campbell, 1998, p. 132, Rodermann, 1999, p.
40). The co-operational sphere of this concept is limited to intra-firm collaboration,
supporting conceptualised expansion strategies such as product/market development, market
penetration and diversification strategies. Synergy, according to Ansoff, is correspondingly
"(i..) concerned with the desired characteristics of fit between the firm and its new product-
market entries" (Ansoff, 1965, p. 75).
Initially, synergies were evaluated according to the firm's strategic intent. While highest
synergies were expected to be achieved in market penetration strategies, diversification was
supposed to produce, synergistically, the least benefits (see RopeIla, 1989, pp. 178-179). Firm
diversification, however, became part of competitive strategies in the 1970s. Synergies were
thereafter also pursued in creating competitive advantage and superior performance in
diversified, multi-business firms. In due course, a number of research efforts attempted to
scrutinise the positive effects of resource sharing in multi-business firms (for an overview of
resource sharing, see Ensign, 1998). However, the synopsis of all basic synergy concepts,
namely the benefits or interrelationships between business units and product-market
expansion as well as resource sharing in diversified firms, leads to the notion to uncover a
125 The performance figure used by Ansoffwas Return on Investment (ROt). A portfolio of strategic business
units accordingly heralds positive synergies if the ROJ of the portfolio with synergies is higher than the ROJ of
the portfolio without synergies (see Ansoff, 1965, p. 31, 38). ~
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heuristic criterion with which to evaluate alternatives in the strategic decisions of a single
company.
This school of thought has triggered the founding of synergy management, which, in contrast
to the widely practised portfolio management, aims at positively utilising diversification while
decreasing complexity by identifying affinities within the firm (see Hirzel, Leder & Partner
(Hrsg.), 1993, Vizjak, 1994, RoB!, 1994, Rodermann, 1995, pp. 304-309, Goold and
Campbell, 2000). The concept of synergy management denotes that the economics of one
business in a symbiotically beneficial relationship with another business is based on sharing
and exchanging business resources (see Clarke and Brennan, 1990, p. 11). Sharing resource
conceptually implies to contribute to the 2+2=5 equation, whereby organisational structures,
and personnel group action can support that quest by identifying product and market affinities
and by developing corresponding strategies (see Ropella, 1989, pp. 176-188 and
Osegowitsch, 2001). Synergy management explicitly entails joint, co-ordinated action, and is
thus strongly concerned with interrelationships inside the firm. Co-evolution, with reference
to biological symbiotic relationships (species help one another in a mutually advantageous
manner) and their development, has also been recently used to describe synergetic intra-
business relationships. Synergies are accordingly achieved by establishing a culture of
creative and fair collaboration and competition within multi-business firms and between their
units (see Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000).
In a wider functional interpretation, which has emerged into the more popular definition,
business synergies also entail the effects of external collaborative strategies.V" The original
arithmetic is accordingly regularly altered into 1+1=3 for a one-to-one intercompany
partnership. Collaborative strategies are consequently more competitive relative to other
configurations. The common reference to win-win solutions in collaborations essentially
describes the positive aspects of partnerships (see e.g. Lorange and Roos, 1991, p. 64). The
fundamental maxim of business scientific synergy concepts - the total being bigger than the
sum of the individual parts - thus remains applicable, also for external growth. An evaluation
of synergy for envisaged collaborative action is consequently the key in deciding on the
feasibility of a collaborative venture. Synergy thus serves as a guiding premise in external
growth strategies, just as much as it positively describes the benefits of internal growth.
126 Ansoff's description of synergy is often misinterpreted to originally entail synergies occurring in external
growth. It is, however, focused on interrelationships between firm units in the firm's product-market strategy.
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Conceptually, acquisitions, mergers, or collaborations are consequently only justifiable ifthey
result in a satisfying level of synergy between the firm entities (see Mahajan and Wind, 1988,
p.59).
Whether for internal or external growth, a delineation of synergy must also explicitly honour
the existence of negative collaborative factors. Disadvantageous determinants can be
described as dissynergies pertaining to operational disturbances, original conflicts, adaptation
or integration problems and expenditures such as any co-ordination and compromise costs
(see Lutz, 1993, p. 183, Goold and Campbell, 1998, p. l31, Osegowitsch, 2001, p. 18). It is
comprehensible that win-win situations from collaborative activities can occasionally only be
achieved to the detriment of certain value chain activities, organisational, managerial and
personnel structures (see Vizjak, 1994, pp. 32-33). Business science, however, has strongly
dressed synergy with positive attributes, where the combined effects of interaction between
forces or agents are greater than the sum of the individual parts. Synergy is consequently
created when activities that have relatedness are shared, or organisational structures, cultural
and strategic orientations - either intra-firm or interfirm - can be beneficially combined. To
underscore its positive business science connotation, synergy is thus the positive aggregate of
beneficial and disadvantageous parameters in collaborative action. Clearly, the benefits of
sharing must outweigh the costs of co-ordination and other dissynergies, thus resulting in a
positive balance of the advantages and disadvantages of a collaboration, essentially creating a
net advantage.
However, this notion should not lead to the conclusion that synergy is a singular, discrete
motivator for collaboration, equivalent to quantifiable motivations of cost reduction, revenue
generation and, more qualitatively, circumvention of regulatory barriers. Synergy is certainly
likely to be explicitly mentioned as a key motivator and goal in company collaborations, but,
again, the usage is often tautological. Cost-effectiveness in collaboration is a synergy, as are a
combination of revenue generation and knowledge transfer. Synergy is a generic term for the
net advantage of varying collaborative activities.
The business science connotation of synergy implies a conjunctive symbiotic meaning,
whereas entities involved in the collaboration (business units, individual firms, and persons)
have an association of mutual benefit. While following this delineation, specific interairline
synergies can be described in a more detailed fashion.
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6.2.1 Dimensions of Synergy Potential and Synergy Effects
The aforementioned definition of synergy and its motivational character has naturally found
application in airline collaborations. Synergy considerations are ideally at the heart of
corporate strategies and playa leading role in partnership activities (see Leibold and Slabbert,
1994, p. 2, Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000, p. 91). The quest to enhance performance by jointly
employing production factors and resources, both internally and externally, has been
strategised by international passenger airlines for some time. The initial decision to undertake
collaborative action and the subsequent commitment to partnership fitness or relatedness
should at all times heed the specific benefits of collaboration (see Harrison et al., 2001, pp.
680-681). Consequently, partnership synergies need to be discovered and planned in the
preparatory phase of the collaboration. In subsequent collaboration stages, airlines must
maintain their focus on identifying and enhancing synergy. Interairline partnership synergies
must be concomitant to the entire collaborative life-cycle (for alliance life-cycles, see
Spekman et al., 1998, pp.760-763).
The principal dimensions of synergy prior to entering a partnership and while being involved
in collaborative agreements are synergy potential and synergy effects.
Synergy potential describes the anticipated - ex ante - positive effects of exploiting the
benefits of future interrelationships of firms (for a definition see Rodermann, 1999, p. 124 and
Madhok and Tallman, 1998, p. 327). For airline partnerships, the initial evaluation of
partnership fitness or relatedness is, to a large extent, based upon initiatory synergy potential
recognition (see also Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993, p. 35). Here, the benefits of
interrelationships have to be balanced against diseconomies. The anticipation of advantageous
results from collaborative efforts either brings prospective partners together mutually, or
triggers unilateral courting.
The pursuit to match individual company characteristics is largely driven by the core
inducements to collaborate and the likely economic benefits. In a particular case, the
Comprehension of synergy potentials thus corresponds with the initial motivations to
collaborate and the partners' unique profiles. Synergy potential is therefore not necessarily
equally perceived by all partners. Allies' particular profiles, individual backgrounds, sizes,
value chains, and strategic orientations might only result in partially overlapping synergy
expectations (for benefit overlap, see Khanna, 1998, pp. 341-346). While one carrier might
purely seek a codeshare partner to generate and distribute traffic, its prospective ally might
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pursue further advantages, such as know-how transfer or future capital linkages, in the
process of its privatisation. The partners thus each have their own benefit expectations, while
they should certainly also strive towards common benefits. In most cases, the initial
complementarity of inter-business combinations and their benefit expectations are likely to
herald synergistic prospects (see Harrison et al. 2001, p. 680). In addition, the expected
benefits from collaborative action can change over time, migrating from operative to strategic
benefits, or increasingly including more parts of an airline's value chain. Partners learn from
each other, or undergo structural changes, either internally or externally (e.g. privatisation)
induced. The potential for mutually benefiting might thus change for either the benefit or to
the disadvantage of the collaboration. This is why an assessment of synergy potential should
not be exclusively and statically conducted at the outset of the partnership.
In the course of the collaboration, partnering firms should furthermore dynamically and
continuously seek and liberate further in situ synergy potential. The scope of any synergy
potential assessment is accordingly subject to changes. While initiatory synergy potential
evaluation is based on the cardinal motivations of the collaboration, the quest for synergy
potential in the course of the partnership can be a creative process of occasionally seeking
new and/or uncharted collaborative areas which promise further mutual benefits. Synergy
potential thus needs to be made a partnership-managerial topic, spanning the entire
collaboration life-cycle from its outset to the ultimate termination of the relationship.
Synergy effects are effectuated synergies or realised synergy potentials - in situ and/or ex
post. Synergy effects are thus the materialisation of synergy potential and chronologically
unfold in the later stages of the partnership (see Hirzel, 1993). The values of synergy effects
for the partnering firms are determined by their individual quantity and/or quality. However,
synergy effects are also partly determined by a temporal dimension. The actual time,
frequency and duration of their occurrence influence their momentum for the partners. In
addition, synergy realisation follows a progressive trajectory. In the start-up phase of resource
sharing, diseconomies can be rather high, which then have to be balanced against limited
benefits. Ideally, diseconomies should diminish in the operating stages of the partnership and
thus absolute synergies can be expected to be higher (see Vizjak, 1994, p. 32). In general, the
later synergy effects materialise, the more intermittently they arise, the shorter their duration,
the less they avail the collaborating parties (see Sandler, 1991, pp. 128-138).
This time frame and the realisation pattern of synergies are a critical parameter III
intercompany relationships and this parameter regularly leads to disturbances in partnerships.
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However, the time span that lies between the identification of synergy potentials and the
realisation of synergy effects greatly varies with the underlying synergy content or synergy
area (see Ropella, 1989, p. 223). While operative collaboration goals are rapidly
accomplishable, more complex, strategic objectives take more time to synergistically
materialise. Consequently, one key demand of synergy effects is to materialise as quickly and
as evenly as possible considering the individual temporal demands for the materialisation
process.
A further requirement of synergy effects is that they should be equal. Synergies, as the
positive effects of collaboration must qualitatively and quantitatively be symmetrical for all
the parties involved in the collaboration (see Bleeke and Ernst, 1995, p. 99 and Klein, 1996, p.
15). This demand is discussed in greater detail below (see 6.3).
Generally, in identifying synergy potentials and ultimately evaluating synergy effects, a
multidimensional, qualitative approach can be employed. The effective synergistic value can
only be assessed once the dimensions promise a profitable collaborative result. This
dimensional consideration, both for synergy potential and synergy effects, could exemplary
entail the following aspects with discrete parameter values (see Sandler, 1991, p. 129 and
Rodermann, 1999, p. 127):
•
Time of occurrence: immediately - later
Frequency of occurrence: once - recurring
Duration: transient - perpetual
Location of occurrence: internal - external (e.g. in external vs. external growth)
Abstract relation: qualitative - quantitative
Type: interdependent (describing the relationship between factors and processes) -
interactive (concerning the strategic company level)
Effect: positive (true synergies) - negative (diseconomies)
Form of appearance: costs (reduction) - revenue (enhancement) - power considerations
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Synergy dimensions can be made a useful tool in distinguishing synergies. They can serve as
a table of contents in identifying the characteristics of beneficial partnership action. However,
for collaborating airlines genuine applicability can only be achieved once the dimensional
consideration is paired with a functional perspective (see areas of synergy 6.2.4) and a
transparent quantification of synergies (see synergy measurement 6.2.5). A clearer
understanding of the potentials of synergy in interairline partnerships as well as of realised
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synergy effects can thus be delineated. The first step leading to a comprehensive synergy
audit model has now been taken with the description of the broad dimensions of what is
expected from interrelationships - synergy potentials - and what is actually produced by these
interrelationships -synergy effects.
6.2.2 Sources of Synergy
Sources of synergy represent the most elementary rationale and the first cognitive element in
the synergy concept. Sources of synergy recognise - for different collaborative areas - the
prime objectives, both qualitative and quantitative, for engaging in partnership action.
An interpretation of sources of synergy, thus their origin, firstly depends on the formal
definition of synergy. Synergy denoting the positive effects of internal growth strategies in
multi-business, diversified firms certainly leads to a different terminological deduction of its
sources than synergy as the benefits of external growth strategies (see Grote, 1990, pp. 72-77
and Spickers, 1994, pp. 43-45). External growth strategies also occur in a range of variants,
with specific focus on certain parts of the value chain and/or diversification intentions.
Collaborative directions obviously strongly impact on the unique sources of synergy that they
indicate. Subsequently, and in the context of this dissertation, synergies and their sources in
horizontal airline partnerships are scrutinised.
Sources of synergy have been repeatedly described by scholars as the fountain of
collaborative benefits. Size and scope effects, power and risk considerations, customer
satisfaction, circumvention of restrictive elements as well as collaborative compensation are
regularly mentioned as the source of positive effects from company interrelationships. In
theory, industry-focused synergy research thus regularly describes very individual sources of
synergy inherent in the particular branch it is scrutinising (see e.g. Meining and Rennert,
1990, pp. 73-74). However, all descriptions have in common that they essentially outline the
core motivations for collaborating (see e.g. Ropella, 1989, pp. 234-235, Grote, 1990, pp. 81-
86, Sandler, 1991, p. 5, pp. 28-94, Krebs, 1995, pp. 10-13). These core motivations can differ
according to the collaboration's general orientation, its anticipated life-span and the very
unique characteristics of the participating players. For the purpose of simplification, general
categories of synergy sources or motivations are used.
Motivations for airline collaboration were categorised and individually described (see 4.3.2).
They also serve as main categories of sources of synergy and entail the following:
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• Cost considerations (scale/scope effects)
Revenue motivations (scale/scope effects)
Market- and regulation-induced motivations
Power/strength motivations
•
•
•
Collaborative motivators, thus sources of synergies, are closely related to synergy potential.
Perceived sources of synergy mark the intellectual boundary for the definition of synergy
potential in a first, pre-collaborative stage of the partnership.
6.2.3 Arenas of Synergy
While sources of synergy describe the rationale behind synergy potentials, arenas of synergy
conceptualise influencing drivers in the detection and materialisation of synergies. Arenas of
synergy represent the universe in which benefits actually occur, in which they should occur in
interrelationships, or which ultimately affect synergies. These influencing drivers originate
from procedural considerations in creating value and are determined by other, secondary,
components as well as external dimensions.
A functional categorisation of synergies that is regularly employed, is built on a company's
value chain paired with other enhanced input factors, or secondary activities, such as
technology, human resources, capital and information. The airline value chain, supplemented
by secondary activities, are used to functionally define synergies. Potentially or actually,
synergies surface in these functional areas which are the domains that also determine the
qualitative and quantitative value of synergies.
The value chain system itself is embedded in the integration dimensions of corporate culture,
knowledge basis and corporate mission, representing the arenas of synergy creation (see
Spickers, 1994, p. 45 description and figure below). The convoluted structure of arenas
honours the interlinked characteristics of synergy, which are not only identified by the
confined core value creation process, but are also externally determined. Correspondingly,
synergy potential and effects are not exclusively produced by an airline's internal functions
alone, but also by occasionally intangible external and behavioural as well as attitudinal
factors. In researching the synergy environment, these integration dimensions are, however,
regularly neglected, as only the very procedural parameters are evaluated (see Spickers, 1994
pp. 44-45, Meining and Rennert, 1990, Ensign, 1998, p. 659). On the other hand, the success
of many airline alliances is greatly influenced by the e non-core business functional issues.
Especially in external growth strategies, which do not incorporate capital linkages, and thus
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lack strong formal binding, integration dimensions tend to steer the alliance towards
prosperity or failure.
The portfolio-type approach in defining and measuring synergies for segregated functional
areas is largely accountable for companies disregarding wider spheres in their consideration
of collaborative benefits. Confined approaches of concentrating on the mere functional
aspects of synergy creation do not produce satisfactory results. A lack of holistic perspective
by the drivers of partnership benefits, leads to non- or under-performance in uncovering
synergy potential and transferring them into synergy effects (see Lorange and Roos, 1991, p.
69).
Ideally, in revealing synergies, the following should be considered as part of synergy arenas:
• Corporate culture: a firm's culture must be amenable to and able to stimulate positive
effects from collaborative action. Airlines' specific susceptibility to the strong influences
of business and ethnic cultural factors, which play an important role in unleashing the
benefits of collaboration, has been discussed (see 5.3.2.3).
• Knowledge basis: knowledge needs to be present in order to detect and develop potential
partnership synergies. Best practice and skills sharing must support the quest for
collaborative action. An attitude of learning must support the aggregation of further
wisdom to day-to-day business, but also to the management and the advancement of the
collaboration itself (see Goold and Campbell, 1998, p. 132).
• Corporate mission: the corporate mission, embodying the strategic intent, needs to sustain
collaborative strategies, thus the initial decree to generate synergy through
interrelationships (see Goold and Campbell, 1998, p. 132). It has been proven that many
airline partnerships have been entered into on the basis of ad hoc necessity, rather than
well-reflected choice and strategic intent. Lack of a corporate mission, and supporting
partnership strategies, can thus have a negative impact on synergy creation.
In connection with partnership suitability, the earlier-described organisational fitness
essentially incorporates these integration dimensions. Only if a company is organisationally
suitable with regard to its collaborating culture, its strategic resolution to horizontally ally and
its knowledge base is capable of grasping the prerequisites, the requirements and the
procedural skills to collaborate, can synergies be mapped.
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Most important, however, is an issue that lies beyond integration dimensions and the value
chain system. Partnership intensity eventually drives synergy (see also Howarth and
Kirsebom, 2000, p. 13). While synergy potential evaluation may detect a host of benefits
potentially to be achieved in interairline collaborations, the realisation of these potentials
might be inhibited by a lack of partnership depth. Relatedness in executing the partnership - in
situ - is thus an important synergy driver and ascribable to synergy arenas (see Ensign, 1998,
p. 659). Only if the partnership is sufficiently intense, will the realisation of synergy
potentials into tangible effects be successful.
The following figure illustrates these synergy arenas.
Figure 6.1: Synergy Arenas in Airline Alliances
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Source: Spickers, 1994, p. 45 and own supplements
6.2.4 Areas of Synergy
Synergies are commonly titled according to the functional areas from which they are derived.
The original synergy definition distinguished between sales, operation (production),
investment and management synergies (see Ansoff, 1965, pp. 79-80, Rotering, 1993, pp. 38-
46, Ensign, 1998, p. 658). Generally, synergies can be generic to parts of an organisational
structure (business unit, departments, groups) or functions, but can also be generated by
spilling over to other fields and affecting these with varying intensity. Consequently
synergies are not discretely occurring, but interrelating, benefits.
Without engaging in a deeper discussion on their causes, synergy areas are now emphasised.
Sources of synergies, which logically apply to areas of synergies, are mirrored by the
motivations to collaborate, which have been thoroughly scrutinised (see Day, 1995, p. 297).
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6.2.4.1 External Synergies
External synergies are primarily concerned with the positive effects that interairline
partnership structures expect to exploit in their relationships with the environment in which
they operate.
A main component of external synergies is the influence that collaborative activities can have
on circumventing regulatory constraints on carriers' market access or extensions. In addition,
synergies can occur indirectly through co-ordinated behaviour vis-a-vis regulatory and/or
competition authorities concerning the inducement of more liberalised market surroundings.
The desire to reap external synergies in the spheres of deregulation and market liberalisation,
ranks very high in airlines' motivations for collaborating, particularly in the light of
restrictions on consolidation.
Co-ordinated behaviour can produce significant effects in joint negotiations with political
authorities, infrastructure providers, and air traffic control regarding extension or alterations
of facilities. The pooling of negotiation power, either in straightforward horizontal alliances,
in associations or other forms of interest groups, has repeatedly aided in lobbying and
motivating airline-related issues towards the mentioned parties (see also Goold and Campbell,
2000, p. 75).
External synergies can also surface in carriers' privatisation. Partnership action can thus
produce gainful outcomes in respect of the ownership development of carriers. Airlines in
partnership with other state-owned carriers can motivate the need for privatisation more
strongly to their owning governments. Few cases have witnessed the inducement of further
privatisation, initialised by the emergence of a strategic airline partner. In the instance of the
partnership between KLM and Alitalia, the privatisation topic played an important role in
negotiating the partnership, also with representatives from the Italian government.
External synergies also entail the positive effects that collaborations have on the joint market
appearance of allied parties. While this area is strongly interlinked to marketing synergies, the
position of an alliance airline towards the external environment features highly in carriers'
synergy expectations. Aspects of status play an important role in externally presenting the
alliance. In times of virtually mandatory airline collaboration, alliance membership can have
significant effects on the status of carriers and the way markets and customers perceive them.
As opposed to being unaligned, carriers might enjoy more appreciative capital markets and
thus increased power towards suppliers and other stakeholders.
Synergy Audit 333
6.2.4.2 Management Synergies
Management synergies generally develop from collaborating in managerial, organisational
and administrational settings. The potential benefits from management synergies evolve with
cost-effectiveness in avoiding redundancies, governing and gathering know-how, as well as in
efficiently increasing managerial output. Thus, qualitative as well as quantitative dimensions
drive management synergies, while qualitative synergy considerations definitely play a
dominant role.
The exchange of knowledge and management skills is salient in delineating management
synergies. Management skills, inherent to the collaborating parties, can be transferred to the
new managerial tasks that develop during collaborative activities (see Ansoff, 1965, p. 80 and
Goold and Campbell, 1998, pp. 135-136). An important aspect in any management synergy is,
however, the fundamental claim to establish synergistic relationships among the management
teams of collaborating parties. Before any formalisation of synergy evaluation can be
conducted, the presence of functioning inter-partner management structures needs to be
ensured. This is a prerequisite for management to be synergistically refined (see Leder, 1993,
p. 19).
This demand respects the difficulties in harvesting management synergies. The reasons for
these difficulties are twofold. Firstly, management synergies may not be achievable, because
a true exchange of knowledge and management skills does not occur. Often, collaborating
airlines are not even aware of managerial skills worth sharing. Weak partner knowledge and a
rudimentary sense of the unique needs and capacities of partnership management are
responsible for this state of affairs. The ignorance of managerial frailties to be mutually
redressed, and little comprehension of the challenges associated with partnership
management, leave the exploitation of management synergies untouched. This can occur
because collaborating parties are simply not willing to actively share - give or take -
managerial skills (for managerial implications of synergy generation in diversified firms, see
Goold and Campbell, 1998).
Proprietary and appropriation concerns, dependency considerations as well as the individual
self-image, prevent airlines from sharing knowledge. Secondly, and interrelated to the first
aspect, is the depth of partnership integration that does not necessarily call for managerial
collaboration. In most cases of interairline partnerships, the collaboration intensity is rather
hallow and limited to very specific areas. As certain collaborative tasks, e.g. codeshare
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agreements can, information-systematically, largely be handled in an automated manner, a
more intensive partnership on managerial issues is seemingly not even required. However,
even for these cases, synergistic management relationships need to be ensured. The presence
of synergistically-focused management links between the collaborating airlines can spur
resolution, particularly in the event of conflict and operational problems.
For more intensive partnership agreements, closer managerial collaboration can and needs to
be achieved. The possibilities of managerial collaboration, especially in multilateral brand
partnerships, are multifarious, yet decisive. While internal and external partnership
management structures have been described above (see 5.5), it remains to be noted that
governance synergies per se are not realisable by establishing joint partnership management
organisations. Partnership management, if at all existent, is merely defined as a governmental
and administrative function and serves as a platform for strategy design, operational handling
and conflict resolution in a partnership. Synergy considerations usually playa less significant
role. Thus, synergy has to be made a formal goal in managerial structures and its specific
demands regarding resource sharing have to be instrumentalised. Consequently, formalised
exchange structures, in particular knowledge and best practice transfer, are of cardinal
importance. There is an abundance of possibilities to exchange knowledge, either on an as-
needed basis, e.g. through interlinked information systems, or, more formalised, through
training and/or staff exchange programmes. These have to be taken into account and, most
optimally, need to be implemented.
6.2.4.3 Synergies in Production and Networks
Synergies in production describe all mutual cost-decreasing, scope, power, revenue and
operational efficiency-enhancing advantages, originating from merging functions across the
collaborating airlines' value chains. Most common among passenger carriers are the shared
usage of capital intensive equipment (aircraft, maintenance and handling facilities, and airport
passenger infrastructure) as well as co-ordinated production or production programmes. High
occupancy rates increase and optimise revenues, efficient employment of personnel and
physical equipment lead to lower unit costs, and thus scale effects.
Collaborative airline production is usually concerned with co-ordinated schedules in O&D
markets. Network synergies, partly based on topological network density, arise in the
production of appropriate connections between markets and through the joint usage of feeder
and defeeder services. Interconnectivity (network oriented), intermodality (vehicle oriented)
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and interoperability (institution oriented) concisely describe the synergy-producing
dimensions in airline networks and beyond, in relation to other network structures (see
Capineri and Kamann, 1998, p. 43).
Interconnectivity, to a greater or lesser extent, is therefore what has been currently achieved
between carriers in their quest to harvest proficient results from territorial partnership action
and hub and spoke concepts. Schedule co-ordination is thus the condition sine qua non for
functioning interconnections. Aircraft employed by collaborating partners allow utilisation of
a standardised infrastructure for handling purposes (e.g. airport ground handling) as well as
with regards to the original transportation infrastructure (e.g. cargo container standards,
seating! class standards).
lntermodality is a substantial synergy aspect and mostly touches on transportation issues that
lie outside an airline's core transportation value chain. Intermodality has, however, only been
accomplished on a very limited scale and its synergy potential lies somewhat unrealised.
Airline partnerships as a whole have a very strong inward focus and only recently have
modest efforts emerged in which synergies with other modes of transport have been exploited
(see 3.2.4.1 for high-speed train linkages). While this aspect is very important in the design
and functionality of future transportation concepts, airline partnerships need to master the
challenges arising from intermodal transportation.
Interoperability is largely based on systematic compatibility of hard- and software equipment
that airline partners utilise. Collective usage of CRSs, or CRSs adaptability, allows for
common reservation, booking and ticket issuing standards. Common departure control
systems facilitate passenger handling and allow for smoother staff rotation. Industry
associations, such as lATA or ICAO, have additionally established standards that generally
provide for interoperability in handling-related procedures.
As for the scope of the value of these synergy potentials, high partnership intensity can lead to
worthy overall results. This is usually motivated by a deeper integration of systems and
standards that can potentially be shared. More shallowly-oriented partnerships often only
Superficially glean synergistic effects in production and networks. Driven by a mere
operational focus that is concerned with the very core transportation process, other lateral
functions and tasks are neglected in their synergistic potential. To comprehensively and most
effectively benefit from synergies in less intensive partnerships airlines have to consider
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integrating production functions that correspond with their partnership intensity, but have yet
not been the initial focus of the collaboration.
6.2.4.4 Synergies in Marketing, Sales and Distribution
The benefits of mutually utilising revenue-generating functions and tools, also by means of
saving costs for their establishment, are currently the single most important synergistic topic
in interairline partnerships.
Synergies in marketing, sales and distribution can result from the joint usage of the marketing
toolbox, distribution channels and distribution agents, of trade-names, and trade-marks of the
collaborating firms (see also Goold and Campbell, 2000, p. 76). In addition, shared market
intelligence as a supportive tool to distribution can add to synergy generation. Superbrand and
umbrella brand concepts as well as collaboration in travel trade, corporate and Internet-based
distribution, have been described above with specific focus on their beneficial collaborative
impact. These profound forms of interairline partnerships unequivocally aim at benefiting
from group action in distributing their joint products or jointly distributing their discrete
products.
The principle sources of synergies in marketing, sales and distribution collaboration lie in
revenue generation. Fast market extension or penetration through partnerships is one of the
key motivators for airlines to collaborate. Cost savings for the set-up of a distribution
organisation, marketing campaigns and the induction of changes in the demand structure is a
further, although less important synergy factor. More strategically oriented are schemes that
aim at realising synergy potential from joint branding. The main airline groupings have long
started to establish new alliance brands, but at present their synergistic brand potential for the
individual partners must be judged with some misgivings. Scope effects are currently realised
and occur especially in connection with the previously mentioned shared sales facilities in the
case of market enlargement strategies. An increase in revenue can consequently be achieved
through an alteration in the demand structure, whereby airline passengers can successfully
request extensive integrated products from airline partnerships (see Schmidt, 1993, p. 25).
Thus, full passenger satisfaction essentially drives marketing, sales and distribution synergies.
The wielding of market power in respect of trade intermediaries is a further synergistic
motivator. These synergies are also described as collusive synergies or power benefits from
competitor interrelationships (see Pfahler and Lehmann-Grube, 1993, p. 130). As previously
described, the power status of an allied group of carriers in dense markets, especially those
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markets where one of the member airlines is a dominant hub player, can be substantial.
Synergies in combining these powers in a horizontal group can be immense and lead to
sufficient sales premiums. 127
6.2.4.5 Investment Synergies
In a narrow interpretation, investment synergies are the result of jointly using production
facilities, common raw materials and inventories, thus sharing of tangible resources (for
resource sharing in multi-business firms, see Ansoff, 1965, p. 80).
The joint usage of aircraft, maintenance facilities, spare warehouses, R&D efforts, service
features, training facilities, management capabilities, and others, leads to positive effects
regarding the initial investment into and sustenance of these areas. The list of areas where,
potentially, interairline investment synergies can be achieved is easily extendable.
Each business territory that involves procurement and employment of strategic and non-
strategic items can potentially yield collaborative benefits. Benefits thereby primarily
originate from scale effects and, to a limited extent, scope effects. The aforementioned
domains, however, only entail joint collaborative operations that promise direct internal
monetary gains, either through joint procurement or operational enhancement. A limitation of
the term investment synergy in these operative areas would make it only a further generic
terminology for scale and scope effects. Investment synergies, particularly for intercompany
relationships, incorporate a wider view of the equity and capital, as well as of an airline's
asset situation. Investment synergies thus also entail capital market-related and hence external
finance-related issues.
A survey found that on average companies' stock prices jumped by about 1% with each
declaration of a new alliance formed (see Dyer et al., 2001, p. 37). In some market or
Companyconstellations, the simple announcement of a prospective collaborative engagement
Can lead to positive stock market reactions (see Ernst and Halevy, 2000). Investors evidently
have a high regard for firm linkages from which partnership synergies can be expected and
make them a basis for investment decisions (see Pfahler and Lehmann-Grube, 1993, p. 139,
Goold and Campbell, 2000, p. 72). Thus, partnerships can create tangible stock value, a fact
very seldom mentioned as a motivator for collaborative agreements. This connection, as does
the sphere of investment synergy, obviously incorporates very immediate capitalisation
127 Also see 4.5 for a discu~sion of the negative competitive effects of combined market power.
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Comparative statistical and empirically-founded analyses of the aforementioned kind, are
nevertheless difficult to apply to the airline industry. With only a small number of airlines
having substantial capital linkages or being entirely merged, a monetary-based synergy
measure entailing value concepts and capital profitability, would produce limited plausible
and universally applicable results. However, monetary-based synergy measurement does find
application in airline partnerships within the limitations of the respective partnership, thus
utilising portfolio-oriented approaches. For example, a confined codeshare agreement must
ideally produce higher load factors, ideally higher yields and should contribute to the
profitability of the routing for each of the collaborating partners (see above for distribution of
benefits). Synergies should therefore be quantifiable in route result calculations. More
comprehensive partnerships must consequently be evaluated with regards to the individual
partnership areas and their distinct positive contribution to the allied carriers' performance
(see above for motivations to collaborate (4.3.2) and Howarth and Kirsebom, 2000, pp. 9-17).
A total quantification of synergy effects would thus comprise an aggregation of the effects of
pre-collaborative vs. collaborative performance in all of the partnership areas.
However, a complete quantification of positive collaborative effects is not attainable, nor with
regard to the plurality of company goals, which additionally entail non-quantifiable
objectives.l'" Thus soft, qualitative and intangible factors such as business cultural,
communicational and work climatic issues, can also actually contribute to synergy effects, but
often remain imponderable. Regarding the frailties of monetary synergy measurement and the
imponderables surrounding the consequences of partnership action, some other synergy
measure needs to be developed specifically for airline partnerships.
6.2.6 Summary - a Taxonomyof Synergy
The description of different aspects of synergy has introduced a terminology that is
subsequently used in order to discuss aspects of auditing synergy in interairline partnerships
more specifically. Figure 6.2 summarises these synergy aspects and brings them into a visual
relation.
129 However, it can be argued that all qualitative synergy effects necessarily lead to quantitative, tangible
benefits, following a period of delay (see discussion in Sandler, 1991, pp. 148-149 and pp. 154-155).
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Figure 6.2: Aspects of Synergy
Dimensions of Synergy
•Characteristics
Source: own compilation
• Dimensions of synergies characterise positive collaborative effects by utilising a range of
parameters and their individual values. For each further sphere of synergy, dimensions
provide a guideline in distinguishing and evaluating them.
Sources of synergies delineate fundamental springs of gains from interrelationships and•
•
rationalise why collaborative action leads to benefits. Sources of benefits thereby correlate
with the original motivations for collaboration. This is why these sources have a strong
individual character, inherent to each collaborative transaction.
Arenas of synergies entail the influencing drivers. They give rise to a more holistic view
of the synergy concept, also incorporating intangible corporate and cultural aspects.
Areas of synergy finally locate where synergies should ideally surface. Their morphology
can be itemised to a more or less high degree of aggregation, largely depending on the
width and depth of integration.
•
These aspects of synergy affect both, synergy potential and synergy effects. While the first
describes anticipated synergies, the latter is concerned with their realisation.
6.3 Dissynergies as a Symptom of Diseconomies in Interrelationships
The realisation of potential opportunities depends on how effectively linkages between
activities and firms are actually managed and how well the partnership can handle
environmental issues. That is, just because a collaborative opportunity exists does not mean
that it may be possible to fully develop it or bring it to fruition (see Ensign, 1998 p. 657). The
synergy hoped for - potential - and the synergy actually achieved - effect - may be quite
different - in the most drastic case, antipodal. In a directional approach synergies can
consequently also be negative (see Ansoff 1965, p. 76). Thus, to renew the mathematical
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synergy equation mentioned above, 2+2 might equal 3 - with the total being smaller than the
sum of the individual parts (see Ensign, 1998, p. 658).
In cases of mergers or capital linkages that do not result in positive synergistic outcomes, the
term diminutive fusion outlines the anti-synergistic arithmetic (see Grote, 1990, pp. 76-77). A
further expression that originated in the 80s, when synergy was at the forefront of the
motivation for corporate development, is synergy trap. Synergy trap basically describes the
unsatisfactory recognition that expected synergistic relationships have not materialised (see
Hirzel, 1993, pp. 32-36, Goold and Campbell, 1998, pp. 135-136). The concept of failing to
fully benefit from positive effects in collaborations is also described as dissynergy, the
antonym of synergy. The term dissynergy is subsequently to be used.
The reasons why synergies do not realise can be multifarious. Whether strategies work against
synergy, incentives are misaligned, mistrust prevails, or the collaborating companies' cultures
do not match, synergy killers inhibit company linkages (see Goold and Campbell, 2000, p.
86). Often, the failure to realise synergies stems from the inability of companies to understand
the benefits of interrelationships. Misunderstanding potential economic advantages can be
related to differing expectations regarding the outcome of the partnership and/or dissimilar
interpretations of the results. Partnering firms additionally fail to realise the full set of
collaborative benefits, as the entire, holistic spectrum of opportunities is not recognised (see
Lorange and Roos, 1991, p. 69). However, companies that have a clear, explicit knowledge of
the full spectrum of potential benefits arising from collaborations and which thoroughly
examine themselves and their prospective partners, should be able to minimise the risk of
dissynergies developing - at least in the pre-collaborative phase.
The previous chapter (chapter 5) assessed some key prerequisites in successfully paving the
way for self- and partner-examination prior to entering collaborations. The reason for failing
to realise synergies can thus also lie in the inability to manage synergy potentials properly and
transfer them into synergy effects. In turn, this inability can arise from a lack of partnership
managerial skills, conflicts that evolve while in a collaboration or th~ have not been
adequately addressed at the outset of the partnership.
External causes can also lead to a deviation of the collaboration from the initially agreed
track. Macro-economical shifts as well as statutory changes can influence the way partners
perform and thus interact. In many cases, however, dissynergies evolve with the individual
development of a partner and this is often due to the contractual details of partnership
Synergy Audit 343
agreements. They usually revolve around the mutual development of the collaboration, but do
not embody contingencies concerning the evolution of individual members. To a certain
extent partnership agreements might be flexible in nature and honour the individual
maturation of allies, but all the effects of this development can still not be anticipated.
A temporal dimension of dissynergies supports the notion mentioned above that synergy
potentials must be accomplished in a reasonable time span in order to create tangible synergy
effects. Failing to achieve symmetrical synergies can also lead to negative collaborative
effects. The equal realisation of benefits is an important prerequisite in achieving overall
partnership synergies. While synergies can have varying relative importance for partners, their
absolute attainment should be equal. This is because the threat of real and perceptive
development of opportunism and predatory behaviour arises with asymmetrical synergies.
The term dissynergy thus entails conflicts that could not have been anticipated ex ante - thus
were not part of the suitability assessment process - and that arise in the course of the
partnership. In a more comprehensive definition, dissynergies can also develop from the
delayed realisation of synergies.
-
Essentially, dissynergies can partly be attributed to management failures also with regard to
the development of a firm (internal) or negative influences on the realisation of synergy
effects from the environment (external) (see Rodermann, 1999, pp. 208-209). Though there
are guidelines in the form of partnership suitability evaluations for airlines to follow to help
ensure a successful partnership, airlines encounter dissynergies both internally and externally.
The division into internal and external dissynergies describes the position of these negative
effects.
Generally, all individual synergy killers and dissynergies surface as a number of symptoms.
In a first approach, these symptoms can be described as the inversion of the collaborative
motivators mentioned above. They are consequently:
• Negative cost effects
Negative revenue effects
Non-realisation of circumvention of regulatory limitations
Non-realisation of power and market strength
•
•
•
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Figure 6.3 depicts a broad division into internal and external sources of dissynergies. A more
detailed discussion, focussing on a typological conceptualisation of dissynergies in airline
partnerships, follows in 6.3.1. and 6.3.2.
Figure 6.3: A Conceptualisation of Dissynergies
Dissynergies
• Negative CostlRevenue Effects
• Non-realisation of Circumvention of
regulatory Constraints
• Non-realisatlon of Powerl
Market Strength
Internal
• Regulation
• Nationalism
• Marco-Economics
• Strategy
• Management
• Production I
Service I Network
• Marketing I Sales I
Distribution
• Complexity
• Culture
Source: own compilation
6.3.1 External Negative Effects
External negative effects can potentially evolve from all parties and circumstances that
comprise 'the environment within which airline partnerships operate. Rapid business
environmental changes may therefore lead organisations to alter their needs and business
orientation, thus affecting their ongoing partnerships. New air transportation business models,
such as the emergence of the low-cost sector, macro economic shifts like the trough
experienced in 2001 and particularly after September 2001, and ongoing market regulation
require individual carriers and partnerships to react in order to maintain a satisfying level of
collaborative synergy. Consequently, political, social and economical arenas can determine
dissynergies, alongside the previously described oppositions of strategic partnerships.
Externally influenced dissynergies include nationalism or protectionism displayed by a
government which is concerned that the home carrier may lose control of valuable technology
and market stature to a foreign partnering entity. These concerns are manifested in the
bilateral regime based on the Chicago Convention of 1944,130 and other regulatory hurdles
that still impede airlines from freely competing. A country's antitrust laws may also affect the
formation of airline partnerships, prohibiting or restricting those transactions that are deemed
130 See 2.3.1 and 2.5.4 for an intensive discussion and Doganis, 2001, p. 19, 196.
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to be anti-competitive or monopolistic in nature. While most of these hurdles are foreseeable,
airlines in existing partnerships are negatively affected by these constraints in their attempts
to close further collaborative agreements.
The previously mentioned example of British Airways and American Airlines trying to
receive immunity from antitrust laws, illustrates this precisely. Many broad interairline
partnerships imply a priori that they will gain exemption from antitrust jurisdiction once they
Commence operation. In fact, their entire collaborative strategy, including network, passenger
service, loyalty schemes, and branding, is based on this assumption. If, however, the
expectation of operating in liberated market circumstances does not actualise, their
collaboration is handicapped in the light of the initially agreed announcement. Tangible
negative results can then basically originate from all four of the above-mentioned dis synergy
sources.
National authorities and national jurisdiction are respectively responsible for another external
impingement on airline partnerships. When national states wish to privatise their flag carriers,
they create incentives for foreign airlines to engage in financial linkages. As the privatisation
process is usually only to a limited extent within the control of the airline concerned,
dissynergies may arise from these groupings for strategic partners. Therefore government
policy might not necessarily agree with company strategy. The latter case terminated the
partnership between KLM and Alitalia and illustrates this connection. While KLM was
hoping for a quick privatisation of its strategic partner in order to establish a far-reaching
collaboration, this confidence was undermined by the Italian government. As the privatisation
process took longer than initially agreed, KLM discontinued its agreement with Alitalia due to
the uneconomic time span within which to accomplish synergy effects. Thai Airways has
encountered a similar dilemma. The Thai government has repeatedly proposed privatisation
partners that are related to traditional political linkages between host governments. Air France
was therefore mentioned as one of the investors. However, Air France is a member of the
Skyteam alliance, which could have a counterproductive effect on Thai Airways' membership
in the Star Alliance.
As a further external dissynergy category, airline partnerships might even create re-regulation
and the establishment of competitive barriers. Where national or supra-national (e.g. EU)
competition authorities feel that the establishment of an airline partnership can lead to anti-
competitive groupings, directives can be imposed on the partnering airlines (see Shearman,
1992, p. 120). These directives can be to give up airport slots or other forms of compensations
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to competitors. The case of the Lufthansa-Eurowings financial partnership in the German
market exemplifies dissynergies developing from collaborations. Although, in this specific
case, the negative effects of the competition authority's ruling have not fatally influenced the
partnership, the effects were not anticipated by the collaborating parties.
When collaborative agreements exist between airlines originating from countries with
dramatically different national or ethnic cultures, value and styles, external dissynergies can
arise (see Perlmuter and Heenan, 1986, pp. 146-147 and for more on cultural dissynergy, see
6.3.2.6). The nature of these culturally-driven dissynergies can be diverse and range from
negative brand perceptions to dissent regarding service features and quality standards. It is
basically the market that might non-affirmatively assess the partnership and deprive it of the
desired and imperative customer support. While partnering firms concentrate on gathering
information and establishing policies in order to preclude cultural dissynergies, these conflicts
appear to be inescapable for airline alliances.
Other environmental and infrastructure constraints might hinder the planned evolution of a
partnership. Airport extensions or alterations, necessary, e.g., for the establishment of a
partnership hub, alliance terminals or schemes to redress congestion, can be delayed or not
take place at all. The same applies to important infrastructure such as airport slot allocation or
an ATC service, which can slow down partnership expansion strategies.
Airlines find external conflicts hard to anticipate and control. Airlines are companies that still
operate in legally constrained markets, but these companies are forced to engage in strategic
action that goes beyond the legally, or bilaterally constrained limits. Information asymmetries
between geographically separat~d and culturally distant carriers, as well as potential action
from other groups residing in the airlines' environment increase the risk of external
dissynergies. Airlines must thus be aware of these threats, be vigilant and attempt their utmost
to anticipate them (see also Lorange and Roos, 1992, pp. 345-346).
6.3.2 Internal Dissynergies
Equally important to external dissynergies are negative partnership effects that arise
internally. Internal dissynergies are a more intensively discussed topic (see e.g. Harrigan,
1988, Fontanari, 1995, Goold and Campbell, 1998). This is mainly due to the fact that they
primarily concern partnership managerial and organisational issues, which are evidently more
directly controllable by the allies. In order to structure internal dissynergies, a classification
into functional areas is subsequently introduced.
Synergy Audit 347
6.3.2.1 Strategy Dissynergies
Strategy dissynergies describe unanticipated predicaments emerging from the partnership's
strategic orientation. Ideally, strategy dissynergies should not occur. If a partnership
suitability process has intensively evaluated the partners' individual as well as the
partnership's common strategic goals, substantial strategy asymmetries should not arise in
situ. Allies should at least not turn out to be strategically incompatible during the course of
the alliance. In the broadest sense, partnership objectives, particularly the partnership
development and its financial benefits, should be congruent and not be set too broadly if
unrealistic expectations are to be avoided (see Bleeke et al., 1992, p. 120). Airlines that are
competitively forced to enter partnerships often lack a clear understanding of the real benefits
to be expected from the collaboration, which makes it difficult to evaluate them. Ideally,
agreements on the term of the partnership should be mutually reached and the partnership
vision should be shared (see Bleeke and Ernst, 1991, p. 128 and Lindquist, 1996, p. 12).
Firms are dynamic structures, flexible organisms and always subject to changes, which
occasionally lead allies to steer away from the partnership track. In addition, the
aforementioned rashness to gain market access and the determination to be ahead of
competition by means of collaborations, result in strategic dis synergies regularly
materialising. Partners' positions within the partnership, their attitude towards the
collaboration and their individual business intent often change. Airlines entering partnerships
thus face considerable moral hazards, particularly because of the unpredictability of a
partner's behaviour when this occurs (see Park and Ungson, 2001, p. 37). It is as a result of
the associated dissynergies that, despite the rapid growth of both domestic and international
airline partnerships, such collaborations are still considered risky. A partner may either have a
free ride by limiting its contributions to an alliance, or simply behave opportunistically. Such
concerns and the resulting dissynergies are further compounded by the unpredictable
character of such relationships (see Gulati, 1998, p. 300).
The reasons for such behaviour can be diverse. A partner's strategies may initially need to be
abandoned or changed in order to accommodate new partnership strategies (see Shearman,
1992, p. 120). However, this seemingly predictable, and thus resolvable, development can
also appear in later stages of the partnership, due to movements in the composition of
multilateral collaborations or because of externally induced changes in the overall partnership
strategy. The example of Star Alliance members Thai Airways and Singapore Airlines (SIA)
illustrates this connection. While Thai Airways was Star Alliance's only carrier with a strong
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position in Southeast Asia, the entry of SIA into the airline network created unpredicted
partnership strategy difficulties for Thai and ultimately for the entire network (see Flint, SIA's
global Tilt, 2000). In this case, the overall strategic orientation of the multilateral partnership,
which the individual members could only restrictively influence, lead to dissynergies within
the collaboration. Cast in this context, the possibility of intra-partnership rivalry becomes
evident. With SIA and Thai Airways having been strong competitors prior to the partnership,
the Star Alliance membership has not helped to alleviate the situation.
The complex of strategic dissynergies with regards to partnership composition is also related
to exclusivity expectations or competitive considerations that develop in multilateral webs of
partnerships. With an abundance of carriers engaging intensively in a growing number of
partnerships, the possibility of overlapping multilateral partnerships is evident. While single
carriers are usually contractually barred from being member of more than one multilateral
strategic partnership, less strategic links between discrete members of networks or individual
airlines are possible and common. British Airways (Oneworld) and KLM (Wings), for
example, have codeshare agreements on routes from Europe to the Middle East. This link
might be beneficial for the two carriers, but may cause friction or dissatisfaction among the
remaining partners in the respective alliance networks.
The alliance between SIA and Virgin Atlantic Airways gives SIA a back door to the domestic
Australian market with Virgin's subsidiary Virgin Blue operating as an Australian low-cost
carrier. However, their partnership could potentially cause problems with Ansett Australia
and Air New Zealand, which both operate in the domestic Australian market but are members
of the Star Alliance, a rival of Virgin Blue. The same will occur once SIA gets traffic rights to
start services from the UK to the US. SIA will be in direct competition with United Airlines,
another Star Alliance member. Other carriers are virtually pivots for the partnership action of
various groups. SAA, for example, used to codeshare to Europe with Lufthansa (Star
Alliance) and Swissair (Qualiflyer). Its routes to the USA are supported by a codeshare
agreement with Delta (Skyteam). SAA thus concentrates individual networks' demands,
which can trigger negative effects on the individual operations. Thus individual strategic
partnership action always needs to be weighed against group-inherent exclusivity
considerations to avoid dissatisfaction and dissynergies.
In the worst case, dis synergies can tum an ally into an opponent. A strategic shift from social
to opportunistic behaviour motivated Austrian Airlines to abandon the Qualiflyer Group.
Austrian's decision to leave Qualiflyer was partly caused by its shareholder and strategic ally,
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Swissair Group's attempt at a share increase. Swissair Group already held 10% of Austrian
Airlines, but an increase in that stake was formally precluded. Swissair Group, however, tried
to acquire an additional 9% stake held by All Nippon Airways (ANA) without informing its
long-term partner. This strategic re-orientation lead to substantial friction in the partnership
and ultimately to its dissolution.
It becomes apparent that with volatile air transport markets on the one hand and
comparatively loose airline collaborations on the other, strategic dissynergies are often
unavoidable. These dissynergies might not necessarily manifest themselves in reneging on
partnership agreements, but in individually deviating slightly from a strategic path that
heralds benefits for the entire multilateral grouping.
6.3.2.2 Management Dissynergies
Management dissynergies describe negative partnership effects that develop from
governmental structures and managerial activities within collaborations (for managerial
synergy biases, see Goold and Campbell, 1998). The reasons for management dissynergies
can be diverse, as their definition indicates. However, three main management dis synergy
areas are definable.
•
Government structure dissynergies
Conflict resolution dissynergies
Corporate style dissynergies
•
•
The inherent organisational volatility, changes in organisational theory and hierarchical
configurations, and the overall composition of especially multilateral partnerships, potentially
host dissynergies. These dissynergies can lie in lost managerial potential through
redundancies, lengthy decision taking, inflexible processes, loss of dynamism and obviously
in tangible conflicts (see also Lorange and Roos, 1992, p. 345 and Raffee and Eisele, 1994, p.
19). Consequently, initially planned managerial synergies do not materialise. In the worst
case, intra-partnership managerial tasks are inadvertently made more strenuous.
Dissyncrgies from government structures are spurred by the inability to relinquish managerial
authority and thus economic independence (for inter-business dissynergies see Goold and
Campbell, 2000, p. 86). Incumbent carriers regularly lack the disposition to withhold
themselves from managerial duties in a partnership. Joint managerial structures imply that
resources are shared and that partners gain - limited - user rights over these resources (see
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Lorange and Roos, 1992, p. 344). However, when gaining access to new resources, partners
also have to abandon some of their independence. This context is a key presupposition for
collaborative action. Violation of resource sharing and opposition to the loss of independence
associated with it can lead to dissynergies.
In asymmetrically configured collaborations, the set-up of partnership management structures
can lead to substantial negative results for smaller carriers. While the larger partner can
accommodate larger collaboration management structures and easily assign more staff,
smaller airlines might not necessarily be able to do so without having to sacrifice resources
elsewhere. Especially franchise partnerships that incumbent carriers (e.g. British Airways)
establish with smaller regional airlines can impose significant managerial challenges on the
junior franchisee. As managerial resources have to be dedicated to the set-up of predefined
management structures, focus on the daily business, the external environment and the
strategic advancement can be lost. The effect can be negative for all parties as the overall
result from the joint business might not be as expected or agreed.
Qualitative and quantitative differences in resources invested in the establishment of adequate
partner management structures can enhance power imbalances (see also Bucklin and
Sengupta, 1993, p. 36). In tum, the presence of power asymmetries in exchange relationships
creates the potential for dissynergies. The expectation that organisations with superior power
will appropriately exploit that power is the essence of the issue. If dependencies are out of
balance in a relationship, the weaker party will take precautions to limit its vulnerability. In
the context of dissynergies, this effort could take the form of competing airlines within a
partnership, subtle efforts to diminish the role of its partner with customers, or failure to
employ all of the collaborative resources required. Recognising the potential for this
behaviour, the more powerful party may similarly be loath to put forth the maximum effort
required by the collaboration project (see Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993, p. 34). This is mainly
the reason why larger multilateral partnerships give their smaller partners equal voting rights
and managerial representation.
Dissynergies originating from a lack of conflict resolution are an overall negative effect, and
thus very important. The inability to resolve ubiquitous conflicts in partnerships through
appropriate structures and mindset is seen as one of the most critical factors leading to failure.
Dissynergy through managerial frictions presents itself once the resolution of conflict requires
an excess of managerial resources and/or the commitment of top management (see Shearman,
1992, p. 120). The occurrence as well as the laborious resolution of conflicts is frequently
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associated with a lack of trust (see 5.6.1 for trust in partnerships and Goold and Campbell,
2000, pp. 87-88).
Once relationships have been impaired due to breaches of trust, the resolution of conflict
becomes even more of an obstacle. Airline partnership management occasionally
acknowledges these risks on head-office level by setting up adequate resolution mechanisms,
processes that support conflict resolution and personnel in charge of investigating conflicts.
However, processes with which to work through disharmonies on a station level are often
neglected. This is especially true of codeshare partnerships or other geographically confined
marketing agreements that likely create conflicts. Since these conflicts often arise from
passenger complaints and operational issues, they need to be addressed where they occur -
namely on the station level. Conflict resolution must thus be made universally significant, at
all hierarchy levels, in order to avoid dissynergies from failed or lagging problem-solving
processes.
Corporate style dissynergies can arise notwithstanding appropriate partnership management
structures (see Shearman, 1992, p. 120). External collaboration management serves as an
interface between the partners and is consequently the junction where corporate management
styles converge. If these styles are not in some way compatible, if the chemistry between the
collaborating managers does not exist, and if these frailties result in friction and delays in the
joint partnership management, then dissynergies arise (see Gulati, 1998, p. 300). While
external collaboration management structures offer a formal basis for managerial partner
transactions, they can, however, only very restrainedly address the way in which managerial
tasks are dealt with inside a partner's organisation. A culture of secrecy domineering staff
and mistrust towards the alliance undermines co-operation (see Weipert, 1993 pp. 233-234).
Different approaches to prioritising issues that need to be addressed are also seen as a factor
in corporate style dissynergies (see Lindquist, 1996, p. 12). While one carrier might highly
value FFP partnership issues, its collaborating partner could prioritise technical matters.
These matters must be given equal priority in the partnership management process to ward off
dissynergies. Corporate style issues are a particular driver for management dissynergies, they
are, however, embedded in the corporate culture sphere, which is described below (see
6.3.2.6).
Appropriate partnership management structures, both internally and externally, should be
created in a way to avoid dissynergies (see 5.5 for partnership management and for an
empirical study, see Dyer et al., 2001, p. 38). The main elements of successful dissynergy-
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avoiding management structures are suitable representation of partnership members, 131 the
inclusion of all, relevant partnership tasks and functions, and sensitive conflict resolution
mechanisms. Nevertheless, what was planned to be an optimal governance solution at the
outset of the partnership might not necessarily prove to be beneficial in the course of the
collaboration.
6.3.2.3 Production, Service and Network Dissynergies
While the production process of an air transport service might not necessarily create friction
among collaborating partners, it is the qualitative results of this process that can possibly lead
to disenchantment within a partnership (see Lindquist, 1996, p. 12).
Differences in customer expectations and perceptions on codeshare operations are a primal
source of concern in airline partnerships. Differing products and onboard service standards
can lead to substantial customer dissatisfaction, and consequently dilute positive partnership
effects. Some examples above have described the negative results of inconsistent service
levels within an alliance.132 These examples nevertheless visualise the lack of partnership
planning and suitability evaluation. Service level differences that can be anticipated ex ante,
should not persist into the operating phase of a partnership. Dissynergies of this kind are
avoidable if partners have been thoroughly scanned prior to contractually engaging in the
collaboration.
Dissynergies in the course of a partnership can, however, arlse from the unilateral
development of a carrier. In respect of service standards, it is perceivable that a partner could
individually change its onboard service philosophy while in collaboration with another
carrier. Possible service modification that can lead to drastic consequences for the partnership
are, e.g., the abandonment of a 3-class system or the termination of the serving of alcoholic
drinks on flights. The results of these unilateral service standard variances surface once the
passengers feel deceived or merely distressed by service inconsistencies within a partnership.
An upward development, however, might also occur. An airline could increase its passengers'
comfort by offering, e.g., highly sophisticated entertainment and communication services, or
more comfortable seating configurations. This action might be to the partnering carrier's
131 E.g., external partnership management structures (Star Alliance) or mutual board representation (e.g.,
KLMlNorthwest).
132 See the example of the parallel codeshare agreement between SAA and Cathay Pacific, and Delta Air Lines
and Korean Air Lines above (see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 1999, p. 3).
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detriment as consumer expectations and preferences can develop unevenly In the
collaboration due to the superior service offers.
Other service related dissynergies arise with unsymmetrical treatment in the provision of
services to partners. A reason for the break-up of the long standing codeshare partnership
between SAA and American Airlines (AA) was that AA charged SAA frequent flier fees that
were several times higher than those it charged other partners (see Feldman, 2000, Alliance
Costs Start Building, p. 48). In this case, the reciprocal FFP acceptance was more expensive
for SAA passengers flying on AA.133 While these negative effects with immediate financial
implications for SAA were not present at the outset of the partnership, they nevertheless
developed in the course of the alliance. More negative effects arising from inter-partnership
service provision or service standards can develop from an abandonment of preferential
passenger treatment, e.g. not admitting partners' passengers to lounges or not accepting FFP
statuses.
Dissynergies can also evolve with network structures. Airlines joining forces either bring
complementary or overlapping networks to the partnership. Both constellation are feasible in
certain partnership configurations and strategic orientations, and should be scrutinised in the
partnership suitability process ahead of time. Network structures, however, foster potential
dissynergies. These negative effects mainly evolve with individual partner developments
concerning network extensions by engaging in other partnerships (see 6.3.2.1 for strategy
dissynergies). Partners opportunistically advancing their own networks, either via hubs or
feeder services, enter in competition with a partner's individual network or with an overall
multilateral network structure. American Airlines, in its partnership with SAA, undermined
the overall Oneworld network structure. AA's partner British Airways aimed at offering
attractive connections from South Africa to the USA via its London Heathrow hub. AA
conversely offered direct services to the USA through its codeshare with SAA.
6.3.2.4 Marketing, Sales and Distribution Dissynergies
Selected negative effects developing from airline collaboration in the marketing, sales and
distribution sphere have been previously described. Once more, partner suitability evaluation
should ideally detect strengths and weaknesses in these functional areas prior to engaging in
partnership action. If necessary and practicable, the evaluation should activate a process of
13) The common system ofFFP benefit allocation denotes that for a partner airline A's passenger, using A's FFP
system but flying on B and requesting 8's FFP bonuses, B charges A for the miles credited.
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redressing these weaknesses. Negative effects - dissynergies - mostly originate from the
disadvantageous evolution of a partnership or non-perceivable factors arising in the course of
establishing alliance marketing, sales and distribution organisations.
One of the greatest concerns expressed with regard to the close co-operation of carriers is the
possible weakening of the brand and the heritage of partner airlines (see Howarth and
Kirsebom, 2000, pp. 42-43). The standing of key partners in a multilateral partnership can
have an especially influencing effect on the overall brand status. Swissair's economic troubles
at the beginning of 2001 had a strong impact on the brand perception of the entire Qualiflyer
Group of carriers, which thereafter started to disintegrate. The same usually happens
following accidents or other events of high prominence. Air France's Concorde crash in 2000
ignited a discussion on the French national carrier's safety standards and the technical
reliability of the Concord equipment. This event has most probably affected its ally Delta Air
Lines as well. In collaborations, the image of one of the partners may be damaged when
customers have the perception that the lower quality or technical deficiency of the second
carrier prevails throughout the partnership (see Shearman, 1992, p.120). These events are
impossible to anticipate, but can lead to drastic effects on the wellbeing of a partnership.
Marketing messages can have a similar negative effect on the partnership. As individual
carriers or multilateral groups usually associate themselves with the collaboration by
graphically linking their own brand to the partnership, a negative image transfer is
conceivable. When South Africa's Comair became a franchise partner of British Airways, one
of the main concerns of Comair's management was the possible negative image effect of the
collaboration. While Comair was previously a well-established South African carrier, the
brand link to BA was anxiously anticipated. For some South Africans, BA's corporate image
and culture represented associations with colonialism and stiffness. Aversion against a new
franchisee due to image consideration has never been empirically proven, the example,
however, shows the potentiality of image associations.
Sales and distribution, especially personal sales, drive dissynergies. In many cases, these
dissynergies are less of a systematic and IT nature, but more of a people matter. Lack of
commitment and support for a partnering carrier in the joint sales process is an issue that
needs to be seriously considered by airlines entering and operating a partnership. Adequate
measures need to be taken to avoid negative, tangible and intangible effects on the individual
partners and the overall partnership by opportunistic andlor destructive behaviour in sales.
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For both, marketing and sales, it is argued that agreements on integrating strategies and tactics
may prove to be very difficult and time-consuming. In most instances it is the individual
airline's self-image that forms an obstacle to the conclusion of common business approaches.
On the other hand, long-standing and successful business philosophies are less likely to be
changed. A prudent, yet comprehensive approach in analysing, conceptual ising and ultimately
implementing these joint systems in order to avoid the occurrence of dissynergies thus needs
to be established.
6.3.2.5 Complexity-induced Dissynergies
Many researchers have testified to the complexities associated with the interdependence of
activities across members in strategic partnerships (see Hamel et al., 1989, Park and Ungson,
2001). In this context, complexity is an issue regularly alluded to regarding collaborative
challenges and negative partnership effects.
Complexity per se does not necessarily incorporate dissynergy. As virtually every partnership
business transaction is associated with complexity to a greater or lesser extent, the resolution
of complex interrelationships is a fundamental task of partnership management. However, a
certain degree of complexity can be a destabilising force in a partnership, once if cannot be
dealt with. The mastery of complexity should thus receive significant managerial attention
and this discipline is argued to be inseparable from synergy considerations (see Rhumbler,
1993, p. 24). There is no doubt that the larger the companies and the more intensive they are
in terms of width and depth collaborations, the more complex formation, integration and
governance of the joint business becomes. Huge operations may even cannibalise positive
partnership effects by their mere size and by the complexities associated with internally
administering partnership issues.
In defining and evaluating complexity, the costs of partnership activities play an important
role. Co-ordination costs mirror the anticipated and experienced organisational complexity of
distributing tasks among partners together with the ongoing co-ordination of activities to be
completed jointly or individually across organisational boundaries (see Gulati and Singh,
1998, p. 782, Osegowitsch, 2001, p. 18). Costs of co-ordination can thus be an index that
potentially visualises the negative effects that evolve with complexity. In this context, it is
prudent that the gains of the partnership may be questioned once the costs of co-ordinating the
partnership action have superseded the synergy potentials or diluted the synergy effects.
Equally important 111 materialisation, but more difficult to quantify, are intangible
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complexities. These can lie in the interpersonal and cultural areas of collaborations where
complicated transactions can have non-affirmative effects on synergy.
Yet complexity should and can be anticipated. In 2000, British Airways and KLM
discontinued their merger talks at a sufficiently early stage, due to the complexity of the
venture, particularly in the light of the restraining legal and regulatory environment of airline
consolidation in Europe. In 200 I, the Star Alliance development came to a halt as far as the
admission of additional global partners was concerned. The reasons provided were
considerations weighing the incremental benefits of more partners against the increasing
complexity of and inhibiting effects on the multilateral partnership. It is obvious that a web of
15 independent core members harbours extremely complicated and laborious processes in the
finding of consensus. Star Alliance still wants to grow, but the managerial systems and
procedures addressing the complexity of governing and advancing the partnership in its
current size, require refinement prior to admitting new partners.
While these examples display prudent approaches, other carriers might find themselves in
what was earlier described as the synergy trap. With little or no consideration of the calibre of
complexity to be expected from partnership action, airlines almost blindly enter
collaborations. This was the case in the web of main linkages that the Swissair Group
established in the air transport industry until the year 2000. Given the cultural diversity of its
airline equity partners, their geographical dispersion and strategic orientation, complexity
proliferated and impeded the subsequent advancement of the partnership.
Specific complexity concerns related to larger airline partnerships and leading to a negation of
collaborative benefits have been empirically proven: These are (see Howarth and Kirsebom
2000, p. 42):
• Increasingly complex and difficult mechanisms of governance and specifically the basis
of agreeing on the division of contributions to joint air transport operations.
Complex operational problems - transfer passengers, baggage, service recovery, customer
enquiries, and others. Large infrastructure co-ordination costs and complexities are likely
to be incurred.
• Escalating training and communications costs due to the scope and intensity of the
partnership or to the increasingly complex demands of these areas.
•
• Growing comparability arguments in staff relations and pay negotiations, consequently
increasing the complications of addressing and redressing these issues.
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• Short-term increases in the (co-ordination) cost of the sales and distribution process as
complexity precedes consolidation.
Some issues of complexity need to be considered with reference to dissynergies. While
partnership intensity increases, so does collaborative synergy potential and consequently the
possibility of dissynergy induced by complexity. Airlines seem to be lacking aptitude to
honour this relationship and to adequately address the problems associated with it. Coming
from a background that has traditionally been characterised by oligopolistic structures and
rather loose connections between partner carriers, the ability to tackle complexity in closer
collaborations seems to be non-existent or in very nascent stages. The example of the once
very close and subsequently untied and restructured relationship between KLM and
Northwest Airlines (see Tully, 1996) has shown the lack of knowledge to successfully operate
a close airline linkage by tackling complexity-induced dissynergies. Managerial skills to meet
the challenges of collaborative complexity are, however, salient, not just with regard to the
current phase of interairline partnerships, but in particular in the context of the expected
consolidation in the airline industry.
6.3.2.6 Cultural Dissynergies
The cultural dimension of business partnerships has received thorough scholarly attention (see
e.g. Perlmutter and Heenan, 1986, p. 146, Lewis, 1990, pp. 253-279, Bleicher, 1992, pp. 281-
285, Lorange and Roos, 1992, p. 353, Schmidt, 1993, p. 79, Ensign, 1998, p. 665, Park and
Ungson, 2001 and 5.3.2.3 for cultural fitness). Most studies depict the cultural (business and
ethnic) challenges associated with linkage building, and possible negative effects from
cultural diversity on partnership action (see Bittner, 1996). In some research, cultural
differences are deduced to be a source of conflict, which can consequently result in
partnership dissynergies (see e.g. Schmidt, 1993, p. 79, Raffee and Eisele, 1994, p. 19).
It has previously been stated and empirically proven that similarity of cultural values may
reduce misunderstanding between the partners and propagate thriving partnerships.
Conversely, culturally distant partners experience greater difficulty in their interactions and
cultural dissimilarities enhance the risk of failing in a collaboration (see Raffee and Eisele,
1994, p. 19). The cultural challenge is further intensified by the scope and intensity of
interaction, since more intense partnerships display a larger frontage for cultural clashes (see
Lewis, 1990, p. 260). Cultural compatibility between partners is one of the most important
factors in the survival of a collaboration, because the defects in partnerships often stem from
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the unobtrusive influence of culture, in its different spheres, on behaviour and management
systems, which may create unresolved conflicts (see Park and Ungson, 2001, p. 44).
The main spheres of cultural dissynergies are seen in the incompatibility of partners' cultures
and the contrariety of a company's overall development philosophy and its own culture (see
Raffee and Eisele, 1994, p. 19). The first aspect represents the classic view of cultural
dissimilarities, driven by misfits of the collaborating firms' individual cultural orientation.
The latter, however, is a more internal view of the company's general cultural aptitude to
engage in partnerships. While most studies are concerned with ex post views of cultural
dissimilarities, individual cultural fitness for partnership action considerations combats
cultural dissynergies that primarily lie within one of the partners and from an ex ante
perspective.
In the light of the strategic decisions to be made, individual cultural fitness and a critical
cultural self-evaluation are important to elude culturally motivated dissynergies. A carrier's
management might be enthusiastic to expand the operation by means of strategic partnerships,
but the company's own culture might not be supportive of this kind of strategic action.
Swissair's strong national and quality-driven culture did not value the parent's expansion
strategy with second-tier European carriers; initially the collaborations with TAP Air Portugal
and Sabena of Belgium lacked staff support. It has repeatedly been argued that especially
staffs reluctance to sustain collaboration strategies is a symptom of internally cultural unfit
carriers (see also Weipert, 1993, pp. 232-233). A decision whether or not to collaborate
should initially be based on a comprehensive evaluation of the individual culture and,
possibly, a transformation through training and awareness campaigns. Southwest Airlines, for
example, has a strong corporate culture, which is widely acknowledged to be incompatible
with any other North American carrier with which the airline could theoretically co-operate.
Once compatibility of the individual corporate culture and the corporate strategic intent has
been achieved, cultural dissynergies can emanate from the mismatch of the partners' cultures
in situ. The external management organisation of strategic airline partnerships usually
includes managers from different carriers with different national, ethnic cultural, social,
political and economic backgrounds. As far as the abundant cross-border airline partnerships
are concerned, the social context in which they operate is partly defined by the cultural and
institutional background of the nationalities that the partners represent. National culture then
affects managerial behaviour and moderates the relationship between the structural and
economic variables and partnership performance.
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Since different corporate cultures come together in business partnerships, it is imperative that
management considers these differences, understands how these cultures interact and knows
how to redress problems that arise. The following general reactions are perceivable when
different cultures encounter one another (see Schmidt, 1993, p. 79):
• Pluralism: The distinct cultures stay separate
• Assimilation: Business cultures slowly merge to form one culture
• Take-over: One partner sacrifices its own culture in favour of a partner's culture
• Resistance: Business cultures turn out to be incompatible
Dissynergies are perceivable in all of the aforementioned intercultural reactions. While
assimilation and take-over suggest that they occur with little cultural friction, this has to be
regarded with certain scepticism. Assimilation might fail, since separate firms' long-
established cultures cannot easily be meshed to incorporate a new common culture. Cultural
take over often occurs in differently sized firm linkages. Potentially, however, the culturally
integrated firm might repel the new culture, which certainly leads to friction. Pluralism and
resistance are prone to critical negative effects from cultural dissimilarities. Both dissynergies
lie in the failure to properly integrate organisational cultures from the senior management
level down to the front line. Partners from different and unrelated national cultures tend to
experience a lack of fit in organisational and strategic practices, making co-ordination more
difficult. A lack of partners' cultural suitability could also lead to poor communication and
mutual distrust. Negative effects manifest in less efficient alliance performance as well as in
insecurity and dissatisfaction of staff. A further symptom is increased staff fluctuation on all
hierarchy levels, leading to decreased performance.
For proposed capital linkages or mergers, the culture issue becomes even more of a strategic
success factor. This is why some advanced carriers pay more attention to leadership and other
human capital and cultural elements. The merger between Air Canada and Canadian Airlines
was preceded by a comprehensive assessment of Canadian Airlines' officer corps.
Consolidation strategies touching the cultural sphere of the human element can include a
culture due diligence on pre-merger human capital evaluation, post-merger integration,
leadership talent benchmarking and succession planning (see Bell, 2000, p. 106). In some
instances, historical airline mergers would not have made progress had the acquirers taken
adequate stock of the culture's chief elements (for Swissair's failed integration strategy see
Buerkle and Smith, 2002).
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Soft as well as hard and tangible factors arise with cultural dissynergies. Additional costs
incurred by having to co-ordinate cultural issues and lost revenue as a result of friction in
processes and among staff members largely contribute to negative financial effects. Although
many culturally induced dissynergies are not quantifiable, they are equally important.
Business traits and habits that are uncommon to partners, difficult to understand and to deal
with, can cause delays in decision making and slow down daily business. As these effects are
not necessarily quantifiable, they often remain concealed and are thus excluded from
formalised resolution.
Internal and external evaluation processes provide some measure of risk mitigation, preparing
the prospective partners for what lies ahead culturally. The overall objective therewith is to
lessen the risks to the wellbeing of the partnership from inherently different corporate
cultures, while also appreciating the challenges, the developmental and creative potential of
bringing cultures together in interairline partnerships.
6.4 Partnership Intensity - a Determinant for Collaborative Synergy
Partnership intensity has repeatedly been referred to in connection with the possible benefits
of synergy I 34 (see Khanna, 1998, p. 340). Itwas also proposed that partnership intensity forms
part of the arenas of synergy, and is thus one of synergy's influencing drivers. This
connection is now scrutinised further, placing partnership intensity and synergy in a more
detailed causal relationship.
Partnership intensity is defined as the extent of direct involvement between business partners.
This involvement is determined by the size of assets and resources (soft-, hardware, and
personnel) invested in establishing and maintaining the partnership (see Zinn and
Parasuraman, 1997, p. 140 and Khanna, 1998, p. 344). A further constituent of partnership
intensity is seen in the frequency of interaction and the planned duration of the partnership
(see Lutz, 1993, pp. 54-55 and Parkhe, 1993, pp. 800-801). Frequent interaction does not only
mean to regularly engage in economic transactions, but also implies the importance of jointly
deciding on further strategic moves to benefit the partnership'S development. Intensive
involvement in collaborative action also suggests that the partnership is not easily dissolvable.
In contrast, low intensity partnerships are characterised by the possibility of unconstrained
134 For a quantification of cost benefits determined by the intensity of the partnership, see further above in the
section on cost motivators to collaborate (4.3.2.1)
Synergy Audit
separation and the probability of a facile partner replacement with a suitable substitute (see
Zinn and Parasuraman, 1997, p. 141).
Therefore, partnership intensity is concerned with both, the reach or scope and the depth of
collaborative agreements, as visualised by figure 6.4. Considering the value chain, airlines
might collaborate in almost the entire value creation process and consequently engage in
widely-oriented partnership activities.l " In turn, collaboration might be limited to very few
selected parts of the value chain, e.g. maintenance collaboration, which would then signify a
narrow partnership. However, narrow partnerships can be profound in their particular
collaboration area. A maintenance alliance can show significant depth if the participating
carriers, e.g., jointly develop, uphold and refine maintenance systems. Partnership intensity
should thus be understood in a two-dimensional context describing the resultant of the
horizontal (width) and vertical (depth) partnership orientation along the value chain.
Figure 6.4: Intensity-determining Two-dimensional Collaboration Context
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6.4.1 A Relational Devolution of Partnership Intensity and Synergy
Airlines' collaboration strategies centre on improving their competitive position and
increasing shareholder wealth by means of inter-company synergies. The intensity of their
collaboration thus determines the potentiality of synergy effects. Obviously, not every airline
wishes or can engage in proximate partnerships. In deciding on whether or not to collaborate
intensively, airlines are firstly restrained by the legal and regulatory environment in which
they operate. Secondly, the decision regarding the intensity level of the partnership is based
IJ5 By definition, collaborations cannot entail partnerships spanning the entire value chain of the allies.
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on individual synergy potential considerations, which are founded on collaborative motivators
and thus embedded in the firm's strategy (see Khanna, 1998, p. 344).
If high intensity relationships embody greater levels of resources committed to the
relationship, it follows that more intense linkages might produce higher levels of output. It is
thus plausible that the less intense a partnership is, the fewer the overall, absolute synergies
that are achievable. Nevertheless, this does not imply that only intensive collaboration is
necessarily required. Broad synergy potential cannot be desired at all times nor is it expected.
If an airline wishes to enter a specific market, e.g. through unilateral codesharing and a sales
agreement, then the synergies of this specific strategic partnership move should ideally
materialise. The initial synergy potential in this case has a very limited, narrow scope and it
primarily lies in extending the airline's network to a discrete geographic region and in brand
awareness considerations. If these limited synergy criteria regarding sources, arenas,
motivations and areas of synergies can be symmetrically translated into tangible synergy
effects, the partnership strategy is a success.
Limited interairline collaboration can thus be beneficial despite its confined reach. The
question is how significant this one collaboration is for the participating airline and its
corporate performance. This significance is mainly determined by the qualitative and
quantitative value of the collaboration vis-a-vis the airline's general economic condition and
developmental orientation. Lufthansa, for example, undoubtedly benefits from codeshare
services with its regional Lufthansa Team partner Cirrus Airlines'r" to economically viable,
although less frequented destinations in Germany and the neighbouring region. In relative
terms, compared to Lufthansa's passenger air transport operation and with reference to its
other partnerships, this joint business is economically of marginal significance. Cirrus
Airlines, on the other hand, depends completely on this partnership, as its entire asset
structure is dedicated to permanently providing connections and feed for Lufthansa. Relative
to the participants' businesses, synergies can thus drastically differ. From an absolute
perspective, however, the achieved synergies on both sides can be equally high.137
The following, simplified graphical juxtaposition of absolute synergy size and carrier size
allows for a delineation of the weight of synergies for differently sized partners.
136 Cirrus Airlines operates 5 regional aircraft and supplements Lufthansa's network out of Saarbrucken in the
western part of Germany.
137 This presupposes that the partnership action strives to fulfil the same goals and that opportunistic behaviour
and unbalanced contribution can be avoided.
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Figure 6.5: Synergy Size vs. Carrier Size
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Source: own compilation
For carriers that do not differ that drastically in size and operate in a multilateral partnership
environment, synergies have a separate character. Lufthansa's linkage to, e.g., Ansett
Australia has a more strategic meaning, given the background of the common Star Alliance
membership. Despite the carriers being joined under the Star Alliance umbrella, they are far
from being profound partners. The premier motivation for admitting Ansett was to provide the
entire Star Alliance group with access to the Australian market and to feed traffic from
Australia and the region into the Star network. Individual partnership motives were of
secondary importance, the group-based synergies in this case outweighing the company-based
benefits of the agreement. The collaboration with United Airlines, Lufthansa's ally, especially
in the North American and transatlantic markets, is of the highest importance for both
carriers. This is only partly due to the common Star membership of which the two are
founding partners, but is ascribable to the close, comprehensive and competitively important
relationship. What is even more salient in their affiliation is that in the USA they operate
under antitrust immunity in an open skies agreement. As the main pillars of the Star Alliance,
their strong presence in two of the main air traffic markets, as well as their size and status,
make them the main drivers of the evolution and the generation of collaborative benefits and
the subsequent advancement of the multilateral partnership.
As far as synergies are concerned, the examples of Lufthansa's partners show that for
different scopes and depths of collaborative activities, synergies lie on divergent corporate or
multilateral group significance levels. ynergies for narrow collaborations can be adequately
effectuated, the realisation of synergy potentials provided. However, the efficacy of these on
the company's performance as a whole depends on the significance of the synergies in
relation to the size of the respective firm or collaborating business. Figure 6.5 graphically
illustrates that the extent of positive effects from collaboration almost equals the size of small
carrier B. The resulting synergies from the collaboration with carrier A, consequently de cribe
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the importance for carrier B's operation, but also visualise the dependence on collaborative
synergies. Synergies have a lower relative effect on carrier A, which is not surprising
considering A's size. However, absolutely, the partnership itself is likely to produce
maximum synergy if the potential of the intensity level is fully exploited and synergies occur
evenly.
Multilateral partnerships or carrier networks, currently the most profound form of horizontal
multi-carrier alliances, can produce different synergy levels among their members. In a
partnership that is mainly driven by joint membership in a multilateral grouping, thus serving
group interests, synergies are of varying momentum to the individual carriers. As the airlines
primarily partner via the multilateral group, the relationship is further and synergies normally
less immediate (see e.g. Ansett - Lufthansa). In close relationships of equally sized carriers
with related strategic intents, synergies have a similar absolute and relative importance and
the development of the partnership can jointly be given impetus (see e.g. United Airlines -
Lufthansa).
The absolute synergy efficacy does not depend on merely the scope nor purely on the depth of
the collaboration, but its intensity, which describes the resultant of the two (see figure 6.5).
Synergy can thus be defined as the function of partnership intensity, with the absolute synergy
result having a direct relation to the closeness of the collaboration.
In a graphic presentation, the position of the intensity/synergy potential function's graph can
thus vary in the system of co-ordinates. As no empirically founded and universally applicable
data on the relation of partnership intensity and synergy are available, the following positions
and courses are considered hypothetically possible. As one of many functions, the system of
co-ordinates only shows a few, but significant possibilities. Since the graphs describe
synergies that are possibly achievable, they are obviously concerned with synergy potentials.
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Figure 6.6: Graphic Presentation ofthe Relationships Between Partnership Intensity and
Synergy
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• No.1 puts partnership intensity and synergy potential in a linear relationship. The course
delineates that with each increase in partnership intensity, an equally high increase in
synergy potential is to be expected.
• No. 2 also puts partnership intensity and synergy in a linear relationship, but reveals that
synergies only start to evolve once a certain stage of partnership intensity has been
reached or a critical intensity threshold has been passed. This relationship, e.g., would
occur in the case of an airline IT collaboration if the benefits from partnering can only be
achieved once both parties have fully integrated a common IT system or infrastructure. 138
No.3 describes a radical-shaped relationship function with a degressive gradient. After a•
•
growth phase in the partnership intensity/synergy function, a virtual synergy threshold
value will be reached. This shape applies to collaborations that are limited to certain
functions and which, after a phase of synergy exploitation through intensity enhancement,
cannot grow any further.
No.4 puts partnership intensity and synergy in a seemingly exponential relationship with
a progressive growth, where an increase in intensity results in a disproportionally high
growth in synergy. The exponential growth in synergy can be attributed to positive effects
such as synergy spillover and effects on other areas, or the subsequent advancement or
creative development of further positive effects. 139
138 Airline partnerships that seem to generally require a critical scope of collaborative activities for gainful
partnership effects to evolve have been previously discussed.
139 For both, NO.3 and No.4, a positive shift on the x-axis - similar to No.2 - is possible.
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With the delineation above, the general functional relationship between synergy potential and
partnership intensity could be deduced. The following sections scrutinise these functions
further.
6.4.2 Potentiality of Dissynergies and Synergies with Regard to Partnership
Intensity
The discussion in paragraph 6.4.1 predominantly described the reciprocal dependence of
partnership intensity and synergy potential. From a business evolutionary perspective, the
way in which synergies or dissynergies are influenced by growing partnership intensity is of
additional interest.
As indicated, once synergy potentials have been detected, it becomes a managerial challenge
to successfully transform them into synergy effects. The way to achieve this can be paved
with many obstacles. Dissynergies, thus unforeseeable obstructions in the course of a
partnership, can form a barrier to converting potentials into tangible effects. More positively,
however, intensive collaboration might even unearth synergy effects that were not anticipated
at the outset of the alliance. The relational issues of partnership intensity and dis synergies as
well as synergies can now be briefly introduced.
6.4.2.1 Partnership Intensity vs. Dissynergy
To readdress one of the aforementioned examples, Lufthansa might only be able to potentially
achieve synergies with its strategic partner United Airlines. What was originally envisaged
regarding the outcome of their strategic partnership could possibly not be realisable at all, or
be accomplishable within a reasonable time frame, or within the constraints of a certain
financial budget (see also Hirzel, 1993, Goold and Campbell, 1998). In addition, synergy
effects might turn out to be unevenly diffused among the partners, leading to dissatisfaction or
even opportunistic behaviour (e.g. Austrian - Swissair). Other carriers suffer from external
dissynergies, blocking flourishing alliances. The partnership between British Airways and
American Airlines (and so the entire Oneworld alliance) is far from reaching its synergy
effects as a decision on antitrust immunity is pending and, related to this, no agreements can
be reached between the UK and the USA regarding open skies. Various dissynergies can thus
stand in the way of realising synergy effects.
As the explanations above have shown (see in particular figure 6.6), with an increasing
partnership intensity, the potential for synergy mounts. However, the capacity for dissynergies
increases as much. Closer partnerships simply have more to lose than less close lin.~ages.
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Dissynergies can thus be brought into a direct relation to partnership intensity (see Lutz, 1993,
p. 195 for organisational synergy models). Figure 6.7 visualises this effect.
Figure 6.7: Graphic Presentation of the Relationship Between Dissynergy and Synergy as
Determined by Intensity
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The figure is essentially three-dimensional as it incorporates the development of synergy and
dissynergy in relation to a corridor of partnership intensity. Partnership intensity thereby
develops progressively from full autonomy (low synergy, low dissynergy potential) to
complete integration (high synergy, high dissynergy potential) of the participating airlines.
The basic burdens in the synergy realisation process, such as internal and external
dissynergies apply. With partnerships being able to achieve greater synergies if they are more
intensively involved, they also face the problem of exacerbating the capacity for conflict and
the gravity of dissynergies in close relationships. Considering the co-mingling of assets and
resources invested in the establishment and governance of close partnerships, the risk
potential in conflicts and the loss potential (vulnerability) of dissolution becomes apparent.
While close co-operations represent a window of opportunities towards harvesting higher
benefits, they also exemplify collaborative hazards.
The immediate post-merger phase of, for example, Daimler Benz and Chrysler has been
paved with conflicts induced by the closeness of the newly formed DaimlerChrylser co-
operation. Lengthy discussions regarding seemingly trivial issues such as business card
formats and letterhead styles have repeatedly caused friction between the parties of the
automotive firm. Finding an adequate balance between the right synergy-generating and
dissyncrgy-avoiding intensity level is without a doubt an art form. Airlines are usually aware
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of this association and thus take gradual partnering steps to escape the likely negative effects
of early, close collaborations.
6.4.2.2 Partnership Intensity vs. Synergy Potentiality
Synergy is generally a function of partnership intensity - this relationship has been delineated
before. The transformation of what partners expect from a collaboration into actual, tangible
results, thus requires an airline's full capabilities in meeting the challenges associated with
partnership management and operation. The transformation process can produce an outcome
that meets all targets, under- or over-delivers the initial prospects. In contrast to the above,
synergy effects can thus also surmount synergy potential. This can especially occur in the
case of exceptionally well-managed, flexible and gainful partnerships where the realised
outcome of the collaboration is more valuable than the foreseen results. Such a development
would form an ideal basis for the partnership'S subsequent advancement and making it a core
for more comprehensive alliances. The South African market, for example, has witnessed the
BA-Comair franchise, which - after initial obstacles - developed beyond prediction for both
parties, with BA taking up a 20% share in its junior franchisee.
Figure 6.8 visualises this general connection. Assuming that partnership intensity and synergy
potential follow a linear function (for other functions, see figure 6.6), the devolution of
synergy effects can be as indicated.
Figure 6.8: Synergy Potential and Development of Effects in Relation to Partnership Intensity
Partnership
Intensity
Synergy Over-realised
Synergy Effects Potential
Source: own compilation
The figure clearly illustrates the options to the development of unrealised as well as over-
realised synergy effects from the basis of initially expected synergy potentials (the diagonal).
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The exact position and size of un- and over-realised synergy effects are largely assumed,
although they are possible. The possibility of not reaching synergy targets increases with
partnership intensity and synergy potential. This connection can be deduced from the
relationship between conflict potential (dissynergies) and synergy potential. Accordingly, the
probability and potentiality of dissynergies increase with close collaborations. Superior
degrees of integration lead to higher conflict capacity. It is consequently to be expected that
unrealised synergies occur in a proportionally higher degree in intensive partnerships than in
rather loose collaborations.
It is equally conceivable that synergy effects can surmount synergy potentials. Spillover
effects from already realised synergies can lead to further benefits developing with the
collaboration. Environmental imponderables, such as changing government policies leading
to liberalised markets, can also result in actual partnership benefits being weightier than
anticipated. Partnering carriers often seek these surmounting synergies by creatively
searching for new areas of collaborative action. This active, progressive and creative process
of advancing the collaboration can be seen as a positive development in an interairline
collaboration as it shows strong commitment and the will to conclude further ties.
6.S Airline Partnership Intensity Evaluator (A.PIE) as a Multidimensional
Tool for Collaborative Closeness
Synergy as the beneficial product of partnership action correlates with partnership intensity.
Hence, the quantitative and qualitative value of the collaboration is fundamentally determined
by the closeness of the relationship. In a further step towards developing the synergy audit
model and towards introducing an audit methodology, the following operationalises the
relationship between interairline synergy and partnership intensity.
As indicated above, the closeness of an airline inter-business linkage must not be exclusively
associated with the scope (width) of the collaboration. Collaborations with a very limited
coverage of the value chain can be as intensive in their respective collaborative domain as
wide partnerships are. This indicates that even confined collaborations lead to satisfying and
gainful results once the relationship potential from these partnership actions has been fully
exploited.
To establish an operational tool in order to measure the intensity of the partnership and
ultimately synergy, the Airline Partnership Intensity Evaluator (A.PIE) is subsequently
introduced. A.PIE. is a synthesis of academic facts, secondary empirical evidence, as well as
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findings drawn from discussions with airline partnership practitioners and specialists. The
model finds application as a tool and is an integral part of a as yet theoretical synergy auditing
process, which is further described below (see 6.6).
6.5.1 Goals and Objectives of A.PIE
A.PIE serves a series of interrelated objectives and helps to achieve a number of goals,
particularly in the context of assessing interairline benefits as part of the synergy audit. In
accordance with the limitations of this dissertation, only horizontal partnerships between
scheduled air transport passenger services are supported by the evaluator. Any other forms of
airline collaboration with other aviation or non-aviation service and/or product providers have
not been incorporated into the model's functionality.
A.PIE is a comprehensive and sustainable tool, broadly providing multidimensional
objectives and goals that can be divided into:
• Individual goals: concerned with the distinct intentions of a single carrier's collaborative
activities
• Comparative goals: the relative dimension of status and effects of partnership intensity
• Developmental goals: referring to the collaboration's evolution
The aforementioned goals also give an indication of A.PIE's temporal dimension. The tool
can be used during the entire life-span of the interairline partnership - from preparation via
formation until termination of the collaboration. While individual goals occur primarily at the
outset, during the strategic decision for a partnership, and are applicable during its entire life-
span, comparative goals are concerned with the joint attainment of benefits from the
collaboration and thus arise in situ. Developmental goals incorporate the subsequent progress
of the collaboration, which entails the joint intensification of the partnership, also by
creatively seeking new synergy potentials, thus, synergistically, co-evolving (see figure 6.15).
A collaboration can be very individually and discretely motivated. This is because, especially
in loose forms of interairline partnerships, individual, private goals are superior to commonly
achievable benefits. This opportunism is widely acknowledged and even accepted, as it
represents the main condition for many, mostly operative, partnerships. While it is
counterproductive to simply endeavour to fulfil individual partnership goals, airlines do
pursue their discrete incremental qualitative and quantitative gains from partnership action.
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A.PIE thus provides the individual framework for each collaborating carrier to achieve the
following synergy-related issues:
• Identification of areas of synergy potential (ex ante)
Guiding tool to individually and sequentially realise synergies
Identification of synergy effects (in situ, ex post)
•
•
Comparatively and commonly achieving benefits from the partnership is another objective of
collaborations (see also Khanna, 1998, p. 340). Despite individualism being widely found,
learning and business alliances focus on the joint maximisation of business performance
through partnership action - a common set of goals is therefore salient. With regards to a
comparative dimension, A.PIE thus caters for:
•
Identical comparative synergy areas; benefit overlap/complementarity
Balanced comparative synergy intensity levels; avoidance of asymmetries
Benchmarking, quantification and qualification of partnership action
•
•
The aforementioned dimensions are only concerned with the present status of individual and
comparative partnership intensity and synergy. A.PIE furthermore allows for the delineation
of dynamic, developmental aspects of partnership intensity and comprehensiveness. The
evaluator can thereby trigger fresh thinking. This helps to prevent systematic blind spots and
makes it more likely that the review of the partnership areas will be comprehensive. In
conclusion, the tool helps the development of the partnership to accomplish the following
purposes:
•
Identification of advancement areas for the partnership
A practical basis for organisational intervention
Guiding tool to the gradual unfolding of further collaborative synergies
•
•
A.PIE is, however, not a device to quantitatively measure synergy with the aid of partnership
intensity. The above described synergy measures indexes, which can vary from company to
company and are based on different benchmarks, need to quantify the tangible effects from
collaborative action (see 6.2.5 and for tangible airline alliance benchmarks, see e.g. Merrill
Lynch & Co., 2000). A.PIE mainly seeks to fulfil the aforementioned goals qualitatively,
although the embodiment of a numerical dimension in the form of a rating of the partner hip
is also conceivable.
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In summary, A.PIE· thus supports unveiling of beneficial partnership activities and their
effects in the following domains:
• Goal orientation and achievement of objectives
Temporal perspective
Partnership social and compensation perspective
Developmental perspective
•
•
•
The embeddedness of the A.PIE in the synergy audit methodology is elucidated further
below.
6.5.2 Conceptualisation of A.PIE and Key Aspects of its Application
A.PIE is a comprehensive and multidimensional device that can find application in every type
of airline partnership within the original limitation of this dissertation and considering the
aforementioned goals and objectives. In line with its structure, it thus needs to take the
possibilities of wide and deep as well as narrow and shallow interairline partnerships into
consideration, by comprehensively covering all possible and feasible areas and forms of
airline collaboration. Since A.PIE is a model, it also needs to extract some main aspects of
partnership action that are relevant to collaborative intensity and synergy, besides providing a
simplified assessment of the complex partnership status and process. A.PIE therefore consists
of a functional and an assessing/evaluating section:
• The functional section is concerned with business activities to be evaluated regarding their
collaborative intensity. This section isstrongly oriented towards the airline's value chain
and its primary (physical) and secondary (managerial) activities (for the airline value
chain, see figure 4.4 above). However, the operability of the tool calls for condensed
functionality areas of alliance activity. Hence, areas were established using real-life
evidence of elementary partnership orientation and on the basis of an evaluation of further
valuable partnership functions. The area selection is additionally based on an assessment
of the relative importance of partnership functions for airline collaboration. The
importance of certain non-core issues for interairline collaborations also motivated the
addition of further environmental and soft factors representing indispensable criteria of
partnership intensity. Among these is the customers' perception of the partnership's
-
intensity, which can provide important understanding from an outside-in perspective.
• The assessing/evaluating section brings each function in a collaborative area into the
context of partnership intensity by individually describing and scaling the profundity of
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the collaboration. The assessing/evaluating section thus provides an overview of relevant,
clustered partnership functions and their scaled intensity. The continuum of partnership
intensity can quantitatively range from 1 - no collaboration - to 10 - common
control/concentration (see appendix for the comprehensive model). However, the
partnership intensity of each functional area must be defined by a qualitative continuum as
well. This is why the scaled positions of the continuum are circumscribed by specific
partnership characteristics. According to the continuum, the qualitative clusters outline the
possible subsequent progression of a partnership from "no collaboration" to "full
collaboration" or "concentration".
The choice of functional sections and their respective assessing continuums was additionally
critically discussed and subsequently adjusted with the aid of a panel of airline and strategic
alliance experts (see chapter 1 for research methodology). This procedure aimed at achieving
highest possible accuracy and topicality in the selection of items as well as internal
consistency.
The basic sectional set-up of A.PIE is summarised in figure 6.9.
Figure 6.9: A.PIE Structure
Evaluating
Section
VALUE CHAINFunctional
Section Primary Activitie
Other softlenviro mental Factors
Source: own compilation
The figure displays primary and secondary value chain activities/functions as well as soft and
environmental factors in the functional section of the A.PIE model. For each separately
defined activity, a continuum has been designed with a clustered partnership intensity
classification, comprising the evaluating section.
Classifying partnership intensity clusters can be a complex task. A gradation of collaborative
forms in the continuum between "no collaboration" and "full collaboration" is often not easily
achievable, as in reality either many different or very few discrete levels or gradual steps of
intensity exist. Exemplary of a greatly detailed continuum, figure 6.10 depicts the integrative
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progression of a FFP, with clustered intensity levels and the resulting synergy. The FFP
thereby migrates from an individually utilised loyalty device by a single carrier, to a
commonly applied superbrand marketing tool.
Figure 6.10: FFP Integration Intensity Continuum
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Whether this degree of detail is operational for each of the evaluated functions remains
questionable. A main criterion for practicable intensity continuums is the display of discrete
and separable integration steps from no collaboration to full integration. In this regard, the
detailed FFP example shows that a clear path of synergistic intensity expansion up to full
integration can be designed for separate corporate functions and businesses.
FFP Partnership
Intensity
-"
Table 6.1 provides an overview of the functions and the soft/environmental factors included
in the A.PIE structure. A comprehensive description of the continuum, including the
assessing/evaluating section and the clusters of intensity can be found in Appendix B.
Source: own compilation
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Table 6.1: A.PIE Evaluation Clusters
Partnership Structure
General Set-Up Type of Collaboration
Primary Functions
Procurement and Finance IT Hard-/Software
Purchasing of Strateoic Input Factors
Fleet Planning/Purchasing/Co-ordination
Ground Operations Operations Control
Ground Operations
Airport Facilities
MaintenanceiTechnicalOperation MRO
Spares, Service Purchasing
Flight Operations Destinations Affected/Geooraphic Restriction (Network Width)
Frequencies Available for Partnership/ Available Inventory (Network
Depth)
Schedule DevelopmentlPlannino
Network Structure
Passenger Service/Product Passenger Handling (Pre-flioht, Post-flioht), Check-in, Check-out
Inflight
Marketing/Sales /Distribution Marketing Operations and Strategy
Branding
FFP
ALP/CLP
CRS
Sales Teams
Online Distribution
Yield Management
Pricing
Seconda~Functions
General Management stratecv DevelopmentlBusiness Plannino
Governance
Accounting, Finance
Revenue Manaoement
Personnel Management Human Resources
Information Management and Logistics IT Strategy
Others
Customer Perspective/Look Outside-In Perceived Closeness of the Relationship
Interaction with External Environment Government Relationship
Air Service Agreements/Regulation
ATC, Airports, Others
Benefit Areas Objective Focus /Ambition
Knowledge and Know-How Learning Potential
Knowledoe Transfer
Business Culture Status Quo/Adaptation Process
Loss Potential Number of Alternatives
Re-creation Effort/Exit & Entry Costs
Trust UncertaintyNulnerability/Control
Collaboration Authority Power Perception
Source: own compilation
By evaluating each of the above-mentioned functions and areas in terms of their clustered
intensity, the desired goals and objectives of A.PIE can be ideally achieved, namely to draw a
comprehensive picture of the closeness of the collaboration.
The specific evaluation and interpretation of the results, however, varies with the different
objectives and goals partners pursue in applying the A.PIE. These were described abo e (see
6.5.1) and impact on the process of concluding from the intensity evaluation process.
• Individual evaluation must be benchmarked against perceived and desired synergy
potential and synergy effects. This is important as certain partnerships are not designed to
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be overly profound. A codeshare agreement would not receive the highest absolute
partnership intensity rating.14o However, if the partnership strategy and the agreement
based upon it do not permit a closer type of collaboration, then A.PIE can help to identify
further functions of collaboration in line with this intensity level. In addition, the model
can support the detection of domains that are below the overall intensity level and provide
guidance for the subsequent development of the partnership.
• Comparatively evaluating partnership synergy against intensity goals can give an
indication of intensity congruence among partners. In this respect, a distinction
concerning the operability of intensity evaluation needs to be made with regards to value
chain activities and the soft/environmental factors. While value chain activities can often
be objectively evaluated based on partnership agreements, and the legally determined
issues and ensuing design and operation of the partnership, the rating of soft factors can be
more biased. Soft factors, which form a significant part of the partnership capital, are
mostly not determined in any legally binding format. Their evaluation relies on the
participants' perceptions of the collaboration. Herein major intensity discrepancies
regularly surface. These originate from misperceptions of the collaboration and individual
definitions of partners' standing within the alliance, the contribution to the partnership,
and the understanding of the power constellations. Soft, and sometimes environmental
evaluation factors thus leave room for individual interpretation, which can occasionally
represent a domain for dissynergies based on mutual misperception.
In comparatively evaluating partnership intensity, the A.PIE can graphically give indications
of exactly these shortcomings of the partnership. As discussed, synergies should congruently
occur for each airline participating in a partnership. One-sided expectations and
materialisation of synergies ropresent potentials for conflict and should be avoided. A.PIE
provides the possibility of a clear, descriptive and graphical identification of the intensity of
partnership areas across the collaborating spectrum. In the form of a semantic differential, it
can thus comparatively depict the stature of a relationship.
140 Codesharing would be mainly concerned with marketing functions and would receive higher ratings in this
category as it would also result in higher ratings assessing the outside-in perspective (passenger perception).
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Figure 6.11: Intensity Semantic Differential
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The figure is fictional in the positions and courses of the graphs, and simplified in terms of the
number of evaluating activities and soft/external factors. Its devolution, however, could apply
to the evaluation of soft and environmental factors of the partnership.
In the case of - fictionally - evaluated partners A and B, the graphical devolution illustrates
that the intensity of the partnership is not rated equally. While it is uncommon for partners to
assess the intensity of their collaboration as differing drastically, or even antipodally, the
perception of partnership intensity can vary greatly in certain areas. This is especially true of
soft factors that are harder to evaluate objectively. An example in the South African market
illustrates this context. Two carriers were operating parallel codeshare operations between
South Africa and an Asian capital. While the African carrier saw the basis for further
development of a more strategic partnership, the Asian carrier merely regarded the agreement
as being of a limited duration and merely undertaken in order to operatively "manage
competition" on Africa-Asia trunk routes. 141
Similar set-ups are perceivable in small-big interairline partnerships. A smaller carrier might
feel that all of its business decisions can be taken independently, whereas the larger partner
insists on having a strong say in, e.g., the establishment of the junior counterpart's new route
services. For both the partners, partnership intensity, in particular perceived intensity and thus
synergy for discrete activities of the value chain, lie on different levels. The consequence is
141 Information garnered from expert interviews. The carrier names are known to the author.
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that the allies do not equally benefit from the partnership. In the aforementioned form, A.PIE
is a tool to graphically juxtapose partnership intensity, which must ideally result in a quasi-
parallel devolution of the graphs. Diverging intensity levels are sources of friction, leading to
drastic partnership dissynergies, which then need be redressed by partnership development
and governance.
A.PIE finds application in a wider synergy auditing context, which is why, due to varying
perceivable auditing organisations, a detailed framework for the practice of its employment
can not be given at this point. However, certain generic rules need to be followed in order to
harvest best possible results from the intensity evaluation:
• The assessment needs to be conducted by authorised and skilled personnel. In the best
case, the synergy audit team carries out the intensity evaluation (see 6.6.1.2 for
organisational alternatives of the audit). Neutrality in gathering the necessary information
from the sample airlines must avoid data collection, processing and interpretation bias.
• A.PIE draws its conclusions from a comparative assessment of the intensity of the
partnership's core value chain activities, additional functions and soft and environmental
factors. Consequently, it is important to analogously conduct the intensity evaluation for
all evaluated partners. This parallelism is required to incorporate the same assessment
methodology for the entire sample. Additionally, data gathering processes need to be
identical and empirical evidence must be collected from similar sources within the
research objects (i.e. personnel with matching functional backgrounds and seniority inside
the sampled carriers).
• For certain evaluation areas, I.e. soft and environmental factors, preparatory research
needs to conducted in the. form of passenger surveys, regulatory assessments or other
external evaluations, in order for A.PIE to be adequately completed. These surveys need
to be planned and carried out ahead of conducting the A.PIE as such, they must follow
similar or identical methodologies for the sample carriers and their results need to be
submitted at a fixed date.
The evaluation of partnership intensity by means of A.PIE should be conducted in a•
predefined, rather short period of time, in which the entire sample is assessed. This is to
avoid shifts in the partnership or corporate changes of one of the sampled airlines to
impact unevenly on the assessment or to distort the overall result.
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• The results of the intensity evaluation should be reviewed and cleared of random errors
before being interpreted, published or made a basis for partnership-strategic decisions.
Validity and reliability measures therefore should be applied.
• An interpretation of the intensity evaluation's results must be carried out for each
functional section. The conclusion drawn from assessing the results strongly depends on
the original focus of the audit, i.e. whether individual or comparative goals were pursued
in conducting the audit (see above for individual and comparative dimensions).
As the A.PIE is embedded into an audit context, the rules above can only provide general
guidelines for carrying out the evaluation. Detailed structural and organisational principles
will be determined by the respective audit set-up.
The following paragraphs describe the overall concept in which A.PIE should find application
as an evaluating tool, namely the synergy audit concept.
6.6 Synergy Auditing Model
Auditing plays a significant role m partnership development and management, from
reviewing potential partners and structuring operating agreements to evaluating operations
and verifying performance results (see Applegate, 1998, p. 54). On the other hand, synergy
has been defined as the key motivator and driver for interairline partnerships. Its positive
effects as well as the potential disadvantages arising with the desire for gainful partnership
action have been discussed (see 6.3 and 6.3). How, in a structured manner, synergy can be
detected, managed and enhanced during the partnership's whole life-span, remains to be
described. Before the entire synergy audit concept can be delineated, however, some general
aspects, and key prerequisites of auditing must be introduced.
6.6.1 General Audit Criteria
Audits are used to verify the compliance with agreed standards. They are not designed to be
once-off measures, but should be applied as continuous improvement tools (see Karapetrovic
and Willborn, 2001, p. 13). In an alliance context, auditing should be an independent
objective assurance and consulting activity created to add value and improve an
organisation's partnership operations. Ideally, this is accomplished by gathering u eful
information on the full spectrum of issues with which collaboration management is concerned
(see Beeler, 1999, p. 74). Audit, in the context of this dissertation, is hence not concerned
with the widely used financial audit, or compliance checks with I 0 standards such as qualit
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and environmental audits,142 but with a general examination of partnership performance and
the benefits company linkages produce.
Main components of audits are agreed standards and the compliance of the system with these
standards. Compliance can therefore be assessed internally, between a firm and its
environment and other stakeholders, and in any type of inter-company partnership. Some
generic audit types in an alliance context, particularly to review audit practice and to
introduce the audit nomenclature, can now be described.
6.6.1.1 Typological Audit Perspective
Partnership activities about to produce gainful results for participants are exposed to a number
of challenges. Auditing is a practicable tool for assessing whether the means of combating
these challenges comply with agreed standards and expectations. Typologically, audits in
partnerships can take different forms, depending on the content and the original auditing
objective (see Strickland, 1999, pp. 22-23).
• Financial audits: An audit type oriented around financial-statements, focussing mainly on
the books and records of the partnership. Financial alliance audits thus require adequately
defined measurement indexes as well as historical and actual financial figures.
• Regulatory compliance audits: A review of compliance with laws and regulations within
the airline partnership and its environment. A compliance audit can give management
high-level assurances on the most critical items that may negatively affect the
collaborative venture and be of interest to regulatory and/or government agencies. For
airlines seeking and being active in partnerships, compliance with regulations plays an
important role in the legal and regulatory environment in most regions around the
•
world. 143
• Standard compliance audits: These types of audits find application in close relationships
that are based on strict and pre-defined codes of business behaviour and governance.
Standard compliance audits are usually built into franchise agreements and ensure the
franchisor that all commercial and operational terms of the agreement have been complied
with.
142 See, e.g., ISO 9,000 (quality audits) or ISO 14,000 (environmental audits).
143 Regulatory compliance audits, e.g., also entail codeshare safety audits, which are a mandatory measure for
US airlines prior to receiving approval for codeshare operations.
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• Management/regulatory reporting: Focuses on the completeness and accuracy of internal
management reporting (on business results, processing or control exceptions) and
externally issued reports (such as regulatory, financial, or public reporting requirements).
This approach provides reassurance about the information flow within the partnership and
with other external stakeholders.
• Internal control audits: Basically, audit types in this category include a targeted or limited-
scope review of a specific aspect of the partnership venture (such as maintenance, sales
and marketing, knowledge, learning and growth) and a full-scope review, which could
cover the entire collaborative value chain. Individual control audits are performed
separately by each member of the partnership. Each partner may indeed define these
audits differently and desire varying levels of review, to which the partners would need to
agree up front, should the results be shared.
• Customer compliance audits: This measure focuses on how an alliance is viewed by its
customers - looking in from the outside. Typically, passengers evaluate an airline
partnership according to certain performance measures. The perceived performance can
then be benchmarked against agreed standards.
The aforementioned types of audit have introduced auditing scopes that are highly relevant
for assessing compliance with fundamental partnership issues. They are, however, each
confined to a pertinent, but yet restricted, audit objective and only apply to partnerships in
situ. The synergy audit is more comprehensive. While each mentioned audit type lends some
of its capacity to the synergy audit, it does not fully comply with either of the above. This is
particularly true of the temporal and functional orientation. Being qualitatively oriented, the
synergy audit makes use of some assessing aspects of the aforementioned audit types and
amalgamates them into one audit process, applicable to the partnership's entire life-cycle (for
partnership life-cycles, see Spekman et al., 1998, pp. 760-763).
6.6.1.2 Structural-organisational Perspective
Auditing plays a more or less important role in different industry sectors, One industry, which
is certainly the heart of quantity-driven audits, is the financial service industry. Others, e.g.
the production sector of commerce, have recently been intensively involved in auditing
product and process quality and the compliance with environmental standards. Just as there
are infinite approaches to auditing financial institutions, there may be various options for
delivering audit services with varying depths of audit coverage to airline partnerships. Each
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pattern for structuring the audit approach and the type of audit to perform - some of which are
discussed below - has advantages and disadvantages.
The synergy audit for interairline partnership action can be performed on an individual basis
or jointly among the partners. For the subsequent progress of the partnership, and in order to
avoid conflicts in the partnership, an open, joint audit process is certainly preferable. This
approach would redress the ubiquitous concerns of power imbalances and appropriation.
However, as airlines may wish to gain information on the individual value of the
collaboration for the sake of their individual strategic development, separate synergy audit
cycles can also be envisaged.
Generally, the conducting of synergy audits fall within the responsibility of the partnership
management. Since governance can be purely internal or internal and/or external, depending
on the set-up of partnership managerial structures, different structural audit alternatives are
perceivable. As the synergy audit is a comprehensive and integral tool, its tasks can be
completed by specialists originating from the respective functional areas. In a partnership
project management organisation, these functions need to be shared between the partners in
order to accurately design, implement and merge the results of the audit. It is most crucial in
this context that the right to audit is stated in the partnership contract. Structurally, audit types
can take the following forms (see Strickland, 1999, p. 22):
• Internal assurance group: An internal audit group is created or an existing group IS
leveraged to perform assurance and compliance testing of policies and procedures within
an individual partner. The group typically reports to the partnership management and
provides the results of testing and does the follow-up of issues. The results need to be
detailed and focused on specific compliance issues, also with regards to the chronological
stage (planning, management, and advancement) of the collaboration. Internal auditing
results usually are not shared among the partners. Internal assurance groups certainly need
to conduct audits prior to entering a partnership. As part of a synergy due diligence
process, their task can be to detect ex ante collaborative synergies based on audit findings.
• Joint audits: Resources from each of the partners' internal audit functions (if present) are
occasionally combined to design and implement a collective audit of the partnership. This
type leverages expertise from each partner in the business, systems and operations, and
shares the results of the combined review with all allies and partnership management.
Joint audits are particularly appropriate when the collaboration is not yet operating on a
common managerial platform with one set of documents, operations and procedures -
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which is usually the case in most airline partnerships. Joint audits offer the potential to
eliminate redundant audit work and provide a venue for best practice sharing and
development (see Applegate, 1998, p. 54). These audit types ensure that all parties receive
results of equal quality, they can level size differences between the partners and redress
appropriation concerns. Joint audits certainly provide the most unbiased findings, as all
partners can participate equally. Possible disadvantages include difficulties in arranging
for experts from the different partners to be assigned to the audit simultaneously, as well
as problems in agreeing on audit procedures and reporting criteria.
Reliance on and sharing of one partner's audit results: In certain cases, especially in
asymmetrically sized partnerships, one partner may lack the resources or expertise to
adequately perform a collaboration audit. Therefore, partners place trust on one ally to
conduct the audit and share the results with all allies. Most ideally, the auditing party
discloses the entire structure and operation of the audit programme to its partners. In
multilateral partnerships, this may imply that information is supplied to partners who are
not conducting the audit themselves. Sharing of audit results thus requires trust in the
auditing airline's audit performance, its interpretations and final judgements.
Appropriation concerns, and the loss of independence and partnership authority can not be
fully removed. This structure is obviously only feasible for in situ synergy audits, since it
requires the collaborating parties to be in an operational, stable relationship.
Creation of a permanent internal audit function within the partnership: This approach is
similar to that of joint audits but is permanent in nature, but relies on partnership
management to hire competent and experienced audit professionals. It should be
structured in such a way that the audit function reports directly to an audit committee
(ideally) of the partnership management board. The partnering firms would receive reports
and information through their representative in the partnership management organisation.
The budget, charter, and overall audit methods of this function can be designed in
consultation with the audit departments (if existent) of the airline partners. This type
provides a more independent approach to auditing the collaboration, but usually requires a
close collaboration between larger airlines.
Hiring audit expertise: Typically, each partner has a different approach to audit
programmes, based on its respective culture and - if existent - audit practice. A common
strategy in partnerships (particularly joint ventures) is to appoint an outside firm to
perform internal control reviews of the partnership, often in conjunction with an annual
audit of the financial statements. For some partnership ventures, this practice represents a
•
•
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cost-effective approach that provides fully independent results, which can be shared
equally with all stakeholders. This audit approach, although externally and independently
performed, usually focuses on quantitative data and therefore lacks comprehension of soft
issues that are relevant to the synergy detection process. In general, as there are usually no
standards for partnership synergy audits - as opposed to, e.g., environmental or quality
audits - audit processes and standards for this audit type have to be defined prior to
auditing the collaboration.
The selection of a particular audit type largely depends on the size of the collaboration, its
closeness and the importance for the overall business performance, individually as well as
comparatively. As audits commonly require investments, bind staff and occasionally obligate
the procurement of external expertise, the costs of the audit need to be weighed against the
expected benefits from the process. Clarity about this matter should result in a general view of
the investments in synergy audit programmes, which, in tum, ought to determine the choice of
a structural type of audit. However, certain types of audits are more suitable, especially when
needing to make allowance for the specific demands of airline partnership variants, and to
satisfy the requirements during the developmental phases of the alliance.
Figure 12 depicts a summary of audit typologies and structures being feasible or possibly
feasible for certain audit phases or life-cycle phases in airline partnerships. The pre-
collaboration phase is mainly concerned with an individual airline's strategic decree prior to
starting with comparative fitness evaluation procedures.
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Figure 6.12: Audit Structure and Typology Feasibility in Collaborative Phases
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6.6.1.3 Audit Nomenclature and Corresponding Synergy Audit Defmition
Set against the background of the above-described typological and structural-organisational
audit perspectives, the following nomenclature needs to be introduced in order to
conceptualise an audit. The references are thus concerned with the synergy audit and define
its specific categories.
Table 6.2: Audit Nomenclature
Terminology Definition Airline Synergy Audit Reference
Auditee Organisation(s) to be audited · Prospective airline partners· Airlines involved in partnerships, bi- or multilateral
Audit Objective The definition of the audit's purpose · Synergy potential· Synergy effects (materialisation of synergy potential)· Balanced materialisation among partners· Benchmarking synergy vis-a-vis other alliances· DissynerQies
Audit Scope The definition of the extent and boundaries of · Horizontal interairline collaboration
the audit In terms of factors such as physical · Value chain areas already or potentially (creative
location and organisational activities areas) affected by the partnership
· Extent according to the partnership acreernent
Audit Criteria Policies, practices, procedures or requirements · Partnership strategic decree (single airline)
against which the auditor compares collected · Partnership fitness
audit evidence on the subject matter · Intensity of the collaboration with regard to the audit
scope
· Synergy benchmarks
Audit Evidence Verifiable information, records, statements of · Suitability
fact · Intensity scaling of hard and soft factors
Other Qualitative and Quantitative information
Audit Team Team designated to perform a given audit · Independent (partnership management)· Independent (appointed)· Single-sided or· Commonly-agreed joint internal audit team
Source: own compilation and ISO, 1996, p. 1
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Further tasks of the auditing organisation and its processes are:
•
The design of the overall synergy audit policy
The transformation of policy into meaningful programmes and auditing processes
The deployment of humans resources, hard-, software, and infrastructure resources
The audit quality assurance
An assessment of the effectiveness in meeting the audit policy, including policy changes
Continuous improvement
•
•
•
•
•
6.6.2 Hierarchical and Functional Synergy Auditing Conception
The structural-organisational description, as well as the cardinal objectives of synergy audits,
lead to the conclusion that the auditing function needs to be embedded - in some form or
another - in partnership management. However, common audits, particularly those dealing
with interfirm linkages, tend to lack proper conceptualisation and management systems (see
Strickland, 1999).
Concerns should thus be raised about the usefulness of audit applications for continuous
business improvement, the inconsistencies of audit processes and results and the value of
compliance audits in understanding complexities of business systems (see Karapetrovic and
Willborn, 2001, p. 13). In scrutinising the airline industry and its partnership management,
structured, consistent and recurring approaches to detecting and enhancing partnership
synergy could not be observed, neither in an audit nor in some other format. While there is a
strong need to enhance airline alliance's business performance, there is a clear gap between
this need and the application of adequate managerial and functional systems to do so (see also
Applegate, 1998, p. 53).
The embeddedness of synergy audits in partnership management systems needs to be
advocated by using a systematic approach. Interdependent, goal-oriented and driven processes
and related resources are required to support the incorporation of the synergy audit within the
partnership's structures. The type of audit can thereby give indications of the configuration of
the audit function itself, while the synergy audit definition points to the audit content. With
regards to its organisational anchoring, the synergy audit needs to be a partially integrated and
interrelated function of partnership management, which itself is a subsystem of general
management. The synergy audit is therefore connected to other managerial systems that exist
beyond its particular boundaries.
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Ideally, auditing objectives must be aligned with - if existent - the overriding audit objectives,
which in turn must correspond to the overall partnership management and general
management policies and goals. Information flow, resource allocation, and project
management structures are required to be adjusted between the management organisation and
the auditing in order to avoid frictions. Figure 6.13 depicts the position of the synergy audit in
the hierarchy of management systems and illustrates its most elementary tasks.
Figure 6.13: Synergy Audit in the Managerial Hierarchy
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L____----'
[> ·Partner Selection'Partnership Management·Improvement
c..._______...J
[> • Overall Synergy Audit POlicy• Transformation of Policy inmeaningful Programs and Audits
• Deployment of HR, Hard-, Software,
Infrastructure Resources
• Audit Quality Assurance
• Assesses the Effectiveness in
meeting the Audit Policy including
Policy Changes
• Audits Synergy comprehensively
during the entire Partnership Life-
Cycle
• Continuous Improvement
Source: own compilation
Hierarchically, the synergy audit is a function and thus subordinate to airline partnership
management. For whatever procedural type of audit in the collaboration's life-cycle,
partnership management is charged with organising the synergy audit process (see Applegate,
1998, p. 53). An important feature of the synergy audit is the feedback loop. Results of the
audit have to be referred back to partnership management. The immediate outcome of the
synergy audit, the detection of frailties and imbalances or areas of synergy potential, need to
be made a basis for partnership managerial decisions.
General management, as the deciding authority regarding corporate strategy, also requires
information on the status and developmental possibilities of partnership action and formation.
The findings of the auditing process can impart crucial information for future partnership
managerial and corporate strategic decisions. However, partnership management can also
directly contribute to the audit's development by providing critical advice. Only once
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feedback from the audit process has lead to its own improvement, can the adequacy of further
audit cycles be achieved (see Karapetrovic and Willborn, 2001, p. 21).
6.6.3 Sequential Synergy Auditing Conception
Various interrelated auditing processes, such as resource allocation, project management as
well as the actual auditing and reporting of audit results, comprise a synergy audit. The
auditing process also includes the identification of audit criteria, collection and verification of
audit evidence and comparison against audit standards. These separate, yet related and linked
steps comprise the sequential synergy audit conception.
Two main features of successful auditing processes are dynamism and an adaptive character
(for adaptive partnership governance, see Spekman et al., 1998, p. 763). These characteristics
illustrate the audit system's ability to accommodate environmental changes and cyclical
movements instead of being procedurally immobile and inflexible. The external environment,
both regulative and competitive, can inflict drastic changes on the airline industry. These
changes need to be absorbed in a levelling as well as in an adaptive manner. The synergy
audit furthermore needs to adjust to conditions in the airline partnership environment in such
a way that it ensures that audit policies and objectives are met. The dynamic features of a
well-planned and implemented audit system will facilitate and simplify suitable and effective
integration of changing audit programmes. Feedback from the audit, not only with regard to
the results of the process, but particularly with regard to the suitability of the synergy auditing
itself, needs to be absorbed for the continuous improvement and design of the synergy audit.
The following figure serves as a framework to describe the sequences of a synergy auditing
process in a more detailed manner.
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Figure 6.14: Sequential Synergy Audit System
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An individual airline or a group of carriers need to be defined as auditees. The choice of
auditees is largely dependent on the life-cycle phase of the partnership, on the fundamental
set-up, and the form and instruments of the collaboration. Generally, all sequences of the
audit are greatly influenced by the discrete stages of partnership evolution. Pre-collaboration
audits are performed individually and are commonly based upon a confined set of data and
assumptions. Auditing a more developed interairline alliance entails including actual partners
in the audit and guarantees that comprehensive amounts of information can be assessed. The
circular audit process thus receives refinement in the course of partnership evolution and with
more data being at the disposal of the iterative auditing process. Thus, all phases of
partnership planning, from the initial investigation via fitness evaluation and the final choice,
to the configuration and operation of the partnership can be subject to synergy auditing, which
evidently determines the group of auditees.
The audit objective of the present evaluation is partnership synergy, potential and effects, thus
collaborative benefits. The scope of the audit has to be defined in the light of the scope of the
partnership and needs to comprise all areas of interairline collaboration. Partnership action
along the value chain can serve as a guiding premise for the auditing scope. However, also the
creative, if future, terrain of partnership action can be audited.
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An audit always has to be conducted according to some benchmark, standard, regulation,
guideline or set of rules, categorised under the common name of audit criteria (see
Karapetrovic and Willborn, 1999, p. 20). The prime gauge for the synergy audit in this
context is partnership intensity and fitness evaluation. Criteria have to be tested against audit
evidences, which are the measured collaboration fitness and its intensity. They are based on
intensity scaling, partner suitability and synergy potential. Audit evidences must be reliable
and sufficient, should be obtained by validated auditing techniques and need to be collected
within the audit scope. As no standardised benchmark for partnership intensity exists, the
goals and objectives of A.PIE, in particular the necessity for levelled synergies, serve as a set
of audit evidence (see 6.5.2 for key issues of applying A.PIE). Fitness evidence can be
gathered in a way similarly to the intensity evaluation structure introduced above. However,
in order to execute the audit and to complement the A.PIE, a set of measures needs to be
explicated in the form of a fitness evaluation screen. 144
The audit team needs to be selected individually. Its composition primarily depends on the
group of airline auditees, the general structure and audit type as well as the partnership phase
in which the audit is carried out. Some perceivable auditing structures have previously been
introduced.
The execution of the audit is finally carried out with the aid of auditing resources. People,
methods and tools as well as facilities have to be selected in order to perform the actual audit.
Aside from adequately preparing the audit, auditing resource allocation is of the utmost
importance for the result-finding process. Resource allocation must respect the audit scope as
well as the auditees. An audit might, for example, entail a larger airline scrutinising a smaller
partner. Objections from, or organisational shortcomings by, the junior ally could inhibit
support of and participation in the audit. Satisfactory resource allocation by the auditee should
therefore be ensured. In auditing any firm, the audit team should consider the needs and
requirements of the partners, the cost, and resource availability in order to conduct a
purposeful audit (see Strickland, 1999, p. 21).
This auditing result mechanism is based on the methodology to be implemented in the
execution of the audit. The execution methods can be multifarious and include quantitative
and qualitative measures. Questionnaire surveys and focus group discussions are therefore
144 The fitness evaluation screen can incorporate partner fitness assessment criteria. A detailed conceptual
description will not be given at this point.
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regularly used (see Goold and Campbell, 2000, p. 77). A selected methodology should be able
to prioritise significant audit execution elements and thus allow the auditor to concentrate on
areas critical for the airline's partnership performance. For the underlying audit, A.PIE is the
key methodology for the in situ synergy audit processes. Personnel involved in the audit
should, at least to a certain extent, come from the partnership management field as well as
from line managerial functions (see Beeler, 1999, p. 78 and 6.5.2 for the general organisation
of carrying out the A.PIE). In auditing creative synergy areas, strong and enthusiastic
champions should be included to identify priority opportunity areas (see Goold and Campbell,
2000, p. 78).
The results of the auditing execution, and after their appropriate evaluation, lead to the
reporting and follow-up of the findings. Where the audit shows discrepancies between the
actual synergy status and the audit criteria, corrective and preventive managerial action needs
to be taken to eliminate the causes of the discrepancy. In addition, the audit structure and type
of audit coverage chosen for one auditing cycle, may not be the most pertinent selection for
the coming iteration. In any case, the audit should provide opportunities for and contribute to
continual improvement, not only as far as the audit process is concerned, but also regarding
the audit methodologies. This can be accomplished by conducting follow-up audits on the
implementation and effectiveness of corrective and preventive actions, which will also serve
as a relatively unbiased and objective source of feedback on the organisation's systems (see
Beeler, 1999, p. 76).
6.7 The Comprehensive Airline Synergy Audit Model
Auditing synergy is neither a one-time task nor is it confined to one particular stage of
collaboration. Horizontal partnerships require strategic decisions in favour of partnership
action, preparation of the collaboration, partner fitness evaluation, assessment of the
collaborative benefits and finally, if required, the winding up of the partnership. All stages are
associated with synergy considerations and should be assessed accordingly.
The main requirements of the synergy audit, namely the managerial, organisational and
sequential structure and the tool A.PI ,have been defined (see 6.5 and 6.6). Compliance with
configurational and organisational principles is of particular relevance to the synergy audit
concept. The synergy audit does not stand alone either. It its embedded in the carrier
individual governance organisation and in the partnership's managerial structures. As such, it
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receives input from and provides feedback to governance functions (see Karapetrovic and
Willborn, 2001).
Figure 6.15 comprehensively illustrates synergy audit in the respective partnership phases,
showing the underlying audit criteria (data, against which the auditor compares audit
evidence), the corresponding audit evidence (verifiable information) and the employable
supporting tools. Interfaces with individual management or partnership management
structures are not, however, illustrated.
Figure 6.15: Synergy Audit Model
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The audit approach follows a life-cycle, just as airline partnerships themselves do. The
synergy audit accommodates a dynamic orientation by concurrently and recurrently following
the stages of preparation, formation, management, advancement and possible termination of
the partnership. The figure depicts the synergy audit spanning the summarised phases of pre-
collaboration and collaboration. Pre-collaborative synergy audits are primarily concerned with
the audit criteria of fitness considerations and assessments of partnership synergy potential.
Audit evidence is collected by gathering interairline partnership fitness data. Collaborative
motivations and synergy potential are closely related, motivating this phase's objective of
formulating and evaluating perceived synergies. Partnership management's original function
lies in creatively seeking synergies that go beyond the partnership's standard beneficial
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potential. The synergy audit can help to unearth latent synergy potential that could be in line
with the restrictions and the intensity level of the collaboration. During the assessment of
fitness and business relatedness, synergy potential and fitness criteria are tested against what
is expected from the prospective airline partner(s). The results of this synergy audit phase lead
to the conclusion to either collaborate or to shed a partner.
Once a collaboration has been concluded, synergy effects become the leading audit criteria.
As in situ collaborative synergies correlate with the closeness of the partnership, actual
intensity will be scrutinised as well. A further audit criterion at this stage is creative synergy
potential. Based on the experience with the ongoing partnership, its intensity could perhaps be
increased, and its scope could be widened in order to realise synergetic effects that go beyond
the current level. It is important to evaluate evidence of the adequate transformation of
synergy potential into synergy effects. However, the efficacy of synergy effects is another
aspect of the evidence in this auditing phase. Discrepancies in expected and realised synergies
can form the foundation for dissynergies, which will then also be detectable by the audit
process. Any partnership should ideally progress by reacting to and anticipating changes in
the industry and market environment. A synergy audit should produce the informative basis
for the subsequent alliance's development.
In the earliest stages of the partnership, a suitability assessment can be conducted with the aid
of a fitness evaluation screen. This tool should ideally apply the fitness categories mentioned
above (see 5.3) in order to detect partners' symmetries as well as asymmetries.l'" The fitness
evaluation screen thereby compliments the A.PIE device as it is specifically concerned with
issues relating to pre-collaborative company relatedness.
A.PIE has been developed as a basic, supporting tool for the entire synergy audit process. It
thus applies to every phase of the synergy audit, whereas the focal intention of its usage varies
with the auditing stage. Pre-collaboration audit uses A.PIE primarily as a guideline for the
range of possibilities of interairline collaboration. Fitness evaluation and the test for business
relatedness are supported by A.PI by comparatively scrutinising suitability along the value
chain and its activities. However, A.PIE's most cardinal function occurs in the collaboration
phase when both the individual and comparative realisation, of synergies can be examined.
145 Fitness categories are: fundamental fitness, strategic fitness, and cultural fitness. ee 5.3 for more details.
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The tool also allows for the detection of dissynergies, as a synergy antipode, m the
partnership.
According to the organisational and hierarchical structure of synergy audit, the results of the
audit process have to be made available to the partnership management as well as to the
general management for control of subsequent collaboration developments.
6.8 Limitations to and Challenges of the Presented Synergy Audit Model
Though the research results and design of the synergy model are highly indicative of its
efficacy, both in theory and in the practice of interairline partnerships, and echo findings of
prior research and practical insufficiencies, certain cautions need to be raised. Although the
use of synergy and its correlation with partnership intensity as a performance measure
provides much needed information regarding the extent to which airline alliances have
achieved their overall objectives, the synergy audit is a new model and this implies that there
are a few limitations to its application.
Research bias forms a general limitation to any type of research and development of new
models or concepts. Research bias pertains to unknown or unacknowledged errors during the
design, measurement, sampling, procedure or choice of problems studied. The key difference
between qualitative and quantitative scrutiny is that quantitative research attempts to
eliminate bias (through representative samples) and that qualitative research explicitly
acknowledges bias. This dissertation is primarily qualitative, and is thus generally prone to
prejudice in some direction or another (see also research methodology in chapter 1).While the
researcher attempted to minimise bias, also by utilising sound scientific approaches, the
underlying empirical study, availability of literature and the researcher's own knowledge
background cannot guarantee a total elimination of partiality. Judgmental or discretionary
accumulation, such as A.PIE's partnership categories, can consequently be particularly
inclined towards bias - although unintentionally.
Models regularly only work within the delimitation of the universe to which they have been
assigned - only describing issues in line with the scope of the research macrocosm. In
practice, models are only applicable to the range of issues they portray. The synergy audit
model has been designed in line with this dissertation's research delimitation, i.e. the
examination of horizontal passenger airline partnerships. As such, it is thus not envisaged that
the audit should be employable in other types of collaboration within the air transport
industry, or in entirely different industries.
Synergy Audit 395
The audit process itself follows a common auditing scheme, designed to structure the
assessment of any type of research matter. For each type of audit, the criteria have to be tested
against audit evidence. As is most common in practice, the criteria originate from thorough
examinations of the research matter, as well as from empirical data regarding the choice of
most suitable and prevalent standards and all derived from the environment (social, industrial,
and cultural) in which the audit is conducted. For common, recurring audits such as
environmental audits or quality audits, long years of practice have lead to very refined
standards regarding the attributes of the audit, the audit's performance and the
implementation of the findings.
In the case of the synergy audit, a commonly accepted audit approach has been paired with
very specific audit criteria, i.e. synergy. Synergy therefore had to be defined in a way to make
it "auditable". This has been achieved by delineating the correlation of partnership intensity
and synergy, as well as by describing the specific requirements for partner suitability. The
synergy audit thus uses the tools A.PIE and the fitness evaluation screen, which make it
unique when compared to standard-type auditing processes. In comparison to standardised
environmental or quality audits, the supporting tools of the synergy audit lack industry-
specific fine-tuning and level of detail. Although the novelty of the synergy audit has a
limiting effect on its application, it does signify that there is potential for improvement and
subsequent refinement.
A further practical limitation to the audit lies in its specific organisational demands. The
synergy audit requires organisational proficiency and investment for the assessment to be
carried out. Obviously, not every allied airline will have the funding, personnel resources and
general expertise to operate the audit. With respect to the inter-company organisation of the
audit, adequate audit administration needs to be ensured contractually.
In its present stage, the main limitation to the instantaneous applicability of the synergy audit
is that the audit has not yet been applied in practice. Applying the synergy audit would entail
companies' understanding of the following issues and might necessitate further empirical
testing (see N/A, Standards for the Professional Practice ofIntemal Auditing, 2001):
• Quality assurance and improvement programmes
Planning of the audit itself
Resource management
Reporting guidelines to the board, senior and partnership management
•
•
•
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• Monitoring of the process of the auditing
• Documentation of the audit results
• Facilitation, training and advisory services
Notwithstanding these limitations, the findings regarding the synergy concept in interairline
partnerships and the development of the synergy audit concept carry useful implications for
managerial practice and the body of business science knowledge.
6.9 Summary and Implications
Synergy is a term widely used in any type of interrelationship. Its business management
connotation is, unlike in many other scientific disciplines, positive in nature and either
describes the gainful effects of co-operating businesses within a firm, or the benefits from
interfirm linkages. Synergy appears in a context of at least three elements that describe its
encouragement, its influencing drivers and its disciplinary morphology. Its delineation in a
partnership context is associated with the core motivations to collaborate and thus, habitually,
is concerned with benefit potential. Synergy effects, delineating realised synergies, emerge in
quantitative and qualitative forms.
Synergy's antipode is dissynergy, which regularly occurs in any form of partnership, although
it can take on different forms due to airline linkages' individual characteristics. Dissynergy
causes friction among the collaborating parties, disturbs the transformation of synergy effects
in synergy potential, binds personnel and ultimately becomes a monetary burden on allies.
Dissynergy can be internally- or externally-bred and has to be dealt with, also preventively,
by partnership management. Both, synergy and dissynergy are influenced by the intensity of
the partnership and the life-cycle phase in which the collaboration operates.
Airlines seek synergistic relationships by entering horizontal linkages. Despite being a
transitional instrument on the way to true consolidation, airline partnership formation and
management is currently the most important strategic tool in the scheduled air transport
industry. With an anticipated industry development ahead, the immanent cyclical evolution
and the threatening consequences that imponderable events can inflict on air transportation,
strategies that represent a springboard for future survival need to be given the highest priority.
Claims to a solid orientation of all aspects of alliance formation, governance and
advancements towards a partnership's life-cycle have been made before, therefore carriers are
well advised to implement a structured and cautious process for the selection process of
partners. Where the range of prospective partners is limited and fast decisions are required,
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rapid opportunism and thorough due diligence must be weighed against each other, using a set
of evaluating guidelines. In the collaborating phase, airlines do not just need a partnership
management practice to control the collaboration and to deal with friction, but also to develop
themselves, and to improve the ties that bind partners. Only sufficient flexibility to tackle the
perpetual challenges associated with interairline partnerships guarantees ongoing
improvement and the fitness to face global industry trends.
Devices and measures that support these priorities are rather the exception than the norm. The
reality in airline alliances is that opportunism when selecting partners ignores short-term
suitability and long-term fitness components. Partnership management is regularly driven by
operatively running the collaboration, which disregards the requirement that the linkage's
value should be continuously measured. There is an obvious absence of standardised scales or
structured controlling mechanisms with which to evaluate the appropriateness and closeness
of the relationship and to provide indications for its improvement. In all, there is a clear
deficit of comprehensive tools with which to support interairline partnerships' quest to be an
output- and synergy-oriented means to enhance its participants' competitive position.
The paragraphs above have introduced the synergy concept and have described collaborative
dissynergies and their particular relevance for horizontal airline partnerships. Based on
synergy considerations and the results of the discussion on prerequisites and success factors
(chapter 5), a theoretical framework in the form of a circular auditing process was designed,
which addresses the challenges of interairline linkages and their current shortcomings.
The airline synergy audit concept is structured and disciplined, the audit categories are clearly
defined and its respective resource classes are alluded to. A transparent succession of auditing
events outlines the assessment scenario and gives leads as to which tasks, preparative as well
as procedural, are to be completed. Selection guidelines by means of a fitness evaluation
cover all the requirements for aptly choosing a partner. A fitness evaluation screen as the
supporting tool for this premature stage, scrutinises partner suitability in pre-defined
categories. The results will either lead to a decision to collaborate or to reject the partner.
Prerequisites and success factors as discussed above (see chapter 5), but also the collaborating
categories of A.PIE, can provide valuable leads and provide safeguards for a successful
configuration of the partnership, operationally as well as managerially.
In the succeeding stage, collaboration is evaluated in situ. By applying the A.PIE model the
overall motivation for collaboration - to achieve synergies - is qualitatively measured through
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the intensity of the partnership collaboration. The fact that not partnership width nor
exclusively depth, but the resulting intensity of the partnership determines a potentially
successful collaboration, can be concluded from the examinations of this chapter. Intensity
considerations can begin as early as during the fitness evaluation and can continue virtually
until the termination of the linkage. At the same time, the actual and perceived closeness of
joint business efforts and the plan-actual comparison provide grounds for the improvement of
the collaboration. The synergy audit provides incentives for the perpetual improvement of the
collaboration by continuously seeking new, creative areas of partnership benefits in line with
the partnership agreement.
The audit framework, comprising tools and methodologies, is dynamic in itself and requires
and ideally receives enhancement over time. From a result-oriented perspective, the synergy
audit distinguishes between individual and collaborative objectives as well as common
advancement goals. This tri-intent approach covers all conceivable spheres in which carriers
wish to establish and then optimise their collaborative activities. Feedback of the assessment's
results to the partnership management and corporate development can leverage the airline's
overall partnership performance. Methodologically more important, however, is the
adjustment of the audit process to its own findings and to the ever changing environment.
Applying the synergy audit will assist scheduled passenger carriers to perform the much-
required tasks commonly associated with interairline collaboration. It furthermore spans the
identified gap in partnership management practice and operation, also by avoiding interairline
partnership dissynergies. These tasks, however, can only be completed once airlines
understand the strategic importance of their partnership action. Comprehension of the
competitive implications should result in a concept of continuously optimising their
horizontal ties. This, on the other hand, is only achievable if carriers begin to take note of all
possible areas of partnership action in terms of joint revenue generation and cost savings as
well as other, more qualitative, objectives.
The way to get there is by fully exploiting the benefit streams of existing collaborative
activities and by continuously seeking new alliance areas that promise synergies. As a
prerequisite, allied carriers must be willing to share resources and information, they need to
be favourably disposed to tapping into formerly untouched collaborative areas and they must
be prepared to invest in present and future collaborative activities and the tools and
mechanisms that drive them.
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7 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations
7.1 Summarising Aspects Regarding Airline Collaborations
Airlines join forces horizontally in various types and configurations, with differing intensities
to achieve a number of customary, and yet very individual, goals. For quite some time now
there has been an economic need to mitigate the negative effects of the air transport industry's
innate sensitivity to cyclical developments and of its inherent lack of substantial profits.
Before deregulation, this requirement did not appear all that acute since many airlines around
the world operated under a regime of market protectionism and state subsidies. The change of
policy that prompted various countries to liberalise and privatise their air transportation
industry and scale down the regulatory barriers under which scheduled carriers could operate,
started to change the pattern of airline competition. Subsequently, interairline partnerships
were induced and identified as a means through which to redress the industry's inherent
frailties as well as through which to weather the challenges of the new air transport rivalry
structures and the increasingly deregulated environment.
However, to some degree the global airline industry is still regulated, the exception being the
internal/domestic air transportation within integration regions such as the USA and the
European Union. A cardinal argument for many forms and instruments of airline partnerships
is derived from this continued regulation and its circumvention thereof by joining forces
horizontally.
Other motivations for collaboration reside in achieving economic and competitive advantages
as well as in considerations of power, particularly vis-a-vis unaligned competitors and
pertaining to those forces that make up the immediate air transport industry environment.
The air transport industry environment, or the competitive landscape in which scheduled
passenger airlines operate, has changed drastically in recent years:
• Travel value chains have been re-organised, with power shifting away from traditional
incumbent configurations. New technologies in the aviation and non-aviation field, as
well as the increasing complexity of doing business in an enlarging geographic arena
require novel managerial and organisational capabilities from all participants.
• Customers have been empowered, they have access to an increasing number of travel
product offerings through a wide variety of freely selectable distribution channels, while
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•
simultaneously becoming ever more demanding themselves and therefore less capable of
being precisely segmented by the industry.
The hub and spoke model of air transport is being challenged by more time-effective,
point-to-point connections.
Substitutive land-based travel offerings and new communication technologies influence
travel patterns and mandate refined competitive expertise.
• Costpressure in operation and management is ubiquitous and demands the best utilisation
of personnel and physical assets. The necessity to operate with high load factors and to
•
best manage capacity has never been stronger.
• More recently the proliferation of low-cost air transport business models has spurred even
further changes in the air transport landscape. Concurrently, these new entrants have
internalised some of today's fundamental requirements for successful air transport
business.
All aforementioned aspects have called into question the sustainability of incumbent carriers'
current business models using traditional management approaches and infrastructure. At the
same time, the latest developments have given augmented motivational impetus to airline
partnership formation in order to jointly fight these competitive threats.
Competing in the present business environment is only one challenge faced by passenger
carriers, the other is to face future challenges successfully. The developmental path of
passenger air transportation is foreseeable and in many parts of the world already observable.
Mirroring other - formerly regulated - industry sectors, the air transport business is now
globalising, liberalising and consolidating m drastically aggravated competitive
circumstances. Airline partnerships clearly playa major role in the continuing rationalisation
and eventual consolidation of the air transport industry - both from an industry-economic
perspective as well as with regard to capability building within and between individual firms.
Passenger carrier alliances have not only been made possible by occasionally hesitant
deregulation, they also induce further deregulation. Organisationally, airlines are now
becoming more alliance-sophisticated and are building important expertise. Both these
perspectives support the stand that collaborative activities are only an early stage of the
inevitable wave of global airline .concentration that is to come. Consequently, partnership
activities are laying a foundation for future survival in even more competitive, truly
globalised air transport markets. Interairline alliances are thus not only convenient, but also
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necessary vehicles for prepanng and facilitating consolidation, which need to counter
competitive threats while continuing to accommodate regulative pressures.
This strategic importance mandates solid and lasting interfirm linkages. However, the
international airline alliance scene is still far from a stable and sustainable picture. In alliance
groupings, there are still perceptions of winners and losers, stronger and weaker members,
and a continuing evaluation of the threats to and opportunities for individual airlines. Forms
and instruments of interairline partnerships are being developed, refined and sometimes
rejected, suggesting that horizontal passenger carrier linkages are in a trial stage. The remains
of the era of regulatory obstructions as well as occasional undetermined market liberalisation
impede alliances' development. Airline partnerships fall apart, operate frictionally, mirroring
the partners' discontent, or do not produce the desired results. Carriers leave certain groupings
and join others, or multilateral partnerships merge - a very plausible scenario as groupings
expand.
Airline partnerships suffer from increased complexity, which not merely grows with the
number of participants, but also with the scope and the depths of interairline collaboration.
Lack of partnership fitness, often surfacing as a variant of dissimilarities, leads to conflicts
and forms another hurdle to establishing effortless partnership operations. The power of soft
factors in airline linkages is often not sufficiently taken into account, which produces
unwanted and unanticipated diseconomies. Managerially, airlines are under considerable
strain to fulfil the multifaceted tasks of partnership ventures. While airline partnerships are
claimed to be the main competitive issue in today's scheduled air carrier industry, the
challenges to achieve satisfactory partnership stability become ever more demanding.
While instability is one drawback of contemporary interairline partnerships, the other main
challenge is derived from the inability to fully realise all potential benefits from joint
activities. Airlines either lack comprehension of the full set of possible partnership benefits,
or they focus too narrowly on specific areas, disregarding or undervaluing others. Potentially,
there are many more domains in which a partnership can be brought to fruition than is
currently being achieved. One, as yet very broad aspect of joint benefit generation, lies in
much more extensively realising the gains from joint activities with positive cost effects.
Although this aspect has been regularly advanced as a core objective of alliance strategies, it
has been widely neglected in practice.
402 Summary and Recommendations
In the light of airline collaborations' strategic weight on the one hand, and the obstacles and
shortcomings associated with airline partnerships on the other, specific demands arise
regarding member composition, collaborative forms and instruments, administrative concepts
and strategic orientations. Airline partnership management thus becomes a key success
factor, not only on a day-to-day, operative basis, but also as far as airlines' corporate
strategies are concerned.
In many cases, airlines have failed to establish adequate collaborative managerial
configurations to deal with the internal organisational and structural challenges, the demands
arising from governing relations with the external environment and, more generally, from all
of the company's stakeholders. Some airlines do not realise the potential and the future
implications of satisfactory partnership management and many partnership managerial
deficiencies have been identified. Since alliance decisions are often based on pure ad hoc
necessity, carriers have been reluctant to place the burden of procedural and governmental
tasks - so very vital for lasting and successful partnerships - on their management and
organisation. The lack of prescience in managerial practice regarding more intangible issues
of firm linkages such as culture, interfirm trust and interpersonal relationships, is another
deficiency in today's horizontal partnerships. Often mechanisms that provide platforms for
conflict resolution and mediation do not exist. These managerial inadequacies naturally
impact negatively on performance, leaving the partners unable to fully exploit the desired
benefits from the alliance.
A tremendous need has been shown for managerial skills in airline partnerships. Alliance
management is an all-embracing qualification that needs to span the entire life-cycle from the
initial decree for partnership formation until the dissolution of the alliance. Partnership
design, governance structures and managerial tools need to ascertain that the collaboration's
benefits are optimally exploited. Configurational prerequisites must be met in order to
mitigate the risk of failure. Although there is no one-size-fits-all approach to airline
partnership configuration, prescripts need to be used to actualise success. One particular
recommendation is to follow a structured sequence of events on the way to closing a
partnership agreement.
Some salient concepts of partnership arrangement and management structures, aimed at
building airline partnership capabilities within this sequence, have been introduced and
discussed (see chapter 5). The foregoing paragraphs thus focused on partnership benefits as
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the desired results of alliance activities (see in particular 4.3.2 for motivations for airline co-
operations and 6.2 for synergies in airline interrelationships).
A managerial tool - the synergy audit - has been developed, filling a gap in airline partnership
management, which was identified by studying primary and secondary sources of information
(see chapter 6). The synergy audit assists airlines in detecting and enhancing the gains of
their horizontal collaboration, particularly those based on intensity assumptions. The tool has
a dynamic nature in order to accommodate alterations and variety in partnership composition,
as well as the tendency towards more consolidated alliance groupings. The synergy audit is
only one piece of more far-reaching management concepts. Its core concept, however, is to
concentrate on what is so critically required in either loose forms of collaboration or inhighly
consolidated organisations, namely the overall benefits from horizontal interfirm linkages.
7.2 Conclusions, Implications and Outlook
The research objectives outlined in the introductory chapter of the dissertation were achieved.
A synergy auditing model, incorporating a multidimensional supporting tool, was developed
on the basis of empirical findings and extensive studies of secondary sources of information.
Proc-edurally, the model is workable in different airline-organisational settings and for varying
partnership goals. This novel managerial device enriches both airline management practice
and the body of knowledge on interfirm partnership theory.
Assisting this primary objective, the secondary objectives were equally well accomplished by
describing and critically discussing the landscape in which airlines currently operate and
which strongly induces scheduled passenger carriers to adopt collaborative strategies. These
collaborative strategies are built on various highly individual, but also rather standard
motivations which, in practice, emerge as different forms and instruments of airline
collaboration. The foregoing chapters amply elucidated these issues (see in particular chapter
4). As a further secondary objective, important prerequisites and success factors embedded in
a rational sequence of partnership formation events were introduced (see chapter 5). In this
regard secondary objectives were not only necessary to accentuate their issues as such, but
they were also highly relevant for the eventual development of the synergy audit model.
An original contribution to management science was made by introducing a novel managerial
device which is idiosyncratic to the airline industry and based on a thorough evaluation of the
stimuli, the types and key success factors or horizontal carrier interrelationships. The synergy
audit utilises a unique supportive tool, the A.PIE, which operationalises the synergy-
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generating effects of partnership intensity. As such, this dissertation enriches the body of
management knowledge and managerial practise in describing the aspects that lead to the
formation of carrier partnerships, in outlining specific requirements for their success and in
introducing a workable tool to ensure and enhance value creation, from an original
perspective.
The chosen methodology of mainly qualitative, inductive studies of both pnmary and
secondary sources proved to be appropriate for the purpose of this dissertation. It allowed the
building of general partnership management and, more specifically, airline partnership theory.
Besides, the methodology could balance the demands to contribute to the body of knowledge
and the requirements to provide solutions to acute problems in real life airline partnerships.
In a similar vein, the methodology supported the development of a workable tool that
improves the managerial practice of airline alliance.
Measures of research quality could be applied as outlined in the introductory chapter. Content
validity, by means of a direct input of knowledgeable sources and triangulation by means of
cross checking with other resources, were particularly worthy assurance devices. These
quality measures not only allowed valid results to be produced, but furthermore permitted the
researcher to be receptive to occasionally contrary findings. While keeping within the limits
of the selected research methodology, the researcher was thus not restrained from drawing
his own conclusions and analytically and creatively seeking new solutions to the research
phenomenon.
The presented research could, for the first time, outline salient selection, design and
management features of an airline partnership's entire life span. In short, the structure of the
I
dissertation, its methodology and the final synthesis lead to the accomplishment of the
objectives and the development of an acutely needed model.
In line with the achieved objectives, the fundamental implications from scrutinising the
passenger airline industry, airline partnerships, their forms and competitive instruments, and
proposing a managerial model can, in short, be reduced to the following:
• Scheduled passenger airlines need to better understand the strategic importance of
alliance formation and its likely evolution.
• Airlines need to more proficiently exploit the possible benefits from horizontal
collaboration by drawing from a widening partnership scope.
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• Airlines need to invest more resources in setting up adequate partnership management
structures and in tools that assist with the more effective governance of alliances.
Passenger airlines lack comprehension of the strategic implications of their partnership
behaviour and the momentum and perceivable outcome of the alliance frenzy. With the air
transportation business migrating into a globalised economy with changing competitive
groupings, carriers need to identify the current phase of alliance formation as a preparative
stage offurther consolidation and, concurrently, as a means to economic survival.
Consolidation will, to a limited degree, appear within established alliance formations. Carriers
thus need to utilise their present partnership course, their alliance capabilities as well as their
competitive position in an alliance and vis-a-vis other partnerships as a springboard for
further consolidation. Partnership suitability is therefore both an active attribute - being
alliance-sophisticated oneself - and a passive property - being perceived by others to be
alliance-sophisticated and, thus, to be a valuable partner.
From an industry perspective, a more refined re-structuring process of airline partnerships,
also accompanied by rearrangements in the current alliance groupings will appear. A sharper
market segmentation will surface with an advanced alliance-building phase. Multilateral
alliances will incorporate large, senior hub carriers using the services of a range of second tier
feeder carriers. In tum, they will be supported by regional carriers providing feeder point-to-
point services to secondary hubs. Generally, it is expected that globally operating multilateral
alliances will only satisfactorily meet passenger demands for network reach once these
alliances incorporate at least one USA carrier. Outside these multilateral alliance constructs an
increasing number of low-cost airlines will either operate as independent carriers or as
subsidiaries of the large incumbents. Furthermore, budget airlines will exert considerable
competitive pressure on established incumbents and their alliance formations.
The recent widespread belief that incumbent carriers will consolidate quasi naturally and
operate as a group of four to five carriers in a solid oligopoly has to be relinquished. There
will certainly be consolidation, but considerations concerning complexity will induce a
cautious approach with regard to a wave of concentration that would create only afew mega-
carriers. Alternative air transport business models will effectively occupy niches in operating
certain point-to-point connections, offering dedicated service philosophies ranging from no-
frills to top quality, which will rival carrier alliances.
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Critical strategic implications can be derived from these anticipated developments, both
regarding alliance formation and approaches to competition. Partnering airlines' strategies
will need to be more refined to fit into the new competitive structures. Flag carrier strategies,
such as operating from a concept of national pride, and offering services to main centres
around the world via their hubs, will need to be abandoned in favour of more selective
schemes in which the alliance's wellbeing receives the highest priority. Power constellations
and governance authority, particularly in alliances headed by senior hub carriers without
capital linkages, must be given detailed attention. Second tier allied carriers and regional
carriers will need to shape their appearance and product offerings to best fill the niche they
occupy and the position they hold in the alliance. In most cases, this coincides with giving up
costly and complex individual features (FFPs, lounges, IT systems, and others) and economic
self-determination in areas such as route development, pricing, and branding in order to
accommodate the needs and standards of the overarching partnership.
For all carriers, partnership formation can thus either represent a threat or an opportunity and
therefore is, almost always, associated with a number of concerns. Alliances may not benefit
each of the members. Second tier carriers may be particularly vulnerable in dominant hub
strategies where, as smaller partners, they serve as mere regional feeder carriers. Smaller,
formerly sovereign and unconstrained flag carriers might have to content themselves with
second rank positions in larger alliance formations. These concerns need to be addressed to
the benefit of the entire alliance grouping.
Organisational strategies will need to be supplemented by corporate strategies entailing
increased focus on capital markets. Alliances, their status and development are already
touchstones in assessing the I financing and capitalisation of carriers, since they must
increasingly respond to both the capital requirements of airlines and financing through
markets.
There is no doubt that interairline partnerships are built upon efforts to increase revenues,
save costs, and circumvent regulative constraints. Practitioners and scholars usually consider
the entire economic spectrum of collaborative benefits as a motivation for interairline
collaboration. However, evidence suggests that carriers either do not comprehend the full
spectrum of benefits likely to be achieved, or that airlines concentrate restrictively on selected
collaborative benefit areas.
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Carrier partnerships are classically constituted on a notion of joint revenue generation. Joint
marketing activities, market access and sales considerations are unquestionably worthwhile
motivations and for many collaborative agreements represent the core raison d'etre for joining
forces. They are, however, only one side of the collaborative spectrum airlines can possibly
exploit. Alliance bias will have to move away from a distinct focus on revenue enhancement
to cost reduction if continuing benefits are to be derived. Indeed, cost considerations played
an increasingly important role in single carriers' business models, even before the severe
industry crisis of 2001. However, they seem to be paid only lip service when it comes to
operating interairline partnerships. Although airlines do feel cost pressure, joint cost reduction
ambitions are mostly limited to non-strategic purchasing items. This despite the fact that the
market for airline-related services and products is experiencing a competitive struggle as
intense as that which airlines themselves are experiencing. Jointly containing and reducing
unit costs is still in a very premature stage. If in the light of the increased competitive pressure
by budget carriers airlines move away from competing carrier vs. carrier to competing
alliance vs. alliance, then the focus on collaborative unit cost reductions will have to sharpen.
Clear and coherent partnership strategies will require more attention, and the arena of
collaborative synergy generation will need to increase in scope. Simultaneously, the demands
on partnership management will mount. The organisation of management structures, their
functionality and the ability to advance with the partnership are currently important subjects.
Managerial capacities need to be equipped with practicability that allows for the adequate
selection, design, governance and development of the partnership. Management needs to be
armed with ample tools to managerially accompany, assess and govern the entire partnership
life-cycle. Issues such as complexity management, decision- and strategy-making processes in
multi-member partnerships, conflict resolution and benefit identification, quantification and
allocation, as well as the softer issues of alliances need to be addressed by partnership
management. Airline alliance management must additionally pay attention to the
developmental path of both the overall evolution of airline collaboration towards more
consolidation, and the widening scope of synergy generation. It will consequently have to
move to more unified structures affecting the configuration and tasks of internal and external
or multilateral management bodies.
Currently there seem to be no supporting tools and methodologies that allow for the proposal
and execution of more targeted partnership management practices. At first this deficiency
seems surprising, particularly in view of the competitive advantages associated with
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interairline partnership strategies. However, it illustrates both the failure of airlines to
internalise the significance of adequate partnership management and the lack of commitment
to alliances. The reasons for this can be diverse and range from trust considerations, and
appropriation concerns to the somewhat recent loss of confidence in partnering airlines'
financial performances.
One recommendation to future horizontal airline partnerships is to abolish these internal
hurdles that impede the development of adequate and acutely required alliance management
tools. The evolution of the global industry is broadly foreseeable and will obligate managerial
routines that embody best practices which enhance interrelationships' synergy generation and
that address the identified overall frailties of interairline partnerships. In future, partnering
airlines will consequently have to employ more structured and elaborate governance devices
that sustain operational and strategic leadership. Such tools and their utilisation need to be
based on a sound understanding of the dimensions of key success factors of horizontal
partnerships, the partnership's core competencies, and the knowledge of how and where to
most optimally unleash interfirm synergies. One multidimensional tool that could aid
partnering airlines to achieve best alliance results was developed and discussed in this
dissertation. Tools of this type can assist airline alliances to stay competitive in the current air
transport business landscape and will strengthen their position on the way to further
consolidation.
7.3 Recommendations and Further Research Challenges
Researching strategic airline alliances unveils a multitude of questions, of which a limited
selection was dealt with. Hence, from a conceptual and methodological perspective, further
research avenues can and should be examined.
The immediate importance of contemporary research for practical use and the significance of
examining future research questions make it difficult for management researchers to use a
single theoretical framework. Increasingly, researchers need to integrate multiple theoretical
and multidisciplinary frameworks to explain complex international strategic issues to satisfy
both current and future research requirements. The following focuses on some significant
research demands.
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Primary Recommendations
Primary recommendations are concerned with further research issues that are directly related
to the achievement of the dissertation's primary objective. In short, these are:
• Application of the synergy audit model in actual cases
Applicability and advancement of the synergy audit model III other industries and
partnership contexts
Quantification of gains from airline partnerships
•
•
Focused on the specific outcome of the dissertation, further research and managerial practice
should comprehensively apply the synergy audit tool in actual interairline partnership cases.
In practice its application assists in unearthing synergy potential and effects not yet realised.
As far as the concept and the model's structural content are concerned, applying the model in
various different partnership settings leads to the advancement of the model and its
components, e.g., A.PIE. Utilising the synergy audit to build theory as in, for instance,
longitudinal studies, can yield further domains of knowledge of the field of partnership and
interfirm synergy management and, more specifically, of alliance organisational science and
strategy process research.
It was stated earlier that the synergy audit model is customised and idiosyncratic to the airline
industry. As such, it has limited applicability (see 6.8 above for the limitations of the model).
However, its causality and its principal structure should allow a generic usage in other
industries and in differently oriented partnerships as well (e.g. vertical and diagonal alliances,
see 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). The underlying objective of striving for partnership synergies is not
exclusive to horizontal linkages in the airline industry. Also the key assumption that synergies
grow with partnership intensity is a correlation that, at first glance, should likewise be valid in
other industry sectors and for different types of collaborations, such as buyer-supplier
relationships. The need to utilise such a tool is imperative. Other industries also face problems
in their various alliance operations that are similar to the ones discussed, and thus there too
the need for effective capabilities in partnership management is crucial. One line of inquiry
could build on the synergy audit's basic structure and apply the concept to other indu tries
and in another collaborative context, while simultaneously developing it.
Additional research needs to be conducted on the terrain of quantitative gains of airline
partnerships. Cost-effectiveness has been claimed to develop into a more augmented focus in
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airline alliance action. On the other hand, synergies are often only tangible once quantifiable.
Politically, and to satisfy the needs of all stakeholders, quantifiable results should therefore be
produced. The constant control of airline partnerships' productivity needs to be supported by
mechanisms both actually evaluating profitability, but also a priori determining the financial
gains from prospective partnership action. Alliance performance metrics must assist
managerial tasks by providing comprehensive information. In this context, a stream of studies
could focus on value-based management topics within interairline partnership synergy
generation. Strongly related to this complex are research efforts occupied with investment
synergies in financing and capitalisation of entire airline partnerships.
Secondary Recommendations
Secondary recommendations are concerned with other salient issues in the field of airline
partnership operation and management which need further scrutiny, because there is either a
deficiency in current research and/or an acute need for practical expertise. These, in short,
need to provide deeper insights into:
•
The dynamic competitive resources of alliance management and operation
The validity of the institutional context of current airline alliance theory
The sustainability of competitive advantages in alliances
Partner selection strategy and metrics
Partnership knowledge management strategies and tools
Information technologies in interairline relationships
Development of the production depths and widths of single earners and horizontal
alliance formations
• Opportunities for and threats to classic airline alliance transportation by new competitive
forces
•
•
•
•
•
•
The fluidity of many intercompany partnership issues requires strategy researchers to keep
developing the extant body of knowledge. Airlines are exposed to new competitive landscapes,
constituted by decreasing state control, increasing globalisation, rapid technological changes,
re-structured value chains and the emergence of new business models. As airlines compete in
global markets, dynamic competitive resources develop into crucial assets and carriers'
competitive positions become more complex and vigorous. This evolution will continue to
pose different, changing questions for airline alliance researchers, who will be increasingly
challenged to respond to frequent, discontinuous changes and provide answers to new
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competitive and collaborative problems. On the other hand, a number of contemporary airline
partnership topics have not been scrutinised to a satisfactory extent. Both the current status of
airline alliances and their future development need thorough and, most importantly, ongoing
examination, particularly in the fields of competitive and collaborative strategy. In fact, the
results of continuous airline strategic partnership management research will become
increasingly important for current executives and in educating future business leaders,
especially in the light of the developments lying ahead.
Generally related to the issue of economic globalisation is the importance of the institutional
context of international research. There is no theoretical work nor empirical finding
suggesting that the existing body of partnership management knowledge, largely obtained in
the context of the USA and Europe, is equally applicable in other countries. As airlines
globalise, there may be applicability of international theories. However, many airlines operate
in confined national or regional boundaries, which applies especially to emerging air transport
markets such as Asia. In a similar fashion, airline strategies, organisational structures and
governance mechanisms, successfully pursued and implemented in a particular institutional
context, may not achieve the same outcomes in another institutional context. The universality
of specific competitive advantages will increasingly be called into question. More research
that acknowledges the institutional differences among geographic or cultural environments is
certainly required.
While many theoretical perspectives have significantly advanced the understanding of the
sources of airlines' competitive advantages and prerequisites for gainful firm performance,
the sustainability of these competitive advantages has become an increasingly important
question. This is because the new competitive environment forces firms to continue to
evaluate the sustainability of their positions. The questions to answer will be whether airline
partnership strategies could be worthwhile contemporary competitive tools and, more
strategically, whether they could be preparative vehicles for future consolidation. In this
regard, a few issues on gaining competitive advantages have already been scrutinised. Other,
new fields of collaborative benefits now need to be addressed in order to clarify competitive
threats. Among a host of important issues are subjects which presently appear to be critical,
such as partner selection, joint knowledge management strategies, alliance IT topics, supplier
and/or purchaser relationships and the effects of industry structure and new competitive
forces. The basic question to answer will be what constitutes a true competitive or
comparative advantage for interairline partnerships.
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Among those competitive/comparative advantages, partner selection certainly plays a key
role. Collaborative strategies, especially multilateral network strategies on an international
scale, continue to shape the trajectory, nature and pattern of air transport business
competition. In the near future and in view of intensifying relationships, airline strategic
management researchers will have to pay attention to challenging issues such as the partner
selection for an international airline alliance in the context of allies' competencies and their
particular culture. Whereas it is foreseeable that airline partnerships will migrate to more
concrete and strategic agreements, potentially leading towards consolidation, selection
processes need to be more refined, less operative in orientation and need to examine alliance
proposals on their specific merits.
Knowledge management and organisational learning in strategic airline partnerships have
thus far been treated rather cautiously. Organisations are moving away from command and
control hierarchies, and towards empowered networks and teams. Technologies to help people
communicate are becoming ever more usable and widespread. The need to exchange data,
particularly in information-rich industries where companies are interlinked, has become an
important part of strategy. Knowledge management is where all these developments meet.
Knowledge management is a term used to describe a raft of approaches, behaviours and tools,
which help companies to compete effectively in the information age. Knowledge is the key to
all airlines' success - for innovation, creativity, flexibility, speed to market, meeting customer
needs and working effectively in a global business. Knowledge management is needed to
exploit existing knowledge effectively to, for example, learn from past collaborative
experience, or access the right expert quickly, and to tap into internal, external and
specifically partners' knowledge sources. It is also needed to create new knowledge that
enables the organisation to compete more effectively by, for example, discovering new
passenger needs and devising services and products to meet them. While many of these issues
are of key importance to airlines, knowledge strategies, and sharing expertise outside the
confined borders of an individual carrier are the exception rather than the rule. In the light of
the further consolidation of passenger airlines, research should focus on this topic and support
practitioners with empirical evidence and best practices.
Another important issue that needs to be scientifically clarified to contribute to both theory
building and practical application, is information technology in airline alliances. From a
marketing and passenger service perspective, joint set-up and operation of distribution
systems, CRM and passenger handling are major challenges. From an IT viewpoint, the
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overall aim must be to treat all alliance customers as if they were customers of the operating
carrier, and to extract the most critical passenger information for further joint usage. In a
similar vein, IT strategies, and cost savings must be further pursued in interairline
partnerships. While these demands seem trivial, the hurdles to achieve an integration of
applications are significant. Stagnating IT budgets, little conviction of the urgency of such
applications, a shift in priorities and anticipated complexities account for slow adaptation
processes. Airlines, particularly, have traditional linkages to GDS providers and rely on
individually designed legacy systems that increase the unwillingness to migrate to more
collaborative IT strategies. Research should focus on these topics in order to evaluate,
strategize and design future collaborative IT schemes.
The structure of the industry will change along with the trend to more consolidation, as
indicated by the outlook above (see 7.2). New competitive groups will be formed, which will
particularly impact on the supplier and airline consumers or purchasers' relationships.
Many other industries already witness extensive outsourcing of competencies that were
formerly an integral part of the production and innovation process. The airline industry will
be no exception. According to their size and market niche coverage, different carrier tiers will
provide front-end transport services. In an operational context, functions will be outsourced
and new purchasing and equipment operation concepts will be implemented. This concept of
big airlines being mere marketing and branding bodies supplemented by a host of differently
tiered suppliers has been discussed for some time. With the new competitive scene creating
new competitive groups, but also with the availability of new technologies, outsourcing
strategies and supplier/purchaser relationships should be further examined and evaluated in
the context of interairline alliances.
A final recommendation for further research is to scrutinise particular players in the new
competitive landscape. New competitive forces have emerged with modern or recently
advanced transport modes, such as high-speed rail transport or low-cost airline operators.
These time- and cost-effective means of transport pose a significant threat to airline
partnerships. Airline partnerships propagate network reach as one of their main competitive
advantages to attract and to retain customers. Future research needs to investigate to which
extent passengers favour reach and other alliance benefits, such as FFP, above air fare. It is a
justifiable question whether low-cost business models could in highly populated geographies
at any rate, turn airline partnership advantages obsolete. It would be as interesting to clarify
how very fast rail transport will impact on the development of short-haul point-to-point and
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feeder services. In a more positive context, both presumed threats can equally develop into
opportunities for airline partnerships which is equally worthwhile scrutinising in coming
research.
The mentioned research recommendations could possibly help to shed more light on to both
academic and practical topics of airline alliances. In essence, they will assist in applying and
complementing this dissertation's findings adequately in order for airline governance to base
alliance decisions and partnership operation on a solid set of expertise and a structured
managerial toolbox. The combination of new findings - in particular in the field of recently
emerged competitive forces surrounding airline partnerships - and the presented research
results, will additionally enrich the understanding of how airline alliances will operate in the
future and how they will manage to weather the challenges ahead.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Questionnaire
QuestionnairelInterview Guideline
Name of Airline
Questionnaire No.
Name of Interviewee
Date/Place of Interview
Time started
Questions Regarding Interviewee
Information Regarding the Sample Airline
2 What is your fleet size? {including leased aircraftJ
3 Please give the total number of employees?
4 How many destinations does your airline
serve?{for the domestic SA market and
international routes Originating in SAJ -
5 What are your airline's key markets and routes?
{for the domestic SA market and
international routes originating in SAJ
6 Other comments
Information Regarding Horizontal Partnerships
Details for Horizontal Partnerships
{use columns for different partnerships, max 4J
7 Which airlines are you having partnerships with
and of what nature are these alliances? {only
those which are relevant for the SA market,
technical and commercia/]
8 For how long have these partnerships been in
place?
9 Which destinations are affected by these o national/reg. o nationaUreg. o nationaUreg. o nationaUreg.
partnerships? Please specify. o international o international o intemational o intemational
o global o global o global o global
10 Has your airline got any kind of capital DYes DYes DYes DYes
investment in the partnering company? What ONo o No ONo o No
type and level of investment?
11 Other comments
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Pre-Partnership Planning Issues
12 What did you expect from a business
partnership?
13 How important was the size of the business of 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
the possible partner? [explain scaling]
1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 9 . 10
not important. ................... very important
14 How important is it, that partners had previous 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
business links with your airline before
1 .2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10entering an alliance? Why?
15 How important is the business culture of a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
prospective partner for the choice of that
1 .2.3.4 . 5.6.7 . 8 . 9.10partner and the alliance?
[use columns for 2 most important partnerships]
16 For the following questions please choose the 2
most important partners from your partner
portfolio. Why did you choose them and not
the other ones?
17 Which political, economical or other
circumstances have supported the formation
of the partnership?
18 What were the first steps taken to get into the
partnership?
19 Who initiated the process of partnership
formation?
20 Did your airline form a special task group to DYes DYes .
deal with the possible partnership? Why? o No o No
21 Would you say that your airline was
inexperienced in the market you intended to
enter or extend through your partnership?
22 How long did it take from the first contact until
the alliance went live?
23 Other comments
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Motivations to Choose a Partner and to Enter a Partnership
Operational and Business-related Motivations
The following deals with motivations to choose a partner and to enter a partnership.
If you have more than two partnerships, please select the two most important ones,
for which the questions will be asked.
24 Please state the name of the partner
25 What were the motivations to enter the partnership initially? {open end question,
max 3 min.]
26 In the following, a choice of possible motivations to enter the partnership will be 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
provided. Please tell how important these motivations were for you. {explain
1 .2. 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 .9. 10scaling]
not important.. .................. very important
· Overcome limited knowledge of the market you have entered 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10
· Overcome limited knowledge of the local business culture in the market 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2 . 3 .4. 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 .9. 10
· Overcome limited knowledge of marketing channels 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Overcome limited knowledge of consumer preferences 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6 7.8.9.10
· Risk reduction for new route development 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6 . 7 . 8 . 9 10
· Facilitating initial international expansion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10
· Facilitating initial national or regional expansion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Slot sharing opportunities at congested airports 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Access to new markets by tapping a partner's unutilised route rights or unused 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
slots
1 .2. 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 1 0
· Shared costs and economies of scale through the pooling of resources across
the following operational areas or cost centres such as
· (...) sales 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· (...) marketing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 . 2 . 3 4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· ( ...) check-in and ground handling facilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 . 2 . 3 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 8 9 . 10
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· (...) joint usage of aircraft 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 · 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 6.7.8.9.10
· (...) purchasing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-1 · 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10
· (...) joint negotiation of insurance rates 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 · 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 6 .7.8.9.10
· How important was the motivation to jointly promote your alliance's services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0initially?
1 .2.3 .4.5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 .10
· Joint pricing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 .10
· Schedule integration 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Joint maintenance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1
I
.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Technology exchange 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 . 3 .4. 5 6.7.8.9.10
· Traffic feed and de-feed into established gateways 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2 . 3.4.5.6 . 7.8 . 9 . 10
· Defence of current markets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Management of seat capacity of shared operations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Advancing organisational knowledge 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2 . 3.4.5.6.7.8 .9.10
· Increased market status and passenger awareness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Overcome government-mandated trade or in-vestmentbarriers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2 . 3 .4.5.6.7 . 8 . 9 .10
· Computer Reservation System benefits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 . 2 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10
Being part of a broader, e.g. global, alliance network 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 . 3.4 . 5.6 . 7.8 . 9.10
· Circumvent limitations by bilateral agreements 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2 . 3 .4.5.6.7.8 .9.10
27 Did any further motivations come up while being involved in the partnership? DYes
Please name them. o No
28 Other comments
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Passenger-related Motivations
29 Please name the most important passenger related advantages to form an
alliance. [open end, max. 3 min.]
30 In the following, a choice of possible motivations to enter the alliance to improve 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
passenger benefits will be provided. Please tell how important these
1 · 2 . 3 .4. 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 10motivations were for you. [explain scaling]
not important. ................... very important
· Shorten travel time 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Reciprocal Frequent Flyer Programme participation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 · 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 .9. 10
· Ticketing advantages 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 · 2 . 3 . 4 5.6.7.8.9.10
· Baggage handling advantages 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2. 3 . 4 . 5 .6. 7 . 8 . 9 10
· Liability advantages [the carrier issuing the travel document is responsible vis-a- D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0vis the passenger for the entire journey)
1 · 2 . 3 .4. 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10
· Offering extended route networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
31 Other comments
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Organisation of the Partnership
32 Did you check your partner for business compatibility? Which set of criteria did DYes
you use? [strategic fit, cultural fit] o No
33 Was your partnership contract or agreement subject to a time limit? Why? DYes
o No
34 Are there any details on termination procedures in the partnership contract or DYes
agreement? What do they specify? o No
35 Is it important that number of partners in an alliance is limited? If Yes, why? DYes
o No
36 In the following, a choice of possible reasons to limit the number of partners in an 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
alliance will be provided. Please tell how important these reasons are for you.
1 2 . 3 .4. 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10[explain scaling]
not important... ................. very important
· Organisational constraints 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Difficulties in managing the complexity of the partnership 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Limited availability of partners 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Competition among alliances or networks respectively 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Loss of control over company destiny 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2 . 3.4.5.6.7.8 . 9.10
· Difficulties in rationalising operations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2 . 3.4.5.6.7 . 8.9.10
· Limited positive effects through number of partners 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 . 2 . 3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
I
37 Did your company organisation change because of your business partnership? DYes
How? o No
38 Other comments
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Governance Structure of the Partnership
39 Has your airline got an alliance management department? o Yes [go to 40]
o No [go to 43/
40 [If Yes above] Is your alliance management department centralised or o Centralised
decentralised and how is it structured? o Decentralised
41 On which hierarchy level is the head of alliance management situated and who
does helshe report to?
42 By which criteria do you choose alliance management staff?
43 [if No above] Who is dealing with alliance issues?
44 Are any mechanisms in place to adjust alliance goals of the partnership to the
changing environment?
45 How does your airline ensure that its resources and intellectual capital (technical,
know-how, human) are protected and remain its property?
46 How has your airline learnt from its partner?
47 Has newly learnt knowledge ever been applied? How? DYes
ONo
48 Do you see any managerial imbalances between the partners of your alliance? DYes -
Please describe. o No
49 Which of the partners is controlling the alliance? Please state the name of the
partner out of the above-mentioned partnerships.
50 Do you run any special training programmes with your staff to ensure their DYes
support for alliance issues? Please specify. o No
51 How do you promote the alliance in your company? [magazines, staff letters or
meetings, etc.]
52 Other comments
.
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Information Regarding the Alliance Performance
Business Accomplishments
The following deals with alliance performance issues. If you have more than two
partnerships, please select the two most important ones, for which the questions will
be asked.
53 Please state the name of the partner.
54 Did the alliance performance D a.
a. meet, Db.
b. exceed, or Dc.
c. disappoint your expectations?
55 Can you determine the financial benefits achieved by the alliance? How? DYes
DNo
56 Did you experience any increase in costs through your alliance? [friction costs, DYes
transaction costs, control costs] Please describe. DNo
57 Do you use any controlling system to track the success of the alliance [financial, D Yes [go to 59]
statistical, strategy]? What are its components? D No
58 If No, what prevents you from tracking the benefits?
59 Do you use any mechanism to control service and safety standards of your partner? DYes
Please specify. DNo
60 Please name the key success factors for your alliance.
61 Where do you see your key resources and strengths that you brought to the
partnership?
62 Where do you see your weaknesses?
63 How important is the success of the alliance for the success of your company? D D D D D D D D D D
[explain scaling]
1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
I
not imoortant... ................. verv imoortant
64 How did the alliance change over time?
65 Other comments
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Partnership Conflicts and Synergies
The following deals with partnership conflicts and synergies. If you have more than two
partnerships, please select the most significant one, for which the questions will be
asked.
66 Please state the name of the partner.
67 Which problems have been experienced initially in your alliance? {open end, max. 3
min.]
68 In the following, a choice of possible problems you could have experienced in your 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
alliance initially will be provided. Please tell how serious these problems were for
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10you. {explain scaling]
not serious ........................... very serious
· Difficulties to find an appropriate partner 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 .7. 8 9 . 10
· Problems to initially make contact with partner 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Negotiation problems 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2 . 3 .4. 5 .6. 7 . 8 . 9 . 10
· Cultural problems amongst partners 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 .9.10
· Managerial problems 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7 . 8.9.10
69 Which problems have been experienced over time? {open end, max. 3 min.]
70 In the following, a choice of possible problems you could have experienced in your 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
alliance over time will be provided. Please tell how serious these problems were
1 · 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10for you. {explain scaling]
not serious ........................... very serious
· Contrasting corporate cultures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 .10
· Negotiation problems 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 · 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 1 0
· Time horizons not being met 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7 8 . 9 . 10
· Organisational and managerial problems 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Expectations not being met 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2 .3. 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 .9. 10
· Unbalanced standards of service 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Schedule integration conflicts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 · 2 3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Management style difficulties 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 · 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 6 . 7 8 . 9 . 10
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· Problems with sharing of financial benefits D D D D D D D D D D
1 2 . 3 . 4 5 . 6 .7.8.9.10
· Problems with governmental regulation D D D D D D D D D D
1.2.3 .4.5.6.7 . 8 .9.10
· Incompatibility of IT systems D D D D D D D D D D
1 .2. 3 .4. 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10
· Difficulties with marketing strategies D D D D D D D D D D
1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Problems with business processes D D D D D D D D D D
1 . 2 . 3 .4. 5 . 6 .7.8.9.10
· Human resources conflicts D D D D D D D D D D
1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10
· Over-dependence on the alliance D D D D D D D D D D
1 .2 . 3 .4.5 . 6 . 7 . 8 .9. 10
· Decision-making speed D D D D D D D D D D
1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Increase in costs D D D D D D D D D D
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
· Difficulties with sales teams [little acceptance of shared product] 0 D D 0 D D 0 D D D
1 .2.3 .4.5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 .10
· Passenger complaints D D D D D D D D D D
1 .2.3 .4.5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10
71 Which kind of passenger complaints did you receive?
72 Did you ever receive passenger complaints concerning the following? D Check-in procedures
D Baggage handling procedures
D Frequent-Flyer-Programme issues
D Passenger deception [flying with different
carrier than booked; codeshare]
73 Do you see a threat to the partnership by passenger complaints? Why? DYes
D No
74 Which further problems in your partnership would come to your mind?
75 Which managerial approaches were used to tackle the problems?
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76 Please name the 3 most important benefits [synergies} you see in your alliance. 1.
2.
3.
77 Did any unexpected benefits [synergies} evolve?
78 What would be the reason for you to break up the alliance?
79 What would you fear to loose in the case of a break-up? [intellectual capital, human
resources}
80 How do you rate the threat by other alliances/networks? [explain scaling} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
low ............................................. very high
81 Where do you see the competitive advantage of your alliance?
82 The following gives you two different options of general areas, where competitive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
advantage is generated by the alliance. Please rate them. [explain scaling}
1 .2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10
not important... ................. very important
. Advantages for the alliance as a whole [inter-alliances} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2. 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10
. Advantages of single members in the network [intra-alliances} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10
83 Other comments
ITime end
Remarks:
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Appendix B: A.PIE - Intensity Continuum
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